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Abstract 
This work attempts to determine what kinds of institutions—if any—the state should implement 
to protect private property, and investigates how individuals and communities operating within 
those institutions ought to behave. Because the laws produced by such institutions may conflict 
with community rights, social welfare, and justice, the political authorities—including judges and 
legislators—who operate the institutions must determine whether, and under what conditions, 
individual property rights ought to prevail over conflicting rights. I argue that considerations of 
privacy are necessary for making these determinations. Privacy—the condition that requires 
limitations upon the ability of others to access one’s physical spaces—has normative significance 
for moral behavior as well as for constitutional law and politics. Privacy’s value is promoted 
through private property rights, which are themselves shaped by the normative aspects of privacy. 
Because private property is valuable due to its intricate relationship to the promotion of privacy, 
states and communities ought to be able to infringe upon private property only to the extent they 
may infringe upon other privacy-oriented rights and interests. This infringement is encapsulated 
in the political act of eminent domain (or expropriation), which permits states to take private 
property for public use. Moral theory clarifies the role of law as political authorities use eminent 
domain to negotiate between private and community interests. In this work, I describe several 
such theories and then provide a contemporary property theory that claims the theory as an 
ancestor. I then ask the following questions: does this property theory facilitate eminent 
domain—the transfer of property from private to public—or does it make eminent domain more 
difficult by protecting private property against expropriation? I argue for a private property right 
that enjoys the same constitutional protection, known as strict scrutiny, as the privacy right, and 
conclude that the privacy aspects of property are best protected by a takings jurisprudence that 
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restructures the definition of takings based upon a reappraisal of the role of just compensation, a 
more narrow conception of public use, and a better understanding of how privacy interests can be 
objectified in physical spaces.  
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Introduction 
In the introduction to his classic exploration of houses, homes, and other spaces, Gaston 
Bachelard informs us that he is engaging in an examination of topophilia—the love or strong 
sense of place. The investigations in The Poetics of Space, Bachelard explains, “seek to determine 
the human value of the sorts of space that may be grasped, that may be defended against adverse 
forces, the space we love.”1 The work that follows shares Bachelard’s fascination with the 
phenomenological experience of space in the form of property—specifically, the kind of property 
that can embody privacy or private interests.  This includes property considered as a physical 
space, such as land, as well as the things that inhabit those spaces, such as Bachelard’s “houses of 
things: drawers, chests, and wardrobes.”2  
 As a work of moral and political philosophy, these investigations into the nature and law 
of private property are framed by two general questions.  First, what kinds of institutions should 
the state implement to protect private property, and second, how should we expect persons 
operating within those institutions to behave?3 In terms of the first question, a property law—
informed and supported by a property theory — that protects private property may conflict with 
community rights, social welfare, and justice. The property institutions must determine whether, 
and under what conditions, the private property right can override these community interests. The 
second question focuses on the moral rights and obligations held by not only by property owners 
but also by nonowners and, perhaps most importantly, by the political authorities tasked with the 
protection, regulation, and potential infringement of the private property right. In seeking the 
answers to these questions, I am interested in how privacy—the condition which requires 
limitation upon the ability of others to access one’s physical spaces—has normative significance 
for moral behavior and, eventually, for constitutional law and politics. I am primarily interested in 
	   2 
how property rights are shaped by the normative aspects of privacy. I aim to show that privacy is 
valuable and how its value is promoted through private property. I also aim to show if and when 
competing interests, such as those of the welfare of the community, override the privacy that is 
created through spaces, places, and locations. If private property is valuable because of its 
intricate relationship to the promotion of privacy, then states and communities ought to be able to 
infringe private property to the same extent it may infringe other privacy-oriented rights and 
interests, which is when the value of private property to the individual or group of individuals is 
outweighed by its value to the community. This infringement is encapsulated in the political act 
of eminent domain which, I will argue, should be a rare occurrence. To that end, I argue for 
strong private property rights.  
A variety of moral theories can illuminate the role of law as it negotiates between private 
and community interests in the same piece of property. In chapters 2 through 5, I describe a 
‘classic’ normative theory and provide a detailed expository account of the theory with an eye 
towards its application to the kind of private property theory I develop in chapter 1. I then provide 
a contemporary property theory that claims the classic theory as an ancestor, and ask the 
following questions: does this property theory facilitate eminent domain—the transfers of 
property from private to public—or does it make eminent domain more difficult by protecting 
private property against expropriation? I intend to find the derivation that best protects privacy by 
best inhibiting regulation and expropriation, and then embody it in law within the framework of 
constitutional property theory.  These chapters each examine how crucial court decisions—
primarily from the United States Supreme Court—reflect the target normative theories about 
property rights in an effort to determine whether any one theory justifies a revaluation of takings 
jurisprudence in regards to stronger privacy and property rights. In the final chapter, I will argue 
for a private property right that enjoys the same constitutional protection, known as strict 
scrutiny, as the privacy right.    
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In chapter 1, I argue that instead of situating the right of self-ownership as the foundation 
of private property ownership, and instead of the proprietarian theory of rights —which claims 
that privacy and all other rights are reducible to the property right—I argue that the right to 
privacy is the foundation of private property ownership. The justifications for both the privacy 
and property right consist primarily of the right to exclude and the corresponding duty not to 
interfere: if a person has no right to exclude others from their body, they have no privacy or right 
to it, and if a person has no right to exclude others from their property, then they have no property 
rights in that thing. The constitutional treatment of privacy in American jurisprudence is 
introduced and, because privacy is not universally understood as a valuable good, this chapter 
answers objections from feminist writers, many of whom claim that privacy promotes unjust 
patriarchy, as well as reductionists, who claim that privacy has no independent good or value of 
its own.  
Chapter 2 begins by explaining the legal procedure of eminent domain as it has 
developed in American property and constitutional jurisprudence. The chapter then sets the 
format for the next three chapters by developing a ‘classic’ moral theory—here, Aristotelian 
virtue theory—into its modern derivation as the social obligation norm which its proponents posit 
as the foundation for a new property regime. The norm attempts to justify strong community 
rights against weakened individual rights and focuses exclusively on the duties of owners.  The 
chapter defines the norm and how it is purported to be located in the jurisprudence by examining 
its potential impact on takings law, privacy rights, and other constitutional property norms. The 
norm fails for a variety of reasons. Contrary to the proponents of the norm, I argue that 
Aristotelian property theory prioritizes the moral obligations of nonowners, and that virtue ethics, 
while providing a foundation for some aspects of a morality of property, cannot form the basis of 
the kind of property law its proponents claim for it.  
In chapter 3, Hegel’s property theory—the personhood theory—is brought into 
contemporary jurisprudence through the work of property theorist Margaret Jane Radin. Radin 
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claims a kinship with Hegel’s complex property theory by arguing that personhood is developed 
primarily through the possession and ownership of personal property, the most important kind 
being the home and other personal yet nonfungible things.  Hegel’s property theory is the most 
intensively explored theory in this work, primarily because of its richness in terms of its ability to 
recognize the importance of property for human development—an importance which, I argue, has 
consanguinity with privacy rights. Although Hegel provides a strong property right, he develops 
an even stronger state right against private ownership that frustrates the kind of private property 
rights I defend. Despite touching upon some key aspects of Hegelian property and constructing a 
persuasive argument for the protection of homes against the use of eminent domain, Radin is 
primarily interested in developing a theory of noncommodification that ignores many of the 
crucial premises of Hegel’s theory.  
Chapter 4 is dedicated to the classic theory of Lockean property rights and their origin in 
self-ownership. Locke’s property ideas are found in contemporary philosophy as the bases of both 
right and left libertarianism. Under scrutiny, Locke’s property theory falls short of justifying the 
kind of strong individual property rights lauded by right libertarians: this is due to the failure of 
self ownership to provide a foundation for world ownership and also due to persuasive arguments 
that Locke’s property theory supports strong communitarian limitations on the individual 
property right.  Left libertarian property theories are inspired by this reading of Locke’s work, 
and the idea of both unowned and communally owned natural resources is developed in this 
chapter. Specifically, left libertarianism argues that these resources are either unownable or 
ownable but only with very strict universal consent requirements. My privacy theory of property 
is put to the test by the general thrust of left libertarianism in regards to subsurface property and 
its potential for embodying an owner’s privacy; to that end, the privacy theory is unable to justify 
strong rights in remote subsurface areas. Interestingly, American property jurisprudence 
coincidentally fails to recognize strong subsurface rights that are predicated solely on the rights of 
the surface property owner. In these subsurface areas, courts might—to the satisfaction of some 
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left libertarians—create a new commons where one had not existed before by using contemporary 
property law. That being said, right libertarianism’s strong property right best protects the kind of 
interests I argue for here, but, because I reject self ownership as the basis of world ownership, I 
attempt to draw out the privacy justifications nestled in this derivation. I conclude that the privacy 
aspects of property are best protected by a takings jurisprudence that restructures the definition of 
takings based upon a reappraisal of the role of just compensation. 
Chapter 5 examines how efficiency considerations affect property rights. Like the 
preceding chapters, I show how a normative theory (utilitarianism) has shaped contemporary 
legal theory (the economic theory of law) as it relates to private property rights. There is a 
conflict between welfare economics and wealth maximization as the primary vehicles for the 
realization of efficiency. Although the economic theory of law broadly supports free markets, it is 
committed to the requirement that property rights be evaluated in terms of efficiency, and 
efficiency will frequently demand non-market solutions such as eminent domain. In particular, 
this chapter weighs the prospects for justifying a broad takings power for private individuals over 
corporate means of production on efficiency grounds. In the final section, prospects for the 
noncommodification of certain properties is reprised from Chapter 3 in more detail, the idea of 
the semiotics of markets is introduced, and a specific kind of property—cultural property—is 
tested against the semiotic objection. I conclude that efficiency considerations poorly protect 
private properties unless they promote efficiency, and because this condition disregards the 
property’s potential to have privacy components, efficiency considerations cannot protect private 
property.  
The final chapter explores the moral constraints that surround privacy rights and how 
they intertwine with the political decisions about property rights. These decisions are made by 
legislatures when they regulate and take property, and by courts when they decide upon the 
constitutionality of the legislature’s actions. In this chapter, the argument is made for a 
fundamental right combining privacy and property, a right requiring that laws affecting the right 
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should be subjected to strict scrutiny. This chapter discusses how the standard of review is framed 
by the idea of fundamental rights, the kinds of scrutiny used by the courts, and how the courts 
have bifurcated property rights from other rights. After presenting—and, I hope, surmounting—a 
series of objections to the right, I explore the use of eminent domain to advance redistributive and 
egalitarian goals, and then offer a number of explanations why communities rarely use their 
constitutional right of democratic governance to pursue those goals. The exception is South 
Africa, who has used constitutional property and eminent domain to rectify past and present 
injustices in both ownership and distribution.  
Throughout this work, takings law—including what is called eminent domain in the 
United States and expropriation in many other countries—is pitted against the private property 
right. This is because the jurisprudence of takings—and the ideology that both supports and 
challenges the parameters of takings—helps frames two further questions that are under constant 
scrutiny in these papers: “What is private property and what are the limits of the state’s actions 
towards it?”4 In terms of state action, the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment clearly 
contemplates that the state may take private property for public use. The circumstances and 
justifications for takings, however, has been the subject of much controversy and litigation. I am 
interested in whether this and other statutes recognize—rather than create or construct—the 
private property right, and how the statutes guide states when they must make the determination 
to protect the property right or take the property it is purported to protect.  
To that extent, many of the arguments that justify the right to privacy in ‘persons, houses, 
papers, effects’ can, mutatis mutandis, also justify the right to private property in those things. It 
is privacy—and the justifications for it—that makes bodies and private property pro tanto 
immune to interference by others. What is important about the personal privacy right is its 
demand for the right to exclude others from the body, and its demand that others not interfere 
with it. These demands are embodied in the person as the privacy right and do not implicate ideas 
about ownership or possession—although ownership or possession are certainly implicated by the 
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privacy aspects of external property. Similarly, what is important about the right to private 
property is its demand for the right to exclude others from the thing owned, and its demand that 
others not interfere with it: these demands are embodied in the thing as the property right. The 
private property right is the privacy right to exclude, and the correlative duty not to interfere, 
objectified in physical things: homes, diaries, computers, land, and safe deposit boxes. If a social 
norm or convention protects the right to privacy, the justifications for that right apply pari passu 
to the right to private property.  
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Chapter 1 
 
The Privacy Theory of Property 
In this chapter, I focus on privacy, property, and private property. By examining the 
dichotomy between the public and private domains and the privacy and property rights that are 
constitutive of them, this initial chapter introduces the argument that property and privacy rights 
are derived from the same foundational right to exclude, and, hence, that both property and 
privacy rights impose the same foundational duty of noninterference.  
I thus argue for the foundational relation between privacy and property that will be 
explored in great detail in the ensuing chapters.  By explaining why the ‘private’ aspect of private 
property distinguishes it from other types of property and marks it for special moral and legal 
protections, I conclude that the values and interests protected by privacy rights are the same 
values and interests protected by property rights. 
As Richard Arneson writes, “[t]here is a voluminous literature devoted to the analysis of 
the concept of privacy.”1 However, according to Stephen Munzer, “academic discussions of the 
concept of privacy are in disarray.”2 One of the primary causes of this disarray is the objection to 
the idea that privacy, and the right to it, are distinct from other rights.  This objection, made most 
prominent by Judith Jarvis Thomson,3 is known as the reductive account of privacy. This account 
claims that the right to privacy is not an independent right but “derivative” of other rights such as 
property rights or the right to bodily security. Because I am writing about the primacy of the 
private in a theory of property, I need to show why privacy is an independent value that is not 
swamped by property rights or other rights. I need to show why privacy is desirable in a variety 
of settings, and why the privacy aspect of private property makes forms of possession and 
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ownership worth protecting against interference from the state or community. Of the many 
theorists that take this approach to privacy, Ruth Gavison’s influential 1980 article on both the 
descriptive and normative aspects of privacy is closest in spirit to the ideas I develop here, and I 
discuss it in depth in section 4.   
 Historically, privacy—and in the particular the much discussed ‘public/private 
distinction’—has been a part of social and political life since both Greek and Roman times. The 
Ancient Greeks first described the bifurcation of human experience into the private (the oikos, or 
household) and public (the polis, or city).4 Roman law, embodied in the corpus juris civilis, reads, 
“[p]ublic is that which regards the establishment of the Roman commonwealth, private that which 
regards individuals’ interests, some matters being of public and other of private interest.”5 With 
this distinction in mind, this and subsequent chapters explore what Daniela Gobetti calls the 
“reciprocal implications between a thinker’s private/public distinction and her conception of 
politics.” This reciprocity, writes Gobetti, means that a political ideology gives a concomitant 
version of the distinction, and the distinction implies a certain kind of politics.6 The link between 
the public/private distinction and political perspective is explored throughout this work. For 
example, for Marxists, a classless society places all social affairs within the domain of politics. 
No private sphere means no private property, and vice versa. If private property ‘belongs’ to the 
public, then private life belongs to it as well.7 
The concept of privacy enters modern political theory with John Locke. For Gobetti, 
Locke recognizes that all persons are “endowed with a private domain of a kind.”8 As Judith 
Wagner DeCew writes, Locke argues that “what belongs to and is acquired by the self is private 
property and is distinctly separate from what is owned publicly or in common with all.”9 For 
Gavison, the modern interest in privacy is a response to the “change in the nature and magnitude 
of threats to privacy, due at least in part to technological change. The legal protection of the past 
is inadequate not because the level of privacy it once secured is no longer sufficient, but because 
	  	   10 
that level can no longer be secured.”10 In other words, privacy rights have arisen with other 
modern rights, but they were not truly threatened until the modern era.   
What, then, makes property private? It is not the simple defining fact that private property 
is just property that is not owned by the state—private property is not, for my purposes, a bland 
contrast with public property.11 Private property, as a conceptual matter, must be something 
capable of containing or expressing something about the owner and their privacy. In terms of the 
relationship between rights as protections of both privacy and property rights, the prevailing 
understanding has been that property rights protect privacy.12 I will be arguing that the opposite 
relationship occurs: by asserting a privacy right in property, property rights are subsequently 
protected by the privacy right. Unlike the reductionists, who reduce privacy claims to claims 
about property or autonomy, I am not reducing all property claims to privacy claims, and neither 
am I claiming that privacy claims are the only way to protect property. There are good reasons to 
justify private property that do not implicate the privacy interests of owners, and these are 
discussed in chapters 2 to 5. I maintain, however, that the strongest protections of property occur 
when owners can claim a nexus between the privacy right and the property right. A garden-
variety property right is ipso facto a stronger right when an owner’s privacy rights are implicated 
in and into the property.  This is due, in part, to the fact that in current American jurisprudence, 
privacy claims are more strongly protected than property claims. By piggybacking the (strong) 
constitutional privacy protections onto the ‘private’ part of (weakly protected) private property, I 
arrive, in chapter 6, at a constitutional theory of private property that, I hope, would be able to 
withstand what I argue to be the most serious threat to the privacy aspects of private property: the 
use of eminent domain by the state for ‘public use’ by the community.  
The right to exclude is a necessary foundational component in both privacy and property 
rights, and ownership or strong possessory rights—a right to be there—are the best way to 
guarantee a right to exclude. So, the right to exclude is foundational for both privacy claims and 
property. The exclusion might be from a thing or a place or from information. However, my focus 
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in this chapter, or this work in general, is not upon privacy issues related to the torts of libel or 
slander or defamation or even protection of personality or publicity, or even the issues related to 
‘big data’ or wiretapping. There is plenty of research being done in those areas already. Rather, I 
am interested in private spaces and places as they are fairly traditionally defined. There are places 
that are not controversially private, such as bodies and homes, but I am also interested in the 
privacy aspects of more contested areas such as businesses, intellectual properties, and ordinary 
objects such as those involved in the early privacy cases involving birth control.13 Even simple 
items—such as an apple or a bag of nails—must occupy some space, and in order to make 
privacy claims about them, the location of those items in one space or another matters.  For 
example, my privacy interest in my apple when it is located in my refrigerator at home is greater 
than when I have left it in the refrigerator at work. However, in both locations, the apple is still 
my private property, and my interests in it are infringed when it is stolen out of either 
refrigerator—yet, obviously, the privacy interest is greater in my home unit because of my 
enhanced privacy interests there. This work recognizes that the combination of the privacy and 
property rights that exist in the home or dwelling place create the paradigmatic private property 
right, a right which protects the boundaries of the home itself but also many of the items 
contained within it—again, these could be apples, bags of nails, or birth control devices. These 
items, I will argue, gain further private property protections by being within the home.  
 To that extent, I am interested in the legal entry into to these and other spaces and places 
by the state or the community. This can be done, of course, with drones and other invasive 
technologies. But those entries are typically undertaken for some surveillance purpose due to law 
enforcement interests, and are usually predicated upon suspicion that a crime has been 
committed. I am interested in how the law enters—and infringes privacy—when owners or 
possessors are not suspected of crime or deviancy: when they are, so to speak, innocent. The 
privacy violations that concern me are administrative, routine, utilitarian—yet, I will argue, 
constitute a more invasive entry than, say, those that are authorized by a search warrant. 
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Section 1 provides a general overview of property and the right to it. It introduces the 
idea that of the many rights property is said to protect, it is the right to exclude that constitutes the 
main or primary right. Section 2 provides a similar overview of privacy and the right to it, and 
also aligns the privacy right with exclusionary rights. Section 3 presents the reductionist account 
of privacy, which argues that privacy rights perform no independent work of their own in the face 
of property and property-like rights over the body.  Ruth Gavison’s influential account of privacy, 
presented in Section 4, argues against this account on the basis that both descriptive and 
normative accounts of privacy and the right to it constitute an independent and central value in 
both moral and legal theory. Section 5 and 6 explore, respectively, sociological and 
legal/constitutional accounts of privacy, while section 7 presents feminist objections to the value 
of privacy that stand apart from the reductionist objection. Section 8 examines the challenges of 
self-ownership for my theory of private property, and section 9 concludes by tying together 
privacy theory with property theory and unites them in the right to exclude and the duty of 
noninterference.  
Section 1. Property Overview 
The predominant property theory in the literature and court decisions is the bundle theory 
of property. This theory views property not in the “vulgar and untechnical sense of a physical 
thing,”14 but as the group of rights or incidents “inhering in the citizen’s relation to the physical 
thing, as the right to possess, use, and dispose of it.”15 Property is therefore the “set of 
government backed rights one has in the physical thing.”16  The theory stands for the idea that 
there is no single primary or formal right that determines ownership. 
This understanding of the right to property is metaphorical—the rights are often termed 
‘sticks’ in the bundle17—but pervasive. Based on Tony Honoré’s classic work, this theory of 
property rights enjoys widespread approval in the theoretical literature and, importantly, the 
jurisprudence. According to the theory, the right is not a single right, but a collection of incidents 
or sub-rights which combine to form the right to own some thing. A person becomes the “full 
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owner” of a property when he or she possesses certain rights, or "standard incidents of 
ownership,” in a mature, liberal legal system.18  
 According to property theorist Stephen Munzer, it is the combination of Honoré’s classic 
incidents with a Hohfeldian rights/claims analysis that constitutes the bundle theory.19 According 
to Hohfeld, the word ‘property’ “is used to denote the legal interest (or aggregate of legal 
relations) appertaining to…a physical object.” 20 This aggregate is described by the well-known 
‘fundamental legal conceptions’ of claim/rights, privileges (or liberties), powers, and immunities. 
A claim/right is a state of affairs such that the rights-holder has a claim on a duty-bearer for an act 
or forbearance that justifies coercive measures to extract the act or obtain compensation should 
the claim/right be in force or exercised.21  The existence of the right entails the existence of the 
duty. Each one of Honoré’s incidents can be analyzed in terms of the claim/right and duty 
correlative relationship, and, if a sufficient number of them obtain, we are in the position to 
situate full ownership against which various types of incomplete or partial ownership might be 
compared.22  
The bundle theory connotes a permissive stance on various kinds of property 
infringements due to its very nature as a bundle, where no particular underlying right serves to 
define ownership and no particular regulation or removal or any right constitutes a violation. 
Theories which tend to minimize the importance of robust property rights, such as the social-
obligation norm,23 the personhood theories,24 and the utilitarian/efficiency theory,25 utilize the 
bundle theory to justify the position that there is no significant infringement of the property right 
when one or more sticks in the bundle are trimmed, altered, or removed altogether, even when 
those rights are transferred from private owners to either the state or other private owners.  The 
bundle theory also claims that property rights are relational between persons, and do not refer to 
rights that inhere in some physical thing. Because the right is not in some thing, the right is more 
easily regulated by rules, which purport to recognize the social or welfare roles that property 
ownership might incur to different degrees based on different conceptions of the property right.  
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The bundle theory faces a significant challenge from the exclusion theorists, who elevate 
the bundle’s right to exclude above all other strands.26  This theory is derived from the work of 
Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, as well as the article “Defining Property Rights” by S. Douglas 
and B. McFarlane.27 Exclusion theorists argue that the standard Hohfeld/Honoré property rights 
are reducible to a single right—the right to exclude—which correlates to some physical thing and 
not to relational rights between owners or the rest of the world.  According to David Schmidtz, 
“[t]he right to exclude is not just one stick in the bundle. Rather, property is a tree. Other sticks 
are the branches; the right to exclude is the trunk.”28 Even theorists such as Munzer, who deny 
that exclusion is the most important stick in the bundle, recognize that excludability as “the 
starting point of the investigation” into property rights.29 
According to exclusion theorists, the right to exclude is the sine qua non, or 
indispensable, essential thing, about ownership,30 and the right is violated when others interfere 
with an owner’s efforts to exclude them. This understanding of property rights reflects the idea 
that what is important about property is its potential for being a repository of private interests and 
goals, where a simple set of duties, based on trespass considerations, reflects the core value of the 
privacy aspect of private property. The right to exclude does not, however, mean owners have no 
obligations, and maintains that owners are subject to traditional obligations not to interfere with, 
harm, defraud, or otherwise violate similar rights enjoyed by others. 
This value is reflected in the right to exclude and the correlated duty not to interfere, 
which are generally the bases for the right and left libertarian approaches to property rights,31 and, 
to an important but very circumscribed degree, the personhood theory as well.32 The right to 
exclude and the duty not to interfere, it is argued, form the personal right to privacy, and it is the 
application of this right and this duty to property that justifies property rights. The right to privacy 
and the right of private property primarily protects the decision to exclude or admit others into a 
protected physical space. The right is violated when others (including the state) interfere with my 
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efforts to exclude them. Others assent to my assertions of privacy when they respect my privacy 
by not interfering with it. Privacy is therefore the subject of the next section.  
Section 2. Privacy Overview 
In terms of definitions, privacy—the thing itself and not, quite yet, the right to it—is 
subject to a variety of interpretations. For starters, privacy can be understood as a condition. Both 
Stephen Munzer and Ruth Gavison agree upon this definition. For Gavison, privacy is a 
“condition of life” where an individual stands “vis-à-vis” with others.33 For Munzer, “privacy is a 
condition in which the government and other individuals are not intruding into or gathering 
information about a person’s acts, decisions, affairs, or intimate qualities.” According to William 
Parent, “the condition of privacy is a moral value for persons who also prize freedom and 
individuality.”34 Here, as in the definition of property, “excludability is central. Just as actual 
control may be thought of as the outward aspect of an efficacious power to exclude, so is privacy 
its inward aspect.”35 This descriptive understanding of privacy as a verifiable condition of fact is 
discussed in depth in section 4. 
The condition of privacy can be protected by rights. Like the property right, the privacy 
right is also a claim of immunity from interference—a right to left alone—and it is a 
characterization of the special interest we have in being able to be free from certain kinds of 
intrusions.36 This claim necessarily implicates a right to exclude and the corresponding duty not 
to interfere. Privacy also consists in the control of transactions between persons and others, the 
ultimate aim of which is to enhance autonomy and minimize vulnerability.  
According to Deckle McLean, privacy is also the right to control one’s own body 
(exemplified by reproductive and sexual conduct rights), security in one’s living space (as in the 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures), and the prerogative to control, for 
example, one’s hair and dress styles and information about oneself. 37 Privacy serves, in this 
conception, a variety of ends including: personal autonomy, or individual control over when to go 
public; emotional release, which is respite from emotional stimulation and room to set aside 
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social roles; self evaluation, which is room to integrate experiences in a meaningful pattern, 
necessary for creative work; and limited and protected communication, including the room to 
share candid communication and confidences with trusted persons.38 
According to Jeffrey Reiman, respect is the cornerstone of privacy, and by respecting 
privacy we respect each other as choosers. This respect exists in relationship to a community: it is 
a “social ritual by means of which an individual’s moral title to his existence in conferred…by 
means of which the social group recognizes—and communicates to the individual—that his 
existence is his own.”39 Particularly in terms of bodies, the right to exclude others from entering 
the body and the correlative duty not to interfere with bodies is the primary right associated with 
bodily integrity. This right in discussed in detail in section 8.  
Put another way, privacy, writes Annabelle Lever, is a combination of seclusion and 
solitude, anonymity and confidentiality, intimacy and domesticity,40 but it is not restricted to 
single persons: two or more people can share their ‘privacy’ with one another and create a new, 
multi-person private space. Friendship is one of those spaces. As Anita Allen notes, “[f]riends 
participate in my personal world,” and it is in friendship that we experience a mutual 
accountability for private life.”41 Privacy also allows us to make distinctions between friends and 
colleagues, lovers and doctors. According to James Rachels, this allows us to be professional and 
businesslike with some, loving and nurturing with others.42 Private life is also important for 
regulating the “moral distance” between persons and the state: it is where, according to Paul 
Fairfield, “autonomy, self expression, and intimacy reside,” and the privacy rights serve to 
“protect individuals against encroaching majorities, institutions, and technologies.”43 
One of the primary justifications for privacy is its relationship to autonomy, or control 
over our bodies and choices.44 When we seek to avoid control over our bodies by others, when we 
seek to use them as we wish to satisfy our desires and our needs, when we seek our own reasons 
that do not fit into some established discourse about bodies, we are seeking the protection of 
privacy rights and not property rights over our bodies or lifestyles. What is truly remarkable about 
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the decision to give away a body part is not that it is property that is being given away, but that 
the privacy interest has been relinquished. The actual property—the thing—is secondary.  
Privacy—in terms of bodies and the kinds of property I discuss here—is conceptually 
impossible without the right to exclude. It might be the right to exclude others from some 
physical thing (like a body, or an artwork, or a home) or from an emotion, or a thought, or a fear. 
We should respect others’ bodies and their decisions about their bodies not because it is one’s 
property, but because one’s body and their decisions about their body are private. In many ways, 
the claim that some activity or thought is private is both foundational and irreducible: in many 
cases, no further justification is required when someone says ‘it’s private.’  
These concerns—for private lives and rights of privacy—correspond to liberal ideas 
about selfhood and autonomy, and they have important implications about what makes property 
private.  If intrinsic to the idea of privacy is the unqualified title to private property which is as 
immune to interference as bodies and selves, then the conflict with egalitarian arrangements to 
redistribute wealth becomes obvious.45 For philosopher Judith Wagner DeCew, privacy is not 
merely control over information—which has become the predominant approach to contemporary 
privacy talk—but also control over decision making, including “freedom from scrutiny and 
judgment, and protection from pressure to conform.”46 This is decisional privacy, and decisional 
privacy is a key element in property ownership or possession. However, the question arises 
whether privacy does any ‘heavy lifting’ of its own in terms of rights. The reductionists, 
discussed in the next section, claim that it does not.  
Section 3. The Reductionist Account of Privacy 
As DeCew observes, there are a variety of objections to both the existence of a distinct 
right to privacy, and to its efficacy as a moral or legal right. These objections constitute was 
DeCew calls the “narrow view” of privacy and it is supported by, most prominently, Judith Jarvis 
Thomson.47 In her famous article on privacy rights, Thomson argues for replacing privacy rights 
with property rights because privacy rights lump together too many things, making for a right that 
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is too complex.48 Privacy claims are therefore best understood as a subset of the right to own 
property and property-like rights over bodies, which make it wrong for others to look, listen, and 
touch us or our property without our permission.49 This reductionist account of privacy, DeCew 
writes, argues that the right to privacy is not an independent right but “derivative” of other rights 
such as those involving property or rights to bodily security.50  
Along these lines, Thomson argues that invading your home to paint your elbow green is 
wrong because of the invasion of the property right in the home and the property right over body. 
We can tell what is wrong in cases that look like privacy invasions by referring to other wrongs; 
in this case, wrongful invasions of rights over bodies and things. Therefore, it is wrong to refer to 
“the” right to privacy because “any privacy right can be explained in terms of other rights, 
notably property rights and rights to bodily security.”51  
According to Gavison, who was the first to label this as the reductionist account of 
privacy, reductionists do not deny value of privacy, but deny that it is a useful legal concept.52 
The nonreductionist account—which both Gavison and I follow—recognizes that while privacy, 
property, and reputation are all interests worthy of protection, the law grants none of them 
absolute protection. However, when two interests—say property and privacy—are invaded in one 
situation, recovery may be compelled even though neither alone would suffice. Reductionists 
cannot account for the fact that an invasion of privacy, coupled with, for example, an invasion of 
a property right, makes that invasion worse. Unlike the reductionist account, the nonreductionist 
account recognizes that there is something additionally valuable about privacy claims that adds 
value to those other claims, particularly in terms of rights over bodies or things.  
There are a variety of ways to describe how a reductionist account of privacy operates, 
but all of them utilize standard philosophical reductionist methodology.53 This methodology 
utilizes the idea that some concept x just is (or really is) concept y, and that every instantiation of 
concept x is better or more productively understood as if it were concept y. In terms of 
Thomson’s reductionism, the privacy right reduces to other rights: any privacy right just is a 
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property right, the privacy right just is control over decisions, or privacy rights just are property-
like rights over bodily integrity.  
I engage, to a degree, in a certain amount of reductionism: on my account, privacy 
consists of the right to exclude and the corresponding duty of noninterference. But any 
definitional attempt to explain a contested concept like privacy is going to run into claims of 
reductionism, and there is nothing wrong or improper about reductionism itself in terms of 
conceptual analysis. The problem with reductionism in discussions of privacy, however, arises 
when the reductionist claim, which is that all privacy claims can be adequately described as 
‘mere’ assertions of property rights, can be shown to be either unpersuasive or incorrect.  
According to DeCew, the reduction of privacy to property rights is initially attractive 
because, understood as a condition,54 privacy indeed appears to be capable of possession: we are 
said to possess our privacy information, and we do not want it possessed by others.55 However, as 
both William Parent and Thomas Scanlon argue, it is just as plausible that “the reverse of 
reductionism is true, that other rights such as those of ownership or rights over one’s person are 
‘derivative’ from privacy rights.”56 It could also be true that liberty is ‘derivative’ from privacy 
rights.57 This ‘reverse reductionism’ could be true, DeCew writes, “if there is a distinctive and 
important value designated by the term ‘privacy.’”58  
According to Scanlon, privacy claims are varied, but have a common and unique 
foundation that is irreducible to other rights. For example, Scanlon writes, we do not better 
understand the issues surrounding electronic surveillance or the privacy interests involved in a 
free press by “consulting rights of ownership or even rights of the person.” Because “the rights of 
ownership and the rights of the person…are based in part on [the] interests which…underlie the 
norms of privacy,”59 privacy rights are not reducible to property rights.   Thomson is therefore 
incorrect when she argues that “every privacy right is really some other kind of right,”60 and that 
we can resolve “unclarities” about our privacy rights by considering, for example, the rights of 
owners.  Along these same lines, privacy is not reducible to the right to exclude; rather, the right 
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to exclude is the essential feature of both privacy and private property rights. To that extent, pace 
Thomson, we can resolve unclarities about property rights and ownership by better understanding 
privacy rights. Privacy is not about ownership, and, as I explain in section 8, rights about bodily 
integrity are also not about self-ownership.  
 For example, the legal cases which define the legal privacy right (cases involving 
contraception, the choice of a marriage partner, abortion, etc) are mostly about choosing and 
involve what is known as decisional privacy. Choosing and using a variety of property is also 
decisional. But, while the contraception cases might be said to involve property rights in the 
contraceptives themselves, they are really about the choice to beget a child, and that is not a 
property right. Similarly, Loving v. Virginia as well as Obergefell v. Hodges—the marriage rights 
cases—do not involve property at all, and nor do they involve what Thomson calls ‘property-like 
rights’ over the body. They may involve bodily autonomy rights, but, as DeCew notes, autonomy 
does not protect these actions or decisions: 61 it simply permits persons to choose to engage in 
those behaviors or not, and it makes them the actions of moral agents.  
Ernest Van den Haag is also a reductionist, and his argument fails along the same lines as 
Thomson’s.  According to Van Den Haag, “privacy is best treated as a property right. Property 
grants an owner the exclusive right to dispose of what he owns. Privacy is the exclusive right to 
dispose of access to one’s proper (private) domain. The genus is the same; the differentia lies in 
the origin and nature of what is owned.” For Van den Haag, every privacy invasion is a property 
invasion, and “any right to privacy is a right to exclude others from some property.”62  
This is incorrect. Privacy rights with doctors, lawyers, or pastors (known more 
technically as the right of confidentiality) are unlike any property rights: although I might have to 
pay in order to enjoy them (this very true with doctors and lawyers; less true, perhaps, with 
pastors) I do not own the information I provide to them or the behavior or conditions they 
witness, nor may the professional sell this information without incurring a variety of liabilities; 
specifically, this kind information is not given to these professionals in the way other property 
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transfers are made. If the information were just property, then somehow my information, as 
property, is located in another’s mind and I would, somehow, have a right to get it back.63 This 
cannot be the case.  
According to Alexander Rosenberg, if all privacy rights were just property rights and 
body rights violations, “then the right to privacy would just be an aspect of the right to property in 
a broad enough sense of the term to include ownership of the body. If privacy rights are a species 
or subject of property rights, they will require and submit to the sorts of argument available for 
justifying private property.”64 As I argue throughout this work, privacy rights are unique and 
separate from property rights, yet they provide the best foundation for the protection of property 
rights in the form of private property rights. This is not a didactic emphasis on this term: privacy 
really is what makes private property not merely property that is not public, but property that 
secures and provides a site for all the other (noncontroversially) privacy claims in bodies and 
many kinds of property.  
Andrei Marmor has recently argued for a modified reductive account of privacy. For 
Marmor, privacy is the “interest in having a reasonable measure of control over the ways in 
which [persons] can present themselves (and what is theirs) to others.”65 This account attempts to 
reduce privacy to control over an environment. For Marmor, “[t]he right to privacy…is there to 
protect our interest in having a reasonable measure of control over ways in which we present 
ourselves to others. The protection of this interest requires the securing of a reasonably 
predictable environment about the flow of information and the likely consequences of our 
conduct in the relevant types of contexts.”66 
So, Marmor asks, what would count as a violation of a right to privacy?  “The answer is 
that your right to privacy is violated when somebody manipulates, without adequate justification, 
the relevant environment in ways that significantly diminish your ability to control what aspects 
of yourself you reveal to others.”67 Contrary to Thomson’s account, Marmor argues that privacy 
rights do the protecting in terms of property—or, as he phrases it, “environment.” To show this, 
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Marmor uses Thomson’s example of the picture in the safe. If a neighbor, Bob, uses an x-ray to 
see into Mary’s safe and view her Picasso, Thomson claims that what appears to a privacy 
violation is really a property rights violation because it is Mary’s picture and the use of the x-ray 
is inconsistent with her ownership rights over it. For Marmor, the property angle is “tangential to 
the main underlying interest here, which is the interest in having control over concealment or 
disclosure.” Bob is wrong because he is invading Mary’s privacy by “manipulating her 
environment in ways that undermine her ability to control whether she shows her painting and to 
whom.”68  Whatever reasons Mary might have for choosing to keep her Picasso concealed from 
others, Marmor continues, “do not have any direct bearing on the question of what the legitimate 
interest is that the right to privacy is there to protect, or on what counts as a violation of this right. 
Bob the neighbor would have violated Mary’s right to privacy regardless of her reasons for 
keeping the painting in the safe or, in fact, even if she kept it there for no reason at all.”69 The 
right to exclude as an essential feature of the right to privacy includes what Marmor believes is 
important about privacy in terms of control and the release of information, and it is clear that he is 
referring to the right to exclude in terms of the right invoked by the neighbor’s peeping. Mary 
obviously has property rights in the picture—after all, it is her picture—but her ownership over it 
is not violated by Bob’s x-ray.  
The anti-reductionist account is most fully developed in Ruth Gavison’s access theory of 
privacy, which is described in the next section.  
Section 4. Privacy as a Nonreductionist Value 
It is difficult to arrive at a noncontroversial conception of privacy. On the one hand, privacy 
appears to be relative across cultures. As Stanley I. Benn writes, “the application even of a quite 
general principle of privacy will be affected by culturally variant norms— those regarding family, 
say, or property.”70 Privacy, in this sense, has greater or lesser value based on the culture’s 
attitudes towards it.71 On the other hand, there are, both within and without those variations, 
certain facts and circumstances about privacy suggesting that it can be understood apart from 
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culture or tradition. These facts describe privacy as a person’s state or condition that is 
unavailable to others—unexpressed thoughts constitute the most immediate example of this kind 
of privacy. Privacy, in this sense, is morally neutral.   
Both the cultural aspects of privacy and the facts of privacy as an objective condition can 
provide a descriptive understanding of privacy. It is useful to first understand that there are 
private things that exist apart from moral valuation, and then attempt to determine how, and in 
what kinds of cultures, privacy has moral value.   
The challenge faced in this section consists in moving from a nonnormative account of 
privacy (as both cultural and noncultural facts) to normative accounts in moral theory and then 
law. My approach draws heavily from Ruth Gavison’s influential work in privacy studies. 
Gavison first shows that there are private things, and then determines why they are valuable. Her 
argument starts with a descriptive account in order to show why nonreductionism is preferable to 
reductionism, and then ends with a normative account of privacy’s value as a central value in 
both moral and legal theory. This account not only shows how reductionism is incorrect, but also 
provides a foundation for a property theory that is predicated on privacy facts and rights.  
Some things, such as unexpressed thoughts and ideas, seem naturally, or, for Raymond 
Geuss, “ontologically” private. 72  The concealed nature of thought suggests that our very 
embodiment naturally creates spaces in our being that are boundaried, private, and available to 
others only when we independently exercise our decision to ‘go public,’ and this decision 
certainly varies between different personality types, cultural influences, and factors related to 
class, race, and gender. Today, unexpressed thoughts, emotions, and attitudes are private parts of 
our interior mental life, but once we can read minds, this privacy is gone.73 Until that time, 
privacy in these things, R.G. Frey writes, is not conventional primarily because, as naturally 
private things, their private status is not conferred by others or by society.74 For Geuss, if some 
feature of one’s life is ontologically private, it is “pointless to try to protect it from possible 
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surveillance”75 because something that is naturally private cannot, by definition, be shared or 
known by others. When it is known, it is no longer ontologically private.  
There are other things that also seem ‘naturally’ private, including the pleasures of sex 
and the displeasures of excretion. Also, privacy in the sense of the sharing of privacies is perhaps 
the chief facilitator for love, friendship, trust, and intimacy. A new sense of privacy is obtained by 
breaking down the withholding of privacy between persons resulting the intimate sharing of 
private facts, wishes, and dreams. Sometimes we want these known by everyone; sometimes, we 
do not.76 The existence of privacy as a factual matter allows us to make that choice.  
Gavison’s account of privacy begins with this understanding of privacy’s factual or 
descriptive properties. Hers is an attempt to “vindicate the way most of us think and talk about 
privacy issues.”  Unlike the reductionists, she writes, “most of us consider privacy to be a useful 
concept. To be useful, however, the concept must denote something that is distinct and 
coherent.” 77  Gavison’s “antireductionist perspective” 78  has come to be known as the 
‘accessibility’ approach to privacy, in which privacy is “the extent to which we are known to 
others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and the extent to which we are  
subject of others' attention.”79 Her goal, which I share, is showing how privacy has both 
descriptive and normative properties, and why privacy has a distinct, independent, and central 
value in human affairs.80 Although her analysis does not focus on the privacy aspect of private 
property, she does provide a justification for protection against physical access by others, which, 
from my perspective, recognizes how property can be imbued with privacy interests and therefore 
make it deserving of the same heightened protection afforded to privacy interests related to 
intimacy, decision, or choice.  
Gavison proceeds in three steps. First, she argues that privacy can be analyzed 
descriptively without looking at its value. In this sense, Gavison is trying to avoid frontloading a 
normative conception of privacy. Second, Gavison writes, after making determination about its 
descriptive properties, “privacy must have coherence as a value, for claims of legal protection of 
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privacy are compelling only if losses of privacy are sometimes undesirable and if those losses are 
undesirable for similar reasons.”81 This focuses on invasions of privacy. Third, “privacy must be a 
concept useful in legal contexts, a concept that enables us to identify those occasions calling for 
legal protection, because the law does not interfere to protect against every undesirable event.”82  
This focuses on actionable violations of privacy.  
For Gavison, using the same word in all three contexts “reinforces the belief that they are 
linked.” This linkage is established in response to the reductionist analyses of privacy, which 
deny “the utility of privacy as a separate concept” by severing these “conceptual and linguistic 
links.”83 This neutral conception of privacy includes, among many other instances, “intruding or 
entering ‘private’ spaces.” But it also includes legal prohibitions on use of contraceptives, 
abortion, or sexual practices which authorize the state to invade bedrooms, for example, to search 
for evidence.84 
Three other descriptive properties of privacy include secrecy, anonymity, and solitude. 
These are, Gavison writes, “distinct and independent, but interrelated, and the complex concept of 
privacy is richer than any definition centered around only one of them. The complex concept 
better explains our intuitions as to when privacy is lost, and captures more of the suggestive 
meaning of privacy.”85  
Gavison’s approach has generated considerable support. As Weinreb observes, “’That’s 
private’ is both a statement of fact and a prescription of how one ought to behave.” 86 
Furthermore, “the adjective ‘private’ is commonly used as if it states matters of fact.” It also, he 
writes, “has normative force” and includes prescriptions “of how one ought to behave.”87 These 
descriptive accounts of privacy fall back on the idea that privacy is a condition, and, pace 
reductionism, it seems strange to claim a right to a condition, even if it is one’s own condition.88 
Because privacy is a condition, Weinreb writes, “just about anything may be private: persons, 
places, things, actions, words, emotions,”89 all of which can constitute a private domain where a 
person “as a person, has (a right to) a ‘space’ in which he is autonomous.”90 If a person has a right 
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to a private space, then an invasion of that privacy is wrong, even with no harmful consequences 
or damages.91  
Continuing with the idea that privacy is a condition, Michael A. Weinstein writes that 
privacy is ‘morally neutral.’ It is  
a condition of being-apart-from-others. It is the voluntary limitation of communication to 
or from others for the purpose of undertaking activity in pursuit of a perceived good. 
Perhaps it is because privacy is a condition of being that so much of the discussion about 
it has been confused. A condition is not moral or valuable in itself. Rather, a condition is 
an opportunity for conducting an activity which may realize value in process or issue in a 
moral outcome.92 
 
Although purely descriptive, a successful privacy claim means something, and it means 
something more than a simple property claim of ownership or possession. If one can make the 
argument that sex is private, then ‘private’ means ‘more protected against intrusion.’ 
In developing her access theory of privacy, Gavison draws upon these descriptive or 
morally neutral facts of privacy in terms of physical spaces and begins to make the connection 
between the condition of privacy and private property. In so doing, Gavison moves from a neutral 
description of privacy to an explanation of the normativity or desirability of privacy; in other 
words, its value. 
Gavison: “Places and spaces, like gardens, beaches, room and theatres are public when 
anyone is entitled to be physically present in them; they are private when someone, or some 
group, having the right of access, can choose whether to deny or allow access to others.”93 Access 
also pertains to resources, and a person has such access “if he is able to manipulate some 
elements in his environment to bring about new and intended states of affairs.”94 But, most 
importantly, privacy can restrict physical access to an individual, and in doing so, it “insulates 
that individual from distraction and from the inhibitive effects that arise from close physical 
proximity with another individual.”95 As DeCew writes, Gavison’s protection of accessibility 
privacy “allows individuals to control decisions about who has physical access to their persons 
through sense perception, observation, or bodily contact and to limit access that would be 
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unwelcome to reasonable individuals in the circumstances due to the distraction, inhibition, fear, 
and vulnerability it can cause.”96  
This sounds very much like the private property right, which individuals lose when others 
gain physical access to them.  Such losses occur in the following situations:  
(a) a stranger who gains entrance to a woman's home on false pretenses in order to watch 
her giving birth; (b) Peeping Toms; (c) a stranger who chooses to sit on ‘our’ bench, even 
though the park is full of empty benches; and (d) a move from a single-person office to a 
much larger one that must be shared with a colleague. In each of these cases, the essence 
of the complaint is not that more information about us has been acquired, nor that more 
attention has been drawn to us, but that our spatial aloneness has been diminished.97 
 
It is at this point we see the emergence of the argument for the moral value of privacy. 
Gavison: “Privacy thus prevents interference, pressures to conform, ridicule, punishment, 
unfavorable decisions, and other forms of hostile reaction. To the extent that privacy does this, it 
functions to promote liberty of action, removing the unpleasant consequences of certain actions 
and thus increasing the liberty to perform them. This promotion of liberty of action links privacy 
to a variety of individual goals. It also raises a number of serious problems, both as to the causal 
link between privacy and other goals, and as to the desirability of this function.”98 
 Because privacy adds to the value of liberty, particularly in terms of legal protection,  
reductionist accounts obscure the continuity of legal protection over time. They give the 
erroneous impression that the concern with privacy is modern, whereas in fact both the 
wish to invade privacy and the need to control such wishes have been features of the 
human condition from antiquity. The common-law maxim that a person's home is his 
castle; early restrictions on the power of government officials to search, detain, or enter; 
strict norms of confidence; and prohibition of Peeping Toms or eavesdropping all attest 
to this early concern.99 
 
 In other words, the privacy right is a kind of old wine in a new skin: it has long held a 
distinct, independent and central value for communities that also value, for example, autonomy. 
As Gavison notes, autonomy is linked to the function of privacy in promoting liberty. “Moral 
autonomy is the reflective and critical acceptance of social norms, with obedience based on an 
independent moral evaluation of their worth. Autonomy requires the capacity to make an 
independent moral judgment, the willingness to exercise it, and the courage to act on the results 
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of this exercise even when the judgment is not a popular one.”100 Although we do not know what 
makes individuals autonomous, Gavison writes, “it is probably easier to be autonomous in an 
open society committed to pluralism, toleration, and encouragement of independent judgment 
rather than blind submissiveness. Privacy is needed to enable the individual to deliberate and 
establish his opinions.”101  
The liberty that privacy protects must exist somewhere. As I will argue throughout this 
work, private property rights best protect this interest. Spaces become private when private 
activities, necessary for the exercise of liberty, inhabit those spaces, and ownership is the best, but 
not only, way to protect those spaces and the things within them. Although different cultures 
value privacy differently, privacy and the right protecting it are important features in cultures that 
value the liberties associated with liberal democracies.  
Section 5. The Sociology of Privacy: Cultural Privacy 
Almost all societies have norms and rules about restricting access to childbirth, sex, excretion, 
and other behaviors. Although these matters may seem ‘naturally private,’ it ought to be clear that 
sexual acts can very public, and, as Weinreb, observes, even behavior related to excretory 
functions appear to be culturally conditioned. In fact, “privacy of this kind typically is obligatory; 
common human impulse though it may be, it is not a reflection of autonomy but an other-
regarding aspect of conduct within the public realm.”102 This reflects the idea that some things are 
not naturally, but normatively private: indeed, some things ought to be private and persons are 
obligated to keep them that way.  
This section examines how privacy is relative between cultures, and why it is important 
for certain but not other cultures. As briefly explained in the introduction to this chapter, we can 
trace the origin of the private to the Ancient Greeks, who first described the bifurcation of human 
experience into the private (the oikos, or household) and public (the polis, or city). For the 
Greeks, the oikos concerned the family, reproduction, birth, and death. It was the realm of the 
female and maintained an inherent inequality. The man of the polis, on the other hand, denigrated 
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the bodily, private sphere, and finds his nobility in the public sphere, concerning himself with 
issues of state, reason, maleness, freedom, and civic virtue.103 In Socrates’ ideal city of the 
Republic, Plato eliminates the private because it “sows seeds of division.” Among the relatively 
small ‘guardian’ class, wives, children, and property are held in common. For those who are 
involved in ruling the city, private life is abolished. Modern liberals reject this, primarily by 
supplementing a traditional private family life with a private individual life where, as in ancient 
Greece, men continue to rule. But here is the dialectical turn: in the modern version, the private is 
not denigrated but exalted over the public. So while “the social” existed as the space between the 
individual/household/private and the state, the social becomes integrated into in the private. 
Social inequalities—gender, race, property, and so forth—are therefore replicated in private life. 
Private life then centralizes private oppression through hierarchy by moving it out of the public 
gaze. 
Because not all cultures value privacy, a universal or necessary understanding of it seems 
improbable. For example, in his classic study Alan Westin describes pre-literate societies where 
“fear of isolation leads individuals to believe…they are never wholly alone, even when they are 
in physical solitude.” In these societies, a person who was truly alone was in “terrible peril, since 
hostile spirits were believed to be all around.”104 According to Rosenberg, “[s]ocial groups in 
which there is extreme equality, both of resources and power, and homogeneity of tastes, 
preferences, and mores, will not trouble themselves to establish rights of privacy.”105 According 
to anthropologists John M. Roberts and Thomas Gregor, ‘high’ privacy is associated with animal 
husbandry, domestication of large animals, and the intensive agriculture required by cereal crops. 
These factors, along with games of strategy (and not mere strength or chance), and “high gods” 
(spiritual beings who are present but not active in human affairs) lead to high privacy. Traditional 
or indigenous societies with simple structures (such as lean-tos) indicate a low preference for 
privacy. In a society such as the Mehinacu of the Xingú River basin in Central Brazil, who cannot 
avoid leaving their footprints on and near the soft earth of the river, privacy is compromised 
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because “[e]ach person’s footprint is well-known to his fellows,”106 and each person is therefore 
easily tracked and detected. As Carl J. Friedrich writes, as a society becomes more ‘civilized’ it 
also becomes more private, and violations become more serious, more felt, and more 
important.107 According to DeCew, the rise of technology in terms of mass transportation, 
communications, and handheld devices, have encouraged privacy while also threatening it.108 
According to Benn, privacy is closely related to the idea of the free person in a 
“minimally regulated society, a way of life where, first, the average individual is subject only 
within reasonable and legally safeguarded limits to the power of others, and, second, where the 
requirements of his social roles still leave him considerable breadth of choice in the way he 
lives.”109 This conception of privacy, Benn writes, “is closely bound up with the liberal ideal.”  
The totalitarian claims that everything a man is and does has significance for society at 
large. He sees the state as the self-conscious organization of society for the well being of 
society; the social significance of our actions and relations overrides any other. 
Consequently, the public or political universe is all-inclusive, all roles are public, and 
every function, whether political, economic, or artistic, can be interpreted as involving a 
public responsibility.110  
 
The liberal ideal is bound up with a certain conception of the individual.  “Privacy,” writes 
Jeffrey Reiman, “is necessary to the creation of selves out of human beings, since a self is at least 
in part a human being who regards his existence—his thoughts, his body, his actions—as his 
own.”111 This notion of the self, Gavison writes, relates to the liberal “notion of the individual, 
and the kinds of actions we think people should be allowed to take in order to become fully 
realized.” Privacy establishes the link between the liberal individual and their “mental health, 
autonomy, growth, creativity, and (their) capacity to form and create meaningful human 
relations.”112 
 Unlike cultures which disvalue privacy or lack it altogether, these properties of the 
individual “relates to the type of society we want. First, we want a society that will not hinder 
individual attainment of the goals mentioned above. For this, society has to be liberal and 
pluralistic. In addition, we link a concern for privacy to our concept of democracy.” Privacy in 
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liberal democracies, Gavison writes, is necessary for “creativity, growth, autonomy, and mental 
health,” and it is “central to the attainment of individual goals under every theory of the 
individual that has ever captured man's imagination.113  
Therefore, privacy may not be essential for all human life, but it is “essential to 
democratic government because it fosters and encourages the moral autonomy of the citizen, a 
central requirement of a democracy.”  Thus, Gavison concludes, to the extent that privacy is 
important for the autonomy of individuals in liberal democracies, “it is important for democracy 
as well.”114 
The privacy right, of course, is protected by the state in contemporary liberal democracies 
to greater or lesser degrees. Privacy permits individuals to establish their boundaries against 
others on their own terms. If liberalism aims for the creation of independent, flourishing humans, 
then it would appear that some measure of privacy—a changing, self-determined establishment of 
boundaries by individuals against others—is necessary. Without this possibility—and again, 
many people may choose to not assert any preferences about privacy, and no one is going to force 
anyone else to maintain boundaries that make privacy possible—there is nothing to kick against, 
so to speak, and the conditions for independent, considered action are lost.115  
Perhaps it is the very possibility of having a private, interior mental life that permits one 
to explore their own concept of the good or the right that constitutes a prerequisite to the 
experience of liberty. The opposite of this kind of liberating privacy is scrutiny, surveillance, and 
observation,116 resulting in the panoptical viewing of everything by everyone. This was the case 
in the film The Truman Show. Because his entire life has been, unbeknownst to him, broadcast on 
television as a kind of reality show in which everything, include his parents, his wife, and the sky 
are phony, Truman has no privacy whatsoever. He consequently has no self, or at least no real 
self, in part because of his false belief in the existence of his own private life. Once he discovers 
his true circumstances, he begins to become a non-public being—a person with a private self. 
Like Truman, a person developing in a constant panoptic society lacks privacy, and the total 
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negation of privacy is one of the reasons why prison, as well as the dystopia of George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, is so feared. According to Andrei Marmor, in the privacy-less global 
Panopticon, our lack of personal privacy also means that “our social lives…would be severely 
compromised.”117 Similarly, a world of Total Honesty, Marmor writes, “would be almost as 
horrific as a global Panopticon,” where “every thought that comes to your mind is immediately 
communicated to others. That is not necessarily or exclusively an issue of privacy, of course, but 
it has a privacy correlate; some concealment and the ability to interact with people at arm’s length 
are really quite essential for us to operate in the complex societies we live in.”118 This world 
would, however, be a world with no crime, where “a person could identify his enemies, anticipate 
dangers stemming from other people, and make sure he was not cheated or manipulated.” 
Gavison: “Criminality would cease, for detection would be certain, frustration probable, and 
punishment sure. The world would be safer, and as a result, the time and resources now spent on 
trying to protect ourselves against human dangers and misrepresentations could be directed to 
other things.”119 
A society with no privacy is tyranny, and a free society provides the opportunity for 
extensive privacy. These opportunities can exist within current states or in one of the many 
possible utopian futures.  For centuries religious groups have created these types of groups within 
the framework of the state, and, depending on a variety of factors, they can be admired for their 
autonomy, their rejection of authority, and their commitment to living off the grid. Perhaps trust 
is better developed in these smaller, localized communities,120 and privacy (understood here as 
the right to exclude) in these spaces is less important than in larger ones. Again, no liberal is 
going to deny anyone’s decision to create or join artist’s communes, workers’ production 
facilities, or nonhierarchical educational facilities where privacy is compromised due to 
agreement, and nor should they deny similar social arrangements that promote a deep 
understanding of the kind of private journey that some of us require in order to occasionally seek 
what writer Paul Bowles called ‘le baptême de la solitude’, or the baptism of solitude.121  
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Section 6. Privacy as a Legal Concept 
Because privacy is an integral part of American liberal democracy, it has been extensively 
legislated and litigated in terms of the rights that purport to protect it. As H. Tristam Engelhardt, 
Jr, writes, the right to privacy creates “freedom from unwarranted government intrusion” by 
establishing  “fundamental limits on the authority of the government,”122 and by granting  “robust 
areas of privacy” in regards to consent, contract, and the market.123 However, it has become a 
truism to remark—as DeCew and many others do—that “the term ‘privacy’ appears nowhere in 
the Constitution.”124 While this is strictly true—the word itself does not appear there—the word 
“private,” the adjectival version of the noun “privacy,” does occur, and it occurs exactly once: in 
the takings clause, which states “nor shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation.” The importance of this occurrence for private property rights is explored in 
chapter 6, where I will argue that the “private property” in the Fifth Amendment creates—or 
recognizes the existence of—a strong privacy right, one which is perhaps the strongest 
constitutional privacy right because of its virtual enumeration there. 
For DeCew, privacy claims are not only protections against government interference, so 
they are not merely liberty or autonomy rights. Privacy claims provide better reasons—over and 
in addition to reasons of liberty and autonomy—for increased protection of the locations where 
private behavior occurs.125 With this recognition in mind, this section describes how the courts 
have treated the privacy right in general, with the understanding that a great many of the legal 
rules that have grown out of these decisions have significant import for the privacy theory of 
property as well. As DeCew observes, the location of behavior is important in terms of many 
privacy decisions, and the courts have recognized this in a variety of decisions.126 
The birth of the privacy right in tort law in the late 19th century, stemming from Thomas 
Cooley’s “right to be left alone” and Warren and Brandeis’ right of “inviolate personality,”127 led 
to the constitutional privacy right due to the fact that the “earliest constitutional challenges to 
federal law tied privacy interests to physical control over a dwelling or other property seized as a 
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tangible item.” As a result of these cases, DeCew writes, the “Fourth Amendment proscriptions 
against unreasonable searches and seizures obviously protect such interests as property and 
freedom of press, in addition to privacy.”128 
 The developed case law has protected a variety of actions and behaviors including the 
possession of obscenity in the home, the right against state-enforced sterilization, the right to use 
contraception, the right to abortion, the right to engage in consenting homosexual behavior, and, 
in at least one outlier case, the use and possession of marijuana in the home.129 The most 
important of these cases is Griswold v Connecticut, which explicitly established the right for the 
first time as a right against the intrusion of the government into private life. In Griswold, a 
provider of contraceptive products and advice was charged with violating the state’s anti-
contraception law. In striking down the law as a violation of the privacy rights of potential 
violators of the law—including both disseminators and users of contraceptives—Justice Douglas 
wrote: “We deal with a right to privacy older than the Bill of Rights, older than our political 
parties, older than our school system.”130 Douglas found this right in a variety of constitutional 
provisions, such as the first amendment freedom to teach or dispel information, the third 
amendment’s protection of home, the fifth amendment’s protection against self incrimination, and 
the fourth amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Griswold 
court held that a search for a constitutionally protected act or thing—here, birth control devices—
is unreasonable because the only way to prosecute violations of this kind of law is to search the 
‘marital bedroom,’ so that even if the law does not violate a first amendment speech right or some 
other principle, the methods used by law enforcement to determine violations of the law are 
unconstitutional as a matter of procedural due process.  
In terms of property rights, Griswold can be read as a right to possess certain kinds of 
private property, which, in this case, consisted of birth control devices.  Griswold only protected 
the right of married couples to possess these devices, but this protection was quickly provided to 
unmarried persons as well in Eisenstadt v Baird, which held that that the individual’s 
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constitutional right of privacy protects them from “unwarranted governmental intrusion” into, for 
example, the decision to have (or not have) a child.131 Possession of pornography in the home was 
protected in Stanley v Georgia,132 and privacy was also cited as grounds for ruling that laws 
against miscegenation were unconstitutional in Loving v. Virginia.  While Loving is not related to 
property rights, Stanley clearly—like Griswold and Eisenstadt—protects both property in terms 
of possession as well as property in terms of the home. In Stanley, the Supreme Court held that an 
individual could not be prosecuted for possessing obscene materials in their home. The Court 
recognized that States' had "broad power to regulate obscenity," but "that power simply does not 
extend to mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home."133  
As DeCew notes, tort privacy is mostly concerned with information, but the 
constitutional privacy cases deals with “zones” or places.134 This is particularly true in Moore v 
City of East Cleveland, which found a privacy right in both family composition and the 
organization of dwellings in physical places such as the home. In Rakas v. Illinois, the Court 
makes the connection between privacy and property rights and the general right to exclude: “And 
it would, of course, be merely tautological to fall back on the notion that those expectations of 
privacy which are legitimate depend primarily on cases deciding exclusionary rule issues in 
criminal cases. Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the 
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to 
understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the main rights attaching to 
property is the right to exclude others, see W. Blackstone, Commentaries, Book 2, ch. 1, and one 
who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will, in all likelihood, have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy by virtue of this right to exclude.”135 
This private property right clearly covers homes: as the Court stated in United States v. 
Karo (1984) it is “belaboring the obvious…that private residences are places in which the 
individual normally expects privacy…, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared 
to recognize as justifiable.”136 
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Mark Tushnet provides a constitutional theory, conventionalism, that explains how these 
cases have developed and taken hold in American jurisprudence. For Tushnet, privacy as a legal 
convention has developed out of constitutional rules which “rest upon what the (Supreme) Court 
describes as the normative understandings of the American people.” Conventionalism constitutes 
a descriptive account of the people’s normative understanding of the role that privacy ought to 
play in the negotiation between individuals and the state. Griswold, for example, (and many of 
the other contraceptive cases including Eisenstadt) can be understood through a conventionalist 
reading to mean that “the notions of privacy held by the American people rule out the possibility 
of a police search of bedrooms for evidence of contraceptive use.” 137  
As Richard Epstein points out, privacy also figures prominently in contract law because 
individuals regulate what kinds of information they share when they negotiate, and because 
persons may keep trade secrets private; the disclosure of this kind of private information is 
tortious. Epstein also notes that a variety of contractual agreements have traditionally demanded 
privacy or, more technically, confidentiality, including those between patient and physician as 
well as the previously-mentioned relationships between lawyer and client and between priest and 
penitent. The information shared in these relationships is not property in any traditional sense, 
making the reductionist account even more difficult to sustain.138  
DeCew makes an important observation about the role privacy plays in constitutional 
interpretation and the standard of review that courts use to evaluate legislation that affects rights. 
As it stands, current constitutional standards require “‘strict scrutiny’ by the Court for cases 
concerning ‘fundamental values,’ and privacy has been judged one such value.”139 Strict scrutiny 
requires that legislation regulating fundamental rights be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government purpose. However, for legislation that affects ‘mere’ liberty rights, the less strict 
standard of rational basis applies. Therefore, if liberty interests also affect privacy, then “these 
privacy claims have a greater chance of being protected when they conflict with other rights or 
general interests than they would have if only liberty, or freedom from governmental interference, 
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were involved.”140 Because of the direction of the jurisprudence, liberty is only protected by due 
process, and claims of due process violations are only protected by the rational basis standard. As 
DeCew recognizes, lawyers are not able to simply argue that “liberty” or “freedom” is curtailed 
by legislation, or that “totalitarianism” would result from the enforcement of some restrictive 
law.141 In the conversational implicature of rights in American jurisprudence, the claim of liberty 
plus the right of privacy is much more powerful than the claim of liberty on its own.   
What degree of legal protection of privacy is desirable? Privacy rights have been on the 
ascendant, and there is little reason to believe that the Court will retreat on these issues. These 
cases point to a growing recognition that the public’s right to regulate private behavior through 
legislation is limited. These rights also reflect the privacy interest in the home and in properties. It 
is not enough for a person to have private thoughts about their sexual behavior, but must also be 
secure in the exercise of their privacy in bedrooms, homes, and hotels. Privacy in spaces, 
therefore, is necessary for the exercise of sexual personhood. Property rights do not give rise to 
the private exercises therein, but the right to exercise private thoughts and desires make the value 
of the property right dependent upon the assertion of privacy. This opinion of the value of 
privacy, however, is not shared by all, and there has been a consistent and forceful objection to 
privacy and privacy rights lodged primarily by feminist philosophers and legal theorists. 
Section 7. Feminist Objections to Privacy 
As Judith DeCew notes, feminist ethicists and legal theorists expose a “darker side of privacy.”142 
Many feminist theorists have long argued that the personal is the political, meaning that the 
purportedly ‘natural’ private domain of intimacy—the family and sexuality—is legally 
constructed, culturally defined, and the site of unjust power relations which are conscientiously 
designed to oppress women. For the most part, the emphasis is this area has been on the critical 
deconstruction of privacy rhetoric as part of a discourse on domination that legitimizes women’s 
oppression.143   According to feminist legal scholar and privacy expert Anita Allen, feminists 
want to politicize these traditionally ‘private matters’ based on the idea that, under conditions of 
	  	   38 
patriarchy, the personal or private realm has always been political or at least politicized.144 The 
gist of this critique is based on gender egalitarianism: under patriarchy, privacy cannot be 
coextensive with gender equality and it is therefore in tension with equality because it places the 
home beyond the reach of gender justice while it deprives privacy to women within their 
marriages and sexual relationships.145 This crucial objection to the traditional understanding of 
privacy as a social good also supports the characterization of privacy as a product of capitalist and 
class-based domination.146 
Obviously, the basic claim of the anti-privacy feminist philosophers is correct: the private 
has been the haven for the perpetuation of structural hierarchies, violence, and injustice. But it 
need not be. As Annabelle Lever notes, the traditional use of privacy to oppress is “by no means 
an unalterable or inescapable feature of privacy.”147  
Another primary objection to strong privacy claims is accountability.  Without 
accountability there is no responsibility. A society cannot afford to fully leave people alone—
after all, most murders are committed ‘in private’—and there many ways in which our 
contemporary culture, for example, is not private due to a variety of non-coercive factors.148  The 
idea here is that some activity might be private, but persons are still socially, politically, morally 
responsible to the community for many of the activities occurring in the private realm.149 But 
accountability has limits, and society must have some interest in the action in order to claim the 
right to regulate it. As John Stuart Mill writes, “The individual is not accountable to society for 
his actions, in so far as these concern the interest of no person but himself.”150 Mill, of course, 
was speaking for a society predicated on liberal democratic values. Perhaps a society that is not 
predicated on these ideals has no need for privacy. Too much privacy can create a disregard for 
public life,151 while openness—a lack of needed or wanted privacy—encourages solidarity. At a 
deeper level of analysis, it could be argued that privacy is only necessary when it is a response to 
the attempted control or invasion of bodies or living spaces. Under this approach, privacy is a 
reaction to and a product of oppression and necessary only in conditions of struggle and 
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revolution. Consider further that privacies—and the interests privacy protects—are features or 
byproducts of capitalism, patriarchy, and possessive individualism. This line of critique suggests 
that privacy—in particular, the right protected by states against the state itself—is a kind of social 
control technique that encourages gendered violence and the artificial creation of spaces that 
promote selfishness, greed, and competition. At its extreme, this line of Marxian inspired critique 
claims that the very existence of the so-called private individual itself is both the target and 
foundation of capitalistic consumerism: economic repression drives consumers into private, 
antisocial worlds, and we respond with a vivid private life that brings us satisfactions unfound in 
the public realm.152 
DeCew and Allen provide responses to these criticisms first by doubting that all privacy 
assertions are sexist. DeCew responds directly to claims by Carole Pateman, Catherine 
MacKinnon, and Susan Muller Okin.153  Pateman, DeCew writes, claims that because there is no 
private realm for women there is also no decision making power, and that men use privacy claims 
to subjugate women. DeCew asks whether this is a normative objection: assuming there currently 
is no private realm for women—and certainly none in the past—feminists ought to be asking 
“should there be one?” for the future on the grounds that it is unlikely that all privacy is sexist.154 
According to DeCew, both MacKinnon and Okin think sexist privacy has encouraged the 
nonintervention by state into the home in order to refuse to encounter and stop men’s violence 
towards women, and that men make privacy rules to keep the state out while they rape and 
subjugate women.155 MacKinnon: “The right of privacy is a right of men ‘to be left alone’ to 
oppress women one at a time.”156 As DeCew notes, this fails to make distinction between justified 
and unjustified uses of state power.157 Also, it should be obvious that secrecy or privacy also 
protects counterfeiters or illegal drug manufacturers, so it seems incorrect to claim that men pass 
privacy laws—such as the Fourth Amendment—to protect drug dealers or counterfeiters as well 
as perpetuators of sexual violence. Finally, DeCew notes that while feminists correctly want to do 
away with privacy because of its association with sexist oppression in the past, they are unable to 
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make a similar argument that considers both the role of privacy as a normative matter in future 
relationships.158 
In response to the question of why there has been so much discussion and litigation over 
privacy, Anita Allen writes that the increase in privacy law corresponds to an overall increase in 
rights for everyone—including women.159 For many feminists, ethical care, compassion, and 
community—not privacy—dominate women’s lives. But, as Allen argues, privacy should not be 
rejected because of harms done in private.160 For Allen, the urge for privacy as “the longing for 
personal quiet time and personal decision making can linger long after the grip of patriarchy over 
women has been loosened.”161 For Allen, privacy is a “rubric” for making decisions about sex, 
abortion, family, religion, and health care.162 Privacy, then, exists as a normative idea independent 
of, and beyond, women’s oppression under it, and that idea consists in respect for solitude, the 
value of independent reflection, true intimacy, and moral choice.163 
I mentioned earlier than the urge for privacy can be interpreted as a product of a fully 
commercialized, capitalist hierarchical state, where individual alienation is the result of worker 
exploitation, the wage system, or consumer anxiety. In this interpretation, we are driven to the 
private by externally oppressive factors over which we have no control: we know we are social 
beings, but under conditions of state capitalism our sociality is fetishized and commodified: it 
becomes a source of profit for the capitalist class. We are therefore forced into a private world 
where our power—formerly social, now private and individual—is realized in our freedom to 
privately choose our consumer goods.164 
The idea here is that if there were no capitalism in public life (replace it with whatever 
you want: liberal democracy or democratic socialism), then there is no need for privacy as 
simultaneously a retreat from alienation and a source of it for both victims and aggressors. There 
are good reasons to reject this interpretation. Privacy permits a wide variety of experiences, and 
part of what is attractive about it is that there is always room for different expression of living. If 
you reject the private, then you should be free to find a community that also rejects it. If you 
	  	   41 
desire privacy, there are plenty of others that will respect that desire due to their sharing of that 
desire.   
           Let’s get back to the idea that the personal is political. The idea behind this important 
slogan was to take what was considered private—reproduction, sexuality, gender identity—and 
get it out in the open and out of the closet, thereby making intimacy, desire, nature, and care part 
of both self knowledge and public life. At its core, this was a demand that men be forced to 
confront and include these issues and values in public/political life. If the private allows for 
oppression that is sanctioned by the public, then it should be politicized and eliminated by 
dispersing or diluting it. Still, as Emma Goldman writes, sexuality is a matter of personal 
liberty,165 and this liberty can only be realized if there is liberty in public life as well, which 
demands the total absence of laws regulating how or with whom the body is used in consensual 
sexual interaction. Although Goldman sought to make the personal public, it was the public’s 
intrusion into the personal that she wanted to eliminate.  Such an elimination results in the kind of 
private life I advocate here. Love—and here she is speaking of women’s love—is made possible 
by securing safe places, free from “busybodies, moral detectives, jailers of the human spirit.”166 
She is clearly calling for private spaces free from the hateful violence of a public whose own 
repressed sexuality causes them to seize, punish, and incarcerate the bodies of sexually 
emancipated persons. A culture that is oppressive in public life will encourage oppressive private 
lives, and vice versa. A public life free of laws punishing or regulating consensual sexual 
behavior will reflect a similarly emancipated private life as well. And, as Goldman observed, 
frank and open discussion of sex as part of public discourse should lead to increased liberty for 
individualized and concrete expressions of sexuality in private relationships.167  
Oppressors want to make private sexual behavior a public issue through condemnation, 
prosecution, and vilification. This is accomplished by a literal invasion into private spheres and a 
transfer of private actions into public courtrooms, surveillance tapes, and criminal records. 
Writers like Goldman, by forcing not only a discourse about sexuality but also refusing the state 
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its claimed authority to punish through protest or refusal to obey, make the private into the public 
in order to secure those private spaces from invasion, prosecution, and incarceration.  
A culture that is oppressive in public life will encourage oppressive private lives, and, I 
suspect, vice versa. It is likely that a public life free of laws punishing most forms of consensual 
sexual behavior will reflect a similarly emancipated private life as well. And, as Emma Goldman 
observed, the frank and open discussion of sex as part of public discourse should lead to 
increased liberty for individual, concrete expressions of sexuality in private relationships as 
well.168  
Section 8. Ton corps est à toi: Private Property in Private Selves 
While there are good reasons to doubt the normative force of many feminist objections to 
the value of privacy and privacy rights, feminist objections to the idea of self-ownership align 
with the denial that privacy rights are simply property or property-like rights in the body. This 
section discusses what kinds of things fill the spaces between bodies and selves by examining 
whether ideas about privacy rights in the body better promote ideas about autonomy and liberty 
than ideas about property rights in the body. In my approach, where bodies are not understood as 
property, privacy is an attribute or feature of personhood which is in turn a unity of both person 
and body. Privacy is, under this conception, more like a skill or character trait or, as I argued in 
section 2, a condition. In this sense, my privacy, my athletic skill, or my virtue are not properties 
in an ownership sense, but indications that I am an athletic or virtuous person. I am not an owner 
of a body that, for example, writes or speaks. I am a speaker or a writer.  
According to the self-ownership theory of property, it is the separateness of persons and 
personal self-ownership which gives persons the right to decide what happens to their body 
because their bodies belong to them. But in order for something to belong to someone, the 
ownership must come into being the same way that anything else comes to be owned, which is by 
meeting the minimum criteria of acquisition, use, and alienation.  These criteria constitute the 
justificatory conditions for ownership. However, bodies—the subject or res of self-ownership—
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are so substantially different than other types of things that they cannot be subjected to the 
ownership triad. To that end, I first discuss several justifications for the conceptualization of the 
body as property, as well as several objections.  
The idea of the human body as a piece of property, where the soul or person who inhabits 
that particular body is considered its owner, is pervasive in political philosophy due perhaps to 
the strongly intuitive nature of the idea coupled with the rules of ordinary language. 
Phenomenologically, it certainly feels like I inhabit my body, and, in terms of the traditional use 
of the English language, it is in my body—as opposed to anyone else’s body—that I feel this 
inhabitation. My body is my body, and, as the title of this section suggests, your body is your 
body.169 The body as property entails a certain metaphysics: the body is the property of the self or 
person who inhabits it.170 In this last sense, the body is both the subject and object of the person 
inhabiting it, yet the owned body and the person are owned by the same ‘thing’: the person and 
their body. This conception may be intuitive, but it is grossly infelicific—despite the major role it 
plays in political theory, it fails to provide a ‘happy’ explanation of the relationship between 
persons and bodies.171 
According to Alan Hyde, there are three ways we can begin to understand the body’s role in 
politics. First, we can view the body as property or commodity. This is the view of the political 
theory that has grown up around the philosophy of John Locke and his conception of self-
ownership.172 Second, the body can be seen as a zone or place of privacy interests, skills, and 
attributes. Third, we can understand the body as inviolable or otherwise unavailable for 
distribution, forced transfers, and commodification. In this sense, we are justified to fight off 
demands and intrusions by others who attempt to distribute or commodify it.173  
Liberals are generally in agreement about bodily autonomy and integrity in terms of 
reproductive freedom, organ donation, and suicide, and agree that decisions related to these 
behaviors are solely within the discretion of the individual whose body happens to possess this or 
that organ or, in the case of suicide, be a repository for their life or its cessation. For example, it is 
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inconsistent for a liberal to deny a body’s owner (or possessor—we will address these problems 
below) the prerogative to give blood or a kidney to a friend or loved one, or to enforce a law that 
forces anyone to give up these fluids and organs. Surely, if we own anything at all (or so the 
argument goes), we own our blood, organs, and hair. We have the right to commit suicide 
because it is our body—our life—that we choose to terminate. Any law or norm that prevents this 
is coercive and contrary to liberal ideals. What about surrogacy? Assuming this kind of act is 
undertaken with plenty of conscience and autonomy at work between the parties, no one who 
values personal liberty and autonomy would prevent these kinds of interactions. What liberals 
ought to be suspicious of—and rightfully so—would be economic or coercive conditions that 
force women into these kinds of situations due to poverty, exploitation, or other human rights 
crises. In any event, laws that discourage or criminalize this kind of freely chosen behavior 
between autonomous persons are anathema to liberal conceptions of liberty and bodily autonomy. 
This is discussed in further depth in chapter 3.  
Rights which grant broad liberties over the use and disposition of bodies are typically 
predicated on the idea of self-ownership. Self-ownership means that persons own themselves, 
and, in some conceptions of the right, this entails ownership of their bodies and some or all of its 
parts. Philosophers, working from so-called ‘state of nature’ positions, have been fairly consistent 
in arguing that in the state of nature—a hypothetical thought experiment intended to determine 
whether there are essential human attributes or ‘natures’ that are presocial and unconstructed—
men naturally have, as John Locke said, a “property in their own person.”174 Because men own 
their persons, Locke claims, when men labor upon previously unowned property and ‘mix’ their 
personhood with that property, that previously unowned property becomes—like a man’s body—
his private, personal property.  This conception of ownership has become the foundation of the 
labor theory of value: if a person puts their labor into their production, then the value of their 
labor (measured in time, expertise, the cost of raw materials, etc.) should be reflected in the value 
or price of the product. The sale of wage labor is the byproduct or extension of self-or body-
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ownership rights, which ‘naturally’ inhere in all human bodies (according, again, to Locke and 
his intellectual progeny). In this sense, the conceptualization of an owned body is foundational to 
the idea of buying and selling the body’s labor.175 
This characterization of the body and its labor as commercial property has several 
implications for how bodies can be ‘used’ by their ‘owners.’ If selves are owned, then self-
ownership means that self-owners have the right to buy and sell their body as they would any 
other piece of property. Property rights generally protect how an owner decides to acquire, use, or 
dispose of something, and property rights also generally restrict how nonowners may or may not 
interfere with the owner’s decisions. Like property itself, persons are said to ‘possess’ the rights 
that protect them. Proprietarianism is the idea that all rights are property rights because of the 
idea that rights are ‘possessions.’  Proprietarians believe that, for example, speech rights are 
simply the right to use one’s bodily property—vocal chords, teeth, tongue, occasionally the 
brain—as one would use any other property, and those rights are violated when others (including 
the state) interfere with one’s property/speech rights by threatening to punish or actually 
punishing. One of the more interesting implications of proprietarianism involves body parts and 
organs. If you own your body, you clearly own the parts that make up your body. Accordingly, 
body parts are your property and may be sold or given away (the term philosophers like to use is 
alienate) at your discretion as an owner. Similar proprietarian conclusions can be drawn for rights 
associated with reproductive freedom, sexual conduct, drug use, and ownership claims in 
everything from toothbrushes to automobiles to tracts of land and natural resources, as well as for 
claims related to privacy which I will discuss shortly.  
At one very simple level, self-ownership simply means that no one is or can be owned by 
another. Self-ownership, in this sense, means that one’s possessions (including their body or self) 
cannot be put into some social common property (through a tax or regulation) without their 
consent. 176   The flipside of this means that the creation of a property right (in bodies or selves) 
imposes some limitation on the natural liberties of others to do what they want with their own 
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bodies.177 Body ownership emerges as a useful and pragmatic metaphor for the modern market 
participant who thinks of their body as a property par excellence, a unique type of property that 
sets the stage for all other types of ownership. In this conception, you own yourself, and this piece 
of property is so special that no one else can own it. Because it is a human body, it has a special 
status among one’s many possessions. 
What, then, justifies an individual’s decision (I am avoiding the use of the word ‘right’ for the 
time being) to give away a body part or other tangible thing? Locke provides an answer. By 
mixing self-owned labor with previously unowned things, ownership just arises in those things as 
it arises in selves. This provides a very short trip from self-ownership to world-ownership (such 
as cell phones, cars, land, natural resources), and that was Locke’s point. In his view, one’s 
interest in their body is just as important and worthy of protection as one’s interest in non-bodily 
things, and this entailment justifies the owned world that follows from his ideas.  
But there are other answers. Self-ownership of oneself necessarily implies that there are other 
self-owners, who are equally entitled to freely alienate their body products with one another as 
forms of unregulated exchange, giving rise not only to a free market of body products (my blood 
for your kidney, my DNA for your hair, etc.) but also one for labor. This is both an equality 
argument and an economic argument which leads to a conception of freedom that includes 
unregulated exchanges of external/worldly things as well.  
In terms of the problem of body commodification, the first approach is purely conceptual: if 
properties—all kinds, including bodies and selves—are things that are subject to the ‘ownership 
triad’ (they are capable of being acquired, used, and alienated) then perhaps we can show that 
bodies and selves are not ownable because they cannot conform to the triad. Selves are certainly 
used, and probably alienated, in various ways. Whether selves are capable of being acquired is, I 
think, the best question to ask in terms of their susceptibility for ownership. If bodies and selves 
cannot be acquired, then they cannot constitute ownable property. If this triad determines 
ownership of all things, including selves, then it also cannot account for either our own role in 
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acquiring personhood or the extent of the roles of other persons in the acquisition of personhood 
or, even more problematically, their granting or bequeathing of personhood as a property. 
Perhaps we are granted our persons when we are born or that we acquire our persons at some 
arbitrary stage in our development (an age, say, or some kind of test).178 In any event, the 
acquisition of the self as a standard or typical piece of property is deeply problematic.  
Part of the problem with self-ownership is its ineluctable association with natural rights. The 
idea that persons are born with the positive right to enjoy property rights in regards to the world’s 
natural resources is the position of most left-libertarians, and a just system of property would 
probably allow the newly born or persons in utero the right to acquire property as a gift, and an 
unjust system would be one that arbitrarily denies this right.179 This type of ownership is due 
solely to convention: as members in a particular social/political organization we can be granted 
purely posited property rights in our bodies in the same way we might be granted (legal) voting 
rights or the (legal) right to obtain an abortion. In this purely posited sense, we are born without 
selves, but are ‘gifted’ them to facilitate self-ownership as members of a community.  We acquire 
ourselves whether we want to or not as a result of some norm, convention, or law. This forces the 
body-self to be “inscribed…into normal economic life” and represents Foucault’s understanding 
of disciplinary power.180 Conversely, the idea that persons inherently own some property as a 
natural fact—in themselves, for example, or as a share in the world’s resources—is somewhat 
incoherent, and would also require that the acquisition/use/alienation triadic understanding of 
ownership be discarded unless it is a gift. But even if it were a gift, there would still be the issue 
of acquisition. An inherent ownership interest acquired by virtue of being a person—which 
sounds like good luck or karma—is quite a different thing than an ownership interest acquired 
through gift, exchange, or negotiation, which are, of course, sometimes the result of luck and 
sometime the result of factors such as effort, desert, or skill.   
That being said, ownable things can certainly ‘appear out of nowhere’ as self-generated 
possessions, and perhaps the person/body as an owned thing can similarly appear ex nihilo. I am 
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thinking specifically of the intellectual property in scientific developments, artistic works, or the 
products of everyday mentality. If these products are truly mine, I acquired them without a 
grantor and without owning them previously, so perhaps my ownership of my body-self arises 
along the same lines: the acquisition is nostra sponte (‘of our own accord’) and without reference 
to the accord of others—in which case personhood as a property can occur in prepolitical states of 
nature or totally asocially and without the involvement of other persons. This is the 
nonconventional or natural understanding of self-ownership. Another way to view this problem—
and potentially solve it—is to see ourselves as both subjects and objects of property rights. I own 
my intellectual property and perhaps my self because I acquired them from me: I am both grantor 
and grantee of the property. A third view considers intellectual property and the self as previously 
unowned property, and we—as the first to ‘find’ these ‘properties’—have first occupier rights in 
these previously nonexistent and therefore unowned things.181 
If it is unlikely that we have spontaneously acquired ourselves, then perhaps acquisition 
occurs at some contingent point between fertilization and death. This allows for the possibility 
that some persons do not and will never own themselves—very young children probably do not 
own themselves, nor do those who suffer from pathological conditions which do not permit them 
to provide for their own basic care. Hegel might approach the problem in the following way: we 
acquire bodies as internal property when we simultaneously objectify our will in external 
property. When we acquire things in the world, our personhood emerges as yet another acquired 
and owned thing. But this cannot be true—for Hegel, at least—because possession of a will is 
precisely what prevents persons from being owned in the first place, and lack of a will is what 
allows things in the world to be made into objects of the will through acquisition, use, and, most 
importantly, alienation.182 Furthermore, personhood is not acquired through the acquisition and 
use of things: it is developed and perfected by both the will to own and the recognition by others 
of the will-made-objective. For Hegel, we are born with personhood but it is merely abstract until 
others recognize it as objective will via ownership of objects in the world. Personhood lies 
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dormant or immature until the world is subjected to will through the desiring, choosing and 
owning and—most importantly—the alienation of things.  Through the medium of voluntary 
exchange, other persons recognize this objectification of will when they affirm each other’s 
potential and actual ownership of things.183 
Because of the ontological and practical problems presented by self-ownership, I suggest 
that privacy forms the foundational basis for addressing and protecting the value of bodily 
integrity rights and interests. When we seek to deny others control over our bodies, when we seek 
to use them as we wish to satisfy our desires and our needs, when we pursue our own reasons that 
do not fit into some established discourse about bodies, what we are seeking are not property 
rights over our bodies or lifestyles (the right to acquire, use, and alienate), but privacy and its 
protection by a privacy right. By conceiving of the body as private space, it moves from property 
to a noncommodified “refuge away from the economic and political life of civil society.”184 
Within such a refuge, what is truly remarkable about the decision to give away a kidney, or to 
‘give’ one’s body to another in the moment of desire, is not that it is property that is being 
exchanged, but that privacy is being shared or ‘given’ to another. The right to privacy, at its most 
basic, is the right to exclude. It might be the right to exclude others from some physical thing—a 
body, or an artwork or a home—or from an emotion, thought, or fear. I should respect your body 
and your decisions about your body not because bodies and decisions are property, but because 
your body and your decisions about your body are within your sphere of privacy. The private, 
autonomous body resists intrusion, and a body that can resist intrusion is an autonomous one.  
These foundational conceptions of bodily integrity combine to form a powerful domain 
of privacy that is constitutive of freedom but avoids the problems associated with ideas of self-
ownership. For example, because they are part of your body, you have deeply important privacy 
rights in your eyes, and others have an even more stringent duty not to interfere with them. 
Bodies, therefore, are things but not property and therefore not subject to ideas about ownership 
by selves or others. We need an adequate account of these interests, and also an account of the 
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structure and foundation of conventional norms erected to secure and protect these interests, 
specifying when, where, and in what ways we may not be observed, listened to, questioned, or 
kept track of.185 These interests are best protected by the private property right, which is derived 
from the privacy interest outlined here and embodied into the world through the right to exclude 
and the correlative duty of noninterference.  
Section 9. Deriving the Property Right from the Privacy Right 
As Richard Arneson writes, there is a strong affinity between a broad sense of privacy—
one in which persons place themselves “where they will not be disturbed by anybody,” and where 
others (including the government) are prevented from interfering with the choices being made in 
that place—and private property. A good strategy for achieving this, Arneson writes, is to live in 
a regime that does not ban the desired action, “own some property in land,” and retire to it with 
like-minded individuals who wish to engage in that kind of activity without disturbance by the 
state or other individuals.186  
As I will show in the following chapters, arguments for the right to private property are 
not only coextensive with arguments for the right to privacy in bodies, but the right to private 
property is largely supervenient upon the right to privacy: the private property right exists as a 
result of the foundational and pre-existing value of privacy.  It is privacy—and the justifications 
for it—that makes bodies pro tanto immune to interference by others. These justifications are 
embodied in the person as the privacy right and do not at first blush implicate ideas about 
ownership or possession—although ownership or possession are certainly implicated by the 
privacy aspects of external property. Like the privacy right, what is important about the right to 
private property is its provision for the right to exclude others from the thing owned, and its 
demand that others not interfere with it. So, private property rights—conventionally, the right to 
own some quantifiable thing, framed in terms of the right of exclude and the duty of nonowners 
not to interfere—are predicated upon privacy rights in that thing, and justifications for privacy 
rights in bodies are mutatis mutandis the same justifications that support property rights in things. 
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If a person has no right to exclude others from their body, they have no privacy, and if a person 
has no right to exclude others from their property, then they have no property right.  
Private property rights are therefore a species of privacy rights, and property rights—to 
varying depths and degrees, and in terms of several competing conceptions of both self ownership 
and world ownership rights—are best understood as rights in external things which give the 
rights-holders the power and security to control things and to exclude others from violating the 
integrity of those things. Importantly, as Christine Sypnowich writes, the domain of privacy is 
also “constituent of freedom, a condition for different kinds of social relationships, and it is 
because we value it that we might opt for institutions like individual ownership of property.” 187 
The power of the state, she continues, is therefore 
checked for sake of an individual’s privacy. Property rights, whilst usually conceived in 
terms of market exchanges and the accumulation of capital, also refer to the more 
mundane but highly prized personal property that the state cannot invade or appropriate 
except under very special circumstances. Other rights, including freedom of conscience, 
opinion, association and expression involve respect for the citizen’s privacy from the 
state. Legal rights that protect the individual from arbitrary arrest, lack of counsel, or an 
unfair trial provide the means for precisely demarcating the private realm from the 
public.188 
 
So, A has a right to privacy in their body when they have the right to control it and the right to 
exclude others, and A similarly has a right to private property when they have a right to control it 
and a right to exclude others.  Although we may not be aware of it, it is often the privacy aspect 
of property rights that concern us when boundary crossings occur. For example, when a person 
runs through our back yard and we yell ‘this is private property!’, Sypnowich observes—astutely 
and correctly, I think—that we are not primarily concerned with interferences of our property 
right, but with an interference with the privacy we sought there.189 It is privacy, in this case, that 
justifies the right to exclude others from this kind of property, and it is our privacy that we feel is 
violated in these cases.    
The privacy interests in bodies and in external things differs not in kind but only in 
degree, and that degree is subjective: one interest—say, in bodily privacy—may be more 
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important to an individual than privacy in property, and this could be determined by their 
behavior in social situations where persons choose to relinquish those rights. For example, a 
person may choose to cover up most of their body when in public spaces, yet choose to not own 
or assert strong property rights in things—I am thinking here of nuns or monks in the many 
religious traditions. Others may choose to relinquish bodily privacy rights in public, yet draw the 
shades at home and assert a private property right there—here, I am thinking of nude beach-
goers, who return home, draw the shades, and put on their pajamas at night. I do not argue that, as 
a foundational matter, bodily privacy is the more important or stronger right, although it seems 
intuitive that invasions of the body are more egregious than invasions of property: this intuition is 
pumped by the fact that crimes against the person—such as robbery by force or fear—are 
punished much more severely than, for example, shoplifting. Different people and different 
cultures value their privacy interests differently. There is no reason to posit a lexical preference 
for one type of privacy over the other, and both need protection by various moral and legal 
provisions.    
Assuming, for the moment, that there is such a right to privacy, and that assertions of it 
can be fairly well determined by objective observation (fences, clothing, encryption), the question 
arises how the right is waived: in other words, when is the right to exclude transformed into an 
invitation to enter or share? On a very rudimentary level, the right to bodily privacy is waived—
to varying degrees—when a person enters the public sphere, but it is debatable how persons 
undertake this kind of waiver. There is certainly a combination of the subjective intent to waive 
and a social determination whether the person has what the Supreme Court has termed a 
‘constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy…that society is prepared to 
recognize.”190 On another rudimentary level, the right to private property is waived when the 
property becomes public. Again, this must be a combination or balance between the subjective 
intent to waive the right, and the willingness of the rest of the world to recognize the right.  
Intuitively, communities have a greater interest in asserting a community interest in the exercise 
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of property rights than in the exercise of bodily privacy rights, particularly when the exercise of 
property rights is undertaken for commercial purposes.  
To conclude: the right to exclude and the duty not to interfere emerge as the primarily 
considerations that a theory of property and its associated institutions should promote and 
protect—particularly when the right is infringed by eminent domain and its modern declinations 
into takings, regulatory takings, and exercises of the police power. The next chapter introduces 
these property concepts, and then evaluates how a privacy-based property right fares against a 
social norm which requires owners to relinquish those rights in order to maximize human 
flourishing.  
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Chapter 2 
 
Virtue, Aristotle, and the Social-Obligation Norm for Property 
According to Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver,1 property rights and property 
law should be governed by a social-obligation norm. The social-obligation norm is a theory of 
property law that is both functionalist and instrumentalist towards human flourishing. By 
claiming that human flourishing should be maximized through the actions of virtuous property 
owners, its proponents look to Aristotle and the theories of virtue that are derived from him (most 
importantly, the capabilities approach developed in recent years by Martha Nussbaum and 
Amartya Sen2) to develop a duty-based property law that is inspired by communitarian political 
obligations. The norm seeks to recharacterize the property right from primarily one of exclusion 
to one in which communities and nonowners are the beneficiaries of substantial duties on the part 
of owners in the form of a right to flourish, and, more significantly, to reconceive the liberal 
conception of the sovereignty and priority of the individual rights-bearer. 
As the foundation for a proposed new property law regime, the social obligation norm: 
1. is instrumentalist and collective: it give the community or state a greater right to 
participate in decisions about privacy property use and ownership than under the current 
property regime3;  
2. claims for each person an equal right, as a matter of human dignity, to flourish,4 which in 
turn grants them “the capabilities that are the foundation of flourishing and the material 
resources required to nurture those capabilities”5; 
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3. morally binds owners to “provide to the society of which the individual is a member 
those benefits that the society reasonably regards as necessary for human flourishing”6; 
4. prioritizes the community, the conception of which is “intentionally capacious: the state 
as well as families, voluntary associations”7 over individual persons;  
5. establishes the community as having a “have a moral status that is distinct from those of 
neighboring owners or non owning individuals”8; and 
6. is legally enforceable through the coercive power of the state. 
The distinct moral status of the community is based on idea that although individuals and their 
community are mutually interdependent, the community has normative priority over the 
individual in terms of individual rights. “We are, in short, inevitably dependent upon 
communities, both chosen and unchosen, not only for our physical survival but also for our ability 
to function as free and rational agents.”9 Dependence creates “an obligation to participate in and 
support the social networks and structures that enable us to develop those human capabilities that 
make human flourishing possible.”10  
Although the norm is enforceable through the use of eminent domain (at the most 
coercive) and routine zoning decisions (at the least), Alexander writes that the adoption of the 
social-obligation norm would not substantially affect impact private property rights.11 This 
chapter argues otherwise. By arguing that the law should prioritize the public interest by 
regulating and controlling property so that benefits inure both to the public and to the owner, the 
social-obligation theorists purvey a legally enforced expropriative and regulative norm that 
authorizes an extremely broad variety of noncompensated takings encompassing regulations 
ranging from the establishment of historic districts in urban areas to environmental measures in 
rural areas.  For Alexander, these measures reflect an implied norm that requires property owners 
to conform to legislative and quasi-legislative efforts to preserve both cultural artifacts (such as 
buildings and their facades) as well as natural phenomena such as lakes and wetlands.  By 
arguing that privacy concerns play a very small role in property disputes, Alexander’s approach 
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defaults to social or democratic prerogatives in almost all commercial property regulations, and, 
apparently, most personal property situations as well. This prioritizing of the public at the 
expense of the private is a key factor in determining whether his example of a social-obligation 
norm is desirable in a property scheme that seeks to maximize privacy interests and the 
personhood-enhancing values that flow from them.  
There are five sections. Section 1 introduces the legal process of eminent domain and its 
statutory basis in the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Section 2 describes the norm, its 
background, and how Alexander and Peñalver situate it into the property law regime of the 
United States. This section focuses on defining the norm and how it sits in the jurisprudence by 
examining its potential impact on takings law, privacy rights, and other constitutional property 
norms. Section 3 analyzes the communitarian and Aristotelian origins of the norm. This section 
focuses on the normative background of property theories and how an Aristotelian property 
supports wide latitude for individual rights. Section 4 analyzes why and how the social-obligation 
theorists, as ‘property instrumentalists,’ distinguish their approach from utilitarianism and their 
shared pursuit of ends such as well-being and flourishing. Section 5 combines the virtue ethics of 
Aristotle with the political aspects of the norm in terms of their foundation for a new property 
regime. In this final section, I will argue that the social obligation norm fails to provide such a 
foundation.  
Section 1. Introduction to Eminent Domain and Constitutional Takings 
This section describes the legal process of eminent domain contained in the jurisprudence 
of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, a jurisprudence that is said by many 
commentators to lie in a ‘muddle.’12 According to legal scholar Jed Rubenfeld, “[t]he ‘eminent 
domain’ power refers to the state's prerogative to seize private property, dispossess its owner, and 
assume full legal right and title to it in the name of some ostensible public good.”13 
Dominium eminens was first described by Hugo Grotius in De Jure Belli et Pacis in 
1625. It refers to the power of the state to take private property for public use.  The power is 
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vested in a sovereign as the inherent right and ability to assume title and ownership over all levels 
of property within its jurisdiction. If a state enjoys this power—and apparently, all do—all 
property is “held subject to defeasance at the will of the State.”14 Eminent domain is therefore the 
right of a state to convert A’s property—call it Blackacre15—to B’s property by way of a forced 
exchange. B might be the state itself or another non-state actor. If A is protected by a limiting 
statute, which places normative boundaries on the right of eminent domain, then the exchange 
might include compensation. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution is such a 
statute. These exchanges might be achieved in a variety of ways, such as occupation of Blackacre 
by B or exchange of title from A to B. Besides the physical property itself, we can say that what 
is exchanged from A to B are A’s rights about Blackacre. These rights might be rights in 
Blackacre, rights to Blackacre, or rights arising from the nature of A and B’s agency qua agents, 
meaning that A’s rights in Blackacre might be more or less full due to A’s status as a private 
individual or as a legal fiction such as a church or corporation, and B—as a state actor—may 
have had various rights in Blackacre prior to the initiation of the transfer which it is simply 
reclaiming through its power of eminent domain. In democratic systems, eminent domain takes 
private property and places, or legislates, at some part of it into the public domain;16 however, it 
is controversial whether a statute like the Fifth Amendment requires that the public, as opposed to 
a private party, becomes the owner of the property.   
The Takings Clause consists of the last twelve words of the Fifth Amendment: “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use without just compensation.” Like many other 
Constitutional powers claimed by the state, there is no explicit or enumerated power of eminent 
domain in the United States Constitution.17 Instead, the courts regard it as a power inherent in the 
nature of sovereignty, a power that requires no constitutional recognition.18  Without some kind 
of restriction, such as the limitations of ‘public use’ and ‘just compensation,’ eminent domain 
would otherwise be absolute.19  In the jurisprudence of the United States and many other 
countries,20 this power—usually vested in the legislature but also found in the executive (as police 
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and emergency powers) and (rarely) the judicial branches21—is restricted by a combination of 
constitutional provisions and judicial review. In the United States, the Takings Clause recognizes 
the implicit power of eminent domain and restricts that power. If a party believes that their 
property has been unconstitutionally taken pursuant to the eminent domain power, the Clause 
requires the party (the takee) to show that (1) their ‘private property’22 (2) has been ‘taken’ by the 
state (3) for a ‘public use’ (4) without ‘just compensation.’23  If successful, the takee loses their 
property but receives compensation. When this occurs with compensation to the former owner, 
the property is ‘purchased,’ a forced or legal taking occurs, and the property enters the public 
domain, or, in many cases, a private domain that is purported to have a public purpose.24 
Property, or some number of sticks in the property rights bundle, also enters the public domain 
when its use is merely regulated: the state then ‘owns’ those regulated sticks in the bundle 
because the erstwhile owner is precluded from controlling those sticks or excluding others from 
entering that particular area because the right to control and exclude have been assumed by the 
state.   
 Takings, as a legal measure, is therefore the power of eminent domain restricted by 
public use and just compensation. If it takes, then the state must pay. Takings are broken down 
into two general categories:  
1. Real or confiscatory takings: the state formally invokes its eminent domain power as a 
plaintiff in a lawsuit against the target property or property owner, usually pursuant to a 
measure passed by the legislature which authorizes the claim. In these cases, there is no 
dispute that property is taken under the eminent power—usually due to the actual or 
intended physical occupation of the property by the state—and litigation focuses on the 
just compensation requirement and rarely on the public use requirement.25  
2. Regulatory takings or inverse condemnation: Here, the state denies that its measure 
effectuates a taking, thereby requiring the property owner to file a lawsuit—a ‘takings 
action’—claiming a taking due to regulation that has gone ‘too far.’ Takings cases 
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typically begin when a permit is denied, and the Government must take a final position 
on what it will or will not approve. If successful, the takee is awarded relief due to the 
state’s ‘regulatory taking’ of their property.  As a legal doctrine, the takings action 
emerged from the Supreme Court’s 1922 opinion in Pennsylvania v. Mahon, which held 
that a mere use restriction, in the absence of physical occupation, could trigger the right 
to compensation.26 
Takings actions are usually filed in response to the state’s exercise of its police power. Exercises 
of the state’s police power were traditionally used to abate nuisances which negatively affect the 
health, safety, morals, or comfort of the public. Nuisance abatements are not takings and therefore 
noncompensable.  Today, the police power permits the state to engage in a wide variety of 
noncompensable regulations that are not intended to abate nuisance, such as historic preservation, 
open space preservation, greenways, public beach access, growth control, vulnerable floodplains, 
and the activities of undesirable neighbors such as brickyards and slaughterhouses.27  Zoning 
restraints, as uses of the police power, also purport to protect wetlands, coastal zones, barrier 
islands, alluvial valley floors, endangered species, lands unsuitable for surface mining, and other 
environmental concerns.28   
 In terms of judicial review, measures which result in both compensable takings and 
noncompensable regulation under the police power are subject to the rational basis standard, 
whereby legislation is constitutionally permissible if it is rationally related to a legitimate 
government objective.29   The courts had previously applied a much closer standard when 
scrutinizing economic regulation, 30  and their abandonment of close scrutiny of economic 
regulation in the 1930s meant ‘hands off’ of most legislative regulation of property rights. The 
closer standard, known as strict scrutiny, is applied when legislation infringes fundamental rights 
or implicates a suspect classification such as race. If legislation implicates fundamental rights 
such as speech, religion, or procreation, the legislation will be struck down unless it is ‘necessary 
to achieve a compelling governmental objective.’31  
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 According to Alexander, whose work frames the issues in this chapter, the ‘muddle’ 
mentioned by other commentators is not unpredictability or normative disagreement - outcomes 
of takings litigation are overwhelmingly in favor of the government and against the property 
owner, and most agree that compensated takings for public use are a necessary evil—rather, it is 
the lack of transparency about the normative underpinnings of the court’s unwillingness to 
disclose its conceptions of the core purposes of constitutional property in an explicit and 
systematic way.32 For Alexander, the social obligation norm provides such an underpinning.  
Section 2. The Social Obligation Norm: Background and Cases  
“What sacrifices may the state legitimately ask private landowners to make concerning 
the use of their land? Stated somewhat differently, the question is: What obligations do 
landowners owe to their communities with respect to the use, condition, or care or their 
property?”33   
This section explores answers to these questions by analyzing the underlying aim of the 
social-obligation norm and the implications for its implementation. This aim, it is argued, is a 
streamlined police power over private property rights, one that facilitates regulations over 
property by denying that the regulation amounts to a compensable taking or that it affects 
fundamental rights. Alexander and Peñalver seek to restrict the cases that require compensation 
by classifying them as exercises of the state’s regulative police power, which are legitimate so 
long as they serve the goals that the norm is intended to promote. The social-obligation norm is 
therefore an attempt—in part—to provide a moral basis and, a fortiori, a moral justification for 
non-compensated property regulation and expropriation. The norm emerges as the exercise of the 
traditional police power but under a different sail. As a new and improved police power, it 
attempts to gather together, under a single theory, jurisprudence that addresses harm (nuisance), 
modifies the right to exclude (trespass), or limits sovereignty (eminent domain), which either do 
not address the kinds of obligations Alexander and Peñalver want them to, or address them under 
very different conditions. Although the case law provides precedent for the understanding that 
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property ownership entails obligations to nonowners, these obligations do not, I will argue, 
support strong moral or legal connections between ownership and the kind of duties necessary for 
promoting a high level of flourishing and capabilities. This lack of a connection between 
ownership and obligation34 results in the lack of an explicit, or positive, social-obligation norm.  
According to Alexander, this is partly due to the background nonconstitutional political 
and legal culture of the United States, which has favored a non-democratic and individualistic 
conception of ownership that denies any social-obligation on the part of the owner. 35 Alexander 
is primarily concerned that the constitutionalization of property as a fundamental and protected 
right—which is, again, the aim of this paper—marks the end of political debate over property, 
and therefore entrenches extant and unjust distributions of wealth. 36  The result of 
constitutionalization is, for Alexander, the nondistributive nightwatchman state, immune from the 
operations of ‘normal’ majority-rule democratic politics.37  By making property a constitutionally 
protected right—one protected by the strict scrutiny standard of review against legislative 
reorganization or redistribution—property and the issues associated with it are removed from the 
realm of ordinary and democratic public discourse, regulation, and control, which are 
implemented primary through the use of institutions such as state and municipal legislatures. 
Property, for Alexander, demands extensive regulation in order to preserve these 
democratic institutions,38 and the property jurisprudence of the United States should not be 
replicated in the constitutions of new states on the grounds that such replication will entail the 
replication of property inequalities as well. 39  This suggests that the property and wealth 
disparities present in the United States are the result of constitutional property protections; in 
other words, constitutional property is constitutive of wealth disparities, and wealth disparities 
deprive morally and politically equal co-citizens of their right to flourish. To avoid these 
disparities, Alexander argues that the state should regulate property more frequently in order to 
minimize inequality40 on the grounds that a more equal distribution of resources will realize more 
capabilities, and is hence more just.41 He purports to support robust property rights, but argues 
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that constitutional recognition is neither necessary nor sufficient for a legal regime of robust 
property rights.42 
While there is no explicit social obligation in American law,43 Alexander and Peñalver 
purport to find “robust” implications of property rights shaped by the social-obligation norm in 
American nuisance,44  trespass, 45  and takings law,46  and argue that courts and scholars are 
obligated to clearly identify and systematically develop the norm.47 The norm is claimed to be 
‘implicit’ in eminent domain proceedings and other encroachments upon private property 
interests,48 and the property law that regulates these interests is improved and made more 
‘transparent’ if judges were to utilize the norm in order to reveal the normative underpinnings of 
the law by disclosing their “conceptions of the core purposes of constitutional property in an 
explicit and systemic way.”49 According to Alexander, the takings doctrine in American property 
law emerges as the best example of the implied social-obligation norm because the doctrine 
operates by defining the parameters of the public dimension of private ownership, resulting in a 
jurisprudence which “implicitly acknowledges that there is a public dimension of private 
ownership.”50 Therefore, the “[p]ower of the state to expropriate property for public uses is 
premised on the necessity of subordinating private will to public well being.”51 Like nuisance 
abatements, this power also extends to uncompensated regulations enacted and enforced pursuant 
to the state’s police power.  
 Alexander also supports extensive use of the takings clause in its negative incarnation 
(i.e., inverse condemnation) when it furthers what might be understood to be a social-obligation 
norm to promote culture, shape the aesthetic of the urban landscape, and preserve history. He 
views the establishment of historic districts, which limit the rights of property owners to develop, 
alter, or sell property due to the property’s alleged value to the community, as well as aesthetic 
restrictions on certain property uses, as both legitimate and desirable examples of the 
implementation of the norm by municipalities and their administrative agencies.  
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The Penn Central case,52 which held that the owners of Grand Central Station did not 
deserve compensation for lost profits when New York City prevented the construction of a 55 
story addition to the building due to its designation as a landmark, is cited approvingly as a 
legitimate regulation resulting in the preservation of “cultural meaning and identity.”53 According 
to Alexander, human flourishing is promoted by preventing development of buildings such as 
Grand Central Terminal because such structures “are integral to an urban community’s identity,” 
and their destruction or radical alteration “erases collective historical memory” which results in 
not merely a different but “civically impoverished” culture.54  
Although Penn Central is widely cited by the theorists as a potential source of the social 
norm, Alexander is clear that “nothing of the sort was acknowledged”55 either in the holding or in 
dicta. Like most cases dealing with the expropriation or regulation of property, the Court looked 
to the economic impact of the regulation in its ruling—and not to virtue, flourishing, or social 
norms. As the most significant factor to consider in takings cases,56 the Court’s analysis of the 
economic impact on the owners of Grand Central resulted in the ruling that the Landmark 
Commission’s denial of the building permit did not constitute a taking of Penn Central’s property 
for the following reasons.  
1. there was no interference with the owner’s primary expectation or present use of 
Grand Central Terminal;  
2. there was no showing the owners could not continue to make a reasonable return 
on their investment; and  
3. The owner’s airspace rights were transferable to other parcels they owned in the 
immediate area.57  
Penn Central has resulted in the establishment of at least six factors that are considered when a 
court rules on claims that regulations constitute compensable takings. These relevant factors, 
which derive primary from Penn Central as well as Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,58 are: 
1. the diminution of value caused by the regulation; 
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2. whether the regulation prevented a harm to the public; 
3. whether the regulation resulted in a reciprocity of advantage  to the owner;  
4. whether the regulation caused the destruction of existing property interests; 
5. the character of the government action (e.g. whether it was physically or merely 
legally invasive); and  
6. the extent to which government action interferes with the owner’s investment 
backed expectations for the use of the property.59 
Penn Central has in fact led to the creation of nationwide comprehensive landmark preservation 
legislation, whereby designated landmarks may not be demolished or significantly altered without 
government approval by a historical commission.60 Owners of landmarks are therefore not 
entitled to the highest and best use of their property, but only an economically viable use. As 
Meltz notes, statutes that create landmarks might operate as a takings if they create an affirmative 
duty for the landmark owner to spend money for particularized maintenance and repair on the 
property.61   
Because Penn Central was a regulatory or inverse takings case—the state did not take 
title or possession through eminent domain—the state’s right to regulate the property was based 
on the police power and not the takings power.  However, Alexander argues, both powers are 
based on the same assumption, which is that  “the state’s power to restrict private owners from 
using their property entirely as they wish, without paying compensation, is best explained by the 
notion that owners inherently owe society certain obligations.”62 As I will show, both owners and 
nonowners are indeed bound by obligations, but it is wrong to try to find the source of such an 
obligation in the takings clause. According to Eric Claeys, the social obligation theorists can only 
make this type of claim only by relying on a crude and inaccurate characterization of private 
property as an owner’s ‘sole and despotic dominion’ that grants owners “the right to exclude 
others, with no obligation owed to them.”63 This view of view of property, Claeys argues, 
mischaracterizes the nature of private property rights, which have always operated with some 
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level of duty to non-owners and the community:  
If one is going to ground property in some sort of exclusiveness, it is better to call 
property a domain of exclusive use, shaped with regard for the like use-interests of other 
owners and the interests of the public properly understood. Alexander and Peñalver trade 
on the discrepancy between the crudeness of the commonplace understanding of property 
and the qualifications one must add to that understanding to make it precise.64 
 
The allegation that the power of eminent domain is premised on a social-obligation 
norm—even, as Alexander makes clear, an “implied” norm “indirectly acknowledged” by the 
takings clause—is not true to the history of eminent domain and property regulation in the United 
States. Eminent domain was never intended to promote a social-obligation norm—of any stripe—
in owners, and understanding it to contain the roots of such a norm is misplaced. Eminent domain 
is a key feature of sovereignty and, for all modern nations, one of the inherent, necessary 
attributes of statehood. The payment of compensation for its exercise is a recognition that its 
implementation injures property rights, and a just state compensates for the exercise of eminent 
domain in virtue of its sovereign power over the nation’s land and patrimony. The moral duty—if 
it can be said to be a moral duty—imposed by the norm is owed by the state to the owner and not, 
as the theorists wish, by the owner to the state.  
The social-obligation theorists also find the foundation of a social obligation norm in the 
law of nuisance. The roots of nuisance law are grounded in the 19th century United States 
Supreme Court case of Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1897), which holds, in dicta, that all 
property is held under the implied obligation that it not be injurious to the community. Mugler is 
widely considered to be the genesis of the state’s right to regulate property as a ‘nuisance’ 
pursuant to the police power. Nuisance law purports to stop or abate an owner’s ‘noxious use’ of 
their property because ownership does not permit the harming of the public. It is based on the 
legal maxim ‘sic utere tue ut alienum non laedas’ (‘use your own property in such a manner as to 
not injure that of another’) (1 Blackstone’s Commentaries 306).  
Mugler involved a claim by a brewer that a Kansas alcohol prohibition ordinance, which 
outlawed the brewer’s commercial product, amounted to a compensable taking under the Fifth 
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Amendment because the ordinance “materially diminished” the value of his property and 
equipment, which was built specifically for brewing.65   The Supreme Court denied that a taking 
occurred because Kansas possessed the power to declare a wide variety of properties to be 
nuisances, on the grounds that the properties and their intended uses were “injurious” to the 
morals, health, or safety of the public. When the state acts to abate an injurious use of property, 
owners are not entitled to compensation so long as the exercise of the police power addresses key 
health, safety, and welfare concerns.66 The Court in Mugler reasoned that Kansas did not violate 
any property rights by declaring the production of beer to be a nuisance, and it specifically did not 
engage in an act of eminent domain because: 
[a] prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes that are declared, by valid 
legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of the community cannot in any 
just sense be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the public benefit. Such 
legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his property for lawful 
purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is only a declaration by the State that 
its use by anyone for certain forbidden purposes is prejudicial to the public interests.67 
 
 Mugler’s dictum about an implied obligation not to harm the community might have been 
the “foundation for a fully developed notion of the implied obligation of owners,” but Alexander 
recognizes that this foundation “was never realized.”68 Mugler and its progeny are nevertheless 
cited approvingly as precedent for two important key concepts for the social-obligation theorists: 
first, that the social obligation has roots in American jurisprudence, and second, that regulations 
that purport to promote human flourishing by abating nuisances can be validly characterized as 
exercises of the uncompensable police power rather than compensable takings. However, in their 
use of Mugler the theorists are in the same position as they are with Penn Central: they are 
searching for the foundational source of a social-obligation norm in order to situate it in the 
cultural, social, and legal history of the United States, but not merely as a norm prohibiting harm, 
but a norm that actively promotes a “fully developed notion of the implied obligation of 
owners.”69 It is uncontroversial that owners cannot use their property to unjustly harm others, and 
a mistake to read anything more than an obligation to refrain from harming into either Mugler or 
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the nuisance law it inspired.  Mugler’s only obligation, which is true of all owners and 
nonowners, was to not harm others, and this does not entail promoting the kinds of benefits a true 
social obligation norm would demand.  
Returning to Penn Central as a source of the norm, Alexander writes that a holding 
against the Landmark Commission in that case—which would permit Grand Central’s owners to 
build the addition—would lead to the destruction of culture, capabilities, and flourishing in New 
York City. As an empirical question, this may be true—although I will argue otherwise. The 
issue, however, is whether the owners owe a social obligation to maintain the building in order to 
promote culture and flourishing. I believe that any social-obligation owed by its owners is met by 
building the addition rather than by not building it because the addition’s potential to maximize 
overall well-being and efficiency.    
Grand Central Station—an enormous train station with typical commercial space, 
serving, in 2013 alone, 21.6 million visitors70—is, according to Alexander, “indispensable” 
according to the perspective of the “relevant communities,” and this is one reason why its owners 
should not be permitted to build an addition upon it. It is part of the “architectural patrimony” of 
the City, and if the City were to lose “all” of its historic buildings, “its culture would be not 
merely different but civically impoverished.”71 These sites are “integral to an urban community's 
identity and the identities of its inhabitants,” and the implication here is that if the owners were 
permitted to destroy the façade of Grand Central—and add yet another skyscraper to an already 
crowded skyline—there would be a ‘civic impoverishment’ in the culture of the city, a culture 
which (presumably) develops the capabilities which in turn promote human flourishing in the 
polis. Because historical landmarks create “collective urban memory,” erasure of this memory 
would “destabilize a society and its culture.”72 Such a destabilization, writes Alexander, has 
“potentially severe political consequences” because repressive regimes tend to destroy the 
structures which “nurtured capacities necessary for robust free citizenship; not infrequently, part 
of the regime's effort at erasure involved architectural landmarks.”73  
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The claim that the addition of a 55-story office tower atop Grand Central Terminal would 
constitute the work of a repressive regime that seeks to erase the memories of past culture is 
hyperbolic. Grand Central Terminal is not the Statue of Liberty, and in seeking to maximize the 
value of its holdings, Penn Central and other owners do not operate as ‘repressive regimes’ that 
‘destabilize’ the society and culture of New York by building multistory additions upon their 
commercial properties. In this context, Alexander also presents a false dichotomy: either Penn 
Central and all such cases are rightfully decided against private property rights, or humans cannot 
flourish. This is a false dichotomy because there are at least three possible outcomes from a ruling 
in Penn Central’s favor, and none of them spell the kind of civic disaster that Alexander 
describes.  Had the Court declared the regulation a compensable taking, the three outcomes are as 
follows.  
In the first possible outcome, the Landmark Commission is required to grant the permit, 
and Penn Central builds the tower. The result is increased jobs and taxes for the city,74 resulting in 
increased well-being, efficiency, and private property rights—the goal of efficiency theorists—
but gained at the cost of the Beaux Arts façade, ‘collective urban memory,’ and community 
control—the goals of the social-obligation theorists.75  In the second outcome, the city continues 
to refuse the permit, but pays for the loss of profits due to the inverse condemnation of the 
airspace using the Court’s established formula for regulatory takings. The property remains 
privately owned, and city is culturally enriched but—quite literally—paying for it.  This would 
amount to a victory for the property rights libertarians led by Richard Epstein—who demand 
compensation for any regulation that diminishes the value of a property right76—and perhaps this 
constitutes the ‘severe political consequences’ that the social-obligation theorists fear most: a 
ruling setting a precedent for increased payment of compensation, which chills future regulation 
of this kind. Alexander fears that a victory for the owners of Grand Central Terminal would 
motivate takings jurisprudence towards the kind of “strict scrutiny” analysis favored by Epstein 
and argued for in the conclusion of this work. This outcome preserves the kind of flourishing 
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provided by Grand Central that the social-obligation theorists claim for it—the building remains 
unchanged—but constitutes a political loss for proponents of increased property regulations.  
In the third outcome—an outright taking—the City uses its power of eminent domain, 
takes the property, and pays just compensation for the fair market value of the landmark.  
Outright taking is, in fact, how many landmarks are preserved by the state: one of the earliest uses 
of eminent domain for such preservation was the securing of the Gettysburg battlefield in 1896.77 
The Supreme Court routinely endorses the preservation—through both regulation and takings—of 
structures and areas with special historic, architectural or cultural significance as a legitimate 
government goal.78 For the social-obligation theorists, this is clearly the second-best option, and 
property rights libertarians such as Epstein would have no argument because of the provision of 
just compensation. The property is now publicly owned, the Beaux Art façade remains, and the 
city enjoys civic enrichment.79 The first-best option for the social-obligation theorists is exactly 
what the Court did, in fact, decide: by holding that the preservation of Grand Central Station did 
not constitute a taking, the City was able to exercise its police power over private property rights, 
provide for varying types of putative benefits, and not pay any compensation. Despite not finding 
a social norm at work in its opinion, the Court—to the satisfaction of the social-obligation 
theorist—provides a moral basis and justification for further non-compensated property 
regulations. 
Penn Central thus emerges as a paradigm example of the implied existence of the norm 
in the jurisprudence. Because the regulation in Penn Central did not require compensation, it is, 
for the social-obligation theorists, expressly not a takings, but an exercise of an uncompensable 
police power that “may impose an obligation on private owners of buildings within the historic 
district to sacrifice to some degree their autonomy regarding the use of their building.” This moral 
entitlement of non-owners results from the “use sacrifice” made by owners: in specific cases 
involving historic preservation, this sacrifice requires that “at a minimum […] the owner owes 
surrounding owners an obligation to maintain the property values of everyone in the vicinity.”80  
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For the social-obligation theorists, Penn Central greatly expands the parameters of 
property owners’ obligations to its community to include maintaining public aesthetic benefits. 
This reading of the police power is supported in part by both Parking v Atlanta,81 which held that 
aesthetic considerations form part of the public welfare element of police power, and Berman v 
Parker,82 where the United States Supreme Court gave “unqualified support to aesthetics as a 
legitimate regulatory concern, where the public has interest in assuring that the community is 
‘beautiful as well as clean, well balanced as well as carefully patrolled.’”83 Regulation of open 
space can be supported by aesthetic concerns as well.84    
  Landmarks do much more, however, than create aesthetically pleasing spaces. According 
to Alexander, “[t]he Landmark Preservation Commission's designation of that building [Grand 
Central Station] as an historical landmark was a legal recognition that as owners of an obviously 
special, nearly unique, building, Penn Central owed the community of which it was a part an 
obligation not to use it in ways that would irrevocably destroy its architectural status.” When the 
Court denied compensation, it judicially enforced the norm in the form of a “democratically 
sanctioned scheme of use-sacrifices required of all private owners of New York City buildings 
whose aesthetic and historic integrity the Commission has determined to be vital to the continuing 
well-being of the city's culture.”85  
Although he does not cite it directly as an example of the norm, the Tahoe-Sierra case 
can be viewed as an application of Alexander’s norm in the effort to regulate the non-urban, 
natural environment in order to promote its aesthetically pleasing characteristics. In Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 86  the TRPA, acting as a 
municipal regulatory agency empowered to issue new building permits, issued a thirty-two month 
moratorium on building new homes in the Tahoe Basin. This temporary legislation was intended 
to preserve the blue color of Lake Tahoe, which was threatened as the result of a huge increase in 
development around the lake.87 This development was causing a nutritional build-up in the lake 
resulting in the growth of algae, which, in turn, threatened to cloud the once-crystal clear 
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visibility of the lake’s water. The landowners, all of whom purchased lots prior to the enactment 
of the moratorium, sued for compensation due to the claimed regulatory taking of their property. 
Relying on Penn Central, the Supreme Court ruled that no takings occurred, and, among other 
rationales, held that a reciprocity of advantage due to the restriction might result in real estate 
values actually increasing due to the lake maintaining its characteristic blue color.88 Like the 
regulation in Penn Central, the social-obligation theorists can read the norm into the Court’s 
opinion, resulting in an implicit understanding that owners owe non-owners a substantial duty to 
use their property so that landmarks, whether they are train stations or grand lakes, are preserved, 
particularly when these landmarks are “vital to the well-being of the [area’s] culture.”89 This 
means that property owners engage in a type of involuntary dedication to the public when they 
happen to create or own buildings or property that take on some undefined special character.  
 Trespass law is also claimed to reflect the implied existence of the norm, but primarily 
due to cases that deny property owners the right to assert trespassory claims against non-owners. 
The social-obligation theorists point to State v Shack as an example of the norm. In Shack, the 
New Jersey Supreme court held that trespassing convictions against a legal aid worker and a 
healthcare worker, who, against the wishes of a farmer/employer, entered upon his property in 
order to serve the migrant farm workers who resided there, were unconstitutional because under 
New Jersey State law, “the ownership of real property does not include the right to bar access to 
governmental services available to migrant workers and hence there was no trespass within the 
meaning of the penal statute.”90 Property rights, held the Court, “serve human values.”  
They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it. Title to real property cannot 
include dominion over the destiny of persons the owner permits to come upon the 
premises. Their well being must remain the paramount concern of a system of law. 
Indeed the needs of the occupants may be so imperative and their strength so weak, that 
the law will deny the occupants the power to contract away what is deemed essential to 
their health, welfare, or dignity.91  
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The implications of Shack for the social-obligation theorists is that human flourishing is 
dependent upon the capabilities of life and affiliation, and that migrant farm workers, as a 
community,  
are particularly fragile and need certain property rights to enable them to perform their 
capabilities-developing function. The property right to receive visitors to the farms where 
they work and live was virtually the only effective means of providing them with access 
to such basic necessities as medical care, which are constitutive of the capability of life.92  
 
The capability of affiliation creates socially just relations in this community by providing the 
workers with “equality and dignity otherwise denied them by their employer's treatment.”93
  
According to Peñalver, the situation in Shack represents an “easy case for legal 
intervention to enforce (in kind) the farmer’s moral obligations to his workers.  
The workers were entitled to receive visitors in their place of residence as a matter of 
justice, and the intrusion of those visitors on the farmer’s own privacy and autonomy was 
minimal. By enforcing the farmer’s obligations to act virtuously, the law helped to 
protect innocent third parties (the farmworkers) from the resulting harm.94  
 
For the social obligation theorists, Shack stands for the propositions that private property rights of 
owners should be adjusted when they conflict with the capabilities of affected non-owners, and 
that the social-obligation norm is not merely social or normative, but a legal right properly 
enforced by laws that limit private property rights. However, Shack is not a United States 
Supreme Court case, it is controlling only in New Jersey, and rather than being illustrative of the 
latent foundations of the norm in standard trespass law, it is an exceptional departure from the 
traditional, rights-based approach to trespass. According to Claeys, the fact that “Shack has not 
been followed often suggests […] that other courts doubt its holding ‘fits’ basic trespass 
principles.” 95  Another commentator writes that Shack is “virtually meaningless outside its 
historical and economic context,” and questions “whether the case accurately expresses even a 
significant minority view of limits on the right to exclude.”96 
Finally, Alexander’s approach emerges as both critical and comparative: American 
property law is less principled and less transparent than other countries, whose functionalist or 
instrumental approach to property asks whether property and takings law is actually solving legal 
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problems and not merely adjudicating disputes.97 American property law is therefore improved, 
according to Alexander, by borrowing property law from Germany, whose constitution states that 
“property entails obligations and should serve the public interest,” and South Africa, whose 
social-obligation norm attempts to redress racial discrimination in property ownership, limit 
compensation based on the state’s role as a past subsidizer of a property’s value when it is taken, 
and require courts to consider the use, history, and acquisition of property in question. 98  
To summarize: in their attempt to locate a social obligation norm in American property 
law, the social obligation theorists offer a normative approach to property that fails to find 
convincing precedent in the case history and the common law as they relate to takings, nuisance, 
or trespass. It would be helpful, for a legal theory in particular, to find ancestral roots in the 
various narratives generated by judicial opinions, but the kind of owner obligations argued for by 
the social obligation theorists requires an inflationary and aspirational reading of the case law. 
But the theory is not cabined by the law, and to that extent purports to find doctrinal support in 
Aristotle’s philosophy of virtue. As I will argue in the next section, the theorists are unsuccessful 
here as well.  
Section 3. Aristotelian Property, Communitarianism, and the Path to Virtue 
This section attempts to determine what an Aristotelian-inspired property theory consists 
in, and whether the social obligation norm tracks Aristotelian property. According to Alexander, 
the social-obligation norm is inspired, in part, by Aristotle, but it is not “strictly Aristotelian” 
because other sources that “do not rest on virtue ethics,” including Kant, Gewirth, and Raz, also 
influence the theory.99  Peñalver also recognizes this debt, and wants to “reintroduce” the 
Aristotelian ethical tradition to property law.100 Although the theory not “strictly” Aristotelian, 
nowhere does Alexander try to distinguish the normative implications of the social obligation 
norm from similar implications in Aristotle’s property theory. I am unsure what a strict 
Aristotelian property theory would look like, but I attempt to outline here what Aristotelian 
property rights might look like based on Aristotle’s own words. If Alexander is merely ‘inspired’ 
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by Aristotle, it would be interesting to know what aspects of Aristotle’s property theory—as 
opposed to his moral theory—influences the social obligation norm. Because Aristotle’s property 
theory includes strong private property rights against the community, it is unlikely—or at least 
uncertain—that he was a communitarian about property and therefore unlikely that his property 
theory would inspire a modern communitarian property theory such as the social-obligation norm.  
The social-obligation norm is a legal theory about property: it tries to establish what 
kinds of laws should govern owners and nonowners and what kinds of coercion states can use 
against individuals when regulating their property.  Aristotle wrote directly on these issues. 
Therefore, an “Aristotelian approach to land use”101 should, presumably, discuss what Aristotle 
said about land use.  At minimum, an Aristotelian approach would seek to produce virtuous and 
good character in everyone, including both owners and nonowners. In this sense, Aristotle 
certainly had a clear conception of the ‘good’ and its indispensable role in human flourishing. It is 
less clear how he envisioned the role of property owners—and the role of property itself—in the 
promotion of human flourishing. Due to this lack of clarity, there are at least three ways to 
approach how ‘Aristotelian property’ might be interpreted: (1) Aristotle’s writings on property 
are “too nebulous to sustain any serious critical discussion”: this is the view of Jonathan 
Barnes102; (2) Aristotelian property supports a kind of social democratic or communitarian 
property scheme with broad provisions for community control over private property; this is 
Martha Nussbaum’s reading of Aristotle103 and the reading supported by the social-obligation 
theorists; and (3) Aristotle’s ideas about property reveal that he supports strong individual rights-
like powers over property, in which case he is not a communitarian but—almost—a liberal about 
property. Fred D. Miller104 and Peter Mayhew105 support this reading.  
The sustained arguments for the communitarian and rights-based readings will, I hope, 
show that Barnes’ reading is too quick and that the communitarian readings are too generous. For 
others—call them the liberal Aristotelians—Aristotelian property prioritizes rights-like powers 
over a property scheme that, as Aristotle writes, is “private in ownership but public in use.” With 
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certain qualifications, I support this liberal and virtuous conception of property against the 
readings given to Aristotle by the social-obligation theorists. It is one thing to claim that a modern 
property law theory has a kinship with ‘Aristotelian virtue ethics,’ and quite another to actually 
look at Aristotle’s writing to see how Aristotle views virtuous property ownership and usage. 
This latter approach is taken by the ‘liberal’ readings of Aristotle’s property theory, which are 
fairly clear in their repudiation of the kinds of property obligations found in modern property 
theories such as the social-obligation norm.  
Part 1. Aristotelian Property in Brief 
Aristotle’s property theory begins as a response and objection to Plato’s communism. In 
book IV of the Republic, Socrates argues that the guardians of Callipolis should not own 
property, be monogamous, or raise their own biological children because private property leads to 
greed, conflict, and discord among the guardians. For Plato, property has the potential to lead to 
vicious behavior and should therefore be banned for the guardians—although not for the 
craftsmen and artisans who keep the guardians fed and housed. Aristotle’s response to this 
property regime is well known. He supports a property regime where “property is private, use is 
common.”106 This configuration has led to substantial disagreement about the extent of Aristotle’s 
conception of private and common property. He clearly rejects Plato’s communism by offering 
both practical reasons why it fails—for example, if harder work leads to equal pay for farmers, 
there will be “a world of trouble”107—and reasons of justice, where equals should get equal shares 
and inequals get unequal shares.108  Because of their self-interest, private owners will also 
“improve their own well being” by making their property “more productive.”109 Contrary to 
Plato’s communism, “private kinship bonds and private property are preconditions for happy and 
well ordered states” and not impediments to them.110 A lack of private property leads to a city that 
will suffer from excessive unity,111 and such unity in turn leads to “an increase in association” 
which will produce “an increase in the potential for conflict.”112 This kind of unity, however, is 
appropriate for the household. Finally, Aristotle believes that private property and wealth do not 
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cause the social ills, such as neighbors fighting over a property line, that Plato attributes to them; 
rather, the problem springs from vice and the improper use of property and wealth.113 The 
solution to these problems is virtue and education and not the kind of “legislation”114—found in 
Plato’s communism—that leads to the leveling of property or its confiscation. 
When properly used, Aristotelian property entails eudaimonia, which Miller translates as 
“happiness” but can also be considered “flourishing.” It is an end, or telos, for both public policy 
and for individual decision making. For Aristotle, eudaimonia is (1) doing well with virtue, or (2) 
self sufficiency of life, or (3) the most pleasant way of life with security, or 4). a thriving state of 
possession and bodies with power to protect and put into action.115 Eudaimonia, as we will see, is 
not always consonant with communitarianism.   
Part 2. Communitarianism  
According to Alexander and Peñalver, the social-obligation norm is broadly Aristotelian, 
and it shares “common ground with communitarian, civic republican, and even ‘liberal’ property 
theories.”116 Unlike other communitarian theorists, who, like Alastair Macintyre, limit community 
to family, tribe, and neighborhood rather than “state, nation, or class” on the grounds that modern 
states cannot hold common moral beliefs,117 Alexander and Peñalver include the state as a part of 
the community.118 Several theorists also recognize the communitarian foundation of the norm. 
David Lametti, for example, writes that Alexander and Peñalver’s social-obligation norm 
expresses the collective or communitarian values of property,119 and Joseph Singer writes that the 
social-obligation norm is a communitarian and dignity-based approach to property law. Singer: 
“this communitarian analysis is more normatively attractive than efficiency analysis because it 
focuses our attention not only on market values but also on appropriate social relations.”120  
Property theories tend to track certain foundational/metaphysical positions about 
individuals and their position in regards to various groups of individuals such as states and 
communities.  Alexander and Peñalver’s property theory aligns with communitarians such as 
Charles Taylor, whose anti-individualism is well known.121 Communitarians maintain that in 
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order to justify the obligations we owe to a community, there must be an intrinsic/non 
instrumental value for community and other persons. According to Shlomo Avineri, 
“community” itself is a normative concept that “describes a desired level of human relationships.” 
For communitarians, the community is a good in itself—it has intrinsic value—as well as a 
human need.122 In terms of political theory, it has traditionally been juxtaposed with liberalism. 
To this end, liberalism is the politics of right, and communitarianism as the politics of common 
good.123 The liberal approach prioritizes freedom and rights over the general good. There is 
considerable disagreement about what kinds of political policies flow from communitarianism, 
but “[a]ll communitarians hold in common advocacy for involvement in public life [and] 
increased participation in small communities, firms, and clubs.”124  
According to Michael Sandel, communitarians have a definite conception of the good, 
whereas liberalism does not presuppose “any particular conception of the good”125 nor does it 
have any telos, or end: because “the right is prior to the good,” liberalism refuses to choose from 
the available ends.126 The social-obligation theorists share this focus on a definable, determinate 
end for social activity; for them, it is human flourishing.  
Part 3. Property Communitarianism 
Erik Olsen suggests that the turn towards communitarian property and away from 
individualist property is explained by a variety of factors, including the threats of 
commodification and commercialism, that have made it “difficult to see property as a location 
with ethical and civic use values.”127 Under individualist property regimes, broader social and 
civic responsibilities are “viewed as hindrances on private property rather than responsibilities 
that are entailed by it.” Such responsibilities mean “society functions as the ultimate property 
holder in the sense of being the ultimate arbiter of the meaning and value of property.” 128  
Communitarian property would, for example, modify the property right enjoyed by modern 
corporations to include, for example, certain obligations to the community: they should support 
health, safety, interests of workers; they should compete fairly; they should promote consumer 
	  	   87 
protection and safety; and they should engage in environmental stewardship. These are costs that 
are either internalized or not, but they should be internalized when possible.129  
Communitarian values are also present in Michael Sandel’s theory of guardianship, 
which views property as an instrument which, “when used properly, can contribute to the 
cultivation and practice of moral and civic virtue”130; in doing so, it “denies individual ownership 
in favor of a more ultimate [or wider] owner or subject of possession of which the individual 
person is the agent.”131  This understanding of the community is important for the idea that a 
norm of property can also operate as an authoritative law, because “guardianship always involves 
someone or some group who acts authoritatively, or claims to act authoritatively, on behalf of 
either other members of the community or the community itself.”132 As a law that regulates both 
the definition of and practice of ownership, the social-obligation norm, like Sandel’s theory of 
guardianship, views private property as being continually subjected to ownership-like claims by 
the community. In this sense, both private and communal assets and resources are seen as shared 
goods of the community, where guardianship is shaped not only by claims or norms of virtuous 
regard for these shared goods, but also by “claims and norms of at least a de facto jurisdiction 
over those assets and resources, or some aspect of the management, use, and disposition of 
them.”133  It is through this authority—a political authority of “higher communal ends”—that “the 
moral authority of communal ends” can confront and subsume the “atomist distortions of liberal 
individualism.”134  
According to Charles Taylor, atomism—the idea that human beings are self-sufficient 
individuals—is the opposite of Aristotle’s social animal. Human beings are not self-sufficient 
alone or outside a polis.135 Individuals can only achieve their identity in a certain type of culture, 
the infrastructure of which require stability and continuity and support from society as a whole. 
This infrastructure includes “bearers of culture” such as museums, universities, law courts, and 
television stations, as well as more mundane elements including buildings, sewers, power grids, 
and railroads.136 These combine to produce “the free individual of the West,” who “is only what 
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he is by virtue of the whole society and civilization which brought him to be and which nourishes 
him.”137 For Taylor, the fact of the community-created person “creates a significant obligation to 
belong for whoever would affirm the value of this freedom; this includes all those who want to 
assert rights either to this freedom or for its sake,” and the obligation is “increased if we ourselves 
have benefitted from this civilization and have been enabled to become free agents ourselves.”138   
Part 4. The Social-Obligation Debt to a “Communitarian Aristotle” 
According to Peñalver, the social obligation norm is a “theory of owner obligation rooted 
in the Aristotelian tradition”139 and the theorists want to “reintroduce the Aristotelian ethical 
tradition into discussions of property and land-use.”140 To that extent, the social obligation norm 
is “rooted in the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics,” and “understands the purpose of property 
law to be the promotion of human flourishing, both of owners and non-owners.” In contrast to 
law and economics, “an Aristotelian approach to land use is capable of incorporating the 
important insights of positive (and even certain features of normative) economic analysis without 
succumbing to the temptation to treat economic consequences as the only factors to weigh in 
determining how to evaluate competing land-use regimes.”141 
The social obligations theorists consider their theory of community  "Aristotelian" 
because it “builds on the Aristotelian notion that the human being is a social and political animal 
and is not self-sufficient alone.”142 The "Aristotelian conception of human beings as social and 
political animals operates for us as part of a substantive understanding of what it means to live a 
distinctively human life and to flourish in a characteristically human way.”143 By allowing for 
many kinds of land use regimes, the norm is pluralistic in terms of consequences and not 
monistic, such as, for example the sole economic consequences promoted by the law and 
economics property tradition.144 Aristotelian virtue ethics recognizes that the goal, or telos, of a 
property regime should be human flourishing: property owners and government actors are 
virtuous when they cooperate in order to promote flourishing through their expressions of 
practical wisdom.145 Peñalver: “Our ability to flourish requires the presence of a material and 
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communal infrastructure that itself depends upon the contributions of each of us. We cannot value 
our ability to flourish without at the same time affirming an obligation to cooperate with others in 
order to sustain the shared infrastructure on which that ability depends.”
146
 
For the social obligation theorists, Aristotelian property entails a duty or moral obligation 
to use one’s property to benefit others by promoting flourishing in the polis.   Like the social 
obligation norm itself, such a conception of property prioritizes an owner’s duties over their 
rights. This communitarian reading of Aristotle locates primarily in the Politics, but also in the 
Nicomachean Ethics and other writings, a theory of property that prioritizes state or community 
regulation and control over private property rights. This theory is founded upon the idea that 
Aristotle regarded self-interest—the kind promoted by the type of private property that ‘houses’ 
the private life of the home—as a type of vice, which ought to be subsumed by the virtue of 
other-regarding actions such as generosity and moderation. The Aristotle-inspired 
communitarians, including the social-obligation theorists, argue that, due to their nature as 
political animals, individuals are dependent upon their communities and therefore obligated, as a 
moral duty, to support that community by virtuously offering up to their property or wealth on its 
behalf.  Virtuous property owners, when faced with the choice of promoting their self-interest or 
promoting the flourishing of their community, will always choose the latter. On this view, the 
virtuous owner actively sacrifices their self-interest while the vicious owner asserts it. Unlimited 
acquisition is vicious, for sure, because it “prevents the agent from achieving the good life.”147 
Communitarian Aristotelians believe the political structure, acting as law, should serve these 
same ends.  Considered as a communitarian theory, Aristotle’s property theory is therefore 
incompatible with liberal political goals such as individual rights, restraints on state power, and, 
obviously, the primacy of private property rights.  It recognizes that Aristotle vindicates private 
property rights in principle, but resolves that these rights are subject to completing claims by the 
community.  No communitarian argues for the outright elimination of private property, and most 
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would accept that it has a proper role in a just property regime. However, the right is easily 
defeasible by the community when the property right stands in the way of the community’s 
flourishing.148  
The social-obligation theorists turn to the Aristotelian tradition of the “social character of 
human beings” in order to establish the obligation of persons to use their property to promote the 
capabilities and flourishing of others in the community.149 The obligation may also be predicated 
upon the self-interest of the owner and community, who both depend upon each other’s mutual 
well being. However, according to Alexander and Peñalver, self-interest cannot explain the moral 
duty to promote flourishing because human beings, despite their striving towards autonomy, are 
inherently dependent and interdependent upon one another.150 
Alexander and Peñalver’s account of human flourishing and the conception of 
community upon which it is based also borrows from the "capabilities" approach developed in 
recent years by Nussbaum and Sen. According to Alexander, this approach 
measures a person's well being not by looking at what they have, but by looking at what 
they are able to do.  The well-lived life is a life that conforms to certain objectively 
valuable patterns of human existence and interaction, or what Sen calls "functionings," 
rather than a life characterized merely by the possession of particular goods, the 
satisfaction of particular (subjective) preferences, or even, without more, the possession 
of particular negative liberties. Social structures, including distributions of property rights 
and the definition of the rights that go along with the ownership of property, should be 
judged, at least in part, by the degree to which they foster the participation by human 
beings in these objectively valuable patterns of existence and interaction.151 
 
The capabilities152  are developed through community and the individual’s dependence and 
reliance upon a community in order to flourish, whereby “even the most seemingly solitary and 
socially threatened of these capabilities, freedom, depends upon a richly social, cultural, and 
institutional context; the free individual must rely upon others to provide this context.”153 
Communities are the mediating vehicles that allow persons to “acquire the resources we need to 
flourish and to become fully socialized into the exercise of our capabilities.”154 Dependency upon 
communities as resources in turn creates an “obligation to participate in and support the social 
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networks and structures that enable us to develop those human capabilities that make human 
flourishing possible.”155 Put another way, by acknowledging our dependence upon others and the 
social networks that permit us to flourish, a moral obligation to support these networks arises.156 
For Peñalver, human flourishing results from the cooperation facilitated by communities, which 
in turn depends on the social infrastructure generated by cooperation.157 As applied to property, 
this moral obligation to cooperate becomes the social-obligation norm at issue here, which is 
implemented into a legal obligation in the form of property law. For Peñalver, property law is a 
vehicle, purposefully driven toward a moral goal: the promotion of human flourishing.158  
There are several possible bases for this obligation. One basis involves the idea that the 
development of a person’s long-term self interests are coextensive with the development of their 
community’s interests, due to the fact that “a community that aids and continues to aid a person's 
development as an autonomous moral agent depends for its well-being, as does the individual, 
upon that person's assistance to the community.”159 Thus, in order to avoid self contradiction, a 
person who values their own flourishing must value the flourishing of their community as well, 
because “insofar as I regard my own flourishing as valuable and something that I ought to foster, 
insofar as I am a rational human being, then I am committed to fostering the flourishing of others 
insofar as they are rational human beings as well.”160 The norm ultimately rests upon a holistic 
conception of persons and communities, whereby “individuals and communities interpenetrate 
one another so completely that they can never be fully separated.”161 	  
Part 5. Is Aristotelian Property Communitarian?   
According to David Lametti, Aristotle’s conception of private property is “grounded in 
the fundamentally communitarian goal of the virtuous development of the city.”162 Does Aristotle 
therefore subscribe to Lametti’s thesis that “the community, rather than the individual, the state, 
the nation, or any other entity, is and should be at the centre of our analysis and our value 
system”?163 If Aristotle is communitarian, then his property theory ought to direct owners towards 
the interests of the community and prioritize those interests over the interests of the individual 
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property owner. His ethical and political theory would motivate this prioritization through virtue 
and political authority, respectively. According to Richard Kraut, this is a mistake. For Kraut, 
Aristotle “does not look to the community as the ultimate arbiter or values and standards.”164 
Aristotle, rather, wants to avoid strong limitations on private property and the redistribution of 
wealth.165 Because of this standpoint on the protection of private property, Aristotle is an unlikely 
source of inspiration for a social obligation theory of property that purports to value 
communitarian over individual interests.  
In this part, I defend the position of a variety of theorists, including Kraut, who argue 
against the communitarian interpretation of Aristotle’s property theory. These theorists agree that 
Aristotle’s ideas about property are closer to liberal ideas about individual rights due to 
Aristotle’s emphasis on the role of property for the ethical virtue of self love, the division 
between the public and private, and the restrictions Aristotle draws for the right of the community 
to expropriate property for public use. If, as I argue here, Aristotle’s writings on property are not 
conducive to a modern property theory such as the social-obligation norm, then modern theorists 
have three options: first, ignore them; second, distinguish them and show why they are not 
relevant; and third, state why an “Aristotelian approach to land use” does not include anything 
Aristotle actually said about land use. Alexander and Peñalver do, in fact, discuss Aristotle’s 
arguments in favor of private property in their Introduction to Property Theory.166 Although this 
work is intended as an introductory or ‘survey’ work on property theory,167 it is also normative in 
the sense that the authors argue that “the human flourishing theory, commonly associated with 
Aristotle(,)” offers an alternative to utilitarianism and law and economics, the “predominant legal 
property theory.”168 As a result, they do not ignore Aristotle’s actual writings on property, but by 
mentioning them in a cursory manner they fail to distinguish Aristotle’s writings on property 
from their own “Aristotelian” modern property law.  These distinctions would be helpful, and I 
attempt to make them here.   
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 According to Peter Mayhew, “a central part of Aristotle's view of property” holds that it 
is better if “desirable ends are achieved by the improvement of a citizen's character through 
education than by an attempt to compel citizens to act in certain ways through the control or 
abolition of their property.”169 Such desirable ends would include a generous spirit towards fellow 
citizens—particularly the poor—and support for the infrastructure of a flourishing polis that 
promotes the owner’s rational self-interest. What is doubtful—and this the major splitting point 
between communitarians and the property-rightists in this section—is whether Aristotle exhibits 
the kind of attitude about duties and the right of the community to enforce them that allow for 
extensive property interventions on behalf of the community’s interest in perfecting the 
flourishing of its members.  
Aristotle certainly has a broad understanding of how a virtuous owner shares their 
property with the community, but this approach is not communitarian because it is based upon the 
owner’s willing and uncoerced participation in the polis; in fact, the idea that the state would 
engage in the type of redistribution imagined by the communitarians, and the social obligation 
theorists in particular, is, I argue, totally foreign to an Aristotelian conception of property. 
Aristotle, of course, is clear that virtue calls for communal use of many kinds of property. 
Wealthy citizens, for example, are virtuous when they share slaves and horses as well as supplies 
for travelers, and they ought to give the needy access to their land. Wealthy citizens are also 
crucial to the functioning of the city because they finance the military and the arts.170 Peter 
Mayhew devotes considerable attention to the question whether this kind of use is voluntary—in 
which case an owner who does not share is merely vicious—or whether it is compelled by law, in 
which case the state or community may coercively impose its understanding of what ‘sharing’ 
should consist in through confiscation or expropriation.  Martha Nussbaum and the social-
obligation theorists support the latter interpretation. Mayhew argues for the former: first, making 
one’s own private property common is done voluntarily from virtue and in the manner of 
friends.171 Second, the power to dispose of property, or to allow others to use it, must reside with 
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the owner. So Aristotle is not advocating the transferring of “rights” to the needy,172 nor does he 
foresee any role for the community in the enforcement of these requirements of virtue. In 
practice, Mayhew writes, a needy person can use another’s lands because they voluntarily 
unfence them and not because they were compelled by law to allow their use. Lawmakers can 
certainly encourage—primarily through education—but not compel this kind of virtuous 
activity.173 
Although they would have the political authority to compel it, the primary job of the 
legislator is not redistribution, but rather ensuring that owners have generous characters. Rather 
than focusing on redistribution or the effect of it upon nonowners, an Aristotelian virtue of 
ownership would focus upon the way wealth and money prevent the development of virtue, and 
why its overaccumulation leads to viciousness in the owner. He is not so much concerned with 
property’s ability to benefit the polis, nor its owner’s duty to use it to benefit the polis, but its 
propensity to harm its owner.174 In fact, Aristotle is very astute about legislators being tempted to 
regulate and expropriate property, asking “Does the legislator just pass laws to make private 
owners make property available for common use?” Rather, legislators promote the flourishing of 
the polis and its members by first managing—and not creating—public lands, ensuring an 
education system that inculcates the virtues (primarily, generosity), and only then resorts to 
taxing the wealthy to achieve these ends.175 
Therefore, Aristotle envisions a city with common property, but there is no indication 
that private property should be confiscated in order to convert it to common property or to use it 
to benefit the poor.176 Also, the common land is meant to pay for common meals by being self-
supporting. This reflects Aristotle’s idea that all should have sustenance, but it is the 
responsibility of the state to provide it and nothing indicates that private property should be 
expropriated for this purpose.177  
Although much of this discussion focuses on property in land and agricultural goods, it is 
the household or oikos that forms an almost impenetrable barrier between individual and the 
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polis. This barrier is the key to understanding Aristotelian property. According to Olsen, the 
household in this context occupies the “primary ethical context of property.”178 According to 
Miller, Aristotelian property ‘naturally’ belongs to the household,179 the point of which is “the 
maintenance of the family.”180   Households require property, but it is not property itself: 
households cannot be bought and sold.181 When such property “becomes a ‘living presence’ by 
virtue of being conditioned as an instrument for life and the good life,” it is transformed into what 
Aristotle calls ‘true wealth.’182 Citing Aristotle, Kraut writes, “between man and wife friendship 
seems to exist by nature, ‘for human beings are by nature couple forming (sunduastikon)—more 
so than political, inasmuch as the household is prior to and more necessary than the city.’”183 
Christophe Rapp notes that this first level of Aristotelian community—mere survival in a pre-
polis ‘state of nature’ consisting of households—is still a community with a sense of justice even 
without a polis.184 But men do not want to live only to survive: they want the good life, and this 
achieved only in the polis, which exists solely for the good life of the individual.185 The end or 
telos of the polis is the good life of the individual, and the polis attains its telos if it “provides 
favorable conditions for the individual quest for happiness by its citizens and supports to the best 
of its ability these possibilities through education and good laws.”186 Individuals choose that 
which is good for them, and not what is obliged by a “certain tradition or community.”187  
In his book on Aristotle, Rosler also presents a focused argument against the popular 
view of Aristotle as a “fountain-head of communitarianism.”188 According to Rosler, Aristotle 
“defends a moderate individualist position, i.e. a form of individualism which embraces other-
regarding virtuous activity as a constituent of individual well being.” 189  Contrary to the 
communitarian emphasis on self-sacrifice, Aristotle’s political theory denies that a community’s 
“parts may be sacrificed in order to promote the general good or for the sake of a metaphysically 
higher being,” but may require sacrifice on the “individualistic grounds that the political 
community is needed for its parts to achieve moral perfection.”190  
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 Rosler argues that communitarians are committed to a flawed conceptual understanding 
of duty: it is definitionally or conceptually true that members of political communities have 
political obligations and therefore—according to the communitarian—members have duties. That 
may be the case, writes Rosler, but there is no practical way to understand their import or role in 
political life.191 The only way to understand the connection is through morals: there must be some 
moral basis—perhaps a contract or actual debt or actual benefit—to justify the demands of a 
communitarian social obligation. For example, property owners who happen to be members of 
politically disenfranchised groups—in the United States, this might include women and African-
Americans or Native Americans of any gender—or any other property owning individual who do 
not enjoy full political rights and benefits are unlikely to be subject to social obligations towards 
the dominant or oppressive political groups on the grounds that their ownership is less profitable 
than other persons’ ownership. In fact, such groups have a demand for more individual or group 
property: their obligations to give or relinquish property are less strict or even nonexistent. 
According to Rosler, this is Aristotle’s nuanced understanding of political obligation: he does not 
endorse the idea that individuals, much less property owners, are obligated to their community 
simply in virtue of the fact that they are community members. This purely conceptual 
understanding is, I think, the kind offered by the social obligation theorists—and, perhaps, 
Nussbaum—and it is not an accurate portrayal of Aristotle’s understanding of moral obligation. 
“Hence,” writes Rosler,  
Aristotle does not share what is usually regarded as a strong communitarian tenet, viz. 
that being a member of a political community gives us a reason for obeying and 
supporting it. He would be much more interested in exploring the moral history of the 
relationship between the political community and its members. It is only when the 
community fulfills its moral tasks that it has a right to demand allegiance from its 
members and that its members and subjects are morally required to abide by its 
decisions.192 
 
Aristotle would not deny that community forms our identity, but the community must have a 
morally sound foundation.193 We may be grateful for, and incur social debt on behalf of, the 
social institutions and language that “form us” but this does not, writes Rosler, “create in us a 
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floating debt which the current society can collect and use as it will.”194 There is a significant gap 
between the necessity of a society or community for the development of the self, and the 
“obligation to belong to and/or obey the political authority of the particularly society from which 
he benefitted in this way.”195 
To Aristotle, it would make little sense why a person would willingly forego their 
holdings to the community unless there was some advantage to them, and the idea that the 
community benefits as a separate agent apart from the owner’s benefit does not appear in his 
work. The idea that the community is a higher good that deserves one’s property or wealth to the 
detriment of the owner also makes no sense. Persons owe a duty of support to their community to 
the extent it allows them to flourish. If it does not allow persons to flourish, they owe it nothing. 
But the duty is not predicated on the simple fact that persons are dependent on communities or 
that they their personhood is the product of communities; it is also not predicated on the idea that 
duty is the natural or logical outcome of an individual’s situatedness in (some) community. For 
Aristotle, persons owe no duty (to support through, for example, taxes) a community that has not 
contributed to their flourishing. In this sense, a ‘debt to society’ is not a metaphor: it is a real debt 
in the sense that the property owner has benefited from the community’s efforts on his behalf—
the owner has chosen to be benefited, so to speak—but it is grounded on that initial benefit to the 
owner. But this version of rational self-interest is not how a communitarian justifies the priority 
of the community. Therefore, Aristotle is most likely not a communitarian. 
 
Part 6. Aristotelian Property: Private not Communitarian 
For Miller, book II of the Politics—the crux of Aristotle’s discussion of property—is not 
simply a vindication of a property system that permits private property rights: it explains what the 
rather cryptic phrase “private property, common use” means, and presents a reasoned argument 
why property arrangements should be organized to benefit the kind of individual private property 
rights that are, in many ways, incommensurate with strong communitarian objectives.196 For 
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Miller, these considerations reveal Aristotle to be a theorist of individual rights because Aristotle 
provides many justifications for private property that echo contemporary ‘incidents’ of 
ownership, particularly those listed in Honore’s classic list.197  For Miller, one of the key 
elements in Aristotelian property is the owner’s claim against interference.198 Use and alienation 
of property are also up to the owner,199 and, in accord with many contemporary property rights 
theorists, the community’s moral and political rights to regulate these rights claims are 
minimized.  
Miller offers five criteria that Aristotle claims as justifications for private property over 
communal property due to the ability of private property to:  
1. reduce quarrels and complaints about use, ownership, and control; 
2. promote the improvement of property; 
3. facilitate friendship; 
4. foster natural pleasures such as self-love; and  
5. make possible the exercise of virtues such as generosity and moderation.200 
What is interesting about these justifications is that they do not merely support a property regime 
that permits some private property, as Nussbaum has argued;201 rather, they justify a regime that 
prioritizes private property over communal property in most cases, and limits the ability of the 
community to engage in forced transfers of private property in order to benefit some public good.  
The first criterion forms the basis of Aristotle’s well-known objection to Plato’s 
communism: whereas Plato advocates for the eradication of private property in order to reduce 
conflict among the guardians, Aristotle argues that carefully defined property rights actually help 
to avoid conflicts in terms of use.202 Criterion 2 is very much in line with the efficiency goals of 
the law and economics theorists: Miller writes that Aristotle recognizes that “privatization gives 
individuals a much greater incentive to use property efficiently” while common property is 
subject to the tragedy of commons.203 Criteria 3–5 presuppose the moderate individualistic view 
that political institutions “should promote the advantages of individual citizens, understood to 
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include virtuous activity”: criteria 3, in particular, reflects the idea that virtuous owners make 
property available to friends but not the general community or to ‘political friends.’ True friends 
indeed “do away with mine and yours”204 and friends do not maintain strong claim of private 
property against one another, but this cannot be the basis of political associations.205 Political 
friendship falls short of virtue based friendship, and this kind of virtue does not translate well 
from Aristotle’s ethics to his conception of political coexistence. Criterion 4 reflects the idea that 
self-love requires acting out of and according to their own rational judgment, which requires that 
owners must be able to determine how their property is used. Finally, criterion 5 recognizes that it 
is only through private property that generosity in the use and “alienation of property”—giving it 
away as the owner determines the demands of virtue—can be achieved. Miller: “Since one can 
act generously only if one acts voluntarily and by choice, one can act generously only if the use 
and alienation of property is up to oneself, and this is possible only in a system of private 
ownership.”206 
Part 7. Aristotle on Redistribution and Expropriation 
In the Politics, Aristotle writes that the “surplus from public revenues should be collected 
and distributed among the poor, especially if one can collect such quantities as may enable them 
to acquire a piece of land, or, if not, to make a beginning in trade or farming.”207 However, this is 
not an indication that he supports anything like the modern concept of eminent domain or the 
social-democratic impulse towards the redistribution of wealth or property. He is critical of 
democratic majorities when they confiscate the property of wealthier citizens,208 and recommends 
that when confiscation does occur, the law should provide that “the property of the condemned 
should not be public and go into the treasury but be sacred.”209 So, despite his recommendation 
that property also be ‘common in use,’ Aristotle is opposed to compulsory state expropriation of 
wealth or property:210 such contributions—however mandated by the demands of virtue—must be 
voluntary in order meet those demands.211 Like the natural acquisition of property to promote the 
health of the household, states or communities must acquire property ‘naturally,’ and, like theft in 
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general expropriation does not promote virtue nor happiness because it is unnatural: it is not 
earned well and nor does it promote the self-sufficiency of the state.212   
However, a virtue-based opposition to expropriation does not mean that Aristotle opposes 
all regulation of property. Miller notes that Aristotle advocates for taxation to support defense and 
internal needs, the use of communal property to support the needy, and legal limits on the 
quantity of land that may be owned.213 Writing in The Athenian Constitution, Aristotle also 
supports surprisingly modern restrictions on private property that pertain to various aspects of the 
urban environment of his era. He recommends that political officials charged with ‘town 
management’ provide ‘superintendence’ over private property including “buildings which 
encroach on the streets, balconies which extend over the streets, overhead drainpipes which 
discharge on the streets, and window shutters which open into the street.”214 These restrictions all 
pertain to the outside of the house, and are intended to prevent private property owners from 
extending their private property into the public sphere. They prevent owners from trespassing 
onto public property and from harming those in the public sphere, both of which are legitimate 
restrictions on property even under the most libertarian conditions.  
Therefore, it is a mistake to ascribe to Aristotle a theory resembling “modern socialism or 
social democracy.” Property owners should put their property to virtuous uses that benefit others, 
but this does not mean creating entitlements on the part of others to this property. Miller: “If 
others have a legally enforceable right to help themselves to one’s crops, it is not an act of 
generosity to permit them to do so.”215 In other words, I might have duty of charity to the poor, 
but that does not give rise to a right of the poor to receive my charity.216  
Although the social obligation theorists recognize that self-interest and reciprocity are 
reasons why one might voluntarily support their community, Aristotle appears to place a much 
higher importance on the relationship between self-interest and the flourishing of the community. 
Rosler writes that Aristotle understands the polis to be a product of human reason and not a 
natural entity;217 it is rational, and not merely natural, for persons to live in the polis because the 
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polis enables individuals to live well. This relationship also enables the polis to flourish and this 
“common benefit” is what brings individuals and cities together.218 The polis therefore operates, 
in large part, as a reciprocity arrangement whose associations obtain cooperation by promising 
some kind of reward to individuals.219 For the social obligation theorists, this reciprocity might be 
constituted by the very infrastructure individuals and communities benefit from and to which they 
contribute. The community is a common enterprise, but one that could not function if it failed to 
provide the opportunity for its citizens to pursue self-love and self-interest. This relationship 
should be pursued not because it is natural or peculiar to us, “but because it is virtuous, good, 
worthwhile”; in this sense, the pursuit of, for example, the virtue of courage is “natural to the 
extent it is good or rational, not the other way around.”220 It is therefore rational—meaning, ‘in 
their best interest’—for human beings to create and “remain in the polis.”221 Self-preservation is 
not the sole reason for political participation; however, as Miller notes, prudence and self-
interest—the kind of interests developed through the virtuous application of practical reason—
guide persons to participate in a polis where their property rights will be respected by one another 
in a system of mutual advantage.222 Therefore, duties to the community (particularly those 
characterized as ‘sacrificial’ or ‘other-regarding’) are fulfilled not merely because they are duties, 
but because they are reciprocal: the individual landowner is benefitted (through virtue-increase, 
wealth, etc.) when they act to promote the good of the community.223 Rather than being duty-
bound to the community due to its priority in any metaphysical sense—as communitarians 
claim—“citizens who live under a political regime which takes care of their well being would 
have a good reason for performing military duties, paying taxes, participating in office, and other 
requirements which embody the idea that citizens belong to the city.”224 This ‘good reason’ is, of 
course, self-interest.  
For Aristotle, self-interest and self-love are among the most important virtues, and one of 
the primary reasons to own property—which is contrary to communitarian objectives—is its 
ability to give pleasure to its owner.225 Private property permits this when persons use their 
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property as a result of the exercise of their own judgment. Property makes this kind of judgment 
and pleasurable action possible.226 So property ownership is connected to the feeling of affection 
for the self, and this is a virtuous trait of character. This contradicts, to a large extent, the idea that 
owners have a duty to give up property, which naturally leads to displeasure; unless, of course, it 
is done virtuously out of moderation and generosity. So, for Aristotle, there is pleasure in 
ownership as well as pleasure in sharing, and a virtuous owner seeks property, in large part, 
because of the pleasure it gives to themselves and to those who benefit from the owner’s 
generosity.227  
Mayhew argues that group ownership lacks the ability for property to give pleasure or 
self-love: group ownership therefore undercuts both the ability to find pleasure in private 
ownership as well as autonomy, and the ability to act according to own judgment. Communal 
ownership prevents persons from acting according to their own judgment, and communal owners 
cannot perform generous acts because they exercise no control over the property. Furthermore, 
we do not feel the same way towards communal property as we do our own.228  As Mayhew 
notes, Aristotle writes approvingly that "doing favors for and helping friends, guests, or mates is 
most pleasant, and this happens [only] when property is private.” 229 This kind of rational self-
interest reflects an emphasis on the type of atomistic individual that ‘does not exist’ for 
communitarians230 or for the kind of virtuous property owner envisioned by the social-obligation 
theorists. 
To conclude: an Aristotelian property theory—such as the one I describe here—would 
certainly have to confront the rather clear elements in Aristotle’s thought that contravenes the 
idea that the purpose of property law is “the promotion of human flourishing.” Aristotle’s many 
writings on property and land use reveals much about both Aristotelian virtue theory and the roles 
played by owners and nonowners in terms of practical reasoning.  Aristotle’s property theory is a 
practical version of his virtue theory: it describes how virtuous persons act, and what the law 
should or should not do in response, in terms of property.  Because the social obligation theories 
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fail to give Aristotle’s ideas on property much of an airing, they also fail to give contemporary 
owners and nonowners alike practical guidance for the kinds of actions virtuous persons ought to 
undertake in regards to one another’s property.   
Section 4. Efficiency’s Challenge to Virtue Theory  
This section considers the social-obligation theorists’ objections to the utilitarian ethics of 
the law and economics theorists and their use of efficiency and welfare as the sole telos of a 
property regime. 231   It is a reframing, in many ways, of the familiar dispute between 
consequentialists, who prioritize the good over the right, and deontologists, who prioritize the 
right over the good. The objection to utilitarian efficiency ethics—which, for convenience, I will 
group together as law and economics—is a prevalent theme among communitarians, libertarians, 
virtue ethicists, and capability theorists, despite the concession that many of the same goals are 
reached through property regimes that aim towards flourishing—such as the social-obligation 
norm—or welfare, including various types of utilitarianism and primarily law and economics.232 
Although both are consequentialist/instrumentalist theories, the objection to law and economics is 
based on the claims that it is unsatisfactory because (1) it fails to consider non-economic factors 
in the evaluation of property’s value to owners and nonowners; (2) it is monist, in that it considers 
only a single factor, welfare, as the good, instead of a plurality of factors; and (3) it is, unlike the 
social-obligation norm, indifferent to morals.233 These objections are considered in light of the 
general thesis of this work, which attempts to justify strong private property rights—specifically, 
the right to exclude—as well as the powerful duty not to interfere with those rights by nonowners. 
Part 1. Law and economics fails to adequately assess property’s value  
 Because property plays a key role not only in trade and commerce but the quality of human 
lives, the social obligation theorists argue that property should not be wholly commodified in the 
way that markets insist, and nor should its value be based solely upon its potential for free 
market-style exchanges which attempt to maximize property’s economic value. In “Land 
Virtues,” for example, Peñalver writes that homeowners in particular have inchoate and 
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occasional conflicting interests in their home’s value that cannot be explained by the kind of 
“pure wealth maximizing” envisioned by property economists such as Harold Demsetz.234 
According to Demsetz,  
[i]f a single person owns land, he will attempt to maximize its present value by taking into 
account alternative future time streams of benefits and costs and selecting that one which 
he believes will maximize the present value of his privately-owned land rights. We all 
know that this means that he will attempt to take into account the supply and demand 
conditions that he thinks will exist after his death. . . .In effect, an owner of a private right 
to use land acts as a broker whose wealth depends on how well he takes into account the 
competing claims of the present and the future.235 
 
This characterization of ownership motivation is incorrect in terms of what owners actually think 
or actually do with their property, particularly when it is their home. Peñalver is correct to 
observe that “market value is just one factor among many that motivate owners.”236 Demsetz’s 
economic model fails to recognize that owners are motivated by, for example, moral obligation or 
by goods that do not correlate with market value, such as sentiments towards their community, 
feelings of belongingness, or other inchoate goods.237 Homes are not merely investments.238 
However, Demsetz’s model seem quite correct in terms of what fully rational owners should do in 
order to maximize overall social welfare: when one owner maximizes their property value, 
similar increases occur in the neighboring properties, and such maximization foreseeably leads to 
flourishing, welfare, or some other community goal. Of course, efficiency analysis is deeply 
normative when it proceeds from a utilitarian foundation that seeks to maximize welfare, and 
Peñalver admits to the normative use of economic analysis towards human welfare, but not 
towards human flourishing.239   
Criticisms that economic analysis lacks a normative foundation are also centered upon 
the fact that it is monist: it relies upon only one factor, human well being, instead of the plurality 
of normative foundations that a property law might rest upon. As Joseph Singer writes,  
[a]lthough economic analysis of property rights appears to be the dominant approach in 
law schools these days, the utilitarian moral theory on which it is based is generally 
regarded by moral and political philosophers as fatally flawed—at least unless it is 
supplemented or cabined by normative analyses of other kinds, such as considerations of 
justice, fairness, obligations, and ethics. 
	  	   105 
 
 According to Singer, only a “morally constrained utilitarianism”—including, I believe, 
the social-obligation norm—is supported by contemporary theorists: to that extent, “all of them 
ask us to consider the ways that our actions affect others and the extent to which we could justify 
our actions to those affected by them.”240  
Although they purvey a similar theory as the economic analysts, the social-obligation 
theorists set out upon a difficult journey: they wish to depart from law and economics, the 
‘dominant’ property regime which pursues welfare, while recognizing that their alternative 
theory, which pursues flourishing, arrives at many of the same conclusions, regulations, court 
opinions, laws, and practical results as the dominant regime. To this end, they seek to explore the 
“limitations” of law and economics’ analysis of the good, which requires them to forego 
efficiency as the sole normative consideration of property law,241 while, like law and economics, 
they “continue to employ a rational actor model of landowner behavior.”242 To that end, a 
property law based on virtue as opposed to efficiency is “as good as utilitarianism but more 
forthright about its limitations.”243 
There is a certain degree of windmill-tilting here: the virtue-based analysis of the social-
obligation theorists and the utilitarian analysis of the economists end up at the same place more 
often than not, due primarily to the difficulty in establishing a bright line between the ends of 
flourishing and well-being, respectively. As a result, the objection to a law and economics 
property regime is not aimed at the results of that regime, but at the idea that law and economics 
somehow lacks a moral foundation: it is vicious in theory—due to the promotion self interest and 
the priority of private ownership—but promotes flourishing, or something very close to in the 
form of well-being, in practice. 244  Peñalver’s disagreement with Demsetz and other legal 
economists, however, is not over the fact that owners are not always economically rational by 
tending to have to have nonfungible attachments to their property. According to Katrina Wyman, 
Peñalver opposes economic analysis because some legal economists—Demsetz included—argue 
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for limited public decision-making about land use and maximized private decision making. But 
not all argue this way, and many economists justify far more regulation.245 The argument 
therefore is not with Demsetz’ claim about the motivation of owners, but with the claim that 
private ownership should be preferred over collective ownership due to its greater propensity for 
efficiency. The strain of law and economics that is taken to stand for the entire approach also ends 
up aligned with libertarian property interests in many situations, particularly those that support 
strong individual property rights. This also contributes to Peñalver’s distrust.  
Although they are critical of law and economics’ view of property as instrumental 
towards the singular goal of well-being, the social-obligation theorists themselves are property 
instrumentalists who, according to Larissa Katz, lack a “clear idea of ownership with any 
independent normative content,”246 and allocate property rights “in whatever way best promotes 
some societal goal”—in their case, that goal is flourishing.247 Flourishing recognizes that (1) 
living within a particular sort of society and social relationships is a necessary condition for 
humans to develop the distinctively human capacities that allow us to flourish; and (2) human 
flourishing must include at least the capacity to make meaningful choices among alternative life 
horizons, to discern the salient differences among them, and to deliberate deeply about what is 
valuable within those available alternative choices. 248  For the social obligation theorists, 
flourishing is the end and property is the means.  
Instrumentalist accounts, of course, disagree about what collective goals communities 
should have.  Communities, by definition, have collective goals. As Katz notes, the outcome of 
the community’s coercive efforts, including legislation, force, command, or law, will usually 
favor whatever collective goal attracts the interests of community at that time: it could be 
equality, excellence of virtue, or the aggregation of welfare. When individual property rights are 
allocated to best promote a collective goal, Katz writes, a conflict arises with libertarian 
conceptions of property rights, which are based on principles of exclusion and legitimate 
acquisition249  and not upon the maximization of some collective goal.  But even property 
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libertarians, as Claeys observes, should find it is hard to resist the claim—if true—that ‘minor 
revisions’ to the property law might lead to more flourishing, particularly when the means for 
achieving that result are claimed to be predicated on the advancement of virtue.250 To this end, if 
the social-obligation norm can show that A’s property is the means to B’s end in terms of 
capabilities or opportunities to flourish, then there is a strong normative argument to use A’s 
property to that end. However, as legal economist Louis Kaplow points out, such a conclusion is 
problematic if “freedom, autonomy or consent [are] thought to be important.”251 A property law 
that is predicated on the communitarian understanding that human beings are not independent or 
autonomous is conceptually barred from having any substantial connection to property’s potential 
for human independence, autonomy, and freedom. Because human beings are not autonomous, 
human autonomy is not one of the ends of the social-obligation norm. The norm therefore 
encourages interdependence by restricting the means—primarily, the right to exclude—which 
encourage autonomy. In other words, by denying the existence of autonomous beings, the social-
obligation norm cannot, at the same time, promote autonomy or similar values.  
 Referring directly to the social-obligation theorists, Katz writes that their “system of 
property serves as a kind of ‘indirect morals legislation’ that coercively enforces owners’ moral 
obligation to make sacrifices that contribute to human flourishing. These sacrifices range from 
accommodations for nonowners (e.g., public access to private beaches) to contributions to public 
projects (e.g., the preservation of historic buildings or the surrender of land needed for roads, 
etc.).”252 Hanoch Dagan refers to this as the ‘fetishization of interdependence,’253 where property 
rights “do not (or at least ought not) enable individuals to withdraw from others and to pursue 
separate, selfish ends; rather, property is ‘a powerful vehicle for tying people more closely to 
their respective social groups.’”254 
Peñalver’s objection to a market that places economic value on all property is also 
intended to provide justification for the establishment of certain types of properties that can be 
taken out of the market, which frustrates the basic tenants of law and economic theory’s reliance 
	  	   108 
on ‘moral-free’ ideas about market infrastructure or cost benefit analysis. By taking, for example, 
wetlands environments and housing for the homeless out of the market, via state ownership or 
other types of non-private ownership, the valuable land that supports these uses becomes 
‘priceless’: the lands are better-protected, and, accordingly to Penalver, used more efficiently 
through collective ownership.255 This is true for all common or publicly held land.  
 Again, this strategy is purely instrumental towards the development of community and 
interdependence. According to Peñalver, the “[a]bsence of market demand can also result from 
people’s belief that they are (morally) entitled to enjoy a particular good (such as clean air and 
water or the preservation of historic landmarks or endangered species) without paying for it or, 
relatedly, that there are certain goods that are so important that the logic and values of the market 
cannot do them justice.”256 
Flourishing and well being may be, in fact, too closely aligned to justify the kind of 
change in the law that would be required to implement flourishing as law’s telos. Kaplow argues 
that all theories that seek to maximize some good, including the social-obligation norm, Rawls’ 
pursuit of primary goods, and Sen’s capabilities approach, are in fact seeking to maximize well 
being, or well being plus some other end.257 But these theories fail because the addition of the 
‘other end’ not only compromise freedom and autonomy by limiting choices, but they entail the 
use of various means of fulfillment which are “systematically assigned different weights than 
individuals themselves assign”258 in terms of assessing their own well-being. “It follows that 
using such theories to design social systems tends to reduce individuals' well-being, (and) in 
principle, every individual's well-being.”259 This reduction in well-being can be prevented, but 
only if individuals themselves are “freely permitted to determine the relative allocation of 
different types of goods that they will receive whether by directly expressing their wishes or 
through conversion between types of goods or by trading with each other,” which will circumvent 
a theory that purports to, for example, promote flourishing. Finally, for these kinds of theories to 
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be implemented, “it is necessary to defy individuals' consent and to subvert their freedom and 
autonomy, understood subjectively.”260  
Kaplow concludes that a means-based theory, like flourishing, need not compete with a 
system that already instrumentally pursues well being, and nor should flourishing, or any other 
similar standard, constitute a “wholesale substitution [and] alternative approach to [the] 
normative assessment of individuals' situations” that welfare economics already pursues.261 The 
adoption of the flourishing standard would “only warrant more modest refinements of the concept 
of well-being” rather than replacing it. 262  Flourishing collapses into well being, and the 
suggestion that a revolution in property law–one that would have drastic results for individual 
rights–is needed to achieve a moralized concept of well being is not convincing.  
There is another disagreement with the legal economists that is worth mentioning. 
Peñalver challenges Demsetz’ claim that individual ownership is better because collective control 
cannot acquire or use the knowledge that impacts how best to use land and how to make wise 
decisions about it, because collective owners are not motivated by the same incentives as private 
owners—primary, wealth maximization and efficiency.263 Land use, then, has a certain epistemic 
requirement. The epistemic requirement suggested by the social-obligation norm places a very 
high informational cost on owners who wish to make informed judgments about their duties 
under the norm.  Assuming that the social-obligation theorists would permit owners to act 
voluntarily before compelling them, owners ought to know what kinds of property uses promote 
flourishing, and then assess their ability to act to promote it. This requires the owners to possess 
some level of epistemic virtue: the virtuous owner must know their property is instrumental 
towards flourishing, and aim towards this goal. If owners lack this information, then they lack this 
kind of virtue by failing to aim towards this goal.264 
In terms of Aristotelian virtue ethics, practical wisdom requires owners to determine 
whether and how much they ought to contribute to their communities. This obligation is not a rule 
(“every owner must do x”); in fact, Aristotle is strongly opposed to the establishment of this kind 
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of rule. Owners, of course, can fail to act virtuously despite their best effort. Imagine an owner 
who dedicates an acre of their crops to the community and the crop fails due to poor weather. The 
owner had virtuous intentions to contribute to their community, but no flourishing results. May 
the community act to take another, more profitable acre? If their taking impacts the ability of the 
owner to flourish, then it is presumably not permissible. But if it is surplus, and it promotes the 
flourishing of the community, then it is permissible under the norm. Because it is a 
consequentialist theory, moral compliance with the obligation consists in results and not 
intentions. However, the social-obligation theorists do not establish a normative baseline for 
'surplus.'265  It might constitute property that is not necessary for the owner's own flourishing, or 
might be property that does not contribute to the owner’s flourishing. In either sense, the 
implication is that once an owner flourishes, then everything else is surplus and should be 
dedicated to the flourishing of others. This is a demanding standard, and probably unattainable by 
owners or by a property regime that purports to protect basic private property rights. It is 
unreasonable to expect owners to be able to determine whether one or another of their property 
uses promotes more or less flourishing in others. The informational and opportunity costs of 
determining the ‘flourishing value’ of one’s property are prohibitively high; these costs of could 
be internalized through rebates or subsidies, which of course might be more costly than outright 
externalization of costs. For this reason, defenders of the social-obligation norm appear 
committed to bypassing expectations that owners can make intelligent or meaningful 
determination about the flourishing-potential of their property. This situation requires the use of 
the state to enforce the norm through involuntary contributions, which redistribute property 
through eminent domain or other regulations.  
 There is, however, a method for providing owners with the epistemic grounds for 
assessing their property’s potential towards the flourishing of the community, and it may so 
simple that it easily escapes notice. Nonowners can assert their interest in property in terms of its 
potential for their flourishing by making claims about it. These claims can be based on the 
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community’s right qua community to have ownership-like interests in the property, whereby its 
value inures to their benefit or flourishing, or they can engage in the method that both law and 
economics and libertarian property theory prefer for determining ownership: they (the 
community) can offer to purchase it and become owners themselves. Through the community’s 
offer, present owners are then apprised of their property’s potential for providing flourishing to 
nonowners, and they can satisfy the demand that they be epistemically virtuous: they now know 
their property’s value to the community, and can make well-informed decisions about voluntarily 
acting with virtue towards the flourishing of the community by selling their property or granting 
some other ownership right in it. On this basis, utilitarian and rights-based theories seem far more 
well-purposed towards informing owners about the community’s stance towards their property 
than the free-standing moral obligation apparently required by the social-obligation norm. 
Section 5. Possibilities for ‘Virtue Property’  
 
This chapter concludes by attempting to situate the social-obligation norm into American 
property law by drawing out its implications for owners both with and without the abstractions of 
virtue theory. It asks whether virtue theory can build the appropriate foundation for a virtuous 
property law that recognizes and enforces social obligations while also protecting property rights. 
As I explain below, a primary property virtue—respecting property one does not own by fulfilling 
the duty not to interfere—is never mentioned by the social-obligation theorists. This virtue is 
already at the core of most moral and legal property regimes and practically universally accepted 
by all cultures.266 Obviously, such a pedigree does not prove its value, but it does demand its 
consideration. This virtue constitutes the basis of the moral and legal norm and grounds the 
corollary right to exclude, both of which are key to the conception of private property discussed 
in this work. This omission is possibly explained by the fact that the social-obligation theorists 
are committed to the elimination of this right as the primary focus or value of property law;267 
perhaps they are committed to eliminating the primary property virtue that it corresponds to as 
well.  
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The following parts describes virtue theory, the virtues of the social-obligation norm, 
how virtue guides owners, and finally if and how virtue guides political authorities and the laws 
they implement.  
Part 1. A Virtue Theory 
Rosalind Hursthouse has suggested that the ‘bare bones’ of a virtue theory begins by 
specifying what premises constitute right action: first, “an action is right iff it is what a virtuous 
agent would do in the circumstances.” Second, a “virtuous agent is one who acts virtuously, that 
is, one who has and exercises the virtues.” Third, a virtue is a “character trait a human being 
needs to flourish or live well.” The third premise makes the connection between virtue, as a 
character trait, and action, which is variously defined as flourishing, living well, or 
eudaimonia.268 Virtues are the character traits required for the appearance or experience of 
eudaimonia. Virtue therefore guides action by saying, “act this way, or don’t act that way,”269 but 
virtue does not lead to flourishing: it is flourishing. As Claeys writes, “the practice of virtue is 
coterminous with human flourishing which is coterminous with eudaimonia.” 270  Peñalver, 
connecting virtue to land use, writes, “virtues are acquired, stable dispositions to engage in 
characteristic modes of behavior conducive to human flourishing. [V]irtuous conduct [is] the 
behavior that flows from stable dispositions to use land in ways that characteristically promote 
human flourishing.” Because “decisions about land are…thoroughly suffused with moral 
content”, “law has an important role to play in encouraging virtuous land use.”271  
As a virtue-based theory, the social-obligation norm urges owners to use their property 
virtuously: owners should act with moral virtue. Mere possession of “property virtue”—as a trait 
of character—does not make an owner virtuous. If property is used such that flourishing results, 
then the promotion of flourishing is virtuous. Because the norm is obligatory in the form of a 
legally-enforceable property law, the challenge for the social-obligation theorists is to show how 
“principles that work in ethics fit seamlessly into law or other forms of politics.”272 
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Part 2. The Virtues of the Social-Obligation Norm  
The social-obligation norm is the tool for a virtue-friendly regulation of property leading 
to a theory of practical action that, according to commentator Eric Claeys, refers to a “broad 
range of theories of practical philosophy that all place high priority on virtue and on human 
happiness understood as the disposition in which human reason regulates human passions.”273 In 
order to implement virtue in a property law, the social-obligation theorists advocate that 
collective decisions should take precedence over individual decisions when better, more morally 
correct decisions require legal intervention. Eminent domain is the best example of this kind of 
decision. According to Peñalver, there are three goals of laws that rightfully override private land 
decisions and “command owners to act with virtue.” These are (1) protection of the poor and 
protection of future generations who might be harmed by private decisions (the externalization of 
harms); (2) the moral education of landowners, which teaches virtue by “constraining the 
behavior of nonvirtuous owners” including, for example, civil rights laws in housing and 
common carriers; and (3) constraining the private behavior of (already) virtuous landowners, by 
helping to clarify social obligations and coordinate virtuous action.”274  
For Peñalver, human flourishing—the corollary of virtue—results from the cooperation 
facilitated by communities, which in turn depends on the social infrastructure generated by 
cooperation.275 As applied to property, this moral obligation to cooperate becomes the social-
obligation norm at issue here, which is implemented into a legal obligation in the form of 
property law. For Peñalver, property law is a vehicle, purposefully driven toward a moral goal: 
the promotion of human flourishing.276 If met, the social obligation required by these goals results 
in a more productive and efficient use of land, which in turn promotes the goal of facilitating 
human flourishing.277  
The social obligation theorists therefore want to use virtue as a normative framework for 
developing land use policy. To this end, Peñalver makes the “explicit argument that law, 
particularly land law, should be structured to promote certain virtues” which in turn promote 
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certain pluralistic ends or values. These ends or values include  
“personhood, liberty, and social welfare” which in turn foster human flourishing.278 Specifically, 
land use should promote three virtues: (1) industry, for developing material wealth; (2) justice, 
which requires the sharing of surplus wealth and property with those in need; and (3) humility, 
which requires that land be used so as to avoid irreparable harm.279 These ends are not achievable 
through social policies that simply tax wealth and redistribute it to others in the form of money or 
entitlements: according to the social obligation theorists, a virtuous property law requires in-kind 
distributions of the type of property that persons need to flourish.280 Such property requires 
physical spaces to perform the types of activities that constitute a dignified human life: these 
resources are “essential not only for human beings’ brute physical survival, but also for the 
education of the young and for people to be able to participate in the social life of the 
community.”281 
Jeremy Waldron, in his article “Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom,” has argued 
convincingly for the importance of such physical spaces.282 Persons cannot flourish without the 
freedom to occupy a physical space for the performance of bathing, eating, or sleeping. When 
these spaces constitute homes, they become deeply important for the dignity and flourishing of 
their owners. Peñalver writes that “[o]nce a person (or a community) has sufficiently incorporated 
a piece of land into his life plans, exchanging that land for some other good (even a good of great 
economic value) or for some other piece of land can hinder, in some cases irreparably, his ability 
to flourish by short-circuiting long-term plans, deeply held commitments, and carefully 
constructed identities.”283 Waldron and the social-obligation theorists support a political right, 
grounded in a virtue-based property law, that guarantees persons these physical spaces.  
For Claeys, this is problematic because the theorists conflate claims about fundamental 
values or ends, which reside within the domain of ethics, the study of which  “focus[es] on the 
choices individual actors make in their capacities as individuals and not citizens,” with claims 
about property and tort law, which “specifies and secures political obligations.” 284 As Waldron 
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notes, a property law should resolve disagreements or contests about resources including, 
obviously, property.285 Property contests are primarily intended to resolve (1) who owns the 
property; (2) how it is used; and (3) who owns it next. But, as the social-obligation theorists 
argue, the law should also promote flourishing, which can conflict with determinations of 
ownership, use, and future owners.  
According to Claeys, “principles that work well as hypothetical rules of practical conduct 
for individuals”—such as principles which promote flourishing—“may not work as well as 
compulsory rules of practical conduct for citizens.”286  If virtue is indeed a proper subject for 
legislation, Claeys notes that “[o]ne of the main functions of law as an institution is to make the 
many who are not naturally virtuous more so—first by compelling them, then by shaming, 
habituating, teaching, and then ultimately persuading them.”287 For example, when the norm is 
enforced as the result of the democratic process through legislation (specifically through the use 
of eminent domain), Alexander argues that it should not be disturbed or ‘interrupted’ by judicial 
review even if it is ‘wrong,’ as was the case in Kelo. The Kelo decision was “correctly decided”288 
in terms of the law on residential/redevelopmental takings, but, Alexander writes, the actual use 
of eminent domain by the city of New London was “likely wrong.”289 What Alexander means 
here is that the Supreme Court was correct not to ‘interrupt’ New London’s exercise of its 
eminent domain power, but that New London’s use did not meet the flourishing standard. 
Alexander, therefore, prioritizes ‘the people’s right’ to make property determinations—even 
when they are wrong—over the non-democratic judicial review process that potentially and 
occasionally upholds individual property rights.290  
Part 3. How Virtue Guides Owners 
I take the following to be the core objective of the social-obligation theorists: the wealthy 
should give property, in kind when the circumstances require it,291 to promote virtue and hence 
happiness in their community292 while still preserving a “domain of discretion organized to 
encourage owner self-preservation and advancement.” As Claeys notes, this second objective is 
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limited so that “public officials may decide how owners’ use rights will best promote specific 
claims about individual or civic flourishing.”293   A property law that requires owners to justify 
the exercise of their ‘incidents of ownership’ ex ante in terms of virtue or flourishing them is 
exceedingly demanding, yet the social-obligation norm is apparently intended to provide that kind 
of oversight by supervising and restricting virtually any property decisions by individuals that 
might impact the group. Peñalver appears to support such oversight “[a]t least in the context of a 
resource as flexible as land,” because “without a relatively thick theory about the sorts of values 
that people are likely to want to pursue, we cannot reach very confident conclusions about 
whether letting them freely pursue those values through the allocation of private rights embedded 
within the market is likely to be, on net, harmful or beneficial relative to collective decision 
making.”294  
The norm, then, should provide a guide for action that property owners should follow in 
order to fulfill their social obligations. On the one hand, the norm is quite clear and simple: it 
obligates owners to use the surplus value generated by appropriation of the value of their property 
to promote the capabilities which foster human flourishing. On the other, because the concept of 
flourishing or eudaimonia is, according to Hursthouse, “not an easy one to grasp,”295 it is 
similarly difficult to determine what kinds of obligations can be demanded by the norm both 
legally (as, for example, when an owner’s property is subject to a takings) or non-legally (in the 
form of, for example, social pressure). The theorists need to explain how property owners should 
behave, specifically in regards to their use of their property, and in response to democratic 
assertions of control over their property, which can range from zoning restrictions to allocations 
for public use to outright expropriation. Property owners might be under the norm and fail in their 
obligations, but that does not entail confiscation or excessive regulation which is the outcome of 
compelled compliance. Here are several suggestions that might guide property owners operating 
under the norm; they are informal norms at the first stage of enforcement, but legally enforceable 
if the duty is not fulfilled. 
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1. property owners are obligated to give up their property if there is a public use for 
it that promotes human flourishing; this is in response to the exercise of police 
power, so owners should not request or accept compensation. This is the norm’s 
claimed duty of sacrifice.296 It requires that owners not oppose takings or litigate 
them because takings are the outcome of the democratic process.  
2. Aesthetic, historic, or cultural determinations which regulate rights by 
democratic bodies take precedence over private property rights (the duty to 
recognize culture); 
3. By becoming a property owner, one owes special duties above and beyond those 
of non-property owners; and  
4. Property rights are not constituted by the right of owners to exclude or the duty 
of non-owners not to steal or interfere; rather, property rights obligate owners to 
promote flourishing in their communities.  
If these are correct statements of the ‘normative pull’ of property ownership under the norm, then 
acting in accord with the norm while also pursuing one’s rights under, for example, takings law 
becomes extremely difficult. Owners should not, according to the norm, challenge the use of 
eminent domain against their property if eminent domain leads to flourishing, and they cannot be 
a virtuous owner if their duty to promote flourishing is fulfilled through coercive law. If eminent 
domain is used to enforce the duty to promote flourishing—as Alexander claims—then eminent 
domain and its threatened use makes it impossible for actors to act virtuously. 297  Assume there is 
a general duty to ϕ. If Stan is coerced to ϕ and later compensated, Stan has not fulfilled their duty 
to ϕ.  Say Stan’s property was used while ϕing, and destroyed, but Stan was paid fair and square 
for the use/destruction of their property. It cannot it be said that Stan fulfilled their duty to ϕ.  By 
way of analogy: there is a general duty to assist in emergencies. If Stan is coerced to assist and 
later compensated, it cannot be said that Stan fulfilled that duty. The social-obligation norm, 
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therefore, requires owners to forego their right to challenge attempted expropriations of their 
property or risk being labeled as vicious.  
This exposes an inherent conflict within the implementation and enforcement of a virtue-
based property law: once contributions become mandatory, “the virtue requirement seems 
dispensable: whether I pay what I owe depends not on my inherent generosity, but on my being a 
citizen with certain duties, independent of my pleasure or pain at having to contribute to the 
common good.”298 This conflict is resolved—or not—with the possibility of a virtuous political 
authority charged with the implementation of a virtuous law of property.299 However, a virtuous 
property law does not begin and end with owner’s obligations, and nonowners have obligations as 
well.   
Part 4. How Virtue Guides Non-Owners 
By ignoring the duty of nonowners, the social obligation theory focuses solely on the duties of 
owners and has tended towards the idea that owners owe unique duties to non-owners based on 
whether or not they own more than the non-owners. In describing the moral obligations of 
nonowners, legal theorist Carol Rose shows how the “outside perspective” of non-owners leads to 
the duty of noninterference—a duty which applies in both privacy and property situations. Non-
owners, writes Rose, are not “persons who own little or nothing themselves” in a general sense. 
Rather, Rose uses the concept situationally, where non-owners are “those who in any given 
particular instance observe but do not own the thing observed.”300 This is a very different 
perspective of the owner/non-owner dialectic, which tends, in political theory, and Marxist 
political theory in particular, to cleave persons into categories or classes and then pit them against 
one another based on the assumption that they have competing interests. Rose suggests that the 
situational, as opposed to general, characterization of the dichotomy gives a more true account of 
the psychology of owners and non-owners. Persons with substantial property are nevertheless 
non-owners of some property as much as persons with little or no property are also non-owners, 
and, similarly, a person with little property is still an owner, and the rest of the world (whether or 
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not they have meager or substantial holdings) are non-owners in regards to their property. On this 
account, non-owners owe the same duties to owners regardless of the size, wealth, or power of 
the owner’s property (including large bank accounts, islands, homes, or toothbrushes) despite 
holding large, small, or no property themselves.   
The obvious concern, as Rose notes, is that objects and possessions do not merely 
influence the development of personality, but define it. For Rose, property permits refuge and 
exclusion, or the “breathing room one needs for other projects.” Rose: “A person needs space and 
security for the sake of privacy, calm, thought; in other words, one needs property for the sake of 
doing the things one wants to do in the world.” Libertarian thinking, according to Rose, “builds 
on this protective quality of property[.]”301   
“So,” asks Rose, “how does it feel to be one who is confronted with the property of 
others?”302 Everyone is the non-owner of something, so we all know what it is like not to own 
something.  However, instead of encouraging respect for the property of others, the social 
obligation norm encourages non-owners to assess the property of others as potential sources for 
their own flourishing and promises a kind of moralized ‘return’ of unearned and unjustly owned 
property in excelsius to the state of nature, ripe for acquisition not by the group of non-owners but 
by the victims of ownership.  
Instead of feeling this redistributive urge, Rose describes—no doubt with some humor—
how nonowners might responded to a “bourgeois” virtue that is the result of a “random genetic 
mutation,” one which gives rise to the “cooperative and non-transgressive psychological 
propensity” towards respect for the property of others, a gene which “build[s] on the outside 
psychology of not owning, of respecting the things others own, even when the owners are not 
around.”303 Rose recalls James Penner’s example of the parking lot, which illustrates the idea of a 
non-owner’s duty towards the property of others. When a person encounters a parking lot full of 
cars, that person has a minimal duty to leave the cars alone, and this duty “applies to all the autos 
in the lot except the one (if any) that you do own.”304 This duty exists even if that person does not 
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own a car or anything else, and it exists even if they do not know whether the owner is wealthy or 
working class.305 What the non-owner does know in this case is that all of these items belong to 
someone else, and by knowing this they become a member of what Rose calls the “audience for 
the rights of others.”306  “The critical point,” writes Rose, “about property is that the non-owner 
shows respect for the owner’s property even when the non-owner has little reason to fear the 
owner’s defense—that is, when the owner is not actually in possession, or when the owner is an 
“obviously weaker party who could not repel invasion.”307  For Rose, a core attribute of 
property—and, for my purposes, for privacy as well—is “precisely that the non-owner respects 
the owner’s claim even when it is not defended.” There is, of course, fear of an owner’s wrath, 
law’s punishment, and other disincentives for taking what is not one’s own. “But that is not what 
makes a property regime work,” writes Rose. What makes it work is a world where non-owners 
respect ownership.308 Property, particularly in things that are not possessed in the traditional way, 
such as stocks, bonds, and bank accounts, can only exist with the cooperation of non-owners.309 
By participating in such a system of trade, suggests Daniel C. Russell, this kind of cooperation 
can be evidence of the non-owner’s virtue.310 This is because in a commercial or exchange 
society, virtue does not lie solely in the seller’s or owner’s motives or actions—this would be the 
position of the social obligation theorists—but in “the fact that [a non-owner does] not just take 
the bread.” Consider, Russell writes, Adam Smith’s example of a baker and someone who would 
like to buy their bread.  The transaction starts with an offer (by the baker) and not a demand (by 
the buyer), and that way the buyer can pay the price “instead of saying ‘If you were virtuous, you 
would give me a loaf of bread.’”311 In this situation, which characterizes a very large percentage 
of the relationships between owners and non-owners, the only thing between buyer and seller is 
not the seller’s duty to supply something to the buyer, or the buyer’s right to demand it, but the 
price to be agreed upon. The price is determined, in large part, by the seller’s right to their 
property, and by the buyer’s duty not to steal it. In terms of the social obligation norm, it is 
unclear why the theorists ignore this.   
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Part 5. The Virtue Guided State and the Possibility of Virtue Politics  
As I have shown, virtue shapes the right to exclude as well as the duty of noninterference, 
but what can virtue tell us about the implementation of rights and duties in a property law? As 
Mark Lebar suggests, a virtuous property law must make both the demos and political authorities 
(they are occasionally the very same group of people) virtuous as well, and some kind of 
constraint must in place to prevent the demos from acting on its own benefit and not from the 
standpoint of virtue. In other words, virtue must bind political authorities as well as the authority 
they claim. 312   
In terms of a political order, many contemporary virtue theorists coming from the 
Aristotelian tradition see political authority as an unproblematic or necessary feature of virtue 
ethics.313 To the contrary, Lebar suggests that virtue ethics actually imposes a liberal constraint 
on the exercise of political authority. Because “the end or purpose of the polis is allowing citizens 
to lead a good life, which is the life of virtue[,] political institutions are devoted to making more 
virtuous both those exercising political authority and those subject to it, in each case for the sake 
of the contribution of that virtue to living well.”314 The social obligation norm implies that 
regulations and takings must promote flourishing, which requires a virtuous political authority. 
How, then, does the norm make the demos or the legislator more virtuous? Determining a public 
use for property does not constitute nor promote flourishing, and taking property for a public 
‘benefit’ seems to circle back on simple considerations for welfare.315  A virtue ethic that requires 
a determination of flourishing for all property uses/regulations would create a major bottleneck 
for regulators. How, then, does a property virtue obligate officials—those who exercise political 
authority, and this can include officials, the demos, and the like—to act upon their good character 
by creating property rules that promote flourishing? In enacting and enforcing the norm, political 
authorities are tasked with either the direct promotion of flourishing through coercive laws, or 
indirectly by creating more virtuous owners who recognize their obligation to promote 
flourishing.316 
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Lebar develops the idea of a virtue-based political authority based on what he calls 
“Hursthouse’s Constraint.” According to Lebar, Hursthouse’s conception of virtue imposes a 
constraint on the exercise of political authority due to the concern that laws might cause others to 
act wickedly. A law that provides criminal punishment for abortion, for example, causes some 
persons, such as law enforcement officers, to act wickedly by threatening and harming abortion 
seekers.317 In such cases, virtue is not concerned with individual actions, but with the actions of 
political authorities. Acting virtuously is therefore a problem for judges and legislators who are 
tasked with enforcing a “conception of the good” in their exercise of political authority.318  
Ordinary persons, in terms of virtue theory, do not and cannot ‘enforce’ conceptions of the good 
except for their own. This returns to the problem of compelled or coerced virtue, which usurps the 
agency of citizens who no longer act in accordance with their practical rationality, but with the 
orders of officials. This is also the problem of political authority in general, and specifically the 
problem of the practical implementation of the social obligation norm. 
Therefore, instead of a conception of virtuous political authority that enforces 
obligations, the interests of the community, or capabilities, Lebar argues that virtue ethics is 
really about rights, such as the rights to life, liberty, and property.319 A virtuous political authority 
provides for conditions for possibility of self-directed (phronesis) life where the “crucial element 
in good human life is the exercise of choice.”320 
In arguing for a liberal political theory based on ‘ancient virtue ethics and modern 
politics,’ Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl321 see rights as metanorms: they secure the 
possibility of flourishing or capabilities by allowing persons to make their own conception of the 
good life, but do not prescribe specific ends for how individuals should live. This constitutes a 
justification for a liberal political order that advances virtue indirectly. Such an order “does not 
promote virtue for virtue’s own sake; it promotes virtue regulation as an indispensable means for 
helping citizens enjoy their own and respect their neighbors’ rights.”322 Virtuous action is not 
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possible without the kind of freedom and autonomy that rights are supposed to protect, so politics 
should protect the rights that can lead to virtuous actions. 
For Lebar, the problem—as Hursthouse observes—is determining what a virtue-based 
property law requires for the agents who carry it out (including police, judges, legislators, 
citizens: anyone who can act with political authority).323 How can authorities act upon and coerce 
those who see their actions as unwarranted or unjustified? What about those who reject 
flourishing as a legitimate aim for the exercise of political authority? As Lebar keenly observes, 
the social-obligation theorists need to anticipate their response when they are faced with the fact 
that some persons will reject their picture of human flourishing through property law,324 and even 
view it as “illiberal.”  “Any idea to use law to achieve an objectively determined goal,” writes 
Wyman, “inevitably runs the risk of this perception.”325 
For example, voters and their legislatures are deeply opposed to the kind of takings used 
in Kelo.326 They do not want their property taken and it would be wrong to characterize this as a 
vice or example of pleonexia (the insatiable greed for more things). The responses to Kelo 
indicate that Americans are opposed to ‘sharing’ private property for ‘public benefit.’ They are a 
community opposing to takings.  The responses also raise—and answer—the question about who 
would want a formally recognized and legally enforceable social-obligation norm. According to 
Freddie Mac, 90% of all Americans will be homeowners at some point in their lives.327 They 
would presumably want increased flourishing through better infrastructure, but they also want to 
ensure their property is not subject to being transformed into said infrastructure, or that political 
authorities tell them they may use it only as “’excellent,’ ‘model,’ or ‘virtuous’ citizens 
would.”328 
For Peñalver, this problem—the problem of political authority and its abuse—can be 
avoided by ensuring that the state is morally justified in using eminent domain to ensure 
compliance with the social-obligation norm only when: 1.) exclusionary property rights are 
inconsistent with the dignity of the excluded; 2). the recipient has an acute need for the property; 
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3). there is a relationship formed between recipient and owner’s land; and 4). the owner has 
created a relationship with recipients that made them dependent on the owner.329 If courts were to 
adopt this, the use of eminent domain (particularly the ‘wrong’ use of it in Kelo) might be 
avoided in a great many cases because of the high standards imposed by this formula.  He 
recognizes the importance of private homes, and that the use of eminent domain can “fail to treat 
someone's home with the respect that it deserves” and “seriously insult their sense of dignity and 
self-worth.”330 Instead of justifying increased rights of homeowners which restrict the power of 
eminent domain, Peñalver suggests that the state give “due regard to the importance of the 
property in question to the lives of the people being displaced.” In doing so, the state should 
refrain from the exercise of eminent domain against homeowners “except when necessary to 
accomplish important public objectives.” If the state deprives owners for “reasons that appear to 
be insufficiently weighty or ill-considered, or when it offers them patently insufficient 
compensation, eminent domain becomes an affront to the dignity” of the homeowner, and 
eminent domain should not be used in that case.331 Eminent domain should be used “only when 
necessary to accomplish important public goals,” and public officials “must effectively 
communicate to the public that they understand and respect the importance of the private home 
and that they will not lightly dispossess owners, however politically vulnerable.”332  
Like Hursthouse’s Constraint, Peñalver places a moral constraint on political authorities 
but refuses to frame the constraint in terms of rights. In fact, he explicitly rejects rights because 
they are ‘exploited’ by property rights groups who attempt to provide all property, and not only 
homes, with greater protection against eminent domain. Such protection for all private land is  
an unnecessarily over-inclusive way of protecting people's castles; it permits a politically 
powerful, well-funded, and well-connected set of property owners to piggyback on the 
rhetorical power of a conception of property that has nothing to do with their own 
relationship to the land. Your home may be your castle, but Alcoa's aluminum mines do 
not possess, and should not be understood to share, the same lofty status.333  
 
I am sympathetic to this, but he jumps too quickly from protecting the home to corporate mining 
interests, which, as I explain in chapter 4, have little privacy value and are therefore less protected 
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in terms of private property claims. There is a lot of property in between that deserves as much 
protection as the home. Like Margaret Radin, Peñalver wants to draw a line on the duty not to 
interfere at the home, but, as I argue in chapter 3, the line between personal and so-called 
‘fungible’ property is not so easily drawn. 
A powerful private property right would protect the interests that Peñalver discusses here, 
and the interest in the home, as private property that is strictly protected against the state and 
community, is a powerful and important one. Peñalver is correct in his analysis that markets do 
not capture this interest. But while Penalver and the others can state how virtue demands that 
political authorities do not take homes—this, again, is Hursthouse’s constraint—they miss the 
opportunity to elaborate upon the political tool that preserves this important interests: it is the 
private property right on the one hand, and a law or other form of restraint that restrains political 
officials from violating their own duty not to interfere with an owner’s right to exclude, 
particularly in the home, on the other. This missed opportunity is understandable, because the 
social-obligation theorists are committed to a virtue property that is conceptually committed to 
community interests, in abrupt opposition to the right to exclude and practically ignoring the 
prime virtue in all property theories: the duty not to interfere with, or steal, or take property that 
you have no right to or do not own. The social-obligation theorists believe that owners will not 
use their property virtuously (due to “the predictable absence of adequate voluntary transfers”334) 
and so ‘jump to the chase’ in terms of compelling compliance, but inexplicably expect political 
authorities to act morally in restraining their grasping for private property and fail to provide any 
suggestion whereby other political authorities might act to restrain them. This restraint is the 
constitutional right to property discussed in chapter 6, and the more specific constitutional 
protection of the home pursuant to the strict scrutiny standard suggested, again, by Margaret 
Radin and defended in chapter 3.  
Viewed another way, it could be argued that the social-obligation is reciprocal and 
applies vertically as well as horizontally, meaning it acts, like the takings clause, as a restriction 
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on regulations and takings by the state. This would mean that property regulation and takings are 
permissible only if they satisfy the norm. After all, the state is a property owner as well, and 
others (owners and non-owners alike) should also be able to restrict its use of property by a norm. 
Were this the case, then only takings, regulations, and restrictions that satisfy the norm (i.e., they 
promote human flourishing by developing the capabilities) would be permissible. It is highly 
unlikely that most takings and regulations would pass this test, which is clearly a higher standard 
to meet than mere ‘public use.’ In this way, the norm might actually backfire on its proponent’s 
goals and drastically limit the kinds of regulations and taking they would like to promote.  
 Wyman, writing in response to the social-obligation theorists, asks perhaps the most 
important question for a virtue-directed law: whether law can actually foster virtue if, as virtue 
ethicists maintain, “it is not virtuous to do the right thing to comply with a rule.”335 In other 
words, the requirements of virtue may preclude the very possibility of virtuous rule-compliance.  
This is because people who change their behavior “due to a change in the law would not seem to 
be acting virtuously as virtue ethicists understand virtue; they would seem to be doing the right 
thing (assuming the law is morally justified) for the wrong reasons because their actions are 
dictated by external constraints rather than their own internal dispositions.”336 One set of such 
external constraints arises from the enactment and implement of civil rights laws. 
Part 5. Civil Rights: A Social Obligation Norm in Action 
The strongest and most visible argument for the existence of the norm in property law—a 
norm which restricts the traditional right to exclude and simultaneously fosters human flourishing 
and dignity in particular—is in regards to civil rights legislation which prohibits discrimination 
by private owners who operate properties designated as common carriers. This type of legislation 
“categorically restrict[s] the exclusion power of owners who use their real property on the 
market” and directly limits their right to claim the state’s protection against trespass. These laws 
may have also promoted more moral and respectful owners.337 These are good examples of how a 
social-obligation norm might work, despite imposing a “significant curtailment of the common 
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law right of business owners to exclude on whatever ground they saw fit.”338  
Ownership, according to commentator Jedediah Purdy, is “a building block of, and sets in 
motion, market relations. What may be less obvious is that what one might call ‘market property’ 
carries special limits on exclusion, in favor of a universalist principle that all comers must have 
access to market relations.”339 Coupled with the reasoning in Shack, which purported to subsume 
the private interests of a property owner to the dignity and accessibility interests of his tenants, 
who were entitled to the same common carrier protections as users of quasi-public entities such as 
railways and restaurants, the obligation of common carriers not to discriminate based on race or 
other classifications is both socially and legally normative, but may be limited to what Purdy 
characterizes as an “open-market principle,” where “all must be able to join in the characteristic 
interactions of market life on terms equal in principle—that is, without legal disability from 
owning, buying, selling, or engaging others.”340 Commercial and intellectual property necessarily 
involve reduced privacy claims, in the same way that opening one’s house to the public—or 
living in a glass house—reduces privacy claims. By entering the market, one ‘opens the curtains’ 
of their privacy by inviting customers. 
In other words, the norm operates in common carrier settings related to housing, 
transportation, or other quasi-public facilities, but it is doubtful that this kind of reasoning applies 
to other types of property situations.  Shack, in particular, is a considerable outlier in the 
jurisprudence, but not because of its holding: it is exceptional because of its language about 
capabilities and human flourishing, and, because it is exceptional, the case does not constitute the 
bellwether of future decisions that the social-obligation theorists wish it to be.  
To the extent that there is a social-obligation norm for property that is reflected in 
American law and society, particularly in terms of nuisance, trespass, takings, and property that is 
private in title but public in function, the norm is not particularly complex and it is very limited in 
scope and application.  The norm seeks to prevent unjust harm, as exemplified in the maxim ‘Sic 
utere tue ut alienum non laedas,’341 and also operates as an attempt to govern situations of 
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necessity, which, as the maxim necessitas non habet legem reveals, cannot comprehensively be 
determined by law. The norm also reflects the right to exclude, with qualifications in terms of 
harm and necessity, but primarily imposes the duty not to steal or interfere with another’s 
rightfully owned property. These maxims, described in detail in Chapters 1 and 6, operate not 
merely upon property owners, but upon all members of the community. The classic restriction on 
property rights involves the ownership of a knife: knife owners do not have the right to use their 
knife by sticking it in another’s back.342 But in this case, ownership of the knife is irrelevant: non-
owners of knives are under as powerful a duty not to harm others as owners. Owners, of course, 
have strong exclusionary right to keep others from their knife, but others have an even stronger 
duty of noninterference (i.e. they must refrain from stealing it) as long as the owner/user is not 
violating their duty not to unjustly harm others with it. The social-obligation norm of non-
interference is uncontroversial, morally apparent, and, in conjunction with the right to exclude, 
and an integral part of any property system.343 Alexander and Peñalver acknowledge, in the 
setting of the Kelo case and its subsequent controversies, that the right to exclude is particularly 
strong with respect to the home, and seem supportive for it in homes as sites of capabilities and 
flourishing,344 but either ignore this aspect of the norm for other types of properties, or privilege 
the duty to benefit others far above the duty not to interfere. That being said, the duty to respect 
existing property rights is undoubtedly the stronger duty from a historical and descriptive point of 
view,345 but receives short (if any) shrift from the theorists.  
Conclusion 
The norm might provide practical reasons for owners to voluntary cede their property for public 
use in appropriate circumstances, but, of course, takings and regulations are not social norms: 
they legally coerce property owners in the event of non-compliance. Were the norm to be adopted 
by courts and legislatures, owners who refuse to comply with the norm are coerced into 
complying through the traditional mechanisms of eminent domain, taxation, and regulation.   
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Were owners to recognize the existence of the norm and the duty it imposes upon them, 
owners would employ their property for the benefit of all, and self regulate (via self governing 
moral laws) their private property interests so that benefits inure in the direction of human 
flourishing. Were owners convinced that they should use their property to promote flourishing 
(i.e. they believe/accept/acknowledge their duties under the norm), they would recognize that 
legitimate claims upon their property (again, in the direction of human flourishing) morally 
obligates them to forego i). self-interested claims for compensation, ii). the assertion of rights that 
entail litigation (and the related expenses for the community), and iii) the belief that their private 
property is their proverbial ‘sole and despotic dominion.’  The result, ex hypothesi, is the 
promotion of human flourishing without the related resentment or rights-violations that pre-norm 
property owners experience when their rights are infringed or violated. Owners who adopt the 
norm would instead experience a sense of community involvement, republican civic-mindedness, 
and benevolence towards nonowners (and other similarly-situated owners) that is far more 
compensatory than money or in-kind compensation. Owners experience the satisfaction of 
knowing that they have fulfilled a moral obligation and take pleasure in their virtuous actions. 
This is, I maintain, how Aristotle would understand the norm, but it is not how the norm plays out 
in the proposed property jurisprudence that supports the social-obligation norm as defended by 
Alexander and Peñalver.   
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Chapter 3 
 
Hegelian Property, Personhood, and Eminent Domain 
 This chapter investigates Hegel’s conception of property as a fundamental element in the 
ethical life of both individuals and communities, and attempts to determine the propriety and 
extent of Hegel’s idea of property in terms of private and public law. For Hegel, private property 
allows for the recognition of oneself and one another, and property holding therefore permits 
recognition between conflicting persons and their competing wills.  Regarding private law—the 
statutes and common law jurisprudence that regulates ownership claims between individuals—
Hegel’s conception appears modern and even liberal, but this portrayal ends abruptly when the 
liberal conception of private property rights abuts the ethical priority of the state and its 
unregulated sovereign authority over property. For Hegel, this is unproblematic because, like all 
rights, the private property right—as a purely abstract, formal, legal/juridical right—is itself a 
product or result of the very state that can claim priority over it. This reveals the dialectic inherent 
in the both the conception and exercise of the right, in which the private right to property at the 
level of civil society confronts the public right of the state, resulting in both the preservation and 
uplifting of the right, and, at the same time, its cancellation or annihilation it at the level of the 
state.  This conflict is exemplified by the common law practice of eminent domain, where private 
property is subject to a decisional ‘takings’ by the state for (ostensibly) public use.  Because 
Hegel fails to provide any vision of a public law that restricts state prerogative in terms of rights, 
it is debatable whether his theory of property can be said to be a rights-based theory in private law 
as well.  
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Hegelian scholars on one side of the debate, represented here by legal theorist Margaret 
Jane Radin, argue that the mere fact of residential occupancy should put an almost complete stop 
to residential eminent domain due to the importance of the home in the development of 
personality and freedom.  Hegelian scholars on the other side of the debate, represented by Alan 
Brudner, argue that the Fifth Amendment’s takings provision reflects a distinctively Hegelian 
position on expropriations, which requires persons to relinquish private property to the interests 
of the community. If the latter interpretation is correct, then property rights are easily overridden 
by claims of public use and, I will argue, underprotected on that basis. This chapter argues that 
the former interpretation should prevail, which, by limiting the state’s prerogative to expropriate 
in all but the most exigent circumstances, results in the protection of the home as the situs of 
personhood, recognition, and ultimately, freedom.  
Section 1 consists of two parts: Radin’s property for personhood theory is followed by a 
critical analysis. Because of Radin’s claim that homes should enjoy greater legal protection than 
other types of property, section 2 explores the importance of the home through a variety of lenses. 
Section 3 is a lengthy journey through Hegelian property, from its basis in personality and 
freedom to its role in civil society and finally its putative annihilation by the state’s power of 
eminent domain. Section 4 revisits Radin’s claims with a pair of critiques. The chapter concludes 
with the recognition that Hegelian property theory can provide robust social property rights—
rights that also serve robust privacy interests—but, because those rights wither at the level of the 
state, a different kind of political theory is needed to promote and protect the privacy interest 
protected by private property.  
Section 1. Takings and Personhood 
According to Margaret Jane Radin’s modified Hegelian Personhood Theory, homes and 
personal property deserve strict constitutional scrutiny and protection, while commercial or 
fungible property deserve very little. Part 1 describes Radin’s personhood theory; the main 
	  	   148 
critique, in part 2, is a response to Radin, primarily in regards to her ability to make a meaningful 
and principled distinction between fungible and nonfungible property.  
Part 1. Radin’s Hegelian Derivation 
Radin is attempting to use Hegel’s property theory in order to “to develop a 
contemporary view useful in the context of the American legal system.”1 Arguing that Hegel’s 
conception of the necessity of property for realizations of personality and freedom implicates 
legal norms that preclude the expropriation of homes, Radin justifies a robust right of private 
personal property in the home but denies similarly robust rights in non-personal or fungible 
property. For Radin, homes and personal property deserve to be protected by the strict scrutiny 
standard of constitutional review, which requires, in the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
that legislation which infringes upon fundamental rights be struck down unless it is ‘necessary to 
achieve a compelling governmental objective.’ Under current law, measures which implicate 
property rights (including rights in homes) are subject to the far more permissible rational basis 
standard, which permits legislation if it is rationally related to a legitimate government objective. 
By arguing that persons have a fundamental right to the property that constitutes their homes and 
personal possessions, Radin presents a property theory where rights are important insofar as they 
promote the development of personality. For Radin, property and the rights that protect certain 
kinds of it are not instrumental towards personhood, but constitutive of it. Conversely, 
commercial or non-personal property deserves little, if any, protection: state regulation of this 
category of property are mere police powers, and do not even rise to the level of compensability 
unless  (presumably) there is an occupation-type takings. 
Personal Property 
According to Radin, "[p]ersonal property marks out a category of things that become justifiably 
bound up with the person and partly constitutive of personhood. Thus, a normative view of 
personhood, and hence a normative view of human flourishing, is needed in order to identify 
which objects are appropriately personal."2 Like the social obligation norm, Radin intends that 
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designating things as "personal property" serves to identify what things promote human 
flourishing:  
I have attached the label ‘personal’ to property that is connected, and is understood 
morally as rightly connected to the proper development and flourishing of persons, 
understood primarily in its positive aspect, and I have attached the label ‘fungible’ to 
property that is not connected to persons in this way but instead is understood as 
representing interchangeable units of exchange value.3 
 
These rights “form a continuum from fungible to personal,” so that the personhood perspective 
“generates a hierarchy of entitlements: the more closely connected with personhood, the stronger 
the entitlement.”4  
For Radin, personal property describes, in particular, the home. She makes a “broad 
moral claim that the personal interest of an individual possessing a home should trump competing 
fungible interests,”5 which entails the position that a tenant’s interest trumps those of a landlord, 
and also that the personal interests of the mortgagor trumps the fungible interest of the lender.6 
Although Radin proposes that there is a continuum from protected personal to unprotected 
fungible (or commercial) property, personal property has greater moral weight and is deserving of 
greater legal protection. As examples, Radin notes that the use of property as a home is more 
closely connected to personhood that using it as a garbage dump for one’s factory, and that 
airplane noise takes more from a hearing resident than from a hearing proprietor, which in turn 
takes more than from a nonhearing corporation.7  
Radin’s primary argument is that eminent domain should be severely restricted when the 
state seeks to acquire property that implicates interests in personhood, the home being the prime 
example of such property.8 The reasons for this restriction are based on the idea that full 
personhood is developed in the privacy of the home, and homes are assumed to contain the other 
instances of personal property that allow for the injection of will into the world: family heirlooms, 
clothing, photographs, kitchen items, and so forth. Personhood and its development are, to a large 
extent, private affairs. Even if personhood or will is made objective through recognition by 
others,9 the initial willful decision to choose this or that object as my willed object is my decision: 
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in fact, were the public involved, then it would be their will that causes me choose this or that 
property. An object that already has will in it—the will of other people or even the public—
cannot be made the object of my personality. However, private ownership is not just about the 
right to use objects or to “feed ourselves, and our loved ones.” Rather, writes privacy scholar 
Annabelle Lever, it is about the “ability to find forms of these that suit us, and respond to our 
particular beliefs and needs, tastes and temperaments.”10 
Homes are therefore uniquely important for the development of personality. 
Consequently, a taking of the home, even upon payment of the required fair market value, can 
never justly compensate a person who has been turned out of their home to ostensibly benefit the 
public good. This is because, for Radin, the market is not capable of determining the subjective 
value of personal property. As a result, the ‘just compensation’ requirement for forced transfers of 
personal property can never truly justly compensate. 
In order to protect it, Radin therefore supports the strict scrutiny standard of review for 
expropriation of personal property:  
In the case of personal property there should be some constitutional mechanism for 
keeping it in the hands of its holder except in dire cases. In other words, some kind of 
‘compelling state interest’ test for compensated takings of personal, but not fungible, 
property seems to be appropriate. In essence, we should recognize a substantive due 
process limitation on the eminent domain power.11 
 
Because of the importance of the home, Radin urges that the Supreme Court ask, "What 
conception of human flourishing—of personhood in the context of community—are we fostering 
by sustaining or disallowing" a statute or legislative measure that takes private property for public 
use. 12 Although “Radin is careful to note that the law has not recognized a personhood limitation 
on the power of eminent domain,” she argues that “favoring a personal interest could also mean 
giving it greater protection from state interference.”13  In terms of takings, “Radin suggests that 
the state might be required to give better reasons for taking someone's home by eminent domain 
than taking land held solely for investment.”14  
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[P]erhaps we are unwilling to presume that all single-family homes are personal because 
many houses are held only for investment, and a subjective inquiry into each case slows 
down government too much. On the other hand, perhaps the personhood perspective is so 
deeply embedded that, without focusing on the problem, we expect that the condemning 
authority will take fungible property where possible.15  
 
As it stands, eminent domain jurisprudence views all property as fungible. Radin is therefore 
looking not only for a moral limit on takings that will either prevent it or provide for increased 
compensation when it is implemented against personal property, but also for a way to deny 
compensation if the property interest is not closely connected to personhood.16 The Takings 
Clause, therefore, should only protect personal property. 
Radin’s protection of the home extends to tenants in rental property as well. According to 
Benjamin Barros, Radin not only defends extensive regulatory rent control, but that “the 
centerpiece of her argument in favor of rent control is that the personal interest in the home 
trumps competing, fungible interests.”17 Radin:  
[M]y claim is simply that the private home is a justifiable form of personal property, 
while a landlord's interest is often fungible. A tenancy, no less than a single-family house, 
is the sort of property interest in which a person becomes self-invested; and after the self-
investment has taken place, retention of the interest becomes a priority claim over 
curtailment of merely fungible interests of others.18  
 
Therefore, for Radin, a rented home has the same moral status (at least in terms of the right to 
exclude and the duty not to interfere) as an owned home, and a tenant’s right to her personal 
property in the form of a home is just as strong as the owner’s right. Unless there is a ‘compelling 
state interest’ in the property, eminent domain cannot be used to evict and displace tenants as well 
as owners. Once secured in one’s home, Radin’s personal property right is truly in rem, a right 
against the world, which includes both the state and the actual owner of the property. 
Because tenants have the same rights as homeowners, and because landlords have only 
fungible interest in their properties, any restriction of landlords’ rights in favor of tenants’ 
personhood rights pursuant to statute (mostly in the form of rent stabilization and housing codes) 
are explicitly not takings, but rather valid uncompensable exercises of the state’s police power. 
According to Radin, housing regulations foster tenants’ personhood by recognizing the 
	  	   152 
nonmarket significance of their homes. The result is that fungible or commercial property enjoys 
far less constitutional protection than personal property. 
Part 2. Several Critical Assessments  
Because Radin’s is a radical reinterpretation of the normative structures of both takings 
and landlord/tenant law, her property for personhood theory can be critiqued from a variety of 
angles. Although her argument for the protection of the home against eminent domain accords 
with several of the objectives contained herein—primarily, that homes should enjoy 
constitutional/strict protection—there are reasons to reject many of Radin’s premises and 
conclusions in regards to the personal/fungible distinction, her reading of Hegel, and her larger 
purpose of arguing for the noncommodification of personal property. The first of these critiques 
is addressed here; the remaining critiques are found after the discussion of Hegel.  
Like the social obligation theorists, Radin is trying to further the ‘ethical purpose’19 of 
private property. Together, these theories argue that if private property does not serve some 
ethical purpose or goal, particularly towards the furtherance of personality or human flourishing, 
then extensive regulation of property is justified to the extent it causes property to work towards 
those goals. For Radin, the distinction between protected and regulated property is most precisely 
drawn between personal and fungible property.  As Radin is aware, there are many coordination 
and litigation problems with this approach.20  
For example, if a person is planning on building a home on a vacant lot as their own 
residence, then Radin supports a wide latitude of rights because this constitutes personal 
property. If the same person is constructing a building (even the very same building) to rent to 
others as dwellings, then a large amount of regulation is acceptable because the property is now 
fungible. Once a home goes ‘on the market,’ its owners no longer enjoy the protections Radin 
proposes for personal property because persons living in homes slated for sale are speculators.  
Property rights do, of course, create distinct power relationships between persons (both 
natural and artificial) and the state.  By natural, I mean individual human beings; artificial persons 
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include corporations, churches, non-profit organizations, partnerships, trusts, and Indian tribes, all 
of which can own property and enjoy property rights in most liberal democratic property regimes. 
Radin would characterize all property owned by these groups as fungible and unprotected by 
constitutional property rights: as non-natural persons, it is axiomatic that they cannot own 
personal—and therefore protected—property.  Their ownership rights are therefore out of the 
ambit of the state’s obligation to pay just compensation and they are subject to severe regulation 
and expropriation, despite the fact that they are important sites for the development of 
personhood.  Several other problems arise for Radin’s theory when persons work out of the home 
or when farmers live on the land and profit through the sale of agricultural products. In these 
cases, the  continuum between personal and commercial property becomes even more blurred and 
fails to assist the courts or other policymakers in making a distinction between the two kinds of 
property.  
Radin is correct that there are limits on what can be called private property. But the 
distinction between personal/private property and other types ought to be drawn at the 
intersection of the rights of the private property owners and occupiers, and the right of the state or 
community of nonowners to regulate, expropriate, or otherwise interfere with the privacy-
protecting aspects of the property. The fungible/nonfungible distinction deflates the opportunity 
for property to promote privacy interests. For example, there are certainly personhood/privacy 
claims in many commercial interests. As Annabelle Lever writes,  
what can be said of families can be said of small businesses, too, which are often the 
repository of as many hopes and fears, time, attention, and resources as families, and as 
much the locus of collective ideals and close personal relationships, as families. This is 
particularly true of family owned and run small businesses, where the parents may spend 
the great part of their time, and where children, and their friends, will often work after 
school, at weekends, and during vacations.21  
 
Barros agrees, writing that “Radin's broad moral claim for favoring the personal interest 
in possession of a home over competing fungible interests is problematic. This claim is based on 
a general intuitive view of people's personal connection with their homes, rather than a more 
	  	   154 
nuanced view recognizing that many important ties to the home are movable. Radin's claim is 
also problematic in its trivialization of the competing interests as merely fungible.”22 Radin’s 
distinction, Barros correctly observes, is overbroad. Fungible wealth or property is property that 
is either replaceable by other tokens of that property (such as a dry erase marker) or by its 
monetary equivalent, with no loss in value to the property owner. Most mass produced goods are 
fungible: one dry erase marker is ceteris parebis as good or as valuable as any other. Cash money 
is similarly fungible. Radin argues that for the manufacturer or producer of the fungible good, 
there is no injection of personality into the good, and therefore the goal of property rights—the 
promotion of personhood—is never met. Of course, once the good has been appropriated by a 
person who makes it the repository of their objective will and demands recognition by others, the 
good becomes personal and strong property rights ipso facto emerge. This dry erase marker might 
be the one used by a doctoral student to sketch out the final, successful outline of their 
dissertation thesis, and it is this injection of will into the marker that precludes it from state 
confiscation, regardless of how much public good might result or how much compensation might 
be paid.23 
Radin uses this terminology for all property held by speculators, landlords, or investors, 
and this is erroneous because many properties, such as land, art, or intellectual innovations, are 
clearly not fungible. Radin also claims that for the investor, a piece of land worth a fair market 
value of $x is fungibly the same as cash money in the amount of $x, and that speculative owners 
have no right to expect anything more from their investment than market price.  This largely 
discounts the fact that investment property is held with the anticipation that the property will 
appreciate in time, and that the owner should have the right to ‘wait and see’ whether their 
expectations for the future value of the property will pay off. If an owner can reasonably expect 
their property to appreciate, then the synchronic payment of fair market value at time t1 deprives 
the owner of risking whether the property will appreciate at time t2.  Radin presumably avoids 
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this rather obvious fact about investment risks by arguing that there is no right to speculate in the 
first place, or, at least, no right worth protecting in a constitutional property scheme.24  
Property scholar Jeffrey Douglas Jones is also critical of the personal/fungible distinction. 
As Jones observes, Professor Radin  
conjures the image of an individual situated in an environment where personal property 
enjoys some deliberate, perceptive foreground while fungible property languishes in a 
muted back. This picture fits with Radin’s idea that the transformation of an object from 
fungible to personal property occurs only upon the investment of a person’s will into a 
thing.25 
 
As a result, Jones argues, it is not personal but rather social factors that determine whether homes 
or other items warrant protection. Jones: “[I]t is only in the context of the norms of liberal society 
that Radin concludes a home residence is property for personhood.”26 Jones uses war medals and 
weddings to illustrate the social recognition of the value of property. Jones: “For then the 
recognition of a war medal—or wedding ring—as property for personhood grows out of what 
wars mean—and what weddings mean— to the individuals themselves and to others within a 
particular system of values, much of which individuals inherit and culturally perpetuate rather 
than determine for themselves.”27  
Therefore, for Jones, the value of ‘property for personhood’ actually lies in its socio-
cultural meaning:  
Rather, [property law] would mean to protect certain socio-cultural meanings through 
legal regulation of the property to which those meanings attach. Similarly, property law 
would never be invoked in the name of personhood in order to assist particular 
individuals in identity security per se. Rather, property law in the name of personhood 
would be used to prop up treasured socio-cultural meanings that might otherwise be lost 
or endangered to particular groups whenever the underlying resources were themselves 
endangered.28 
 
Because anything can be ‘drafted into service’ for personhood,29 Radin’s theory fails to 
“set forth any normative criteria for the legal recognition or legal disqualification of purported 
property for personhood.”30 Jones concludes that first, there is “no case for the special legal 
protection of individual personal property that is constitutive of personhood,” and second, that 
property for personhood exists “in virtue of the socio-cultural meanings attached to the 
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underlying resources, not in virtue of the fact that such resources are constitutive of individual 
identity.”31 Property should be protected, therefore, when it promotes something concrete and 
verifiable, such as welfare, and not personhood.32 
So, while Radin supports a version of strong property rights that not only denies 
expropriation of homes but also protects privacy through the right to exclude and the imposition 
of a duty not to interfere, it does not protect the privacy interests of both personal and fungible 
property. These critiques show that privacy is a better measure of the level of protection required 
by different kinds of property, and the privacy of the home—as well as the reasons for granting it 
special moral and legal protections—is discussed in the following section.  
Section 2. The Home and The Philosophy of Housing 
According to urban theorist John Rennie Short, the social organization of space  
tells us much about the structure and functioning of society…The home is a key site in 
the social organization of space. It is where space becomes place, and where family 
relations and gendered and class identities are negotiated, contested, and transformed. 
The home is an active moment in both time and space in the creation of individual 
identity, social relations, and collective meaning.33 
 
This section is both expository—it looks at the role of the homes from a sociological and 
anthropological perspective—and normative, in that it attempts to determine how and to what 
extent homes should be privileged in property law. It is intended as a crucible with which Radin’s 
claims about the constitutional priority of homes can be tested, and as a segue to a thorough 
analysis of Hegelian property, primarily in terms of its ability to promote personhood and 
withstand the eminent domain claims of the state.  
Do homes protect privacy, or do privacy interests protect homes? If the former is true, 
then proprietarianism is correct, and the property right protects the privacy right. I argue in 
support of the latter claim, which can restated as follows: it is the privacy of the owner that makes 
the property special and deserving of special moral and legal treatment by states and non-owners. 
People did not seek property or possessions and then find out they coincidentally protected their 
privacy: they sought privacy and found it in property, and, specifically, in the home. 
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Modern Families, Households, and Homes 
In a series of publications and books, Peter King has developed a social philosophy of housing. 
For King, “[h]ousing operates as a place of permanence and security—it functions as home—and 
thus insecurity, flux, and contingency are precisely those things that the home seeks to secure us 
against.”34 Housing serves privacy, and privacy is the whole point of seeking out and maintaining 
the home. Strong privacy rights therefore permit us to live without external control over how we 
choose to live in the most intimate detail, and these choices are what determine us as individuals.  
According to King, the word private is “derived from the past participle (privatus) of the 
Latin word privare, meaning to deprive.” 35  Private spaces, therefore, deprive others from 
accessing them. For King, housing is always private. As “the universal condition of housing….it 
is a means, no matter how provided, that allows us to meet our private ends.”36 Housing “allows 
us to meet our own ends as private individuals free from the intervention of others.” It allows us 
to “protect the rights of individuals to live privately.”37  
As King notes, “privacy is [also] something we have…It is a state are in, or more 
properly within[.]” This understanding of privacy comports with the theory of privacy, outlined in 
chapter 1, that views it as a condition. King: “But privacy can also act as a side constraint on 
others, where we are restrained from entering another’s space.”38 In terms of the buildings that 
constitute housing, there is an important difference between inhabited and uninhabited spaces: 
“We give the dwelling its particular and especial meaning by our inhabitation. The space would 
lose much of its meaning if it were empty, but comes into its true significance through its full 
inhabitation.”39 One of the main functions of the dwelling “is to hold things in: to enclose those 
precious things and beings that we wish to protect.”40 Homes and dwellings are therefore, King 
writes,  
the most common form(s) of private property. What is interesting here is how the one 
word—private—affects and alters the meaning of the other. The word ‘private’ 
effectively gives meaning to ‘property’: it gives a sense of exclusivity and particular 
ownership. Private means the property is not shared but ring-fenced for the exclusive use 
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of certain persons: the term ‘private’ qualifies our understanding of property to the 
particular.41  
 
For King, “use predominates over ownership and physicality, so that the ends to which housing is 
put are more significant that any sense of ownership and physicality.”42 This understanding of the 
importance of the private home certainly correlates with much of Radin’s argument in favor of its 
legal priority over other kinds of property. 
Personhood inside the Modern Home 
In her study of French apartment dwellings of the late 1980s, Sophie Chevalier writes 
that 
 [every] household displays in its décor elements that testify to everyday events, to 
individual or family history, materializing social relations near or far, living or dead. It is 
important to realize that most family-related objects, souvenirs, and even heirlooms are 
created out of mass-produced objects. Gifts and purchases are converted into family 
property.43 
 
For Chevalier, an ‘inalienable environment’—the home—is constructed through the appropriation 
of mass-produced objects, where consumers “personalize” these objects by “integrating them into 
their way of life”44 so that the familiar pieces of furniture—sofas, tables, chairs—become the 
“basic embodiments of ‘home’ and ‘family’.”45 “The houses and the objects in them,” writes 
Chevalier, “circulate slowly outside of the sphere of market-related commodities eventually to 
become inalienable (as heirlooms). The longer the residence is in the family, the more legitimate 
its claim.” This includes the content and décor of the family residence.46 Chevalier refers to the 
inhabitants of these homes as “so-called alienated suburbanites [who] create a meaningful 
universe,”47 whereby the act of turning mass-produced objects into meaningful symbols of 
personhood “is not only objectification but also mediation: objects are by their material condition 
a reminiscent link to other individuals.”48   
Chevalier’s research shows how fungible, mass-produced objects can become Radian 
personal property that promotes both personhood as well a social link to others as a mediating 
device.  
	  	   159 
The Sociological Economy of the Household 
In The Household: Informal Order Around the Hearth, legal scholar Robert Ellickson 
writes that “[a] ‘household’ is a set of institutional arrangements, formal or informal, that govern 
relations among the owners and occupants of a particular dwelling space where the occupants 
usually sleep and share meals.” This would include a single person in a studio or a kibbutz of 
several hundred persons.49  “The members of a household (that is, its owners and occupants) 
together manage a real estate enterprise that makes use of inputs of land, capital, and labor in 
order to provide shelter, meals, and other services.”  
Households are different from families. Families have little to no control over their 
members (one cannot choose one’s parents) but persons choose their household partners. 
However, like families, households are “located in a geographical space called the home.” 50 It is 
typically “in the household that children first learn how to recognize and deal with challenges 
posed by endeavors involving common property and collective enterprise.”51 Much of this 
analysis also applies to other forms of real estate typically co-owned by intimates, such as small 
farms or retail outlets.   
For Ellickson, three factors determine the kind of household formations that occur in 
liberal societies: 
1. private ownership; 
2. freedom to exit; and 
3. freedom of contract.52  
 
As a result, the state does not regulate the creation or termination of household relationships.53 
Ellickson: “A liberal society makes little effort to regulate an adult’s entry into, or departure 
from, a co-occupancy, co-ownership, or landlord-tenant relationship (at least in the absence of 
rent control). Relatively unconstrained market forces, in short, largely determine the shape of 
household institutions.”54  
Ellickson concludes that the traditional small household has persisted because it is 
valuable: it is financially advantageous, it promotes liberty, and it protects privacy.  This 
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conclusion does not entail ‘special’ legal protection for household properties or homes in regards 
to non-household properties, but it clearly supports the liberal idea that the formation and 
composition of households is primarily a private matter that should be enjoy a high level of 
immunity from regulation or interference from the state.55 
The Home as Intuitively Privileged 
One of Radin’s claims for the defense of the home is that such a claim is  ‘intuitive.’ 
Consistent with Radin's intuition, Barros writes that the “home is associated with a range of 
feelings related to a long-term tie to a physical location. Home is the physical center of everyday 
life and is a source of feelings of rootedness and belonging. Home is the locus of a person's 
immediate family and can be a source of emotional warmth and personal comfort.” According to 
Barros, the psychology of home reinforces Radin’s intuitive view, in which homes are “sources of 
feelings of rootedness, continuity, stability, permanence, and connection to larger social 
networks.”56 Home as a concept is far broader than a detached suburban home inhabited by a 
traditional nuclear family. "Home" includes urban apartments, both rented and owned, and many 
of the legal protections given to homes apply as strongly to rented homes as to owned homes. 
"Home" also includes the “dwellings of individuals, single parents, gays and lesbians, and other 
‘non-traditional’ households.”57 
The Home and Eminent Domain 
The law has disclosed “a special respect for individual liberty in the home.”58 However, this 
protection has not restricted the power of the state to take, for example, homes as part of an 
economic development scheme. 59   In fact, homes do not enjoy any special constitutional 
protection in terms of the Takings Clause, and no court has denied a takings action because the 
property at issue was a home; in fact, most takings are of homes of poor and/or minority owners 
or residents. 60  According to Barros, a property law regime that permits eminent domain 
underprotects the personal interest in the home by failing to prioritize them.61 Privacy law, 
however, does prioritize homes over other kinds of property. According to Barros, this 
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prioritization is “consistent with the intimate relationship between the cultural ideas of home and 
privacy.”62 Outside of eminent domain law, homes, in comparison to other types of property such 
as the kind of property that Radin characterizes as fungible, are occasionally prioritized and given 
more legal protection that non-home properties.63  Houses, writes Barros,  
are expressly protected by the Third and Fourth Amendments to the Constitution, and 
homes are given more protection than other types of property, such as cars, in search and 
seizure law. The federal tax code strongly favors homeownership over home rental and 
ownership of other types of property.64 
 
These rights protect the home and its occupants from state interference, while self-help in tort and 
criminal law—framed by self-defense or ‘stand your ground’ statutes—protect the home and its 
occupants from interference by nonowners or nonresidents by imposing  higher sanctions for 
invasions of the home than for other invasions.65  Barros concludes the home has indeed enjoyed 
different legal treatment from other properties. This is shown by “homestead exemptions, rights 
of redemption in foreclosure, just-cause eviction statutes, and residential rent control,” which 
show that “debtor-creditor laws and landlord-tenant laws give more protection to the possessory 
interest in the home than the law ordinarily gives to the possession of other types of property.”66 
As Eduardo Peñalver writes, the home-as-castle metaphor is “not so much about the 
power of the property owner to do as he pleases, but about the inherent dignity of 
homeownership. Apart from, or perhaps in addition to, any connotation of unqualified power, the 
statement that one's home is a castle can be understood as a statement about the subjective 
importance and status that our society attaches to homeownership.”67 
 At this point, Radin’s argument, in which the personal aspect of the home prioritizes it 
the above other kind of property, seems to be on solid moral and legal ground. We turn now to an 
in-depth analysis of the putative source of Radin’s personhood theory, Hegelian property, in order 
to determine how Hegel’s ideas about property can be situated within a liberal property regime, 
what can be said about the role of property in the development of both personhood and societies, 
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and whether Hegelian property can provide the kind of bulwark against expropriation that Radin 
proposes for it.  
Section 3. Hegelian Property 
Part 1. Introduction 
According to Seyla Benhabib, Hegel provides “the most systematic analysis of the norms 
of personality, property and contract which are presupposed by modern exchange.”68  The 
following analysis tests the extent to which Radin’s property theory is a Hegelian derivation for 
personal property rights—rights that, in appropriate situations, trump the property claims of the 
community. An analysis of Hegelian property is required to determine whether Hegelian property 
can support the kinds of rights I am advocating for here, to wit, strong property rights in both 
personal and fungible property that promote the owner or occupier’s privacy rights and interests.  
Rehabilitation and Cherry Picking 
Situating Hegel’s property theory into contemporary property jurisprudence raises up the 
twin issues of rehabilitation and cherry-picking. Rehabilitation involves either justifying or 
explaining away unacceptable aspects of Hegel’s—or anyone else’s—philosophy. Jeanne 
Schroeder, for example, provides a qualified rehabilitation of Hegel’s property theory in light of 
what she characterizes as Radin’s misinterpretation of Hegel.69 According to Schroeder, Hegelian 
property can be rehabilitated in order to resolve the paradox regarding the degree to which 
property limitations (ethical, moral, political, legal) are consistent with freedom.70 For Schroeder, 
Hegel agrees that there should be a limitation on takings to facilitate freedom and a just society, 
but he fails to provide an algorithm for settling this paradox. So, according to Schroeder, Radin is 
correct about this aspect of Hegelian property, but incorrect about others, and Hegelian property 
is therefore at least partially rehabilitated by Radin’s contemporary property theory.71 
Cherry-picking, or selective reading, permits a commentator to latch onto certain aspects 
of a thinker’s oeuvre while disregarding the rest, much of which (particularly in the case of 
Hegel) is illiberal, sexist, or authoritarian. It is a kind of reverse rehabilitation: it permits a reader 
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to comment upon an individual topic without having to rehabilitate, or justify, other aspects. 
According to Robert Pippin, it is improper to cherry-pick sections of Philosophy of Right “as if 
they were individual chapters that one could consult about Hegel’s views on individual topics 
such as ‘property’.”72  This raises the issue of whether Hegel’s property theory can be evaluated 
apart from the rest of Philosophy of Right and from his other writings.  Axel Honneth suggests 
that it can, and provides a way to avoid charges of cherry picking while justifiably refusing to 
rehabilitate parts of Hegel’s philosophy.  
In Suffering from Indeterminacy, Honneth proposes that “we can reach a productive 
understanding” of Philosophy of Right without either ‘rehabilitating’ Hegel’s concept of the state 
or “calling upon the state as a substance.”73  This is because, for Honneth, Hegel’s concept of the 
state, and his concept of “spirit,” cannot be rehabilitated. Honneth terms this the indirect mode of 
reactualizing the Philosophy of Right; the direct mode entails a criticism that renders Hegel 
irrelevant because of the clearly objectionable positions he takes in terms of the state. A direct 
mode of reading many (perhaps the majority of) classical political theorists would mean that few 
could be studied because they all have features which render them objectionable, both to their 
contemporaries and to later commentators.  
So, like Honneth, I aim to show how “the fundamental aim of the text and its construction 
as a whole,” particularly in regards to Hegel’s property theory, can be understood when Hegel’s 
“basic conception of the state has been rejected in principle.”74 This will prove to be a difficult 
project, because, as Peter Stillman writes, Hegel’s complete political thought rests on property as 
its logical starting point. Stillman: “More so than most political thinkers[,] Hegel’s thought is 
grounded on property,” where “the right to property is the basis of the rights to life and 
freedom.”75 It may also prove difficult to come up with a Hegelian property law if, as Schroeder 
writes, he fails to supply a practical, positive law of property76 and if he does not give answers to 
“specific policy questions”77 about law, ownership, and distribution.  
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In this section, I propose to read the property theory of Philosophy of Right in light of 
Hegel’s ethical, legal, and political writings, but—like Honneth—will finally reject Hegel’s 
conception of the state as being inconsistent with the kinds of rights proposed in the earlier 
sections of the book.  I also hope to construct a version of a Hegelian property law and to provide 
some answers to policy questions. Under a Hegelian property regime: 
1. property requires a broadly capitalist social and political economy; 
2. the institution of private property is justified to the extent it contributes to individual 
freedom and individuality,78 and this is particularly true for family property; homes, 
therefore, are uniquely protected;  
3. Hegel’s property theory is developmental: persons are not born ready for the ethical 
community nor for the state of nature, and property is therefore necessary for the 
development of persons as social beings;79  
4. a democratic majority cannot expropriate ‘for public use upon payment of just 
compensation’; however, the monarch can expropriate without restriction.  
Philosophy of Right: An Overview 
According to Alan Brudner, Hegel is arguing for the “moral necessity for private 
property,” in which the institution of private property provides justifications for a variety of 
justice-promoting actions that are “normatively privileged” within a social and legal framework.80 
The goal of Philosophy of Right (at least in the sections on property’s role in abstract right) is 
therefore to determine what kinds of conditions must be present for individuals to develop as 
legal persons, distinct from other animals who are wholly dependent upon nature to survive. 
Unlike those animals, persons are free to the extent they mutually recognize each other as such. 
For Hegel, institutions provide the conditions that permit this freedom, and it is by working 
within institutions that the things that make up the free individual are developed. These things are 
property. The abstract right to property is secured by the institution of private property, and the 
institution of private property is created and maintained by a social community that, in turn, is 
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conscious of the importance of private property for the development of the free 
individual.  Unlike the heuristic starting points of liberal theorists such as Hobbes and Locke, 
Hegel’s abstract right is not a state of nature filled with unsocialized beings who spontaneously 
develop a powerful system of rights and duties. The propertied and contracting persons in Hegel’s 
abstract right are fully socialized by their family, civil society, and the state in order to prepare 
them for property ownership.81  
When the state secures the property right through the establishment of institutions which 
codify the rights, define it, and punish those who violate it, it is bound by a certain logic: only 
private property creates free individuals, and persons are free to the extent they can exchange 
property in accord with rational desire. These free individuals in turn perpetuate the institution of 
private property by owning and exchanging property on the terms established by abstract right, 
which promotes the development of persons by permitting them to freely exercise their will upon 
the internal and external world.  Because of the importance of property for personhood, the state 
must conscientiously choose to allow broad discretion for the acquisition, use, and alienation of 
property.  
Reading Philosophy of Right 
In the preface of Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes that “each individual is in any case a child of 
his time; thus philosophy, too, is its own time comprehended in thoughts.”  As Jeremy Waldron 
notes, Hegel’s theory of private property the result of its status as an institution in his era, and he 
sought to discover what was rational about the institution and whether it contributed to human 
freedom. “[I]f we are led to agree with Hegel that private property is a rational necessity, then we 
will be inclined to give a positive evaluation of some features of society…([such as] those that 
represent a progressive tendency towards private ownership) and a negative evaluation…of 
others.”82 By seeking “standards of rationality within existing systems of thought and forms of 
life”,83 Hegel engages in a critique of private property as the apotheosis of freedom in the 1800s.84 
To that extent, Joachim Ritter writes that it is important to understand that Hegel, despite 
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beginning Philosophy of Right with what appears to be a ‘state of nature’-type heuristic about 
property rights, is not attempting to create another Genesis-type story of the origin of property 
rights,85 but is looking rather at how property actually operates within a civil law framework. For 
Ritter, Hegel is asking how freedom can emerge from a civil law that has developed over history 
and not how property was born from the Lockean or Rousseauean ideas of states of nature and 
noble savages. This is key to understanding the so-called ‘backwards’ reading of Philosophy of 
Right, in which the story of the free person actually begins at the end of the book, where the 
person is regressively situated in the state, civil society, and family, and then from morality to 
their ‘base’ personality in abstract right—which is where the book actually begins. Pippin 
endorses this reading—as he writes, Philosophy of Right “can and should be read backwards to 
front”86—and Ritter concurs that the book actually “starts from the relationship posited with civil 
law itself and according to which free individuals are connected with one another as persons in 
and through things qua property.”87 The sequences of the book are therefore of a “logical and 
conceptual, rather than wholly empirical, nature.”88 As Brudner notes, Hegel’s approach is “not to 
begin with a favoured interpretation (conception) of an abstract concept but rather to end with 
one.”89 
Hegelian Property is Capitalist 
According to Honneth, as Hegel developed his system from his youth to his composition of 
Philosophy of Right, he  
persisted in, or even held more strongly, the conviction that in such a culture of 
communicative freedom, or ‘ethical life,’ considerable space would have to be provided 
for that social sphere of action in which subjects could each pursue their private interests 
reciprocally in accordance with the conditions of the capitalist market.90 
 
Hegelian property sits within a capitalist or market framework where it is the object of trade.91 
Not only does he clearly oppose the abolition of private property (§§46R, 185R), he is severely 
critical of both the grounds for, and the effect of, Plato’s communism for the guardians of the 
city. Like modern libertarians, he also provides a detailed justification for the separation of civil 
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society and the state.92  According to Kenneth Westphal, Hegel’s approval of capitalism is 
qualified, but nevertheless “he did not oppose it and indeed based his political philosophy on a 
careful rethinking of modern political economy.”93  For Ludwig Siep, Hegel believes that 
individuals can pursue their abilities and plans “only in the context of the effectively private 
pursuit of interests, involving the free choice of profession or occupation and the private disposal 
over the means of production.”94  The modern era, Hegel writes in §261, promotes this private 
pursuit, in that modern human beings “expect their inner life to be respected” as much as we 
“expect to have our own views, our own volition, and our own conscience.”95 This appears to a 
reference to the right of privacy, which, Benhabib writes, Hegel interprets “in a double sense as 
entailing the moral and the economic freedom of the person.”96 
 According to Hans-Christoph Schmidt am Busch,  
[c]ontracts and market-like exchanges are not a possible institutionalization, but a 
necessary condition of the realization of personal respect…In fact, individuals who 
exchange commodities for money as well as individuals who exchange labor for money 
or money for money ‘recognize each other as persons and property owners.’ Therefore, 
commodity, labor, and capital markets can, in principle, be said to be (possible) 
institutionalizations of personal respect (see §80).97   
 
According to Lisa Herzog, 98 Hegel clearly adopts Adam Smith’s invisible hand when he 
writes that the system of needs—the most basic system in civil society, consisting of 
requirements for food, shelter, and other necessities—is best met in a economy where  
subjective selfishness turns into a contribution towards the satisfaction of the needs of 
everyone else. By a dialectical movement, the particular is mediated by the universal so 
that each individual, in earning, producing, and enjoying his own account, thereby earns 
and produces for the enjoyment of others (see §199).  
 
However, according to Peter Stillman, Hegel does not attempt to justify capitalism, which 
“simply follows from the play of private property in civil society,”99 nor does he provide an 
apology for it because he provides for extensive regulation of property as well as the subjugation 
of the individual to the state.100  
Having provided a brief capsule of Hegelian property, and having shown that Hegelian 
property requires a broadly capitalist social and political economy, we turn, in part 2, to the 
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difficult task of understanding Hegel’s terms of art used in his description of property ownership: 
these include personhood, recognition/respect/mediation, and freedom.  This discussion is 
followed by discussions of Hegel’s difficult concept of abstract right (part 3), the transition from 
abstract right to ethical life (part 4), the role of property in ethical life (part 5), the extent of the 
right against the state (part 6), and finally, in part 7, the complex resolution of the property right 
in terms of eminent domain.  
Part 2: Hegel’s property: personhood, recognition/respect/mediation, and freedom 
 
According to Alan Carter101 and many other commentators,102 Hegel’s property theory justifies 
property as a derivation from considerations related to personhood. Schmidt am Busch explains 
that Hegel derives the institution of private property from personhood by way of four theses.  
 “(1) “The person must give himself an external sphere of freedom.” (§ 41) 
(2) This sphere of freedom must consist of entities that are “immediately different and 
separable” from the person. 
(3) The human body, human capacities, and external things can be said to meet Hegel’s 
criterion of difference and separability; however, they do so in different ways. 
(4) The person can only give himself a ‘sphere of its freedom’ in private property.”103 
In summary, Hegel argues that “as a person, the individual claims to decide on his own which 
goals to pursue; therefore, the external sphere of freedom he gives himself must consist of private 
property…(therefore), the institution of private property can be derived from his concept of the 
person.”104 The following sections explore Hegel’s personhood argument, beginning with the 
importance of personhood and its relationship to recognition, mediation, and respect, and then 
moving to freedom.  
Personality and Subjectivity 
In §41, Hegel writes that  
[t]he rationale of property is to be found not in the satisfaction of needs but in the 
supersession of the pure subjectivity of personality. In his property a person exists for the 
first time as reason. Even if my freedom is here realised first of all in an external thing, 
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and so falsely realised, nevertheless abstract personality in its immediacy can have no 
other embodiment save one characterised by immediacy. 
 
According to Alan Patten, Hegel initially assumes that persons occupy the social world, and then 
asks what kinds of institutions must exist in a world occupied by persons.  But this social world 
cannot be one consisting solely of persons and institutions; this, according to Patten, is the 
standard liberal understanding of the relationship between the individual and the community. 
Rather, these persons also need subjectivity, without which there are no property rights, no 
contracts, and no legitimate punishment; in other words, there are no persons as subjects who 
have rights, make contracts, or suffer the consequences of their actions. Without those features, 
there is no social world for persons to occupy.105  
Subjectivity, Patten explains, is a person’s independence from, and knowledge of, their 
situation, circumstances, and desires. Subjectivity is the basis for individual personality, and 
personality is the distance between oneself and one’s situation. It is what gives persons the ability 
to evaluate and reflect on their ends.106  According to Benhabib, this right of personality is not 
natural nor the result of reason: it is the result of a variety of historical processes, including the 
market economy, the struggle for recognition, reform, revolution, Christianity, the “spread of 
bourgeois market relations” and Bildung.107 Bildung is constituted by the social experiences of 
education and culture, some of which develop into persons and their subjectivity. Only the 
institution of private property, Hegel will argue, allows persons use their education and culture as 
the material with which they construct their personalities as free subjects.108  
Personality, however, is not given freely: it must be realized. To become a person, a 
human being must “at a minimum take possession of her body and acquire property in external 
things.”109 For Hegel, everyone has the capacity to become a person, but we only do so when we 
will our possession over life and body and then over other things.110 Therefore, the institutions 
that regulate property, to the extent they permit the free development of personhood, are in turn 
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“derive[d] from our conception of ourselves as persons, that is, individuals who can abstract the 
contents from particular states of desire and recognise ourselves as possessors of will.”111 
In order to better understand Hegel’s conception of the person, a comparison to Locke 
can be helpful. For example, when Locke asserts that “every Man has a Property in his own 
Person,” he is presupposing that the “essential human person is presocial, autonomous, and self 
acting.”112 This, according to Schroeder, is the “solitary nomad of the primal liberal myth.”113 
Hegel’s critique of this approach consists of showing that those who are capable of entering into 
social or other types of contracts are already socialized, and that concepts such as ‘individuality’ 
are the products of, and not foundations for, social institutions. These persons understand 
property and contract, and they understand how violations of these rights constitute ‘wrong.’ The 
autonomous individual, according to Hegel, can only express and experience freedom as property 
ownership and contractual rights as the result of social relationship that have already defined 
them as a person. This is because “[t]he act of contract cannot generate the conditions of its own 
validity but presupposes background norms and rules the compliance with which confers validity 
on the contractual transaction. Hegel derives these background norms and rules from the rights of 
personality and property.”114 This is a key point towards understanding Hegelian personhood and 
how it opposes traditional Lockean/liberal personhood.  
Liberal theory also presupposes the ability to consent to another’s acquisition of property, 
acquisition being a “unitary act by the will to objectify itself and recognize itself as its own end” 
which is not based on the consent of other persons.115 Hegel, on the other hand, presupposes a 
subjective person who has learned how to acquire and trade property pursuant to some 
configuration of social norms. These norms are comprised, in part, by the institution of private 
property itself. Because persons learn how to inhabit a properly configured system by being a part 
of it, they will use and trade property so that they recognize that the agents with whom they trade 
are persons as well. These kinds of actions  (acquisition, use, and alienation by trade and 
exchange) are the types of actions through which persons experience freedom, and the relevant 
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institutions promote freedom to the extent they promote broad property and contractual rights.  
However, as Peter Benson explains, personality is indeterminate until it acts upon particular and 
determinate things by choosing them as their exclusive individual property. Benson: “The 
minimally presupposed articulation of positive freedom is that subjects be respected as persons 
having a juridical capacity to possess things as their individual property.”116  
But property is not merely meant to meet an individual’s needs. For Thom Brookes, the 
rational aspect of property is in the superseding of mere subjectivity of personality (§§41, 41A), 
whereby “property is instrumental to our discovery of how we can improve upon a mere 
subjective judgment about freedom.” 117  In other words, we discover our freedom through 
property when we manipulate it, transform it, or, most importantly, alienate it. In doing so, we 
also alienate our will by placing it into an object that is external to it.    
Another comparison to Locke is helpful at this point. Whereas Locke locates a person’s 
property in the externalized world as the result of mixing their labor into objects, Hegel is 
actually internalizing these objects.118 Some of these internalized objects are religion, political 
beliefs, and other possessions, all of which come to the person through their culture and the 
Bildung it provides. These ‘things’ become the content of one’s personality. As a heuristic device, 
the full personality might be capable of shedding these things and end up as an abstract person—
one who exchanges pursuant to contract, and gets punished for violating rights—but all persons 
(or, at least, free ones) internalize various aspects of the material world in which they live. For 
Hegel, the result is that there is no noble savage and no state of nature for her to inhabit. Put 
another way, there might be a state of nature, but it is not filled with anything resembling persons.  
According to David Rose, personality requires property in order to demonstrate its 
particularity to the world. I assert myself as a free individual by the things I desire.119 These 
desires fill the will and manifest themselves through action in the world. They become embodied 
in the world by the projection of myself in the world. They are constitutive of my identity. The 
most important of these desires is the desire for recognition. Although this desire is less important 
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in the Philosophy of Right than in Hegel’s other writings, recognition is necessary for the creation 
of self-consciousness, which, in turn, is necessary for the objectification of the will through the 
medium of private property.  
Recognition, Mediation, and Respect 
In §40, Hegel writes that “a person, in distinguishing himself from himself, relates himself to 
another person, and indeed it is only as owners of property that the two have existence (Dasein) 
for each other. Their identity in themselves acquires existence (Existenz) though the transference 
of the property of the one to the other by common will and with due respect of the rights of 
both—that is, by contract.”120  It is not enough to will to own and take initial possession of 
something: the thing must be  “ownerless,” which contemplates the “anticipated relation to 
others” (§51), whereby the inner act of the willing person “that says something is mine must also 
become recognizable by others.” (§51A).  
The concept of recognition as a key concept in Hegelian property is introduced in 
paragraphs 182-184 of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Here, Hegel writes 
this movement of self-consciousness in relation to another self- consciousness has in this 
way been represented as the action of one self-consciousness, but this action of the one 
has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other 
as well. For the other is equally independent and self-contained, and there is nothing in it 
of which it is not itself the origin. The first does not have the object before it merely as it 
exists primarily for desire, but as something that has an independent existence of its own, 
which, therefore, it cannot utilize for its own purposes, if that object does not of its own 
accord do what the first does to it... Each sees the other do the same as it does; each does 
itself what it demands of the other, and therefore also does what it does only in so far as 
the other does the same…They recognise themselves as mutually recognising one 
another.121 
 
“Property is thus,” writes Dudley Knowles, “an essential element of self-consciousness.”122  
Knowles:  
If I am to determine myself, make something of myself, the self that is operated on must 
be recognisable by me in just the same way that it is recognised by others. If, therefore, 
we recognise the grasping of an object as taking possession, we do so precisely because 
we identify the will of the property holder in his grasp.123 
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This effort to “make something of oneself” constitutes the struggle for recognition, and, 
as Shlomo Avineri writes, property is a key moment in this struggle.124 According to Steven 
Smith, “the desire for recognition is the quintessential human desire”: it is desiring the desire of 
another.125 Above all, we desire to be treated with decency and respect: as Hegel’s argument 
develops, we see that persons are treated with decency and respect when their property is 
similarly treated. The right to recognition is therefore the right to dignity, respect, and civility. 
This relationship rather clearly requires some kind of community, and this community 
arises through exchange and the institutions that promote it. As Michael Quante writes, it is 
through contract and exchange that property becomes the thing that mediates between two 
persons and thereby produces a “shared community of will” in that “both parties will the 
maintenance of the institution of property” and of their right.126  For Hegel, objective property—
the ‘things’ of the world—is the initial mediator between the intersubjectivities of subjective 
subjects. The result of this mediation is the “moment of mutual recognition between subjects 
[that] can only be achieved through the mediating object of property, contract, and abstract 
law.”127 When individuals operate in a community of reciprocal recognition, “the object of 
property serves as a medium in and through which such recognition is manifested and given 
presence as a public sign.” The object of property is a social object because another person 
recognizes my will in it.128 The crime of theft, for example, is the breakdown in the recognition of 
another’s will in their property: “crime is denial of right because it fails to engage in any mutual 
recognition with others (§95).”129  
According to Honneth, recognition occurs when the property becomes subject to my 
ability to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to another potential property owner’s offer to exchange her property 
for mine.130 If this exchange takes the form of a promise to exchange in the future (e.g., “I hereby 
agree to sell you my tractor in 30 days”), then despite the fact that no actual property has been 
exchanged, the willful act of promising (based, ideally, on the ‘bargained-for exchange’ so loved 
by contract theorists) moves the literal alienation of property into the realm of obligating one to 
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perform a future event.131  Conversely, even a thief or robber recognizes my right to property by 
denying my right to say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to an exchange, thereby refusing to permit me to engage in 
the willful withdrawal of my will from the res itself.  
Like the institution of justice, which seeks to cancel the wrongness of crime, legal 
institutions serve to both create and protect the abstract rights to property and contract which 
allow the property owners or beneficiaries of contracts to be recognized as such. Unlike Locke, 
for whom the state merely protects and enforces pre-existing natural rights of property, the state’s 
legal institutions provide the framework within which the possessors of these rights become and 
develop as moral beings existing within moral communities.132 Thus, the Hegelian first occupier 
is justified in his possession when he alienates property after his claim to it has been recognized. 
This occurs, according to Waldron, by simply letting others know his claim to ownership. But it 
is more than that: by placing will into property, the will “operates in a realm that transcends the 
subjectivity of inner mental life[.]” 133  
Respect 
Respect is the first ‘commandment’ of Hegelian property: “be a person and respect others as 
persons’ (§36). For Pippin, Hegel clearly means that we must respect abstract rights, including 
those that pertain to property.134 Respect, Avineri writes, is keyed to recognition: it is “[t]hrough 
property [that] man’s existence is recognized by others since the respect others show to his 
property by not trespassing on it reflects their acceptance of him as a person.”135 Respect also 
permits us to “identify ourselves through the medium of our property and to accord others 
equivalent status as they express and recognise themselves in their property.”136 Ownership rights 
impose constraints and duties on other persons, whereby “my having these rights involves others 
recognizing me as a source of moral constraint and thus as a locus of respect.”137 
Respect is, therefore, recognition of the duty not to interfere with another’s property 
right. Hegel writes in §113 that the origin of the moral duty not to interfere occurs when an owner 
recognizes the legal action whereby “I retain my property and let the other party to retain his.” As 
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Benson observes, respect for others is respect for the things that contain another’s will, i.e., their 
property.138 Benson: “In relation to others, the exercise of one’s capacity for ownership is not to 
conceived as a mere liberty but rather as giving rise to a genuine right that others have a 
corresponding duty to respect.”139 According to Schmidt am Busch, respect is also a key part of 
Hegel’s capitalism. Respect “gives individuals who wish to cooperate economically a prima facie 
reason to favor market-like exchanges over state-regulated distributions of goods.”140 Market 
exchanges can therefore “be understood as possible institutionalizations of personal respect,” due 
to the realization that “the structure of personal freedom seems to be larger in market economies 
than in state-regulated economies.”141  Respect is tied to freedom and the market because 
“individuals who wish to exchange goods on the market believe that such exchanges take place if 
and only if they want them to take place. Second, such individuals hold that they are entitled to 
decide independently from one another whether or not to consent to possible exchanges.”142 For 
Hegel, “there is thus no recognition of an individual as a person without recognition of individual 
property rights.”143  It is only through mutual recognition with another person, Brooks writes, that 
freedom is possible: “It is through someone else’s recognition of a thing as mine that [freedom’s] 
existence becomes more ‘actual’ and determinate.”144  
Freedom 
For Hegel, Richard A. Davis writes, “[m]an is not free because he has the ability to withdraw 
(from particularity), or even to choose this or that, and not simply because he somehow ‘knows' 
himself to be free either. For a genuine freedom to be achieved there must be some definite 
contact with objective reality.”145 “At each step of the way,” Davis continues, “property is thus 
the agent of this development of a consciousness of the ethical substance. Whether considered in 
its role in education, or in its more traditional, ‘pure' form, property is ultimately responsible for 
bringing into existence an objective form of the concept of freedom that was one of the original 
goals of the will (§ 4).”146 
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Private property gives concrete expression of independence which is the essential part of 
being a person.147 An independent agent is able to conceive of itself as independent from 
‘anything given,’ but is also able to make choices that accord with its self-conception.148 For 
Hegel, freedom is the will, and an individual person’s will is their subjective will. By putting their 
will in a thing through acquisition and use (§44), a person’s subjective will becomes ‘actual will’ 
in property by gaining embodiment in the external world (§45). When persons enter the world, 
they act in and upon it. When persons are not oppressed or restrained, they freely manipulate the 
world’s resources.  The free will can give itself existence only by reference to an external ‘sphere 
of freedom’ (§41), “a collection of external object over which it alone has power.” According to 
Ritter, all things, including talents and skills, become both property and the subject of freedom. 
The interior life becomes ‘exteriorized’ (§43) in civil society through trade and exchange, which 
are framed by the legal contract. If the law allows for considerable ‘conflict’ in the pursuit of 
trade and exchange, then the law is consonant with freedom.149  Conversely, persons who are not 
permitted to trade or exchange their property are not free.150 For Hegel, this is partially an 
anthropological observation, and partially a normative understanding.151 
As Ritter notes, Hegel is also aware of private property’s potential for moral ruin. Ritter: 
“It is at this point that we cannot pause and take this picture of freedom through property as 
Hegel’s final word on the issue. Property—as we learn later in civil society—can also (and here is 
the dialectic of property) through ‘diremption and difference’ (§§33 and 182) reduce all of human 
existence to buying and selling, thereby ‘loosening’ the relations that bonded persons together in 
the first place in order to create the civil law.” Here, “each individual is his own end and 
everything else counts for nothing” (§182A).152 Despite this, Hegel insists that “property must 
possess the character of private property” (§46). As Ritter notes, the “externality of civil society 
that presents the dual spectacle of extravagance and distress also represents for Hegel the actual 
existence of human freedom,”153 and freedom would be impossible without the ability to acquire 
and get rid of goods and assets.154 Interestingly, Hegel suggests that we truly become owners not 
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by acquiring property, but when we “cease to be an owner of property” by getting rid of property 
through the alienation of it through contract. (§72).  
Like alienation, the duty of noninterference also bridges the important connection 
between private property and freedom.155 Hegel, Patten writes, derives this connection from 
Fichte. For Fichte (and, consequently, Hegel) private property as an institution makes personality 
possible; because of the importance of personality, private property is justified in placing others 
under duties such as the duty of non-interference.156 Private property is the result of a person 
having the right to a sphere of the external world that is free from intervention by others.157 For 
both Fichte and Hegel, the “[p]rivate property system centres on the way in which private 
property provides the individual property holder with a concrete perception of his own agency 
and in this way helps to constitute him as a free person.”158 Non-interference, as a necessary 
feature of private property, also “plays an important role in self understanding whereby the 
individual defines themselves in relation (and contrast) with others.”159 
To summarize: Hegel asks what kinds of actions are the actions of free persons. He 
concludes that free persons would be able to trade material objects amongst themselves with 
considerable autonomy and without undue oversight by a coercive authority. Therefore, as 
Waldron writes, the case for private property can be derived from the case for freedom of trade, 
rather than freedom of trade being derived from private property.160 Different social orders, – 
manifested through various methods for the implementation of Sittlichkeit, may require different 
contractual or property norms, but, in order to be rational and to embody freedom, they must 
provide core protections through a private property and free contract regime.161   
Most importantly, Hegelian property is not instrumental towards freedom, autonomy, or 
personhood. It is not a means to those ends: rather, it is constitutive of them. The right over the 
acquisition, use, and alienation property is an expression of free will, where the right is 
constituted by the “ensemble of conditions that express and realize the conception of the person 
as free and equal, or, more exactly, a possessing the moral powers proper to this conception of the 
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person.”162 Put another way, right is the second nature of the will: it is not ‘natural’ or prior to or 
independent of free activity, but the result of it.163  
Part 3. The Abstract Right of Property and Contract 
In  §§34–104 of Philosophy of Right, Hegel introduces his concept of abstract right, 
which includes the right to property, the right to contract, and punishment for violations of those 
rights. The abstract right consists of the right of personality and the experience of freedom. The 
nature, purpose, and function of the abstract property right is the source of both understanding 
and misunderstanding Hegelian property, and it is capable of at least two interpretations. The first 
interpretation, discussed in this part, argues that abstract right is the product of ethical life and 
morality and the state-created institutions associated with them. This interpretation follows from a 
backwards reading of the book, and it is this reading, which views the abstract right to property as 
the conclusion (and not the foundation) of Hegel’s property theory, that is argued for here. The 
second interpretation views abstract right as a natural right that is foundational to the subsequent 
stages of morality and ethical life: it is pre-social, pre-institutional and very similar to the kind of 
possessive individualism advanced by Lockean liberals and exists pre-socially in a heuristic state 
of nature. Like the Lockean social contract, society and then the state are founded upon this right, 
which is modified to accord with the benefits of living in a state dedicated to the protection of 
property. This interpretation is associated with a forward or lexical reading of the Philosophy of 
Right, and it is untenable as a statement of Hegel’s property right. It is discussed in full in part 5. 
Abstract Right as a Product of Social Life 
 For Peter Stillman, the abstract property right operates as a kind of idealized property 
right, where persons are equal in their capacity for property ownership, and where “full and 
complete” ownership is dependent solely on their personhood and  “irrelevant of social status or 
hierarchy.”164 The corresponding idealized—yet abstract—contract right is the way to move 
property along to others without domination or coercion. The persons who own and transfer 
property within abstract right operate freely, and the right to freely perform these specific actions 
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is essential to any conception of social freedom.165 Hegel uses the idea of abstract right to 
determine what kind of human actions are necessary for freedom, and concludes that human 
freedom is only possible if persons can own and transfer property without substantial restriction. 
Because abstract rights must be concretized and contextualized by custom and social life, the 
abstract property and contract right is then shaped by morality and finally ethical life, neither of 
which fully subsume Hegel’s insistence that freedom consists in the right to satisfy the will 
through free and consensual ownership and transfer of property.  
For Locke, political philosophy starts with the property right as the most sophisticated 
and developed of rights, and all other rights are subservient to it. Property is therefore “not a task 
for the individual nor a problem for his political philosophy.”166 For Hegel, “abstract right 
functions in the exact opposite way.” The values in abstract right, the very first of which is ‘be a 
person and respect others as persons,’ are “external to and prior to rights, which require a 
preexisting relational structure of reciprocally recognizing persons or free wills who have 
developed historically through Sittlichkeit.”167  
The abstract property right is the final, most elemental right that persists after a person’s 
social and cultural contingencies have been ‘stripped.’ It is the right that must remain in order to 
preserve a person’s freedom. Therefore, various social contingencies will determine how the right 
is enjoyed in a variety of civil societies and states, but the right must be in place if the society is 
to promote freedom. In this interpretation, property rights are the logical outcome of an ethical 
society populated with moral beings. According to this interpretation, persons enjoying the 
abstract property right are fully socialized by their families, their society, and their state. 
According to Brian O’Connor,  “[a]bstract right is the sphere of the agent within a system of 
laws. Fulfillment of one’s role within that sphere requires no more than simple adherence to the 
laws…Morality, by sharp contrast, refers to the perspective of the subject as an independent agent 
on what that subject ought to do.”168 As Siep writes, the abstract property right “presupposes 
institutions for its own realization [and] can also be limited by those institutions,” primarily by 
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the “state’s own ‘capacity for action.’”169 As Chad McCracken notes, contract law (and, by 
implication, property law) as it “actually functions in the modern social world is not an institution 
apart from civil society.”170  The institutions that govern and protect abstract right are not 
independent from the law or from civil society: the abstract person always exists within the 
various institutions of civil society and ethical life, but not within the family or the state.  
According to Westphal, abstract right is, in fact, abstract in three ways: 
1. actions and principles are initially abstracted from interpersonal relations; 
2. they are abstracted from moral reflection; and 
3. they are abstracted from legal and political institutions.171 
 
The abstraction, for Hegel, permits us to make determinations about the rationality of our 
property system, and this abstraction “presupposes a social ethos as one of its conditions of 
success.”172 In other words: only persons who are fully socialized by ethical life are able to 
abstract themselves from that very life in order to understand right.  According to Quante, 
morality and ethical life then assist abstract personality in its effort to become actual or 
concretized. The abstract right is therefore empty without moral reflection and an ethical 
community.173 As Quante explains, the abstract person or will “necessarily implies a content that 
can only be found outside self consciousness.” This will has no content, and requires action or 
participation in the actual world. The self-conscious experience of freedom therefore 
“presupposes the existence of an external and immediately encountered world,”174 and this world 
will necessary be filled with other persons who have developed customs, ethics, and a social life 
(Sittlichkeit).   
 So, freedom of the will in abstract right is a kind of incomplete freedom: the free will must 
act within an actual world defined by morality (how the will considers itself), ethical life (how 
others consider the will), and other persons.175 As Quante observes, making a claim (say, of 
property) implicitly assumes that there are other persons who are ‘addressees’ of the claim.176  In 
§38 Hegel writes that abstract right is “limited to the negative—not to violate personality and 
what ensues from personality.”  Property, of course, is what ensues from personality, so abstract 
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right initially establishes a duty not to interfere with another’s property. As Quante explains, “[a]n 
abstract right that contains a positive assertion in its external form (e.g., “the property of a person 
must be respected”) depends in the final analysis on a prohibition” against the mistreatment of 
others by, for example, stealing from them. 177   The Hegelian right to property therefore 
formalizes the duty not to interfere with one’s existent property, but it also formalizes the right to 
attempt to acquire property without interference.178  
As Schroeder notes, we are born into the family and encounter moral and ethical rules 
and concepts before we encounter, and potentially own, property.179 In other words, abstract right 
occurs within ethical life—a social structure of families, civil life, and the state—and not along a 
time line of the individual human being or in some presocial state of nature. In accord with the 
backwards reading of Philosophy of Right, the constitutive property relationships of possession, 
use, and alienation occur as the objective manifestations of abstract property right after a person 
has left their family and while they struggle for recognition within the imperfections of civil 
society. They struggle to meet their own needs within this system of needs. However, the self of 
abstract right is the self of “the atomistic individual external and indifferent to all other 
individuals.”180 This is, perhaps, the most important point to make about abstract right and the 
person that dwells there: it is a selfish being that inhabits, to varying degrees, all persons. But it is 
only a part of the fully socialized individual, and the whole of a fully unsocialized individual. As 
Brudner writes, “[t]he human individual is pictured as a bifurcated being: on one side, a generic 
person stripped  of individuating features; on the other, a particular being rich in such features.”181 
According to Benson, Hegel says libertarians are mistaken about property rights because they 
want to leave the right at the abstract level as a pre-social, natural right.182 But the kinds of 
principles that establish the libertarian right cannot be spontaneously generated in a hypothetical 
state of nature. Various social institutions make the abstract/owning/contracting person 
possible.183 For Gary Browning, this is what makes the abstract person “credible”184 as a right-
holding subject. Browning: “For Hegel, individuals’ capacity to undertake free, meaningful 
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actions entitles them to the Nozickian rights of life and private property. In contrast to Nozick, 
though, Hegel does not see these abstract rights as absolute, undeveloped, side constraints on 
human action.”185 
Benhabib writes that abstract right is Hegel’s term for natural right,186 but also that the 
property and contract rights in abstract right are formal, meaning that property-owning persons 
are legal persons operating within a “formally correct procedure” consisting of “background 
norms and procedures” which “confer validity on the contractual relations,” which are derived 
from the rights of personality and property.187 For Benhabib, contractual relations “presuppose 
the non-contracted and non-contractual capacity of individuals to be treated as beings entitled to 
rights.”188 This capacity permits persons to freely enter into contracts, and to transfer their right to 
property pursuant to contract.  These proprietary rights are “stipulated prior to the act of 
contract,” and the only way a person can contract is if they have full rights over the object of the 
contract, which is some thing or property.189 For Benhabib, abstract right becomes the normative 
presupposition of “modern exchange relations,” or capitalism, constituted by “the reciprocal 
transfer of proprietary rights among formally equal property owners.”190 Importantly, McCracken 
is correct to note that “abstract right cannot be made coherent in its own abstract terms[;] it must 
be supplemented with content from Ethical Life,” which “has the authority to mold Abstract Life 
in a variety of shapes, in order to heighten the rationality of the social order.”191  
Part 4. From Abstract Right to Civil Society 
Property, as an abstract right, is problematic. Persons for whom their property right is their only 
concern are “stubborn,” “emotionally limited,” and “uncultured” (§37A). Hegel’s normative 
property claims are, Pippin writes, incomplete. While “[w]e can appreciate the concrete nature of 
property claims (the extent of such rights, the transferability or inalienable character of some of 
what owns [such as labor power], [and] the taxation and regulation claims of the state,” we can 
only situate them “within a certain kind of ethical life” such as that described in Hegel’s 
discussion of modern Sittlichkeit.192 Although civil society is marked by strong property rights, 
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there are also obligations and relationships, such as the family and state, that are not based on 
private property. All of these institutions are gathered together in the realm of Sittlichkeit, or 
ethical life.  
The communal phenomena analyzed in ethical life (family, civil society, and the state) 
therefore provide the ground for the possibility of the phenomena in abstract right and morality.193 
Westphal: “In abstract right, property rights cannot be understood without reflecting upon action: 
how the rights are implemented and the kinds of phenomena that result from acting with property 
upon the world. In morality, moral reflection upon these principles of action requires a framing 
within a set of objectively valid norms. Ethical life shows how rational social life validates these 
norms both objectively and subjectively.”194  
So, ethical life—a social framework of norms, laws, and practices that operate only 
because subjects actively participate in them—creates the possibility that persons might freely 
trade and contract for property (the actions of abstract right) and also engage in moral reflection 
(the actions of morality).  Without ethical life, there is no free trade but only theft and barbarism, 
which are the products of failed moral reflection. According to Avineri, Sittlichkeit regulates free 
trade as the relationships between citizens or community members. 195   Here, property is 
“actualized and guaranteed in the system of needs and the administration of justice.”196 For 
Stillman, Sittlichkeit is “rich in types of human relations, development, and freedom,” and it is 
here that “[p]roperty must be aufgehoben, both preserved and transcended, so that Hegel can get 
from the property centered starting point of abstract right to a Sittlichkeit that is institutionally 
pluralistic and varied.”197 According to Charles Taylor, Sittlichkeit is constituted by the “moral 
obligations I have to an ongoing community of which I am part. These obligations are based on 
established norms and uses…it enjoins us to bring about what already is [so that] there is no gap 
between what ought to be and what is.”198 As we shall see, the institutions that comprise ethical 
life—the family, civil society, and the state—vary in their treatment of private property, privacy, 
and eminent domain.   
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Homes and Families 
Hegel’s discussion of the family is important because of its relationship to personality, 
private property, and homes. It is the first institution of ethical life, followed by civil society and 
then the state. In Hegel’s anthropology, all persons begin within the communal family, which 
itself begins when two people become a single person in marriage (§162) and then become a 
“unity of love” (§181).199 
According to Brooks, persons in families (unlike persons in the realms of right and 
morality) first encounter each other as real and concrete: persons in families are not abstract and 
there is a high level of mutual recognition between family members. We learn about obligations 
and duties in the family home, and we do so without abstract ideas about property or contract.200 
In families, persons are united by affection or love, whereas in the civil society they are united by 
the common bond which seeks to satisfy their own needs.201 The family is the primary site of the 
development of personality,202 and persons who later engage in ‘proper’ (i.e. consensual) property 
exchanges—characterized by respect, equal value, and recognition—are beings whose 
personalities were developed in families. 
As Eric Weil describes, the family is where abstract person first finds concreteness. With 
the death of their parents and the adult child’s departure from the home, the adult child is 
transformed into a private person who pursues their own ends in civil society.203 Importantly, 
particularly in terms of the ‘backwards’ reading of Philosophy of Right, family intersubjectivity 
precedes abstract right, in that the kind of relationships that are developed in family and home are 
“a relatively autonomous ethical domain unto itself.”204 
According to David V. Ciavetta, Hegelian family property operates as a ‘link’ between 
the atomism of abstract right and the regulated or ‘reconceived’ property in ethical life.205 It is 
essential for families to own their own property, and, contrary to Hegel’s preferred system of 
private, individual property ownership, such property is held in common among all members of 
family (§170-2).206 The family property that operates as a home for the family is the site “defined 
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essentially in terms of collective, spiritual practices whereby otherwise external, singular selves 
first experience each other in their constitutive belongingness to one another.”207 According to 
Ciavetta, family property such the home is itself abstracted from the civil sphere, which is marked 
by self-interest, competition, and individuality. However, the family right is like the individual 
right: the family has exclusive right to acquire, use, possess, and alienate property, and enjoys 
legal protection against infringement.208 The special role of the family home in terms of the state 
is shown by Hegel’s reading of Antigone, which recognizes that there is a “tension between 
family and public law of the land,”209 resulting in the “opposition of the highest order in ethics 
and therefore in tragedy” (§166R), where the “family actually refuses to acknowledge the 
state.”210  
The second institution of ethical life is civil society 
Citing §238, Waldron observes that civil society is intended to tear the individual from 
their family and make them self-sufficient.211 More precisely, it serves an educative function by 
teaching this kind of sufficiency.212 This self-sufficiency occurs within the freedom of the 
marketplace that forms the central basis of civil society.  
Civil society itself is comprised of three institutions. 213  The first institution, the 
Administration of Justice, creates and administers statutory law. Through codification, it makes 
social practices—such as those governing property and contract—public and explicit, and is 
responsible for establishing courts of justice, which enforce the rights of property and contract 
(§209-228).214  The second institution is the Public Authority, or police.  This is a wide-ranging 
institution that encompasses familiar crime prevention and penal justice practices (§233). For 
example, according to §230, police are committed to ensuring security in property by “annulling 
infringements of property and personality” which is Hegel’s prolix term for punishing crime. The 
Public Authority also serves to counter the uncertainly that occur in a market-based economy. 
The police are responsible for price controls on basic commodities, e.g. bread (§236), as well as 
for civil engineering, utilities, public health (§236R), education, and poverty relief.215  The Public 
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Authority is also responsible for the regulation of corporations, which are similar to trade 
associations and constitute the final institution in civil society.216 Corporations help deal with the 
uncertainties of the market, and also minimize the power disparities between the “underclass of 
rabble” and the elite business class (§244; 253R).217  
Civil society and its institutions are strictly distinguished from the final institution in 
ethical life, the central government, or the “strictly political state” (§273, 276).  The central 
government is distinguished from the state proper, which is the “modern social world” and 
encompasses the “sum total of the institutions and individuals within a nation, including, but not 
limited to, the laws and legal system, the various bodies responsible for political decision-making 
and those responsible for public administration, the constitution, […], economic concerns of all 
kinds, ethical traditions, religion, families, and individuals.”218 According to Westphal, Hegel’s 
government comprises the monarch or Crown, the Executive, and the Legislature. Hegel’s 
Legislature is not, however, democratic, and it does not enact laws—although it does draft them 
for the Crown’s signature. Rather, laws are “enacted by the Crown and administered by the 
Executive” with input and advice from the Legislature, which consists of “high level servants 
with direct ties to the Crown and the Executive” and representatives from the Estates Assembly, a 
kind of class-based lobbying organization that provides “popular insight” to lawmakers so that 
legislation will “codify and protect the social practices in which one participates and through 
which one achieves one’s ends.”219  
Except for his conception of the state, the kind of society that Hegel describes in these 
sections shares many features with contemporary liberalism. Hegel’s civil society, on the one 
hand, secures extensive property and contract rights by allowing persons the freedom to trade 
without significant state or regulatory oversight. They may also join the corporation of their 
choice in order to freely pursuit an occupation or trade. On the other hand, because civil society is 
a Hobbesian “field of conflict in which the private interest of each individual comes up against 
that of everyone else” (§289R), it is marked by tension between private property and public 
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welfare. Hegel gives expansive authority to the police not only to prosecute and punish crime, but 
also to develop the corporations that are intended to provide assistance when markets fail as well 
as providing cooperation, mutuality, and ethical guidance. This guidance is, for Hegel, “crucial to 
offsetting the atomistic, self-seeking individualism basic to the aporias of modern market 
societies.”220 Such guidance allows corporate members to “learn to pursue collective interests 
rather than narrow self interest and represent these in the political realm.”221  
However, it is important to note that although Hegel seems to give broad powers to the 
police to provide welfare relief for the poor, at no time does he suggest that any of the institutions 
operating in civil society should be empowered to take property pursuant to eminent domain. 
What is most important in terms of private property rights is that the judicial and administrative 
state and corporations are subordinated to higher regulation by the ethical state.222  This is 
discussed in full in part 7.   
Part 5. Individual and Communal Rights in Ethical Life 
At this point, we can begin to understand how the Hegelian property right is situated 
within ethical life. Like Aristotle, Hegel has been claimed by contemporary communitarians as 
one of their own,223 and it is clear that for Hegel, “all forms of ethical life—family, civil society 
and state—are forms of communal living.”224 However, it is a mistake to situate Hegelian 
property or the totality of social life into a communitarian framework.225 Community practice as 
Sittlichkeit does not, for Hegel, mean that the community takes priority over individuals’ property 
and their exercise of abstract right: it means that the community has interests that the individual 
must respect, and, perhaps more importantly, the individual has interests (many of which are 
protected by abstract rights) that the community must respect.  
Although Hegelian property is not communitarian—Hegel is adamant in his 
condemnation of communist theories of property, including Plato’s 226 —neither is it the 
‘possessive individualist’ conception argued by Renato Cristi. According to Cristi, the conception 
of property in the mature Hegel of Philosophy of Right—the property of abstract right—foregoes 
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the earlier Hegelian property that is necessarily based on recognition. 227  The property of 
Philosophy of Right, rather, “dispenses with recognition and bears all the marks of a possessive 
individualist conception.”228 As opposed to the interpretation of Hegelian property as the product 
of ethical life, Cristi interprets Hegel’s conception of property rights as constituted prior to 
intersubjective recognition, and logically and temporally prior to objective law and the 
constitution of legal system.229 
 Cristi cites §40 as the basis for a personality-based, as opposed to a recognition-based, 
property right. In that section, Hegel writes that "personality alone confers a right to things, and 
consequently [...] personal right is in essence a real right [...]. This real right is the right of 
personality as such.” According to Cristi, “[a] real right requires no mediation. It is constituted by 
the immediate possessive relation between a person and a thing. Other persons are not involved in 
this abstract relation.”230 If correct, an individual living alone in the world comes to own and not 
merely possess property.  In other words, Cristi argues that Hegel adds nothing to Locke’s 
conception that individual property ownership results from an individual’s labor over unowned 
things.  
Cristi makes a very fine-grained point: although property rights do not entail recognition 
by others, and are eo ipso individualistic or personal, their transfer by contract requires 
recognition by others, at which point those rights then become social.231 “Contract,” Cristi writes, 
“allows the formation of a ‘common (gemeinsamen) will’ for it makes it possible for an 
individual proprietor to relate ‘himself to another person’ (§40).” “The formation of this common 
will,” he continues, “is what allows the mediation of property through mutual personal 
recognition. Property is not anymore defined by the monological relation between a person and a 
thing; it is a social event constituted by the recognition of others.”232 Furthermore, “Hegel's 
individualist concept of property loses its abstraction and immediacy when he introduces 
recognition. Hegel does so in the paragraph that marks the transition from property to contract.” 
Hegel:  
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This relation of will to will is the true distinctive ground in which freedom has its 
existence. This mediation whereby I no longer own property by means of a thing and my 
subjective will, but also by means of another will, and hence within the context of a 
common (gemeinsamen) will, constitutes the sphere of contract (§71). 
 
In other words, for Cristi, Hegelian property is individually personal as the expression of will 
upon possession, but it is when it is the subject of contract that it mediates between the common 
will of persons.233  
For Cristi, this understanding of property has a distinctly political aim. Hegel, he writes, 
prioritizes individualist property “[i]n order to override egalitarian aspirations and redistributive 
claims by the state…At the same time, he observes that the legal protection of private property 
requires its socialization.”234 For Hegel, only a strong state can safeguard individual property, and 
it does this by protecting it against theft by common criminals as well as by expropriation by the 
demos. Cristi concludes that it is therefore not inconsistent for Hegel to affirm that only "a state 
which is strong [...] can adopt a more liberal attitude [...]" toward property and other rights.235  
Cristi makes a distinction that, for Hegel, does not make a significance difference. Cristi 
argues that because Hegel supports strong property rights in initial, original possession or 
acquisition, Hegel is therefore a Lockean possessive individualist. But this initial agreement with 
Lockean original acquisition should not be overplayed. For Hegel, it is “immediately self-evident 
and superfluous” that “a thing belongs to the person who happens to be the first to take 
possession of it,” because a “second party cannot take his possession of what is already the 
property someone else.” (§50). For Hegel, the Lockean first appropriator does not merely labor 
upon unowned resources and therefore gain ownership in some state of nature; rather, Hegel’s 
appropriator is a fully socialized person whose appropriation conforms to moral and ethical rights 
and duties. Cristi’s claim also ignores the role of self-recognition in the initial appropriation of 
property. As Knowles writes,  “[i]f I am to determine myself, make something of myself, the self 
that is operated on must be recognisable by me in just the same way that it is recognised by 
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others. If, therefore, we recognise the grasping of an object as taking possession, we do so 
precisely because we identify the will of the property holder in his grasp.”236  
For Locke, the proverbial desert islander/first occupier owns the coconuts he gathers, the 
hut he builds, and the seashells he might eventually use for trade. Indeed, he even owns the land 
that he has labored upon, in spite of the fact that no one else recognizes his claim. For Hegel, on 
the other hand, a first occupier’s ownership is undeveloped until his right to use and/or alienate 
the property is recognized in the eyes of other persons, and it is in property and contract 
relationships that allow persons, as parties to the exchange or as persons who might challenge 
ownership, to recognize each other as such (§71). The social nature of ownership is constituted 
when “the embodiment which my willing thereby attains involves its recognisability by others” 
(§51). So, in the absence of others who might recognize his claim, the desert islander has no 
claim because property ownership is essentially a social and not natural fact. For Hegel, the 
Lockean first occupier is like a child who grabs and claims ownership based on want, but he does 
not yet own; the Hegelian first occupier, on the other hand, is “the rightful owner, however, not 
because he is the first but because he is a free will, for it is only by another's succeeding him that 
he becomes the first” (§50). For Hegel, Locke’s property theory is not only ‘primitive’ but 
incomplete: the desert islander’s ownership becomes recognized only when abstract or legal right 
has first been guaranteed by the state, and then when confrontation occurs with another person 
who has the possibility of exercising their own abstract right to the property. Abstract right 
therefore itself consists in the actual civil (as well as penal) law that guides property owners and 
eventually litigators and jurists.237  
Moreover, Cristi reads abstract right as lexically prior to contract, which does not accord 
with a backwards reading of Philosophy of Right and denies the existence of the fully socialized 
person who must be in possession of both property and contract rights while they operate within 
both morality and ethical life.  Cristi’s interpretation, guilty as it may be of ‘cherry picking’ in 
terms of Hegelian property, succeeds in showing that the individual, abstract right is a very strong 
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right that succeeds in withstanding most nonowner claims against it. However, the ‘strong state’ 
that Cristi positions in order to protect property also has the prerogative to subsume it entirely 
through its sovereign power.  
Unlike the Lockean appropriator, who labors in some unspecified way and thereby 
obtains a property right, the Hegelian appropriator identifies themselves “through the medium of 
our property” and thereby accords to others “equivalent status as they express and recognise 
themselves in their property.”238 In  §194, Hegel writes that it is “mistaken” to  believe that the 
Lockean state of nature could possibly provide “man” with his needs, much less with a property 
right, because in such a state man has no moral understanding, including in particular the kind of 
understanding that provides the basis for property and contractual rights.  Contra Rousseau, 
modern society and civilization is not the “degeneration and destruction of some originally 
‘intact’ humanity.” 239  Freedom is the liberation from the power of nature, and this is 
accomplished by the will’s taking possession of property, trading it, and alienating it in accord 
with the right to exclude and the duty not to interfere. Hegel is clearly puzzled why anyone would 
argue that these kinds of moral stances would spontaneously arise in a state of nature.  Humans, 
in fact, establish “rational control over nature” by the “the process of modernization all over the 
world.” For Ritter, this means that  “tractors, electric plants, and machines of all kinds have 
finally come to be seen as symbols of freedom—symbols that inspire more passionate 
engagement and participation than the ideas of single and individually proclaimed political and 
spiritual freedoms.” 240  Such freedoms are abstract, but they become concrete through the 
institution of property.  
Benhabib writes that Hegel accepts the conclusions of the individualist contractarians—
individuals are entitled to rights—but denies the normative ground or historical origin of the kind 
of political authority that contractarianism attempts to justify; rather, Hegel “proceeds from the 
condition of a society of individuals who have recognized one another’s entitlement to be persons 
in order to describe the concrete forms of interaction compatible with this norm.”241 Hegel denies 
	  	   192 
that the primary justification for the creation of the state is the protection of a pre-existing right to 
property. This, of course, is Locke’s main claim. According to Benhabib, the issue is not under 
what conditions would a rightsholder, in a state of nature, consent to a limitation of their rights by 
a state—this, of course, is also Locke’s position as well as Hobbes’.  For Benhabib, Hegel’s 
concern is rather with the justification of a state governed by the rule of law, exemplified by the 
promulgation of public statutes, fairness, and predictability, as well as the protection of rights.242 
These guarantees objectify rights by giving them “objective existence.”243 An entitlement to 
rights will not merely “justify practices of exchange in the market place,”244 but a fortiori means 
that societies must operate according to the rule of law, the products of which are property and 
contract rights.  Benhabib concludes that Hegel is not, therefore, a possessive individualist, 
contractarian, nor a Marxist because he “avoids reducing the normative dimension of collective 
life to a positivist science of society.”245 
Westphal comes to a similar conclusion. For Westphal, Hegel has an organic conception 
of the individual, but not the conservative organic conception proposed by MacIntyre, et al. 
Organicism, writes Westphal, opposes atomistic individualism by recognizing that people do not 
enter society fully formed, and Hegel maintains this perspective. Organicism becomes 
conservative by holding that individuals have no conception of themselves apart from their group, 
and this is not Hegel’s perspective. Individuals are indeed formed by their society and “their 
society also suits them” as a result, but Hegel avoids the false dichotomy that either individuals 
are prior to society or society is prior to them. In terms of property, individuals meet their needs 
through the objects that society presents to them, but they are not therefore subservient to society. 
They have their “own response to their social context,” and therefore “the issue of the ontological 
priority of individuals or society is bogus.”246 
Part 6. Property Rights, Poverty, and the State 
 This part presents the question of whether Hegelian property rights, made concrete within 
the ethical lives of families, civil society, and the state, are merely private or broadly public. If 
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they are private, they exist only between citizens and one another. If they are public, they exist 
between citizens and the state, and citizens are therefore able to make property claims that can (in 
appropriate situations) trump the property claims of the state. Although Pippin notes that the 
rights claims from abstract right are “meant to be preserved in the subsequent stages of his 
analysis,”247 it is also clear that those rights are different at the end of the book.248 As Stillman 
notes, what begins as a robust defense of private property “does not hold true at the end of 
Philosophy of Right.”249  This is because, as Waldron writes, Hegel’s property theory does not 
reflect any ‘absolutist spirit’ regarding private property: the right to it cannot ‘trump’ the demands 
of genuine ethical community or state.250 Because of the antagonism between this actuality of 
property rights and social goals whereby “private property may have to be subordinated to higher 
spheres of right, such as a community or the state,”251 Waldron questions whether Hegel has, after 
all, posited a theory of property rights, because “a putative right that yields in the face of every 
collective goal is not a right at all: it does no work of its own in the political theory that postulates 
it.”252 
Although Waldron concludes that Hegel defends a general, as opposed to specific, rights-
based theory of property, this section concludes with the suggestion that Hegel’s political or 
public theory of property is not ‘rights-based.’ This is because it lacks a conception of public law 
in terms of property and succeeds only in regulating property and contractual relationships 
between citizens—resulting in a social or private theory of property—leaving the relationship 
between the citizen and the state unregulated. As shown in this and the following part, Hegelian 
property rights, although strongly liberal at the social level, provide only a partial defense against 
eminent domain at the state or political level. This is not some tragedy for rights or the result of a 
totalitarian bent in Hegel’s philosophy: it is simply the recognition the state “does not exist as an 
organization for the satisfaction of needs and the maintenance of rights.”253  
 This part examines the Hegelian property right in light of 1) whether it is instrumental to, 
or essential for, freedom; 2) the kinds of moral goals property promotes; 3) Waldron’s argument 
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that Hegelian property is a general rights based regime and the implications of such a regime; 4) 
Hegelian property rights and poverty; and 5) the implications for Hegelian property as a public 
right against the state.  
Property as Instrumental or Essential 
According to Schroeder, Hegelian property—unlike, for example, utilitarianism, where property 
is instrumental towards the goal of welfare—is not instrumentalist and it does not serve a social 
or political goal.254 For Schroeder, Joseph Singer is an example of a property theorist who “tries 
to use property concepts and rhetoric to support external social goals, such as right of workers to 
acquire a plant.”255 For Singer and other theorists, “property itself is seen as having no essence 
but merely a title for a legal conclusion—a bundle of sticks.”256 Hegelian property is not 
instrumental towards freedom; rather, “property,” Waldron writes, “is the necessary medium 
through which the process of individual and social development occurs.”257  Because it is 
necessary for freedom, it is not instrumental towards it, and Hegelian property cannot be said to 
serve as a bulwark against the state or in pursuit of social or political goals. It may, however, 
serve other moral objectives.  
Hegelian Property As Moral Property 
Hegelian property rights clearly “allow persons to articulate freedom and stake their own 
private domain”258 and “protects will by erecting fences around the objects where the will has 
become embodied,”259 but it is also claimed to ‘prepare’ owners for understanding their rights and 
duties as citizens. 260  Waldron explains that property owning is important for the ethical 
development of human individuals because it is only through “owning and controlling property 
that [persons] can embody [their] will in external objects and begin to transcend the subjectivity 
of [their] immediate existence.” By using objects, [their] will stabilizes and matures and learns to 
take its place in a community of wills. This stabilization and maturation is an absolute 
prerequisite to ethical maturity.261 Owning and working on something imposes discipline on the 
will, and ownership accords recognition to owner when others take his ownership to be a reason 
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for constraining their actions so far as his resources are concerned.262 A person with no property 
gets none of these benefits; there is nothing external for him to work on that concretely registers 
his intention, and he cannot stabilize that intention. So without the disciplining of the will in term 
of both the owner’s ability to make plans and others’ restraint towards his resources, no benefits 
of recognition are afforded to the owner.263 
Hegelian Property: A General or Special Right 
The question then turns to whether Hegel means for everyone to actually own property, 
or whether abstract right only guarantees the mere capacity or opportunity to own property. The 
actual/potential distinction is based on Waldron’s discussion of Hegelian property rights as 
general or specific.  
According to Waldron, an argument for private property is rights-based (either general or 
specific) just in case it takes some individual’s interests (such as, for example, the development of 
their personality) as a sufficient condition for holding others (usually governments) to be “under 
duties to create, secure, maintain, or respect an institution of private property.”264 Hegel’s is, for 
Waldron, a rights-based property regime. In terms of how the right is enjoyed by rightsholders, a 
rights-based property regime can broken down into regimes that respect either special (SR) or 
general rights (GR).  
If Hegel intends that everyone actually own property, then the provision of property is a 
general right that the state or some other institution must provide through the institution of private 
property. A general right to property, like the general right to freedom of speech, means that all 
persons by virtue of their humanity or citizenship enjoy the right. Unlike the special right, persons 
do not need to undertake some qualifying action that provides the right. The general right 
recognizes that property is inherently important due to its connection to individual liberty.  
Special rights are associated with the property theory suggested in Robert Nozick’s 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia. If the right is specific, then the state must merely provide an 
institution that permits the opportunity for ownership to arise upon the performance or occurrence 
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of some act or event. According to Waldron, a special right to property arises when persons 
perform some action that then grants them a right or entitlement over some property. Locke’s 
labor-mixing theory is a special rights theory: by performing the requisite action—laboring upon 
unowned property and mixing one’s self-ownership with the world’s resources—the special right 
of ownership over that resource emerges.  Special rights theories also include first occupier 
theories,265 entitlement theories,266 and reliance theories.267 From the SR point of view, it is no 
matter of concern if some persons own nothing: they are propertyless because they did not 
perform the contingent actions that entitled them to property rights. So, Waldron concludes, 
Locke and Nozick are unconcerned if some persons are entitled to nothing.268  
According to Waldron, Hegel wants to guarantee not only the institution of private 
property or that existing arrangements be respected, but that there should be (in the institution 
itself) a basis for a general right that is predicated upon an “overriding ethical concern if some 
people are left poor and propertyless.”269 When a right is a general right, it serves interests 
directly: we ought to uphold private property because, Waldron argues, “[i]ndividuals have, to put 
it crudely, a general right to own things.”270 The GR argument claims that even if its impossible 
to establish who is entitled to what, it is still desirable to have private property.271 Hegel’s, 
Waldron concludes, is a GR based theory.  
 Whether the right is special or general influences how we interpret Hegel’s understanding 
of property allocation. In §49A, Hegel famously states that “everyone ought to have property.” 
Waldron interprets this to mean that the distribution of property—specifically in term of goods 
required for a minimally decent life—need not be distributed equally,272 but that it be distributed 
so that actual ownership is the result. This is because in Hegel’s ethics private property serves the 
general interest people have in negative liberty but not merely as an ‘acquisitive opportunity’: 
what is important is the socially beneficial results of actual ownership, and this is the logical 
outcome of property as a general right. If private property serves this type of negative liberty 
interest, then it is because owning something is a matter of being free to use it, where one is not 
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opposed in its use by the interference of others. This negative liberty interest is meaningless in a 
society where everything is privately owned if a person owns nothing; this person therefore has 
no liberty in such a society. In other words, if the opportunity for property is unconsummated, 
persons are unfree.273   
Hegelian Property and Poverty 
Hegel is concerned that lack of property leads to a ‘rabble’ whose poverty not only 
causes immorality (where the “feeling of right, integrity, and honour…is lost”), but also the 
“inward rebellion against the rich, against society, the government, etc.”274 So, when Hegel 
argues that ‘everyone must have property” and that “free ownership” is a “fundamental 
condition” of the successful flourishing of the state, it appears that he is concerned with the 
provision of the material things that are necessary for survival, and with the fact that Sittlichkeit, 
or ethical life, demands that persons’ “particular welfare should also be promoted”  (§229) and 
“treated as a right.” (§230). Therefore, Waldron concludes, recognition is only possible through 
actual ownership and the result is welfare promoting. This does not comport with Hegel’s 
somewhat complicated and unsatisfying discussion of poverty, which, contrary to Waldron’s 
interpretation, appears to favor the SR version of property. 
Although it is clear that Hegel’s administrative state regulates some market failures in 
order to provide welfare to the poor, it is also clear that it cannot regulate all market failures.275 
Avineri frames Hegel’s assessment of the problem of poverty as follows: if Hegel leaves the state 
out of economic activity, the impoverished will also be left outside of it. If he brings in the state 
to solve it, the distinctions between state and civil society disappears.276 This because the state 
then becomes a tool not merely for protecting property, but a tool for providing it as well.  In 
order to avoid making the state such a tool, Hegel proposes three approaches for alleviating 
poverty: charity and voluntary institutions, redistribution through direct taxation, and public 
works.277 However, none of these solutions will, in Hegel’s judgment, ‘cure’ the problem. If it 
was the burden of the rich (through private charity) or well-endowed public resources (through 
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redistribution via taxation) to provide services to the poor, Hegel argues, the resulting welfare 
without labor “is contrary to the principles of civil society and the feeling of self-sufficiency and 
honour among its individual members.” (§245). Welfare without work, it is argued, violates the 
dignity that work promotes. In order to dignify the poor, they must labor for their own welfare, 
but the ‘the crisis of overproduction’ results from giving the poor make-work.278 Make-work, 
“public arrangements to provide for and determine the work of everyone,” occupies “the opposite 
extreme to freedom of trade and commerce in civil society.” Hegel offers the example of the 
building of the Egyptian pyramids,279 which were undertaken for public ends, but, because of this, 
the individual’s work is, again, not mediated by his own will and interest. “This interest,” Hegel 
writes, “invokes the freedom of trade and interest against regulation from above,” but it is selfish 
and needs regulation to be brought back to the universal (§236).   
Schroeder is correct when she writes that the Hegelian state imposes “restrictions on 
property to alleviate the degradation of the poor, which is likely to result from the laizzez-faire, 
abstract regime of civil society.”280 Market intervention justifies the imposition of taxes in order 
to satisfy the “most basic of needs” (§189) including the building of infrastructure and temples.281 
This also means that “legislatures may, without violating property rights, enact positive 
legislation limiting property rights and contractual freedom for the sake of the autonomy of 
all.”282 
But the welfare measures available in civil society, such as the establishment of price 
controls on bread, for example,  are not aimed towards providing property to the poor: nowhere 
does Hegel claim that property should be expropriated to provide in-kind transfers in an attempt 
to alleviate poverty or provide property for the poor. Overall eradication of the poor is, in Hegel’s 
eyes, impossible or economically unfeasible. Hegel recognizes that there are costs of freedom 
(including the moral depravity that accompanies poverty283) but that poverty cannot be abolished 
without also abolishing freedom. Therefore, Hegel’s rather feeble attempts to meaningfully 
address the issue of poverty are unrelated to the private property right. As Waldron writes, Hegel 
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does not attempt to link “the plight of the poor with the ethical arguments in favor of private 
property.”284 Furthermore, state intervention to mitigate poverty “should be limited by the need to 
respect the ‘private’ space for individuality within civil society.”285 As Cristi notes, the judicial 
state entrenches property, while the administrative state provides welfare—and not property—to 
those who lack it. 286  Poverty is therefore inevitable, but it cannot be remedied by the 
administrative state or through democratic means.287  
The SR interpretation is therefore the more likely explanation for understanding Hegel’s 
assertion that everyone must have property.  As Peter Benson argues, Hegelian ownership begins 
with the idea that freedom consists in persons having a “juridical capacity to possess things as 
their individual property.”288 This is a positive conception of freedom in which ownership arises 
in the relationship between a subject (i.e. a potential owner) and a thing. But this freedom does 
not demand any particular end, or any end at all, and therefore the choice of ends is permissible or 
impermissible, but not obligatory.289 As a result, the juridical capacity for ownership is negative 
(there is no positive duty upon persons to either obtain property themselves or help others so 
acquire), interactional and not merely individual (the right gives rise to corresponding duties 
[§155]), and external (a property owner’s actions must comport with other’s persons use of things 
as an ends in themselves).290   
 This means that there is no duty owed to oneself to undertake property ownership despite 
the existence of a duty to respect the will of another as objectified in their own property. This is 
because the rights and duties of ownership cannot coalesce in a single person, and therefore no 
one has any duty to ensure their own or anyone else’s initial acquisition.291 As a result, Benson 
argues that right consists only in the capacity to own, and duty consists only in respect towards 
already-owned property. More importantly, if ownership is not a posited right, then there is 
nothing about a propertyless person’s needs or welfare that demands a distributive share of other 
persons’ property, and the coercion necessary to effectuate this (at least at the primitive state of 
abstract right) would violate the owner’s entitlement to her property.292 This requirement to 
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respect each other’s juridical capacity for ownership constitutes the extent of abstract right at this 
stage, and Hegel’s conception of property rights closely tracks the privacy theory of property up 
to this point in the analysis.  
The Property Right and the State 
On Ludwig Siep’s account, rights and interests in the Hegelian system are subordinated to the 
state. But a state that serves exclusively for the protection of persons and property remains 
entirely dependent on particular constellations of interests and therefore can be terminated by its 
members as a purely private contract. For Hegel this ultimately leads back to the feudal form of 
the state. To avoid this, civil freedoms can be subordinated where the very existence of state is at 
issue or in the state of general emergency, where demands on rights may require that property 
interests be sublated. Siep argues that Hegel provides no indication of the appropriate limits with 
respect to ‘fundamental rights’ in this regard; nor does he suggest any procedure for permanently 
securing such rights against potential abuse or violation on the part of the state. 293 As a result, 
Hegel’s philosophy of right seeks to protect individuals from one another, but not from the state 
itself.294 Although there is significant conflict between individuals in civil society, there is no 
“tension between personal right and the governing power of the state,” and therefore, for Siep, no 
protection of individual freedoms against the state monopoly of power.295 “The protection of the 
individual in relation to the power of private persons and particular groups is essential,” Siep 
writes, “but protection in relation to the preponderant power of the state is not.” This is the 
“decisive limit of Hegel’s liberal outlook.”296 For Siep, the “principal deficiency” inherent in 
Philosophy of Right is just this failure to establish a defense of fundamental rights against the 
state. In the case of “misuse of power on the part of the political authorities” (§295), Hegel relies 
on familiar institutions (such courts of appeal) culminating in ‘the monarch’ (§301). The state 
must also be “ethical, ‘transparent’ [and] involve genuinely ‘functioning social and juridical 
practices” that are codified and clear, and must be based on “thought” and “knowledge” and not 
be arbitrary.297 These are admirable aspirations, but nowhere does Hegel indicate how they might 
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be enforced. Rights claims cannot be made where there are no “concrete conditions of their 
existence and enforcement”; such claims are, according to Pippin, “not really rights claims.”298  
Honneth supports this interpretation. In The I in We Honneth writes that individuals must 
be able to “possess an exclusive portion of the external world, objects, or things (Sachen) (§42), 
in order to be able to actualize the preferences they have chosen without restriction.” However, 
this “free-space of subjective arbitrariness” is merely protected from “interference by other 
subjects who contest their possession,”299 but not from interference by the state. In establishing 
this zone of private property, subjects “must be willing to concede other subjects the same claim 
to unhindered actualization of their personal freedom.”300  Of course, legal or abstract right is not 
unlimited or absolute, and it is in the transition to the later stages of morality and ethical life that 
individuals are said to “link one’s will to a conception of a universal good.”301 Honneth’s error (a 
minor one, but relevant to the point being made here) occurs when he ascribes the idea that right 
only protects an individual’s property from one another individual, and not from the state, to the 
“classical doctrines of private property” found in Locke and Kant. Locke, of course, presented a 
doctrine of private property upon which the nation itself is not only founded, but which protects 
property from many kinds of state intrusion as well. Despite struggling against their fellow 
citizens, the Hegelian property owner does not struggle for recognition against the state.  
Even when the purely legal protections afforded to, for example, property rights, are 
reproduced in the “concrete person” of civil society (§182) where the goal of the administration 
of justice is the “protection of property” (§208), there is apparently no indication, stipulation, or 
even hint in the Philosophy of Right that state power in terms of property rights (and perhaps all 
rights) may or should be restricted or regulated at any level of abstract right, morality, or 
Sittlichkeit. Whatever protections are afforded property rights at the intersubjective level between 
subjects are non-existent between subjects and the state.   
If “free will” is truly the “fundamental concept of the entire Philosophy of Right,”302 then 
Hegel’s detailed and expansive plan for a civil society that purports to encourage the 
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objectification of will in its expansive ownership of things is remarkably “modern, liberal, 
(1980s) neo-conservative, formal, commercial, capitalistic, or market.”303 But this conception 
fails because of Hegel’s unwillingness to acknowledge the possibility that free will requires that 
its exercise be guaranteed by restrictions upon state power as well. Although Hegel was cognizant 
of the clash of private interests against one another, the conflict between persons and 
communities, and the conflict between both persons and communities together against the state 
(§289), he was unwilling to create the types of protections in a public law that he found necessary 
in the private law. Hegel cannot countenance the idea that an individual property right, or even 
the property right of a community, can trump the superior right of the state. If private property 
denotes the “enduring, exclusive and relatively unlimited rights of use and decision that persons 
have in relation to enduring objects,” then Hegel’s theory of property is not a rights-based theory 
at all, because “a putative right that yields in the face of every collective goal is not a right at all: 
it does no work of its own in the political theory that postulates it.”304  
 This is not to say that a rights-based theory cannot have restrictions, or that the general 
welfare may trump individual rights on occasion. Hegel’s precursor Adam Smith appears to agree 
that the ‘sacred rights’ of property may be legitimately subsumed by the common good in 
appropriate circumstances. For example, writing in reference to the silver mines of Peru and the 
tin mines in Cornwall, Smith comments that the sovereign encourages the exploitation of natural 
resources as a source of revenue by permitting non-owners to claim mining rights on another’s 
property “without the consent of the owner of the land,” who is nevertheless paid a small 
“acknowledgement” by the miner or “bounder.” In both locations, “the sacred rights of private 
property are sacrificed to the supposed interests of public revenue.”305 But for Hegel, this 
sacrifice is made without any regard, regulation, or protection of the interests that persons will 
naturally have in their things. Strong private rights, in terms of claims, lawsuits, or judgments 
against other subjects mean little if similar provisions are not made for public rights against the 
state.   
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For Benhabib, Hegel’s prioritizing of private property constitutes a “Pyrrhic victory” 
because he “confined the validity of contractual transactions to the civil or private sphere alone, 
and robbed contract arguments of their political significance.” This results in a reconciliation of 
the “liberal market society with an authoritative political state.”306 The authority of the political 
state is most apparent in Hegel’s complicated approach to eminent domain, which, in true 
dialectical form, both uplifts and cancels the private property right at the same time.  
Part 7. Hegel on Expropriation 
This part attempts to reveal the normative role of property law and eminent domain in 
Hegel’s philosophy. In §46, Hegel writes that “private property may have to be subordinated to 
higher spheres of right, such as a community or the state,” but that this “cannot be grounded in 
chance, in private caprice, or private advantage, but only in the rational organism of the state.” 
So, after having normalized private ownership, Hegel recognizes that “exceptions may be made 
by the state,” and the state “alone...can make them” (§46). This is clearly a recognition that the 
state may confiscate property, but it is unclear which state actors are authorized and what 
justifications—if any—must be provided.307  
In section 1, I showed how Radin argues that Hegelian property can be construed to mean 
that the mere fact of occupancy should put an almost complete stop to expropriation due to the 
importance of the home in the development of personality and freedom. Alan Brudner argues, on 
the other hand, that the Fifth Amendment’s takings provision better reflects Hegel’s position on 
expropriations, which requires persons to relinquish private property to the interests of the 
community if the conditions of public use and just compensation are met. In this section, I argue 
that the former interpretation should prevail, which stands for the proposition that by limiting the 
state’s prerogative to expropriate in all but the most exigent circumstances, the home, as the situs 
of personhood, recognition, and ultimately, freedom, is best protected. This, however, is not 
Hegel’s conclusion: rather, Hegelian expropriation discloses the dialectic inherent in both the 
abstract conception and normative exercise of the right, in which the private right to property at 
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the level of civil society confronts the public right of the state, resulting in both the preservation 
and uplifting of the right, and, at the same time, its cancellation or annihilation of it by the state.  
The result is a strong defense against expropriations initiated by the demos, but no defense at all 
against takings by the ethical state.   
This reading of Hegel relies upon 1) his denial of any contractual relationship between 
citizens and the state; 2) Hegel’s distinction between civil society and the state; 3) a critical 
rejection of Brudner’s attempted rehabilitation of Hegelian takings; and 4) Cristi’s reading of the 
authoritative Hegelian state that both protects and annihilates property.  
The Citizen and the State 
In the sections on contract (§§72-83) and specifically in §75, Hegel explicitly denies that a 
contractual relationship—the kind advocated by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Fichte—exists 
between the citizen within a state (a “contract of all with all”), between the citizens (individually 
or as a “unity of different wills”) and the state, or between persons in a marriage. He also denies 
that the state originated for the purpose of protecting private property “in opposition to the right 
of the sovereign and the state” where “the rights of the sovereign and the state [are] regarded as 
objects of contract and based on a contract[.]” (§75).  §75 arrives after Hegel has argued 
forcefully for property rights that are actualized by the “common will” (§71) created by the 
contractual agreement. As discussed, supra, it is in the moment of this profoundly important 
agreement (the “transition from property to contract”) that the “contracting parties recognize each 
other as persons and owners of property,” (§71R; emphasis in original) and where the alienation 
of property allows its soon-to-be former owner to experience their independence from it as the 
experience of freedom from the thing itself.  
 This experience, however, does not hold between all citizens qua citizens, nor between 
citizens and the state. Hegel’s state cannot be the product of a contract between citizens or 
between citizens (as a collective) and “the sovereign and the government” because contracts and 
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property originate in the arbitrary will of persons (as an “optional matter”), and this will cannot 
“break away from the state, because the individual is already by nature a citizen of it.” (§75).  
According to Michael Wolff, Hegel reasons that if the end and purpose of state is located 
solely in, say, protection of property, then it “inevitably appears as ‘something arbitrary’ (or we 
can now say: as something contingent) whether individuals come together to form a state or 
not.”308 The state cannot enter into a contract with anyone because it does not possess an arbitrary 
will (see §75A).  The contract theorist is therefore committed to the idea that one can comprehend 
the ‘whole’ (here, the state) only as “an effect of the competing forces of the individual parts”309 
(here, the individual parts are citizens). For Hegel, this is backwards because states either exist a 
priori to individuals, or individuals are under a duty (based on rational destiny, necessity, or 
reason) to create one ab initio. Unlike the nature of contract, which is based on arbitrary will and 
not duty, Hegel’s concept of the state sees itself “as an end in and for itself, as thus ultimately an 
‘organism.’”310 Therefore, the end of the state cannot be, as it is for Locke, the protection of 
property: the end of the state is the state.  
Also, because there is no ‘exchange of equivalents’ between citizens and state, there is no 
contract with the state, and states therefore cannot violate property or contractual rights.311 
According to Benhabib, these relationships (contract and property) exist only between persons 
and not between persons and the state. That kind of relationship is, of course, Hobbes’ version of 
the social contract, which results in “the contractarian tradition…confus[ing] a norm which has 
binding validity in the sphere of private transactions with norms governing the rights of political 
bodies like the state.”312 When the state proper is confused with civil society, it is purported to 
exist solely for the protection of property—this, of course, is Locke’s position. But that is not the 
goal of the state, because, unlike property, the state is not optional.  When it takes property 
pursuant to eminent domain, for example, the state cannot be obligated to exchange an equivalent 
(in the form of just compensation) pursuant to an express or implied contract such as the takings 
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clause of the Fifth Amendment. For Hegel, states simply are not obligated to respect this category 
of right. 
The Distinction Between Civil Society and the State 
The public use and just compensation requirements are also absent in Hegelian 
expropriation due to Hegel’s distinction between civil society and the state.  This distinction 
means that property and contract rights, as well as the punishment of crimes associated with the 
violation of these rights, such as theft or fraud, lie within the realm of civil society, which itself is 
within the realm of the state. Civil society is tasked with the obligation to uphold these rights 
when they are violated by citizens to the detriment of others, whereas the state is not obligated to 
uphold property rights. This is because, for Hegel, the ultimate purpose of the state is not “the 
security and the protection of property and of personal freedom.” (§258). According to Avineri, 
“under no condition should the state be conceived as an instrument for the preservation and 
defence of property,”313 and, furthermore, the “state can’t be mere executor of private, economic 
interests of citizens.”314 The state, however, does have the prerogative to protect property rights 
from what Cristi calls ‘revolutionary democratization,’ or redistribution for public use in violation 
of its owner’s personhood rights. This is discussed in the last section.  
Brudner’s attempted rehabilitation of Hegelian takings 
According to Alan Brudner, a critical view of the Fifth Amendment can make it appear as 
a “paradox,” a “kind of neurotic accommodation of mutually ambivalent opposites in a divided 
soul writ large.”315 In this interpretation, takings constitute a wrong that “annihilates the person” 
by unjustly taking their property. Takings, therefore, are incoherent because takings are 
incommensurate with personhood.316 This, of course, is the position taken by Radin, supra. But 
Brudner reads this critical view in another, coherent way: “the contradiction inherent in civil 
society is logically surmounted in the political community (what Hegel calls the ‘State’) and […] 
a takings law of the kind found in the Fifth Amendment reflects that solution.”317  The result is a 
rehabilitation of Hegelian property law that makes it familiar to the constitutional property 
	  	   207 
jurisprudence of United States.  According this view, Hegel is in substantial agreement with the 
legal norms provided by the Supreme Court’s contemporary jurisprudence of eminent domain, 
where the paradoxical subordination of private property to “higher spheres of right, such as a 
community or the state”  (§46) is negated by the constitutional duty to compensate.  But because 
Hegel provides no indication of the appropriate limits of state power with respect to ‘fundamental 
rights’ nor suggestions for permanently securing of such rights against potential abuse or 
violation on the part of the state, whatever protections are afforded property rights at the 
intersubjective level between subjects are non-existent between subjects and the state. Such an 
interpretation ignores the unique role of property in the development of personhood and the 
exercise of free will, both of which are preserved in Radin’s preferable account of personal 
property which, again, deserves the protection of strict scrutiny in a constitutional jurisprudence 
that respects the unique importance of personal property rights as they struggle for recognition 
with competing demands by the community.  
Brudner questions whether Hegel proposes the existence of an unqualified in rem right 
outside public law, and if so, how private property can still be subordinate to public welfare in 
terms of permissible takings.318 For Brudner, the takings clause stands for the proposition that 
“forcible expropriations for an ordinary public end are permissible subject to an indefeasible duty 
to compensate the owner.”319 Brudner is correct to note that eminent domain is founded upon the 
state’s “sovereign lordship over all things within its territory,” but incorrect in his claim that 
compensation “qualifies its eminence”320  for both Hegelian property and the constitutional 
property jurisprudence of the United States. His attempt to show specifically how Fifth 
Amendment takings jurisprudence has developed in a distinctly Hegelian manner is, therefore, 
unsuccessful.  
Hegel’s state, he argues, is a holistic entity containing both a public sphere aimed at the 
common welfare and a private sphere aimed at atomic persons. According to Brudner, the takings 
clause reflects the tension in the law of property between these spheres and also belongs to the 
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“constitution of a well ordered political community,”321 where “the idea of a property that is 
established inside the state but outside the public sphere yields the configuration of norms 
contained in the takings clause.”322  
Brudner locates the legitimacy of eminent domain in the citizen’s “positive right to the 
conditions of autonomy,” expressed as a welfare right to the “minimum level of resources needed 
to liberate the mind for the pursuit of self authored projects and to guarantee independence from 
those who would otherwise control the means of subsistence.”323 This guarantee also includes 
equality under law. This equality requires the existence of institutions that further guarantee the 
rule of law in the form of systematic due process, reasoned decisions by the judiciary, and the 
public dissemination of all laws and statutes.  For Brudner, these welfare and equality conditions 
are something that “subjects are entitled to from rulers as condition of authority,” and once they 
are implemented the abstract and negative right against intrusion cannot remain unaltered because 
citizens in civil society owe duties to one another, while persons in abstract right do not.324 As a 
result, abstract right is merged into a civil society where there is “no property independent of the 
common welfare.”325 “Thus,” Brudner concludes, “historically acquired holdings may be forcibly 
redistributed by the public authority without violating rights, providing that the redistribution is 
for the common welfare.”326  
Because there is mutual recognition between individual and community, their 
relationship is one of mutual respect: “public authority and the person are ends only in being 
freely recognized by the other” by renouncing both the individual’s and the community’s claim to 
“exclusive end status.” Each is preserved by respecting the other.327 Because the state “may take 
for ordinary public ends without consent,” public authority must respect private ownership 
through compensation because “property is recognized through the free market”; property, 
therefore, cannot operate “as an internal constraint on state authority.”328 
Brudner’s conclusion is correct: the right to property withers at the level of the state. 
However, his analysis of the role and duty of the state as it expropriates private property 
	  	   209 
contradicts the two tenets of Hegelian property described in section 3, supra. First, Brudner 
writes that the two prerequisites for takings under the United States constitution, public use and 
just compensation, are consistent with Hegelian property because of duties owed by the state to 
the people as conditions of its authority. These duties include the provision of due process, 
welfare, and equality. Granting that these are the duties of the officials in civil society, they are 
not provided to citizens as a quid pro quo in return for the citizenry’s grant of authority. This is 
the citizen/state relationship of the contractarian, where state action is conditioned upon the 
people’s express or implied imprimatur. There is no contractual relationship between the 
Hegelian state and the people. Hegel’s property owners have no political or moral power to 
change the terms of state expropriation (even if it were embodied in a constitution with provisions 
much like the United States takings clause) so it cannot be said that their enjoyment of certain 
property protections in the form of a public use or compensation requirement is the result of a 
grant of authority and, a fortiori, the contractual obligations that result from such a grant.   
Brudner’s interpretation also suffers from his failure to make any distinction between 
Hegel’s forms of the state. In the proposed Hegelian constitution, there is nothing to suggest any 
statutory restrictions on eminent domain other than the assertions in §46, where Hegel writes that 
“private property may have to be subordinated to higher spheres of right, such as a community or 
the state.” Private property is the norm, but “exceptions may be made by the state.” Hegel 
qualifies this right of the state: it “cannot be grounded in chance, in private caprice, or private 
advantage, but only in the rational organism of the state.” (§46). This means that state officials 
may not use expropriation as a way to personally profit from state action, nor that they can use it 
arbitrarily. They may, however, take property ‘rationally.’ This qualification immediately brings 
to mind the current jurisprudential standard of review for takings in the United States—the 
rational basis test—and perhaps Brudner could have based his analysis on this point. However, 
unlike the conditions imposed by Brudner, Hegel does not establish any such conditions, and, 
because of the structure of Hegel’s state, enforcement of the property right against the improper 
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use of eminent domain is unavailable through judicial review.329 Therefore, Hegelian eminent 
domain is a pure act of sovereignty and does not require the state to satisfy constitutional 
requirements of public use or compensation.  
Expropriation by the Monarch but not ‘democratic majorities’ 
Cristi agrees with Brudner’s general idea that Hegelian property provides some protection 
against eminent domain, but approaches the issue from a very different angle. According to 
Cristi, Hegelian property denies the power of eminent domain to the quasi-
democratic/administrative agencies that constitute civil society, and suggests that the state, while 
not burdened with the requirement that it protect private property from violation by other citizens, 
may be obligated to protect it from democratic expropriation for redistribution or ‘public use.’ 
This, of course, is Radin’s perspective as well. Cristi writes that Hegelian property contemplates 
that the monarch protects property against the claims of democratic majorities, which are part of 
civil society (e.g., representatives from Estates). While the demos is part of the ‘state proper,’ it is 
not part of the monarchical state that Hegel believes should “protect private property from 
democratic redistribution.”330  However, there is no provision to protect private property from the 
strong monarchical state itself, and true uses of eminent domain are, again, unchallengeable at the 
judicial level because of Hegel’s opposition to judicial review.331  
 According to Cristi, property and the right to it is regulated in the external state, which  
consists of the institutions of the police or administrative justice.332 This subset of the state proper 
provides for the protection of property through administration of justice (§208,230); yet it can 
also regulate property, impose taxes (§184) and price controls, and otherwise provide for general 
welfare, particularly when charity fails and the state must therefore provide services such public 
poorhouses, hospitals, and streetlights.333   In civil society, persons are particular and their 
property is protected. However, in the ethical state, governed by the executive (or monarch or 
prince) as well as the legislative and corporate institutions, universalizability occurs and there is 
no private property. While civil society and its institutions can regulate property, it cannot both 
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take and protect it at the same time; civil officials similarly cannot prevent the ethical 
state/monarch from using eminent domain.334 Here, the Hegelian aim is to “negate political, [but] 
not economic liberalism”335 by driving a strong wedge between the police or regulatory functions 
of the state and the state proper, the result being that the state proper is not part of civil society. 
Because it is not part of civil society, there is no right, property or otherwise, against it.336  
 For example, Alexander and Peñalver, using Jacque v Steenberg,337 are correct to note 
that Hegelian property provides a justification for strong property rights against trespass.338  In 
Jacque, the defendant was attempting to deliver a mobile home to its customer but the road was 
covered with snow and a sharp turn made the delivery difficult. The defendant asked plaintiff, a 
neighboring homeowner, for permission to pass over their field in order to deliver the mobile 
home. The plaintiffs refused. The Steenburg Homes employees used their property anyway, and 
drove their truck and product over the Jacque’s land. This resulted in a jury’s nominal damage 
award of $1, and a punitive damages award of $100,000.00. According to Alexander and 
Peñalver, the Hegelian property institutions in civil society (to wit, the administration of justice 
and the police) are committed to this kind of resolution. Hegelian property would also protect this 
home against those same institutions in civil society from attempting to expropriate it. However, 
because there is no private property at the level of the ethical state, and because of the distinction 
between the state and the institutions in civil society, Hegelian property fails to protect the Jacque 
residence from expropriation by the monarch, prince, or the various ministers and advisors who 
are responsible for operating the state proper.  
As Fred Dallmayr writes, eminent domain is a sovereign act: it cannot constitute a 
violation of right nor could it be deemed ‘compensable’ by lesser institutions. 339  Hegel 
anticipated that the monarch and his appointed ministers can take, but not civil society 
functionaries.340 These would include, in Hegel’s system, various officials operating within the 
administration of justice and the police. In modern jurisprudence, these institutions would include 
landmark commissions, urban redevelopment corporations, and local or municipal governments. 
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Therefore, Dallmayr concludes, “the people” in Hegel’s system of government—the 
functionaries, representatives in the Estates, and local officials—cannot appropriate property.341  
Hegel supposes a liberal conception of the priority of subjective rights and private 
property, but these are not extended into the political sphere.342 As Cristi notes, the prohibition 
against the state as the protector of property is intended to avoid turning it into “an instrument in 
the service of sovereign property owners” as well as a tool for the redistribution of that very 
property.343 This is accomplished by reserving political power for “an executive of officials 
appointed by an hereditary monarch responsible to a merely advisory legislature, which is 
composed of members whose representation of a wider society is not established by democratic 
procedures.”344  For Hegel, the strong monarchical state protects property from democratic 
redistribution, but not from the sovereign power of the monarch themselves. Therefore, Cristi 
concludes, an absolute monarch is the best safeguard against any revolutionary democratization 
of civil society and the redistribution of property that results from such democratization.345   
James Madison thought a master property rule, such as the takings clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, could achieve the same goal. Like Hegel, Madison is anxious about the implications 
of a demos that might gain control over the property in its jurisdiction by implementing the state’s 
sovereign power of eminent domain in order to redistribute it.346 Both theorists are distrustful that 
a democratic majority could use the power of eminent domain ethically. Madison responds to this 
anxiety with a statute—the Takings Clause—that serves to limit sovereign power by imposing a 
financial (just compensation) and evidentiary (public use) burden on the state. Hegel, on the other 
hand, does not grant the power of eminent domain for judicial or administrative officers, and, 
more importantly, does not burden the monarch with any limitations on its sovereign right to the 
property within its jurisdiction. Under no circumstances might a public land authority, appointed 
by democratically elected municipal government officials such as the authorities in Kelo and 
other cases, expropriate homes without the authority of the monarch or their ministers.  
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According to Cristi, despite identifying the importance of property, its necessity for 
personality, and its resilience to overregulation and expropriation in civil society, Hegel then 
subjugates it for authority. Hegel’s attempt to reconcile freedom (in the form of property 
ownership) and authority (in the form of the state) fails.347 
Section 4. Radin Revisited 
 Hegelian property, as we have seen, provides strong property rights in a liberal, market-
based society. But those rights are in jeopardy when at least one manifestation of the state—the 
executive or monarch—decides to use its eminent domain power against private property. In light 
of this understanding of Hegel’s property theory, we revisit Radin’s attempted reinterpretation of 
it. In part 1 of this section, Jeanne Schroeder argues that Radin has misread Hegelian property as 
the result of her bias against commodification. Following upon Schroeder’s critique, I show in 
part 2 that Radin’s primary target is the market itself and not the promotion of property rights. 
This does not, I conclude, comport with Hegel’s expansive liberalism about markets and cannot 
therefore constitute a Hegelian critique of property and property rights.  
Part 1. The Schroeder Critique 
Jeanne Schroeder writes that Radin engages in both a “common” 348  and a 
“fundamental”349 misreading of Hegel. Her critique focuses on the interpretation of Hegelian 
property that grants ownership over external objects simply by the ‘insertion’ of will into the 
object.  According to Schroeder, this rules out the possibility of two key Hegelian property 
concepts: first, the fact that intangibles and ‘internals’ such opinions, beliefs, and religious views 
are part of Hegelian property, and second, the understanding that property ownership consists 
primarily in the recognition and respect granted by nonowners or contracting partners. The result, 
according to Schroeder, is a faulty reading of Hegel that is primarily oriented towards Radin’s 
political ideas about the noncommodification of women’s bodies (and the homes they occupy) 
instead of towards an understanding of Hegel’s broadly liberal and market-oriented property 
regime.   
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Schroeder’s primary critique of Radin focuses upon the possessory or personhood aspects 
of property as opposed to its recognition aspect.  According to Schroeder, Radin (and many other 
commentators350) read Hegel to be justifying property as a relationship between a single subject 
(the owner or potential owner) and some external object.  This reading imagines some kind of 
‘natural’ relationship between subject and object that leads to ownership merely as the result of a 
person ‘placing their will’ into the thing (see §44). By focusing on the acquisition element in 
property, Radin sidesteps the alienation or contractual elements, where the parties to a property 
transfer are briefly united in a common will.351  Hegel is clear that all three elements—possession 
(or acquisition), use, and alienability—are necessary and sufficient conditions for ownership. For 
example, Radin supports the incomplete commodification of houses, which is intended to protect 
occupiers of houses—persons in their homes—against the damaging effects of a fully 
commodified housing market. For Radin, the fact of possession entails a powerful right against 
all, including the owner (who might seek to repossess the premises or sell the house at a profit) or 
the state (who might use eminent domain to evict the resident as part of an economic 
redevelopment scheme). To this extent, Radin proposes that contractual relationships between 
tenants and owners should be strictly regulated.352 Hegel, on the other hand, recognizes that the 
contractual or alienable element in property means that, for a brief moment, structures such as 
residential buildings are neither house nor home but both for the parties—this is the moment 
where an owner’s will identifies with the next owner’s will in a “unity of different wills” (§72-
73). Radin proposes a market for buyers or occupants only, who are protected against the 
depersonalizing interests of sellers.  Buyers, in due time, then become sellers, and another 
category of one-sided exchanges is initiated. This does not comport with Hegel’s ideas about 
property or contract. Importantly, as Schroeder observes, there is no ‘third person’ in Radin’s 
account: property is owned and enjoyed whether or not there are other persons or a social 
structure in place.353 Hegelian property serves as a way to mediate the intersubjectivity between 
persons: it is not merely the ‘receptacle of will’ that Radin understands it to be.  
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Part 2. Market-Inalienability: Radin’s Larger Project  
As Schnably notes, Radin is really attempting to critique market rhetoric in general.354 As a result, 
her property theory is tied to a larger project: the noncommodification of personality.355 This 
project attempts to show that certain markets are destructive of personhood and should therefore 
be heavily regulated or abolished.  One of the primary ways to achieve this is by removing the 
possibility of commodification of these things by restructuring their status as property.   
If something is property, then it is subject to markets, domination, and commodification.  
Things that are not property are not capable of commodification.  Therefore, according to Radin, 
a categorical restructuring of personal property to ‘market-inalienable’ property would protect 
personhood better than stronger individual rights in those properties. Such items are, in Radin’s 
terminology, ‘contested commodities’ and include infants and children, human reproductive 
materials (sperm, eggs, embryos), human biological materials (blood, organs, hair), human 
sexuality, labor, salaries to college athletes, monetization decrees in divorce or homemaker’s 
services lawsuits, and monetary damages for pain and suffering in personal injury lawsuits. Baby 
selling and prostitution are threats to the personhood of women in particular.356 
For Radin, the property right in the home and other types of personal or non fungible 
property is the last, best right: although Radinian property rights exist on a very steep 
‘continuum’ from personal to fungible, homes provide the bright line between property that 
enjoys constitutional protection and property that enjoys very little protection. For Radin, the 
difference between personal and fungible property is the demarcation line between market 
inalienability and some version of a free market.  The constitutional property right ends with the 
home. This denies the possibility for the home to provide the foundation for extending similarly 
robust rights to a wide variety of fungible goods, some of which have elements of personality in 
them, and all of which must be capable of embodying some degree of the kind of privacy interests 
persons have in the home or personal property. While there is indeed a continuum from the 
deeply personal and private to less protected properties, the slope of the continuum is much more 
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gradual that Radin has described. In fact, despite calling it a continuum, it is difficult to see where 
anything but personal property deserves protection in the form of property rights.  
In the effort to personalize certain kinds of property, Radin’s stated goal is to protect 
those items from the market. But in doing so, at least some property rights are infringed. “For 
Radin,” Schnably writes,  
the only way to counter commodification is to change the legal rules governing property 
and its transfer, making market-inalienable what was market-alienable. Once we take that 
approach, decommodification inevitably involves the imposition of a disability—that is, 
stripping someone of the legal right to make a market transfer of an object or an aspect of 
herself.357 
 
Radin is primarily interested in eliminating women’s bodies from marketization, and 
secondarily in eliminating homes of nonowners and tenants in particular. Radin’s property right is 
therefore a right to a home that is immune from the kind of market forces that remove persons 
from neighborhoods due to gentrification, rising rents, or the arbitrary decision of landlords, as 
well as from market-driven but truly forced exchanges such as eminent domain.  According to 
Radin, "[s]omething that is market-inalienable is not to be sold, which in our economic system 
means it is not to be traded in the market."358 Radin: “[M]arket inalienability is a particular 
species of nontransferability. It differs from the nontransferability that characterizes many non-
traditional property rights—such as the entitlements of the regulatory and welfare state—that are 
not for sale but not to be given away either.”359 The moment a thing is marketized it is 
depersonalized, so market-inalienability is intended to preserve personalization. Bodies and 
homes are examples of the kind of things that are so private and integral to personality that they 
should not enter or be traded on the marketplace. As a result, Radin does not see homes—
“occupied houses”—as a type of ‘true’ property. Homes, it is argued, are like bodies: because 
they are embodied with the personhood of their occupiers/owners, they are integral for 
personhood and they should not be fully market inalienable; rather, they should only be 
incompletely commodified. When items are market-inalienable, they may not be traded on a 
market—human babies, at this point, are market-inalienable in the United States. When items are 
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incompletely commodified, they are traded in a market but it is heavily regulated. Due to the 
variety of statutes that regulate homes, including building codes, landlord/tenant requirement, and 
rent control/stabilization, homes and housing are incompletely commodified to varying degrees 
depending upon the jurisdiction.360 For Radin, the regulations that cause labor and housing to be 
incompletely commodified take personhood into account because the regulations “recognize[s] 
and foster[s] the nonmarket significance of work and housing.”361  
For those things we accept as being appropriately identified with the person, a range of 
protections exists to shield them from market forces and wrongful treatment as fungible. 
The ability to establish oneself in relationship with things is promoted by the social 
aspect of incomplete commodification; once the relationship is established, the thing is 
personal.362 
 
Like those of many property theorists, 363  Radin’s theory is an attempt to find a 
“comprehensive alternative to law and economics theory.”364 These theories, including the social 
obligation norm theory, react to the dominance of law and economics in property theory, and 
object to the use of cost-benefit analysis, where human actions and social outcomes are evaluated 
in terms of actual or potential gains from trade, which is then measured in money.365 Radin 
purports to find the germ of market-inalienability in Hegel. However, the kinds of things that 
Hegel claims are not capable of alienation and are, therefore, market-inalienable, include 
personality (slavery, serfdom, disqualifications on property, encumbrances), universal freedom of 
will, ethical life (Sittlichkeit), and religion.366 There is no indication that homes are prima facie 
market-alienable or that tenants deserve strong protections against landlords in Hegelian property; 
however, Hegelian property does provide strong protections against certain state institutions when 
they attempt to use eminent domain, and to that extent Radin can be said to have arrived at 
property theory that successfully incorporates at least some Hegelian aspects. However, Hegelian 
property recognizes a much broader social right to property than Radin contemplates, and it is 
unlikely that Radin’s political ideas about noncommodification would find much sympathy in a 
Hegelian property regime. Noncommodification in response to the property theories influenced 
by the law and economics movement is explored in further detail in chapter 5.  
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Conclusion 
 
Radin’s property theory, despite initially supporting a strong property right in the home 
against eminent domain (a right that would protect the privacy and private property interests 
implicated by the resident’s occupancy) appears to promote personhood at the risk of creating a 
heavily regulated social environment that bears little resemblance to Hegel’s free market. 
However, this reliance upon the state certainly finds some traction in Hegel’s unfortunate theory 
of the authoritarian state, which, as we have seen, both protects property from one kind of 
intervention while leaving it fully exposed to other kinds. Radin turns to this authoritarian state to 
create the conditions of noncommodification for homes and bodies, and sees in it the possibility 
of providing a shield for these vessels of personhood against the evils of the market.  
But this is not the kind of state that maintains an institution of private property. To that 
extent, we return to Honneth for a way out. Honneth suggested that Hegel could be read without 
making a commitment to his unacceptable conception of the state. To that extent, a Hegelian 
property theory, one in which Hegel’s “basic conception of the state has been rejected in 
principle,”367 can still provide robust social property rights—rights which also serve robust 
privacy interests—but, because those rights wither at the level of the state, a different kind of 
political theory is needed to promote and protect the privacy interest protected by private 
property. This theory, which blends the strong property right with libertarian (left and right) 
political theory, is explored in chapter 4.  
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Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Libertarian Directions in Self-Ownership, Property, and Privacy 
 
This chapter surveys the differences in the libertarian approaches to property, self-
ownership, and takings. Libertarian property ideology has generated a large volume of 
commentary. As Joseph Singer notes, “[t]his new popularity of libertarianism can be attributed, to 
some extent, to a discomfort with cost-benefit analysis and its associated philosophy of 
utilitarianism. If liberty is a primary value, then the rights we cherish should not be put up for 
grabs simply because someone can show that the market costs of protecting those rights outweigh 
their benefits as measured in dollar terms.”1  
Many, but not all, libertarians locate the genesis of their understanding of property rights 
in the natural right of self-ownership.2 Self-ownership as a kind of property ownership was 
discussed in chapter 1, where it was subjected to a variety of skeptical arguments which cast 
doubt whether the self (or person, or body) can be considered an owned thing: a property. It 
reappears here because of its central role in the two primary branches of libertarian property 
theory and because of John Locke’s influence on both derivations.  For Locke, “man had within 
himself the great Foundation of Property” (2.44)3: this, of course, is the idea that self-ownership 
is the basis for world-ownership. This chapter takes the skepticism introduced in chapter 1 to 
several further levels: if the self cannot be owned, then further doubts arise whether the 
‘properties’ of the self (talents and abilities) can be owned, which, in turn, raises doubts about the 
ownership of the ‘properties’ of talents and abilities in the form of labor. The next set of doubts 
should be obvious: if there is no self-ownership, then it cannot provide any foundation for world-
ownership; conversely, even if there is self-ownership, there is reason to doubt that has any 
	  	   237 
traction to things extending beyond the body, much less to the world’s resources or to intangibles 
such as intellectual property.  This type of claim is typical of some of the arguments supported by 
left-libertarian property theorists, many of whom argue in favor of certain individual property 
rights (in bodies and labor, for example) but against individual property rights in land or in 
profits.   
This chapter is structured like the preceding two chapters: a ‘classical’ property theory 
(here, the Lockean natural rights of self ownership and world ownership) is analyzed in terms of 
its ability to provide justifications for contemporary legal/political property relationships. 
Through the work of C.B. Macpherson, Richard Tully, Jeremy Waldron, Matthew Kramer, and 
A. John Simmons, we find, in section 1, that Locke might actually be a property communitarian 
and not an individualist, which then leads to left-libertarian ideas represented, in section 2, by 
Michael Otsuka, Gijs Van Donselaar, John Christman, and James Grunebaum. These writers 
attempt to justify the denial of ownership and income rights in world resources. In section 3, I 
show that current American property jurisprudence might be pressed into service to achieve 
similar results—at least in terms of subsurface property rights. Finally, in section 4, the right-
libertarian approach to property rights, found in Richard Epstein and David Schmidtz, reveals that 
the privacy aspects of property are best protected by a takings jurisprudence that restructures the 
definition of takings based upon a reappraisal of the role of just compensation.  
Section 1. Locke and his Legacy 
According to Richard Arneson, “Locke’s doctrine of natural moral rights, incomplete as 
it is, forms the core of the tradition of deontological, rights based liberalism, a broad position that 
is perhaps the dominant contemporary view. On this view, the account of what we owe one 
another bottoms out in claims of individual claim rights correlated with strict moral duties.”4 At 
first blush, Locke’s own position on the topic of private property appears fairly straightforward:  
private property in, for example, land and objects, is founded on each individual’s prior 
possession of “a Property in his own Person.”5 A Lockean theory of self-ownership locates 
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private property in the property of one’s own person, which gives rise to property in actions, 
which allows persons to mix their labor with things, which then gives property to persons.  His 
insistence that the protection of property is the state’s chief goal is well known; in fact, for Locke, 
private property is the “the basis of all political morality” according to Jeremy Waldron.6 
However, Lockean property, as a foundation for contemporary right-liberation property theory, is 
anything but straightforward. According to Karl Widerquist, “no one seems to agree on exactly 
what he was trying to say,” and as a result, they have “interpreted him in strikingly different 
ways.” Therefore, “[t]here is unlikely to be an ‘a-ha’ moment, when someone writes the 
interpretation, effectively ending the controversy.”7   
The controversy arises during the transition from the state of nature to civil society. 
According to C.B. Macpherson, the idylls of the state of nature and its communal property rules 
are eradicated by the constituted law of civil society, which is nothing more than a justification of 
the potential for unlimited person accumulation which is characteristic of past and current forms 
of capitalism. The Locke of James Tully, on the other hand, accepts Macpherson’s revaluation of 
the natural law in civil society, but argues that the legal system commands a positive submission 
of all property into a communitarian pot for redistribution. This directly contradicts A. John 
Simmons’ claim that “Lockean individualism and voluntarism are opposed most dramatically by 
various naturalist and communitarian theories.”8 
Matthew Kramer’s approach is perhaps the most interesting. For Kramer, the natural law 
persists in the civil arena, and both the natural and civil law are individualistic. However, they are 
individualistic only as the product of Locke’s thoroughgoing communitarianism, which demands 
that individual property interests be submitted to the community whenever there is a conflict. 
Kramer’s detailed exegesis presents a Lockean conception of property that is hardly the stuff of 
modern libertarianism, and makes a powerful claim that contemporary proponents of powerful 
private property rights look elsewhere for the genesis of extensive liberties in regards to holdings.  
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The most visible ‘descendant’ of Lockean property is Robert Nozick, who accepts 
Macpherson’s characterization of Lockean property as individualist and capitalist but without 
apology: Nozick’s property theory finds in Locke a justification for selfishness and a roughly 
unlimited right to accumulate in terms of the right of acquisition. However, Nozick’s attempt to 
justify world-ownership by way of Lockean self-ownership is unsuccessful, due in large part to 
the unlikelihood that selves are property, and that harms to one’s self as a property are 
substantially the same as harms to external things.  
Part 1. Possessive Individualism or Communitarian Conventionalism 
Macpherson’s commentary on the rise of ‘possessive individualism,’ or capitalism, from Hobbes 
to the Levellers to Harrington and finally to Locke, is well known.  Possessive individualism, on 
his account, is an ideology of human behavior whereby the individual is proprietor of his own 
person or capacities and therefore owes nothing to society in return for them.  The individual, as 
owner of themselves, is not a ‘moral whole’ or part of larger social ‘whole.’9  
Initially, Macpherson substantially concurs with Tully’s analysis: the appropriation of 
property in the Lockean state of nature is limited by requirements of usefulness and benevolence, 
which are boundaried by prohibitions against spoilage as well as the proviso that appropriation 
leave “enough and as good” for others.10 Macpherson then argues that these limits are removed 
by the introduction of money into the state of nature, which then negates the natural law-imposed 
limitations on individual accumulation.  Civil society, then, protects this unlimited accumulation 
on behalf of the landowning class, and Lockean property rights serve to justify an “unlimited 
natural right of appropriation, a right transcending the limitations involved in the initial 
acquisition.”11 As a result, persons in civil society have an unlimited right of accumulation that 
permits waste, inefficiency, and greed—in other words, rights to property that are not only natural 
but immune to modification by competing convention or law that might attempt to redistribute 
property on behalf of nonowners.  “Locke’s constitutionalism,” Macpherson writes, is therefore 
“a defence of the rights of expanding property rather than of the rights of the individual against 
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the state.”12 Property rights that are unbounded by law or morals are, for Macpherson, the essence 
of capitalist private property, and Locke is guilty of clearing the way for the resulting inequality 
that is the product of the West’s private property regimes. Locke, therefore, is misread for the 
idea that individual rights against the state are directly protected in Locke’s state.13 Rather, 
Macpherson concludes, it is the rights of the propertied class against the nonpropertied class that 
are protected. 
Tully’s Locke engages in a sustained argument against Macpherson’s Locke. Their 
dialogue pits a compassionate, charitable steward of God’s lands, including “every beast of the 
field, and every fowl of the air” (Genesis 2:19), against a possessive individualist and apologist 
for a merciless capitalism.  Tully not only denies that Locke be considered a capitalist or an 
architect of laissez faire political economy, but that Locke provides a justification for a version of 
private property right that is both communitarian14 and one that establishes natural law as a basis 
for his theory of rights.15 This theory not only supports certain property rights, but asserts a 
“radical constitutionalist theory of popular sovereignty and an individualist theory of resistance” 
designed to oppose arbitrary or absolutist government. 16  Tully agrees with Macpherson’s 
understanding of Locke’s moral restriction of property in the state of nature, but rejects the 
conclusion that Locke’s conception of conventional property lacks similar restrictions.  
According to Tully, Locke begins with Scripture, which states that the world is a gift 
given by God to mankind in common.17 Because mankind has a natural right to sustenance, 
Locke’s challenge is to individuate the common gift within the constraints of each man’s right to 
it.18  This is a right “to make use of the Food and Rayment, and other Conveniences of Life, the 
Materials whereof he had so plentifully provided for them” (1.41). This right is different than the 
right to property which individuals ‘come to have’ pursuant to individuation, or acquisition for 
persons use. Locke derives this from fundamental laws of nature that mankind ought to be 
preserved; this is the primary duty of man due to his relationship with God and other men.19 
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Therefore, Tully writes, “[t]he first and fundamental law of nature is that mankind ought to be 
preserved.”20   
The first Lockean right of property, therefore, is the right to be included in, or, more 
specifically, a right not to be excluded from, the common property provided by God,21 and this 
right to common property is derived from the natural law of preservation. The natural law is the 
foundation of the right to gather things to preserve oneself. The primary role of the right is to 
“justify resistance to arbitrary and unjust rule. If a ruler arbitrarily violates my right or another’s 
right to preservation he has violated natural law” and must be punished.22 
In order to preserve humankind, three rights are required: 
1. The right to preservation itself;  
2. The right to the liberty of preserving oneself and others; 
3. The right to material possessions necessary for 1 and 2.23 
According to Macpherson, property is constituted by the right to use that is “not 
conditional on the owner’s performance of any social function.”24 But, according to Tully, “[i]t is 
never the case that, for Locke, property is independent of a social function,” and that social 
function is, specifically, the preservation of mankind.25 As Alan Ryan observes, Locke praises the 
man who by enclosing land and employing his skill upon it “thus enriches mankind” by helping 
to preserve himself and, by direct implication, mankind. This is a benefit to mankind and not an 
act of “possessive individualism.”26 For Tully, Locke’s challenge is to answer the question of 
property “within a context of positive duties to others, and equal claim to common goods, is his 
exposition of an alternative and morally superior system of property grounded in natural law.”27 
Although Locke writes that men should preserve themselves first, and then the rest of mankind 
(see 1.86), he never, Tully writes, “considers isolated and presocial individuals.” Rather, “since 
norms for the preservation of society and its members are constitutive of society, Locke’s 
analysis always presupposes men organized into a unified community.”28 
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Property in God’s state of nature is natural, but in civil society it becomes conventional. 
Tully: “Locke’s express statement that property under government is conventional contradicts the 
standard, but not exclusive, interpretation of Locke’s analysis of property.”29 He is referring, of 
course, to Macpherson.  Property in political society, Tully writes, is a “creation of that 
society.”30 Macpherson, however, reads Locke as arguing for a natural right in civil society as a 
justification for a ‘naturalized’ capitalism, where ‘market men’ support material inequality in 
civil society as a natural outgrowth of inequality in the state of nature where, according to 
Macpherson, owners are purported to lack any duties towards others: a natural right to the market 
justifies competition as ‘natural’ and normalizes the ‘natural’ desire to accumulate material 
possessions without limit.     
In terms of self-ownership, Locke writes that “man had within himself the great 
Foundation of Property” (2.44): this, of course, is the idea that self-ownership is the basis for 
world-ownership. God is proprietor of man, and man is proprietor of his person and actions: “for 
Locke, God’s right in man and man’s resulting inclusive rights arise from God’s act of making.”31 
A person comes into being when they become a rational adult and a free agent by “using his 
reason to discover natural law and to direct his will in acting.” (2.57).32  
For Tully, Locke’s is a maker or action theory: man “makes the actions of his person and 
so has a natural and exclusive maker’s right in them.”33 Therefore, body and limbs are God’s 
property, but actions (as the product of persons) are man’s own.34 Man comes to have property in 
workmanship by working in a God-like fashion.35 This natural right to “moral property over his 
own” is the right to property. Locke: “Their persons are free by a native right, and their 
properties, be they more or less, are their own, and at their own dispose, and not at his; or else it 
is no property.” (2.194). The property right holds against government in the sense that “[i]t cannot 
be taken from him without consent (2.193).”36  
In response to Nozick’s famous objections to Locke’s labor theory,37 Tully says Locke 
“sees the laborer as making an object out of the material provided by God and so as having 
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property in this product” similar to the way God made the world from other stuff he had created. 
For Locke, use for the sake of “making useful things ushers in ownership of those goods, and this 
activity necessarily entails the exclusion of others.”38 Locke’s property right is conditioned on 
productive use,39 and a use is productive if it promotes the preservation of mankind. Therefore, 
Tully argues, Macpherson is wrong to claim that Locke’s “whole theory of property is a 
justification of the natural right…to unlimited individual appropriation”40 and without social 
obligation.41 Rather, “[i]f land isn’t cultivated, you lose it and it reverts to the commons.” The 
reversion point is spoilage, and Locke is clear that if a person gathers up too much, so that the 
“Fruits rotted, or the Venison putrified, before he could spend it, he offended against the common 
Law of Nature, and was liable to be punished.” (2:37). Punishment for violations of the law of 
nature consist in retributing to the criminal, “so far as calm reason and conscience dictates, what 
is proportionate to his Transgression, which is so much as may serve for Reparation and 
Restraint.” (2:8).  
So, says Tully, there no right in land as such, “but only a use right in improved land 
conditional upon the use of its products.”42 Macpherson is incorrect to the extent that he misreads 
Locke to argue for unconditional or absolute rights over land as possessive individualist or private 
property.43 In fact, Tully writes, “Locke’s theory is in opposition to unlimited rights theory”44 and 
there is a positive duty to sustain those in need:  as Locke writes, a “needy brother has a right to 
the surplusage” of his brother’s goods.45  
According to Richard Boyd, Locke is situated between classical Christianity, with duties 
of positive usage and improvement, and modern capitalist theories of “procedural justice” which 
have displaced the classical/moral theories. Boyd: “Locke’s defense of private property is at once 
natural and positive, utilitarian and grounded in natural rights, secular and theological, hedonistic 
and custodial.”46 This defense involves substantial limits on the absolute right of property in the 
form of stewardship or custodial obligations.47 These include the just usage or “no spoliation 
limitation” (2:46), and the ongoing duty to cultivate and use land (2:37).  Violations of both ‘use 
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it or lose it’ rules means another can take over (2:38).  According to Boyd, Lockean private 
property “rests on a legitimate authority to exclude others…(but), [i]n order for this right to be 
either morally meaningful or practically enforceable…others have to acknowledge a reciprocal 
obligation to respect the moral relationship between proprietors and their possessions. In this 
way, property rights and others’ duties are correlative.”48 Importantly, this right to exclude is not 
coextensive with a right to destroy or waste.  So, ownership of property is “subject to the same 
custodial terms according to which we originally own ourselves” (2.24): because our ownership 
rights over ourselves do not include suicide, our ownership rights over external property also do 
not include wasting or destroying it.  
Lockean property is therefore heavily regulated as a means to an end, and for Locke the 
end is the public good.49 Tully takes an extreme view of this. For Tully, man gives up natural 
liberty for conventional liberty by entering society, and all possessions become common at that 
point and wholly subservient to the public good. If he is correct, then Lockean property cannot be 
said to support strong individual rights in civil society. As a result, it is a mistake to base, as 
certain libertarians are wont to do, powerful property freedoms in Locke’s theory. According to 
Boyd, the traditional, libertarian reading is that Locke’s property theory justifies a political theory 
of limited government and priority of individuals over communities. This reading supports the 
idea that because our “natural right to property is fundamental and inalienable, we have the right 
to abolish any government that infringes it.”50 There is reason to doubt this, says Boyd, because 
the natural and labor theories are replaced by positive title guaranteed by state and positive 
constitutions (2:50). Consenting to community and state, and their protection of property, entails 
its regulation, and as a result Locke ends up back at the “positivism of Hobbes.”51  
Part 2. Waldron, Kramer, Simmons 
This part continues to press the question of whether Locke is the “prophet of a new 
individualism”52 who provides libertarians with the kind of rights structure they require to support 
a robust property right. The answer, I think, depends on consent, both in terms of 1) entering into 
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civil society and 2) obeying its duly enacted laws. Lockean consent is unquestioningly about 
providing legitimacy to majoritarian legislation or decision-making, which in turn is meant to 
provide representative power against despotic or executive power. When Locke says “no man 
may have property taken except with his consent,” he means that consent is given either directly 
or, as is usually the case, through an elected representative. Of course, for Locke, if one’s elected 
representative voted with the minority voices against some issue, it is the majority’s voice that is 
taken to be the consent of the people and the minority is either obligated to obey or welcomed to 
leave for another community.  
The majoritarian demos, however, is fully empowered to regulate and take property in 
accord with natural law and right.  According to Simmons, Locke’s primary concern was that 
government not be ‘arbitrary’ or that it violate natural right on the grounds that one cannot 
reasonably consent to such a government.53 This provides for a property right that is subject to 
severe regulation by a democratic majority, so long as that majority is not arbitrary or acts 
without either direct or representative consent. Lockean property theory is therefore an unlikely 
ancestor for contemporary right-libertarian property theorists, who see property rights as a 
bulwark against this kind of majoritarianism.  
Jeremy Waldron has the benefit of reflecting upon both Macpherson and Tully. He rejects 
Tully’s reading and agrees, to a large extent, with Macpherson.54 Lockean property rights, 
according to Waldron, are natural in that they are acquired as a result of actions and transactions 
“that men undertake on their own initiative and not by virtue of the operation of any civil 
framework of positive rules vesting those rights in them.”55  
According to Waldron, Locke presents a mixed general/specific theory of rights, where 
all persons have a general right to subsistence/sustenance, but only a special right to private 
property: persons must do something to own property, and, for Locke, this is achieved through 
acts of labor.56 Like Nozick’s theory, Locke’s is a theory of historical entitlement: the right to 
property is determined by the historical record of its initial acquisition and its subsequent 
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transfer.57 So Locke’s right is special in that labor leads to ownership, but it is also a kind of 
moral imperative: if one does not labor, one cannot preserve oneself, and it is wrong not to 
preserve oneself. So, one ought to pursue property to sustain both oneself and the community.58  
Tully’s “defective”59 and “completely mistaken”60 reading of Locke is a “far more radical 
rereading of Locke” than Macpherson’s due to Tully’s claim that Locke did not conceive of the 
idea that private property rights could be non-conventional.61  As Waldron observes, Tully objects 
to Macpherson’s definition of private property as that which has no social function. Lockean 
property, of course, has the precise social function of preserving mankind.62 Locke believed that it 
was good for humankind to develop the land from waste to largesse, in which case people lived 
better and had better lives. The only way to achieve this was by widespread individual enclosure, 
which not only provided for oneself and one’s family, but also permitted the owner to benefit 
others through what Adam Smith would soon recognize as the value of labor’s division.63 
Waldron concurs with Tully that the Sufficiency Limitation is “simply the recognition, so 
far as acquisition is concerned, of everyone’s original claim-right to an adequate subsistence from 
the resources of the world.”64 For Locke, there is no moral difference between a person who fails 
to make land profitable or one who allows its profits to spoil: both owners are equally poor 
stewards, and Locke is not content to permit such a misuse of property.65 A system of private 
property and a relatively free market uses its rather visible hand to encourage this wasteful owner 
to sell to someone who values it more highly, or be subject to expropriation. Macpherson is 
therefore correct to relate “Locke’s conception of human nature, along with Hobbes’s, to the 
spirit of rising capitalism.”66 
Waldron’s astonishment at Tully’s communitarian conclusion is understandable: it would 
require all property brought in from the state of nature to be carved up and redistributed by the 
community “on the basis of the general good. In respect of these redistributed holdings, the 
community then falls under an obligation of natural law not subsequently to disturb them.”67 
Tully’s misreading is based on Locke’s statement that, upon entering civil society, owners must 
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submit their possessions to the community.68 Tully says that Locke means that properties become 
the possessions, or property, of the community. This, writes Waldron, is surely incorrect: by 
‘submission,’ Locke meant that both property and person become subject to the dominion, or law, 
of the community. Locke clearly does not intend that persons become possessions of the 
community: they merely become subject to laws, and the same is true for their possessions.69  
Tully’s communitarian/conventional interpretation, where rights change radically from 
nature to society, is unlikely to be an accurate one. For Waldron, it does not make much 
difference for the property rights enjoyed by persons as they transition from the state of nature to 
civil society.70 This is, essentially, the claim of the right libertarians, who approve of this 
transition so long as it preserves the putative individual property right, and Macpherson, who is 
critical of it. However, Waldron locates an underlying communitarian foundation in Locke’s 
view, in which “all property rights, whether natural or conventional, are subject at all times to the 
general right of every man to a basic subsistence when his survival is threatened. That general 
right—the primeval right of Lockean communism—remains in the background of the whole of 
the theory.”71  
Matthew Kramer challenges Waldron’s characterization of Locke’s communism—
Kramer’s term is communitarianism—on the grounds that it is at the foreground, and not 
background, of the theory. If correct, Kramer provides not only a decisive reply to Macpherson, 
but also a rejoinder (in substantial agreement with Waldron) to Tully’s claim that Locke’s 
conventional property rights are a different species of rights than the natural rights that arise in 
the state of nature. According to Kramer, “every pattern of individualism in the state of nature 
and elsewhere is the product of communitarianism,”72 and all of Locke’s entitlements are justified 
in terms of preserving and enhancing the species.73 This is because Locke thought individual and 
group interests coincided, and that group interests predominated if they clashed with individual 
interests. Kramer: “No person was free to strive for comforts and conveniences when the routes 
of her striving were a danger to the collective weal.”74 This is an unconventionally intriguing 
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claim, and requires some unpacking. If accurate, what emerges from Kramer’s analysis is a Locke 
who cannot be relied upon as a theorist of possessive individualism or libertarian property rights.  
Like Tully, Kramer sets out to show that Locke’s “individualistic prescriptions 
concerning property turn out to be communitarian through and through.”75 However, Kramer has 
severe disagreements with Tully, and the primary bone of contention with Tully is over the labor 
theory of acquisition.76 Kramer is primarily opposed to a natural right to property that is the 
product of Lockean self-ownership and labor, which is mixed with unowned resources to produce 
the right of ownership. If Locke is wrong about ownership ‘arising’ from the mixture of labor and 
things, then there is no natural right of ownership in the state of nature and, a fortiori, no natural 
right of ownership in civil society. Kramer’s deeper point, I think, is to show that natural rights 
over property must fail, and that natural rights libertarians are misguided to rely upon Locke as a 
spiritual guide. 
According to Kramer, the labor theory fails because there is no individual right to 
anything in Locke’s property theory that is not in the service of the community. Locke’s 
“structure of private property is consequentialist through and through”77 and therefore no amount 
of labor can spontaneously generate a private property right against the community. Although 
there are individual rights in the state of nature, they “gain their justification solely as the vehicles 
of collective enterprise.”78 For Kramer, Lockean individual rights benefit the collective: people 
(normatively) should have individual rights because individual rights are instrumentally the best 
way to (nonnormatively) benefit the group.  
Kramer appears to accept self-ownership and the ownership of capacities and abilities,79 
but rejects these as the basis for ownership of labor and, ipso facto, for the mixing of one’s labor 
with unowned resources resulting in the ‘natural’ property right. For Kramer, self-ownership does 
not support the ownership of the products of one’s labor, and Locke’s labor theory does not 
bridge the gap between “labor in the object and labor within the subject.”80  “The right-creating 
power of human toil,” Kramer writes, “was the link between the general entitlement to self 
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preservation and the concrete entitlements of individual ownership.”81 However, this link is 
invalid because those entitlements are never concrete and always subject to claims by the 
community. These claims are the essence of Lockean natural law, and are hardly the stuff of 
libertarian property rights. Kramer: “Both of the major strands of self-ownership—the general 
privilege to employ one’s abilities, and the general right against encroachment by one’s fellows 
on the integrity of one’s person—were governed fully indeed by natural law’s communitarian 
impulse.”82 Because his labor theory is invalid, Kramer writes, the labor-mixing theory of 
ownership is invalid as well. As a result, “Locke’s property is indefensible.”83 
Tully, for reasons suggested below, argued that the right to property in civil society is 
conventional, meaning that Locke jettisons nature for positive rights in the transition from natural 
to civil society. Pace Tully, Kramer argues that all natural property rights carry over from state of 
nature to civil society.84  According to Kramer, the property gains in the state of nature, as well as 
the duties to the community, are preserved through the conventions of civil society, which are 
also limited by those natural acquisitions.85 For Kramer, not only does the natural right persist, 
but all of the natural rights have full force in civil society: they determine what the civil law must 
do.  The argument, then, is over Locke’s natural law, and Kramer is obligated to show that Locke 
is not only communitarian through and through, but a natural lawyer through and through as well.  
Therefore, the obligation on owners in the state of nature persists in civil society, and the natural 
lawyer, operating within the boundaries of civil society, is required to justify a property regime 
that protects individual rights only insofar as they promote communitarian objectives. For 
Kramer, this is the primary reason for rejecting Lockean natural laws about self-ownership and 
labor as a foundation for civil law, and also for rejecting natural law as a basis for libertarian 
property rights. Furthermore, this is why natural rights libertarians are wrong: natural rights to 
property are not justified in the state of nature so, a fortiori, they are not justified in civil society. 
Tully’s fault, according to Kramer, is that he avoids Locke’s extensive discussion of the 
importance of consent.  Tully, Kramer argues, belongs to a category of thinkers who want to find 
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in Locke a property theory that does not leave the poor or the propertyless behind, and a 
conventional Locke, who legitimizes the communitarian aspects of the state of nature through 
positive law, might do just this. Tully and other thinkers have erroneously, according to Kramer, 
“committed Locke to allowing that a legitimate expropriation of property could take place 
without any consent from the affected owners. People who had earned rights of ownership in the 
natural state of humanity could not obstruct the taking of all of those rights as soon as the proper 
moment came for the transition to schemes of full fledged society and governance.” The 
preservation of communitarian interests from nature to civil society can only occur, Kramer 
suggests, if owners give up their rights—but Tully cannot explain how or why they would do 
this.86 Tully’s transition from the state of nature to civil society preserves the natural law and, 
simultaneously but incongruously, divests owners for redistribution. What Tully does not 
consider is that a majority of owners, after consenting to enter civil society and consenting to the 
limited types of property regulation that are inevitable, might not consent to the kind of 
widespread expropriation Tully thinks would occur. If property in civil society is conventional, 
then it might move in the other direction (towards individualism and away from communitarian 
expropriation) depending on the consent given.  But, if property in civil society is natural, then 
the undisputed ‘natural’ communitarianism of the state of nature is the ‘natural’ 
communitarianism of civil society. Tully cannot have it both ways.  
Kramer’s conclusion is not that communitarian goals, such as utility or welfare, are 
coincidental or accidental products of individual rights. If they were, he would be rearguing 
Adam Smith’s point that individual self interest just happens to benefit rightsholders and the 
community—a win/win situation, as it were, for both individuals and communities.87 Rather, 
Kramer argues just the opposite: that whatever individualism there is in Locke is the product of a 
selfless communitarianism, and self-ownership is merely instrumental towards serving 
communitarian obligation.88 Whatever individualism and self interest is promoted by Lockean 
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property is only promoted to serve the community: “if possessive individualism characterized the 
state of nature, its predominance stemmed from its ability to promote communitarian ends.”89  
What role, then, does consent play? Consent, as Simmons will show, cannot be given for 
just anything, but transitioning owners and owners in civil society (and similarly situated 
nonowners) certainly play a role in determining what kinds of property rights might govern in the 
jurisdiction of their choice.  Locke is clear that property cannot be taken without consent, and 
owners, after consenting to general jurisdiction over them by the sovereign, might not consent to 
property restrictions. Or, they might consent—directly or through their elected representative—
that all surplus property over a certain amount be taxed at a certain rate, or, familiarly, that private 
property not be taken except for public use without just compensation. 
“Consent,” Simmons writes, “carves the boundaries of natural law.”90 Simmons argues 
that the Lockean state of nature is a ‘moral’ condition, meaning that persons are not morally 
bound to a government until they consent. In this sense, all persons undergo a ‘trial period’ in the 
state of nature where they figure out whether they want to consent to this or that state. One leaves 
the state of nature when one consents to an ‘artificial’ or created civil state.91 For Simmons, 
persons first consent to political obligations. This is actual, personal consent. It means, for 
Simmons, that persons obey the laws that do not contradict natural law, and they must support a 
functioning society through, for example, the payment of taxes.92 Exiting the state of nature and 
entering civil society—either for the first time or as an emigrant to a new society—requires 
unanimous consent, but, Simmons writes, “this consent entails, Locke believes, consent to rule by 
the majority of the members in all subsequent matters” including the consensual taking of 
property (2.95-99) and, short of outright takings, a wide variety of property regulations.93 
Individuals retain the natural rights of preservation of self and Mankind, and at least one kind of 
property always remains even if the majority consents to widespread takings and redistribution: a 
person’s ‘person’ and their labor.94 According to Simmons, no man could or would consent to 
having their right to subsist or preserve themselves violated, and a majoritarian law, even if it 
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were the result of a full and free democratic political participation, would be invalid were it to 
deny a person this right.95 Resistance to this kind of power is justified, even if the power is 
derived from majoritarian decisions.96 Consent therefore may be withdrawn, through resistance, 
when those ends are not met.97 A taking for public use is therefore permitted under a Lockean 
property regime, and just compensation would be appropriate with consent. By the same token, 
electors are free to deny the state the right to take, and the same can be said for taxes, the 
provision of property to the poor through redistribution, and other regulatory schemes. In terms of 
majoritarian authority, political representation is not mandatory, but “well ordered 
commonwealths” (2.143) will consist of legislative bodies made up of representatives chosen “by 
the People” (2.213) who, interestingly, act “as the fence to their properties” (2.222).98   
Simmons comes closest to providing a strong natural right to preservation—one that 
cannot be conventionally infringed on pain of resistance—and this approaches but does not 
constitute the libertarian property ideal. Simmons therefore exposes a flaw in libertarian theory: 
Locke lacks any strong, prescriptive protection of property rights unless they promote survival or 
preservation, and permits wide latitudes for regulation and expropriation if the correct procedures 
are met. Locke’s is therefore a strong due process right, but not a substantive one. Libertarians are 
committed to the latter, so they must turn elsewhere from Locke to find their common ancestor.  
Part 3: Nozick’s Derivation of World-Ownership from Self-Ownership 
This part contains a critique of the moral basis of the right-libertarian theory of property, 
which is represented here by Nozick’s description of the moral equivalence of bodily and external 
property rights. I argue that Nozick makes a series of unwarranted steps when he moves from the 
moral right against physical aggression against the person to the moral right against injury to a 
person’s property.  This unwarranted step is shown to be a category error, based on the assertion 
that rights in bodily integrity and rights in external property are different enough to be subject to 
different degrees of protection. If I am correct, then Nozick’s stated aim of narrowing the 
difference between bodily boundary crossing and external world boundary crossing is 
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unsuccessful. This argument tracks, to a large degree, Kramer’s critique of Locke’s progression 
from a natural right of self-ownership and labor to natural rights in external property.  
 As the paradigmatic example of a property rights libertarian, Robert Nozick’s conception 
of property rights is well known. In addition to his entitlement theory of property rights, Nozick’s 
connection between liberty and property is essentially Kantian: it is wrong to use persons as 
resources for others by forcibly extracting their property from them. If their property is justly 
acquired, then their liberty is also unjustly restrained by extracting their property because, for the 
property rights libertarians, liberty consists in the freedom to dispose of one’s property without 
coercion. Nozick assumes proprietarianism, the view that all enforceable moral rights are moral 
property rights, or rights over things.99  One such right is the right that persons may not physically 
aggress against others: because persons have an inviolable right to bodily integrity, no one may 
aggress against this border or boundary. This is the case because, for Nozick, persons maintain a 
property right in themselves. Nozick: “Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or 
group may do to the them (without violating their rights).”100 As Thomas Nagel observed, this is 
unargued for, and the same can be said for Nozick’s arguments for self-ownership as one of those 
rights.101  
  The self-ownership right extends to rights over external things as well, which Nozick 
identifies as “holdings.”  Because I have the right to bodily integrity in the property of my body, I 
also have the right to integrity in my holdings. Because we own ourselves, it is immoral for others 
to interfere with our personal bodily integrity, and because we own external property, it is 
similarly immoral for others to interfere with that as well. Put another way, he claims that it is 
impermissible to take my property because taking my external property (particularly for purposes 
of redistribution) is equivalent to taking the property that is my body. For example, taxation gives 
“(partial) ownership by others of people and their actions and labor. These principles involve a 
shift from the classic liberals’ notion of self-ownership to a notion of (partial) property rights in 
other people.”102 This is aimed directly at Rawls’s idea that natural talents are a common asset103 
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and therefore unowned by the persons who possess them. So, for Rawls, people possess them but 
do not deserve them and hence do not own them (or, least, do not own them with any kind of 
robust property right) because, for Rawls, you may only own what you deserve.104  Obviously, 
things can be distributed which are not property (such as justice, for one very obvious example). 
Nozick agrees that a person’s “talents and abilities are an asset to a free community”105 and these 
benefits their owners and others; however, they belong to their possessors and taking them 
without consent is a kind of theft. The minimal state that recognizes and protects this type of right 
is, according to Nozick, the only type of justifiable state precisely because of this recognition, and 
any violation of this right to integrity in my holdings crosses the owner’s boundaries and renders 
the state unjustly coercive and ultimately immoral.  Similarly, it is the duty of the state to protect 
and punish persons who violate this right. So, the just state does not cross a property owner’s 
boundaries, and the just state protects my boundaries and prosecutes those who cross them. 
According to Nozick, “[p]olitical philosophy is concerned only with certain ways that 
persons may not use others; primarily, physically aggressing against them.”106  After offering a 
discussion of side constraints and supporting a broadly Kantian notion of respect for persons, 
Nozick claims that such side constraints “express the inviolability of other persons” and also 
“prohibit aggression against another.”107  This side constraint amounts to a right to bodily 
integrity. This right is buttressed by another argument: the doctrine of self-ownership, whereby 
persons possess “property in themselves.”108 Nozick locates the idea of self-ownership in Locke’s 
state of nature, where individuals are in “a state of perfect freedom to order their actions and 
dispose of their possessions and persons as they see fit, within the bounds of the law of nature, 
without asking leave or dependency upon the will of any other man.”109  In fact, as Robert Paul 
Wolff writes, all of the rights in part I of Anarchy, State and Utopia are couched in terms of 
boundary crossings, disadvantages, compensation, and these situations all pertain to property 
rights.110 So—revisting the question posed in chapter 1 in light of the previous discussion of 
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Locke’s property theory—is the right to bodily integrity a legitimate basis on which to build the 
foundation of a right to property?  
Nozick’s answer is fairly simple: because we own ourselves, it is unjust for others to 
interfere with our personal bodily integrity, and because we own external property, it is similarly 
immoral for others to interfere with that as well. Put another way, he claims that it is not morally 
permissible to take my property because taking my external property (particularly for purposes of 
redistribution) is the moral equivalent of violating my bodily integrity.  
Alan Ryan111 locates the libertarian idea of self-ownership in Locke’s account of a 
property in oneself as being merely one of rights and immunities, and, following A. John 
Simmons112, urges us to drop talk of ‘property’ altogether due to its contestable and controversial 
origins.  Ultimately, Ryan argues, only a misreading of Locke leads to the conclusion that 
Lockean property theory entails the type of self-ownership concept advanced by Nozick, and such 
a reading should be discarded in favor of a view of property in one’s person as a type of 
leasehold. Locke founded private property in, for example, land and objects, on each individual’s 
prior possession of “a Property in his own Person.”113 According to this reading, a Lockean 
theory of self-ownership locates private property in one’s own person, which gives rise to 
property in actions, which allows persons to mix their labor with things and results in one’s 
property in their actions beings ‘transferred’ to property in things. This is ‘natural’ and is said to 
exist pre-institutionally. But this is an error, according to both Ryan and Simmons, due to the fact 
that Locke’s conception of property in oneself is religious (God owns us, and we merely lease our 
bodies from Him), and, more importantly, social and not ‘natural.’  It is social in the sense that, in 
our everyday experience, we lack the type of sovereign authority over our selves as well as over 
our external property, which results in the ‘reverse’ of the idealized libertarian picture presented 
by Nozick.114 Ryan argues that this picture is necessary for the libertarian Nozickian’s ultimate 
argument against redistribution of income, but that it is unsupportable.  Here is how Ryan frames 
the argument:  
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First, Nozick argues that if we do not own ourselves, then others must have part 
ownership in us. If others have part ownership in us, then we are partial slaves to others. While 
this might support the general libertarian rejection of so-called victimless crimes, it is not really 
about property: it is about control. So, I might have the right to dye my hair blue, but not because 
I own myself and (by implication) my hair, but because I have the right to control what is on my 
head.115  Second, in order to argue that distributive justice is immoral, Nozick claims that 
(somehow) distributive justice does something to my body: because our bodies are our property, 
we must extend to all property the same ‘tenderness’ we extend to rights of bodily integrity, 
privacy, and noninterference.  This could be expressed in the form of an analogy: I own my body 
in the same sense that I own property in the external world, and hurting my property is as morally 
condemnable as hurting my body.  So, when a part of my property is taken (say, in the form of 
taxes to support the poor), it is the moral equivalent of a pound of flesh.  Ultimately, Ryan argues 
that whatever self-ownership might consist in, it is categorically different than autonomy and 
power of control, and Locke therefore does not provide Nozick with a ‘natural’ bridge from self-
ownership to world-ownership. 
 Even granting that we own our bodies, and that we own our labor and talents,116 a 
violation of our bodily integrity is manifestly different from a violation of whatever external 
things I might be said to possess. In order to make the connection between a property interest in 
our bodies and a property interest in external things, Nozick wants us to think of property 
redistribution as analogous to eyeball redistribution: when a state takes my property and gives it 
to others, it morally the same thing as the state yanking out my eyeball to give to others.117  Both 
forms of redistribution must be condemned with the same moral force, because the same 
argument about my right to my eyes applies to my right to my justly acquired external property.  
However, these are obviously two different types of harms. There is a moral urgency in 
protecting my eyeballs from attack from both a vicious zombie, interested only in their flavor, 
and from a government that wants to implement an eyeball lottery in order to rectify victims of 
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either past zombie/eyeball appropriation or unjust past governmental eyeball-distribution 
programs.  However, absent some rather interesting defeaters,118 appropriating a piece of land or 
other form of external property for the same purpose of implementing distributional justice 
involves a different set of interests, rights, and procedures. 
 For example, human life is at stake when bodily integrity is violated, and the greater the 
violation, the greater the threat of death. Although there are numerous examples showing that 
human life is endangered due to a violation of external property rights (say, a thief steals my iron 
lung, which I need to survive), it is difficult to see how the type of redistribution at issue in 
Nozick’s work affects the property owner with the same sense of violence required for violations 
of bodily rights. In fact, the type of redistribution at issue here (e.g., taxation on wages or perhaps 
capital gains assessments on passive investments in real property) does not involve violence 
whatsoever.  It could be argued that there is violence at some level, particularly in terms of the 
coercive threat of noncompliance. However, the differences between violations of bodily rights 
and property rights can be understood using an example from the Anglo-American common law 
tradition, which prescribes vastly different punishments for the crimes of robbery by force or fear 
on the one hand, and for pick pocketing on the other. Robbery occurs when a victim is directly 
confronted by the perpetrator and threatened with violence in order to force them to turn over 
their money, while pickpocketing occurs when a victim’s property is taken (from their body) 
without their knowledge. Despite the fact that the pickpocket commits a minor act of violence (or, 
more, appropriately for this discussion, an act of boundary crossing) against the person by 
invading their pocket, it is not considered a violent offense due to the victim’s complete lack of 
knowledge or fear, and because no force (as defined in legal or common-sense terminology) was 
used in the theft. As a result, punishment for pick pocketing is minimal, while robbery is typically 
an offense punishable by a term in state prison. In either case, the same property might be 
appropriated, but because of the lack of violence against the person in the pickpocket example, 
the crimes are categorized and punishment quite differently. This is because it the threat of 
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violence to the body is considered a far more serious moral transgression, and it is therefore 
categorized and punished quite differently. Such a distinction is not irrational.  
 Furthermore, it seems axiomatic that life is consistently more highly valued than 
property. In the above example, the thief might make the following offer: your money or your 
life.  It is reasonable to assume that when faced with this option, most people choose to hand over 
their property because persons tend to value bodily integrity more than property on the grounds 
that property tends to be fungible and replaceable, whereas life and bodily integrity are not. 
Therefore, if Nozick’s argument depends on the position that human beings value property rights 
as strongly as bodily rights, he is probably appealing to a minority of human beings whose 
interests in property rights are beyond the pale of the values of those who value life above 
property.  
 This simple taxonomy of value determination, which extends gradually from a right to 
bodily integrity, to a right to one’s labors and talents, and then finally to a right to own external 
property, is reflected in both Locke’s graduated theory of property ownership as well as Nozick’s 
version of the labor theory.119 However, Nozick denies the primary right to bodily integrity when 
he conflates aggression/boundary crossing of persons with aggression/boundary crossing of 
land/copyright/things because there is a significant moral difference between a state protecting 
life and liberty, on the one hand, and protecting property on the other. If this is correct, then an 
obvious question arises: why would he make such a mistake? Recall that Nozick believes that 
political philosophy, and not merely moral theory, is primarily concerned with ways persons may 
not use others: persons use others in the most egregious sense when they are “physically 
aggressing against them.”120 This amounts to a side constraint that expresses the inviolability of 
other persons. Because each person enjoys the benefits of this side constraint in the form of a 
right to bodily integrity, no one may physically aggress against your boundary because you are a 
separate person.121  This constitutes the line or “hyper plane” around the moral space of the 
individual, and the body is the boundary that must not be crossed.122 At this point, it is difficult to 
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see how this discussion concerns political philosophy at all: rather, it is the familiar second 
formulation of the Kantian categorical imperative and a bedrock of moral philosophy: “Act in 
such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any 
other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.”123 Nozick’s error lies both 
in his application of the imperative to external property when it should be limited to persons (as 
Kant makes clear), and in his application of a moral rule prohibiting physical aggression persons 
to a political stance regarding distributive justice. Self-ownership cannot provide the bridge from 
bodily rights to world-ownership rights; this is best achieved, as I argue in the conclusion to this 
chapter, through the use of privacy as a justification for both bodily rights and private property 
rights. It is privacy that best describes the interests persons have in their bodily integrity, and it is 
the ability of private property to contain this interest that forms the connection between persons 
and external property and makes external property worth protecting.  
Section 2. Left-Libertarianism and World Ownership 
This section discusses how left-libertarians approach self-ownership and its implications for 
world-ownership. Left-libertarianism recognizes proprietarianism’s call for strong self ownership 
rights in the body and the immediate uses of it, but argues that as a thing becomes more remote 
from the body and the labor used to produce it, the right of ownership becomes less powerful, 
culminating in the conceptually unowned natural world. At this end of the ownership spectrum, 
there is no such thing as private property in natural resources because there can be nothing private 
about oil, coal, diamonds, or iron. Similar arguments can be made about large corporate property, 
capital, and investments.  Therefore, the left-libertarians would justify the protection of private 
property insofar as it is truly reflective of self-ownership and effort, but facilitate the forcible 
expropriation private property that creates a ‘parasitic’124 relationship between the owner’s right 
to increase and the exploitation of unearned natural resources such as oil, coal, water, and 
minerals. This has fatal results for many kinds of private property, but particularly so for private 
property rights in subsurface things and places.  
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The primary cleavage with right-libertarians occurs not on the issue of self-ownership, 
but with the ownership of natural resources: while right-libertarianism attempt to establish 
ownership of the world as a logical entailment of self-ownership, left libertarians argue that 
“natural resources are owned in some egalitarian manner.”125 
The biggest threat to the egalitarianism of the left-libertarians is the clever temerity of 
Nozick’s Wilt Chamberlain example and its implications for self-ownership. If self-ownership is 
a natural fact, then some selves will do things that either advance their welfare (if they are 
talented) or inhibit it (if they are disabled or otherwise lack whatever talents are valued in that 
society). If it advances, then self-ownership implies a right to the fruits of that ownership in the 
form of wealth, and if it inhibits it, then the talented ought to be required to compensate the less 
talented because no one deserves random good or back luck. Egalitarians wrestle with self-
ownership because self-ownership implies ownership of one’s talent, and talent-ownership can 
rapidly upset egalitarian patterns and justify coercion (or, as Nozick puts it, “tyranny.”)126   
According to Peter Vallentyne, “left-libertarianism endorses full self-ownership,” but 
permits the private appropriation of natural resources only “with the permission of, or with a 
significant payment to, the members of a society.” Like right-libertarianism, Vallentyne writes, 
left-libertarians are proprietarians, in that the basic rights of individuals are ownership rights.127 
Hillel Steiner concurs: rights are possessed, and all rights are property rights.128 To that extent, 
Steiner approvingly quotes H.L.A. Hart: “[r]ights are typically conceived of as possessed or 
owned or belonging to individuals, and these expressions reflect the conception of moral rules as 
not only prescribing conduct but as forming a kind of moral property of individuals to which they 
are as individuals entitled.”129 According to Michael Otsuka, it is “uncontroversial” to claim that 
both that the right of self-ownership and the “injustice of murder, mayhem, or involuntary 
servitude” (i.e. the duty not to harm) are natural rather than conventional. This is because these 
rights and duties are not dependent upon laws or institutions, social conventions, or consensual 
agreement.130 
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Steiner also approvingly quotes Leveller Richard Overton for the idea not only that  “we 
must each be self-owners,”131 but that self-ownership is a natural right:  
To every individual in nature is given an individual property by nature not to be invaded 
or usurped by any. For every one, as he is himself, so he has a self-propriety, else could 
he not be himself; and of this no second may presume to deprive any of without manifest 
violation and affront to the very principles of nature and of the rules of equity and justice 
between man and man. Mine and thine cannot be, except this be.132 
 
For Steiner, self-ownership leads to unencumbered titles for things produced from one’s 
own things (see Michael Otsuka’s hair sweater, infra) but it cannot lead to the same outcome with 
unowned things. Initially unowned things can only be ownable by everyone: “our equal original 
property rights entitle us to equal bundles of (initially unowned) things.”133 The Lockean proviso 
only entitles us to mix our liberty so as to leave enough and as good for others. Therefore, Steiner 
concludes, we are each “entitled to an equal share of (at least) raw natural resources.”134 Were we 
to mix our labor with more than our share, we would relinquish our title to that labor. “Self 
ownership” and the “fruits of our labor,” Steiner concludes, are sufficient bases for “creating 
unencumbered titles both to things produced solely from self-owned things and to things 
produced from this equal portion of unowned things.”135  
Otsuka agrees that we own ourselves and own the products of our labor, but do not have a 
right to the value of things created by other people or, for that matter, by nature, which add to our 
labor. This leaves an absolute property right that is as strong as the self-ownership right in very 
few and limited objects, such as a sweater created from one’s own body hair using solely one’s 
own labor. By distributing non-hair resources in an egalitarian manner, exchanges would be truly 
voluntary and not require forced exchanges (e.g. taxes) or encroachments upon the robust 
libertarian right of self-ownership.136  To this end, it is possible to “distribute initially unowned 
world resources so as to achieve equality of opportunity for welfare in a manner that is 
compatible with each person’s possession of an uninfringed libertarian right of self ownership 
that is robust rather than merely formal.”137 This allows disabled persons the opportunity to 
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acquire enough worldly resources to better themselves by investing those resources to the same 
degree as able-bodied persons.  
Gijs van Donselaar, in expanding on the Lockean idea of property and the importance of 
the Lockean Proviso, similarly claims that we only have property rights in the things we produce, 
but we do not produce natural resources such as water or oil or gold.138 For van Donselaar, private 
endowments in terms of unrestricted property rights are inconsistent with the Lockean proviso, 
which is interpreted here as a restriction upon property rights that coerce others into buying 
privately owned goods.139 
Echoing Proudhon, van Donselaar argues that one’s true possessions (talents, capabilities, 
and so forth) cannot create land or coal, so ownership of the produce of land, such as wheat, is 
conceptually different than ownership of what is underneath it. Expropriation would be justified 
so that those who are most willing and possess the highest ability to exploit resources in the 
cheapest possible way are also those who should have the rights to control them.140 Van 
Donselaar calls these “evanescent rights,” which are rights to control productive property based 
on skill and efficiency and not upon first acquisition or even title.141 Otherwise, making others 
worse off by coercing them to buy from the person who happens to be in control of resources—
the owner, first appropriator, or inheritor of surface or mining rights—makes that owner a 
parasite. Parasitism, or exploitation, occurs when in virtue of a property rights relation between A 
and B, “A is worse off than she would have been had B not existed or if she would have had 
nothing to do with him, while B is better off than he would have been without A, or having 
nothing to do with her, or vice versa.”142 These kinds of situations arise when, according to Matt 
Zwolinski, a party “sells a right in which it has no independent interest”—no interest, that is, 
other than the interest in profiting from the sale of the right.143  The proviso, therefore, “can never 
allow the establishment of exclusive rights in external objects. People’s holdings in natural 
resources are always liable to adjustments in light of the justice of economic outcomes.”144 
Implemented in the way Van Donselaar describes, the proviso can bring about more efficient 
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“and hence more just […] distributions of external endowments” including collective 
ownership.145 
John Christman and James Grunebaum develop their property theories around the 
importance of individual autonomy and self-ownership, which, they argue, cannot be the basis for 
income or resource ownership.  Christman argues that there is a natural right to use and possess 
many things, but no natural right to the income from any thing.  He provides an extended 
argument that frames ownership in terms of two sets of rights. The first set, in which ownership is 
framed as control, protects autonomy interests; the second protects income interests, and is 
framed as the right to income from the trade or rent of a property.146 The income right is the right 
to exchange goods and to retain all goods received from others in such exchanges. Like the other 
left-libertarians, Christman argues for strong control rights in the individual but weak or 
nonexistent income rights.  These rights, he argues, should vest in the community.  
For Christman, the right of self-ownership, as well as the right over one’s labor, are 
natural rights, and natural rights are not contingent upon the state or other enforcement 
mechanisms.147 A right is a natural right if its possession is justified only with reference to a 
certain set of natural attributes of persons, and without reference to social conventions, legal 
institutions or other institutional relationships within or among groups of persons.148 Adapting 
Hart’s well-known definition of natural right, this right is limited to freedom or liberty, because 
those cannot be created or conferred by men’s voluntary action. Hart: “they have the right qua 
men and not only if they are members of some society or stand in certain relations to one another; 
it’s not created or conferred by men’s voluntary action.”149 
Locke, Christman argues, does not establish a natural right to income from property; his 
natural property right only establishes the right to use, possess, and manage property.150 So, 
Christman argues, because the right to income is conventional, and because the use of money is 
conventional, the natural rights argument fails. Similarly, the  right to stored goods in terms of 
money is conventional, while the natural right to one’s labor only justifies working on land in 
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state of nature, and that is not how property law is regulated in the modern state. Therefore, the 
attempt to extend those natural rights to use and possess to a natural right to income fails because 
the state is “always present as an enforcement mechanism for the property rights that people have 
over their possessions;” its presence is “always manifested in any economic organization.”151 This 
presence is felt mostly as the plentiful restrictions upon an owners’ use and transfer of goods, 
including OSHA, zoning, taxes, and so forth.152 If the state determines that whatever possessory 
rights a person has does not include a right to income, then that person’s liberty is not violated.153 
The right to acquire and accumulate goods must be established by other means before claiming 
that right to liberty includes the right to acquire things.154 Furthermore, although the opportunity 
to engage in market exchanges, which involve choosing and deciding among options, is important 
because it allows one to feel like their life is under control, income rights are not essential for 
this.155 
Locke’s ‘tacit consent’ of inequality arises when the convention of money permits the 
conventional right to enlarge possessions. This is also where Locke acknowledges that 
conventional rights are subject to restriction for the common good. 156  Although external 
properties are instruments of our agency as much as our bodies are instruments of our agency, 
Locke—and Christman—interpret this to be no more that the right to use and possess.157 
Like many of theorists in my study, Christman is critical of the way law and economics 
have come to dominate law, and property law in particular, such that a concern for productivity, 
for example, become an indirect justification for powerful income rights.  The productivity 
argument goes like this: a state should adopt the property structure that best achieves its 
distributive and productivity goals. Liberal ownership does this, so states should promote liberal 
ownership. The value of liberty in this line of reasoning has been, according to Christman, “thrust 
into the shadows.”158 However, he argues, if the liberal ownership right to income is more 
productive, then its proponents have to show that productivity also produces more liberty, and 
that productivity (i.e. a larger stock of privately held commodities) is distributed in a way that 
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increases overall liberty as well.159 If people as owners have rights to trade goods and keep 
income in a world of unequally talented people and differential access to new goods, then people 
will enjoy different amounts of freedom.160 Since liberal ownership in a market economy will 
inevitably result in great inequalities of income and wealth and therefore great inequalities of 
freedom, then the disvalue of these inequalities would justify favoring an alternative distribution 
based on a different ownership structure that serves to reduce such inequalities.161  
Here, then, is Christman’s task: he wants to show how restricted ownership leads to more 
freedom, and that the state does not disrespect anyone’s rights if it maintains a property system 
that does not grant full liberal ownership and a right to income.162 Rights of, for example, 
investors cannot be disrespected by denying them income from investments because investors do 
not ‘deserve’ profits based on, for example, weird, lucky, random or unpredictable market 
phenomena. No one morally deserves entrepreneurial profit or income based on luck, so the 
winning of profits, like rewards based on talents and dispositions, are not deserved.163   
At this point, Christman takes on a distinctly familiar Rawlsian contour: even one’s 
character (which gives one the ‘edge’ to be a skillful entrepreneur) depends on fortunate family 
and social circumstances which, Christman claims, one cannot claim credit for and cannot profit 
thereof. So the entrepreneur, who somehow finds the niche in the market that leads to sales and 
an economic surplus, either earns that niche by luck or character, neither of which she 
deserves.164 Profit is not simply risk or innovation: it is the result of resource availability, 
information, lack of credit opportunities, and transaction costs, none of which are created by the 
entrepreneur who profits (directly or indirectly) from these factors, and neither are they the 
beneficial outcomes of their efforts.165 
Christman concludes that “private liberal ownership should be rejected as the general 
pattern of property rights in a society,”166 and replaced by the creation of a regime of control 
rights over the self with no corresponding individual right to income. The distinction between 
control and income ownership solves two of the ‘problems’ of self-ownership.  The first problem 
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is equality and the second is autonomy. Equality becomes coextensive with self-ownership 
because self-ownership is just control ownership, and control ownership does not entail wide 
disparities in income because it does not entail desert for unearned profits.167 Autonomy, for 
Christman, requires the kind of extensive control over oneself that is only possible through self-
ownership, which is a “powerful way of expressing the principle of individual liberty,” or 
autonomy.168 Autonomy consists of control over general aspects of the material conditions of 
one’s life, including social arrangements, leisure, or employment. Autonomy in these areas is met 
by control rights.169 But “minimal autonomy requires more predictability than the market can 
provide,”170 and minimum autonomy therefore requires basic housing, education, and medical 
services. 171  The state must therefore provide “whatever resources are necessary for the 
establishment of minimal autonomy.”172  This is provided by redistributing income through 
market socialism, where firm management, labor markets, and production is determined by 
familiar market mechanisms and where income and profit is generated in traditional ways, but 
where the state “will have the claim to direct all income from those ventures,” meaning that “all 
profit generated by the firms…is collected by the state…[and] distributed equally to citizens as a 
‘social dividend.’” This is “workable” because there are no individuals who have “private income 
rights to the profits of firms”, but “private individuals retain control rights.”173 Curtailing the 
income rights of “some, through taxation and other measures, in order to redistribute resources, 
control over which is necessary to secure autonomy for others, is required by justice.”174  
To summarize: self-ownership extends to control access to body and labor but not to the 
right to income from trade of these things.175 Preventing persons from reaping benefits does not 
ipso facto prevent them from controlling their lives.176  
Like Christman, James Grunebaum proposes a “new theory of ownership,”177  
autonomous ownership, which also divides property into two domains: 1) self and labor, and 2) 
land and resources. Property in the self/labor is incompatible with social or communal ownership 
which views these as no different than any other property (such as land or machinery). This is 
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what Grunebaum calls “real private ownership.” Property in land and resources is incompatible 
with real private ownership of land and resources, or wherever everyone cannot participate. So 
autonomous ownership excludes private ownership of land/resources as well as social ownership 
of self/labor.178 
Because land and resources are independent of human labor, rights over land and 
resources vest in all members of the community.179 Grunebaum’s point is that body/labor is 
categorically different than land/resources, and that very different rules ought to apply for these 
different cases.  
As mentioned in the discussion of Christman, supra, Rawls’ work has proven to be a 
strong influence on the left-libertarian idea that self-ownership rights do not entail income or 
world property rights. This is due, in part, to Rawls’s conception of self-ownership. Rawls has 
what Grunebaum calls a “composite” understanding of self-ownership, where selves own part of 
themselves, and  “at least a part of oneself, i.e., one’s share of the distribution of natural talents or 
abilities, is not privately but collectively or communally owned.” This is true not only for 
inherited traits, but those skills and talents gained through effort.  For Rawls, the real owner of 
these properties is the community or nation.180 Grunebaum: “the difference principle implies that 
possessors of natural talents have no special rights to the income their talents may earn in an 
economic system. Rights over the income from natural talents vest in all members of the 
community.”181 Grunebaum also suggests that, for consistency, Rawls should support communal 
ownership of land and resources for the same reason he supports communal ownership of talents 
and abilities: ownership of land and resources is the result of “social contingency and natural 
fortune on distributive shares,”182 and should therefore be subject to the same communal claims 
as natural talents and abilities.183  
Rawls does not appear to express much preference in terms of private or public 
ownership of, for example, the means of production,184 although he is clear that the right to own 
such means is not basic and therefore “not protected by the priority of the first principle” of 
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justice.185 Such ownership would be decided, according to Samuel Freeman, by the difference 
principle.186 However, he clearly supports both “the right to hold personal property and freedom 
from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defend by the concept of the rule of law.”187 This basic liberty 
to hold personal property – with, again, no mention of private property – is repeated in Political 
Liberalism, alongside Rawls’ rejection of “wider property rights” involving ownership of or the 
right to control the means of production and natural resources.188   
That being said, it is my position that Christman and Grunebaum are correct about the 
weaknesses of the justification of world ownership based on consideration of self-ownership;189 
however, there are several problems with their account. One of the key objections by left-
libertarians to private world ownership is the idea that all first appropriations are illegitimate: 
there is no such thing as a legitimate or just first appropriation that does not run afoul of either the 
Lockean proviso, some other principle of justice, or ideas about group ownership. In response to 
this objection, Edward Feser argues that there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition, and 
that this kind of objection is subject to at least two counter-objections.  First, Feser argues that 
like all possessors, first acquirers must do something to make something their own, and by doing 
something, there is more reason to give that person more rights over the thing than someone who 
does nothing. Most people in the world have done nothing in regards to unacquired property, and 
therefore have no ‘natural’ or implied interest in it. 190  This seems true for all kinds of 
ownership—even over selves—with the result that there is an action requirement that is missing 
in left-libertarian communal ownership theories. Even if property is a gift, the recipient must 
accept it. If Stan leaves a pile of manure on Ollie’s lawn, it does not magically become Stan’s 
property. However, if Stan rakes it and sells it, he has through his labor acted in such a way that 
gives him a better justification to benefit from it than someone who has done nothing.191 
 Feser’s second point in his defense of Lockean first acquisition theory is that the theory 
requires that the object of the first acquisition be unowned. Because it is unowned, no one has any 
rights to it, including ‘everyone’ as a common owner.192 Ryan concurs on this issue: Locke’s 
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conception of mankind as ‘joint owners’ does not mean the same as a modern joint owner, who 
must seek consent or approval from other owners. Rather, property in Locke’s state of nature 
exists in a “no-owner condition” and consent is not required prior to individual acts of 
appropriation.193 Even if the property were commonly owned, “then for this very reason they do 
not start out unowned, in which case there is no initial acquisition of any sort to speak of, unjust 
or otherwise.”194 However, if the property were commonly owned “from the start” and not due to 
some transfer to the group, then the group’s initial acquisition would need justification as well, 
and this justification is surprising difficult to provide. As Nozick observes,  
[w]e should note that it is not only persons favoring private property who need a theory 
of how property rights legitimately originate. Those believing in collective property, for 
example those believing that a group of persons living in an area jointly own the territory, 
or its mineral resources, also must provide a theory of how such property rights arise; 
they must show why persons living there have rights to determine what is done with the 
land and resources there that persons living elsewhere don’t have (with regard to the 
same land and resources).195  
 
Christman and Grunebaum also have a problem with what might be called the fact of 
income. We can assume that body ownership cannot be extended to a natural right of income 
ownership (Christman) or land/resource ownership (Grunebaum), but surely some persons will 
engage in this type of behavior resulting in the fact of income through the consenting acts of 
adults.196 The use of coercion to deny this kind of behavior in order to prevent the fact of income 
would require a variety of control over those very persons, which results in a clear abridgment of 
their autonomy. If persons do not have the right to income from their labor or property (even at 
relatively modest levels) then, for Christman and Grunebaum, no violation of any natural right to 
liberty or autonomy occurs when they are coercively deprived of that income. Autonomous 
persons, I believe, must be permitted to engage in these kinds of behaviors.  If there is no right to 
income, then seizure of property and punishment of persons is unproblematic when they generate 
income from labor or property. This strikes me as obviously incorrect.   
 There is at least one suggestion how communal rights over worldly resources provide for 
autonomy. Otsuka suggests that the self-ownership right is robust if and only if one has enough 
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rights over worldly resources to ensure they are not forced by necessity to assist others and 
sacrifice themselves. Self-ownership does not amount to much if persons have to constantly help 
others or sacrifice themselves because of others’ needs. An egalitarian distribution of the world’s 
goods relieves individuals from having to satisfy each other’s needs; persons are freer by having 
less world ownership rights.197 By giving each person a fair share of world resources measured in 
terms of equality of opportunity for welfare, Otsuka argues, no one is forced to come to anyone’s 
assistance.198  
 The left-libertarian argument for equal ownership over world resources is a weak one, 
but, interestingly, a stream in current American property jurisprudence in terms of subsurface 
property rights corresponds both with left libertarian property theory as well as the privacy theory 
of property argued for in this work.  The next section shows how the privacy theory of property 
cannot ‘reach’ certain places, so that private ownership over them enjoys less protection than 
other kinds of places.  
Section 3. Legal Limits on Resource Ownership 
In this section, I show how American property jurisprudence corresponds with property 
theory in regards to subsurface ownership rights. This is achieved by showing how American 
property law exhibits a lacunae in the connection between ownership of surface land and 
ownership ‘to hell below,’ a lacunae which suggests that private property rights at significant 
depths below the earth’s surface are unlikely if they are predicated on private property rights on 
the surface. Recall that we seek to justify private property based on a thing’s ability to objectify 
one’s privacy interests. If property cannot be a repository for privacy, it presumably cannot be 
private property. Therefore, a conception of property based on privacy interests has several 
important implications for private property and the literal and figurative ‘depth’ of ownership. It 
is figurative or metaphoric because the depth of a right determines its power and importance. 
Taken literally, the depth of a private right in property measures how far beneath the surface the 
right extends.  As a property is less capable of reflecting or embodying the privacy interests of an 
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owner, that property is similarly less capable of being possessed and respected as private 
property.  As should be clear by now, private interests are scalar—there are different degrees of 
privacy opportunities in things, starting with bodies and moving outwards—and depend to a large 
degree on the nature of the thing itself: bodies justify the highest degree of privacy due to the 
naturally private facts of thoughts and body processes, but things that are radically removed from 
bodies in a variety of senses are less capable of being repositories of personhood and ipso facto 
less deserving of the protections afforded by the right to exclude and the duty not to interfere.    
In terms of the physical depth of the property right, it is probably impossible to assert a 
privacy interest in inaccessible items located deep within the earth. This is also true for other 
things like the moon, most if not all parts of the atmosphere we depend upon to live, and various 
parts of the ocean and seafloor. Technological advancements will probably change property 
claims in places that are either inaccessible today or so remote as to be practically inaccessible. 
However, in a privacy-based conception of property rights, accessibility is not the key factor in 
determining property rights: the key factor is whether privacy claims can be made about the 
property, and underground property—whose nature, features, value, characteristics are unknown 
and, in many cases, unknowable—is therefore a good candidate for the left-libertarian’s attempt 
to disqualify some natural resources from private ownership without disqualifying all of them.  
Of course, rights in subsurface property ought to be recognized and protected like any 
other rights by exclusion claims and the nonowner’s duty not to interfere if an owner can show a 
privacy interests in the property. Subterranean dwellers, residing in underground homes, would 
certainly qualify for powerful rights in their homes as much as above-ground dwellers. By 
extension, homes located in high rise buildings, floating on the sea (or even underwater), in trees, 
cliffs and caves, or suspended in the air also qualify for protection, all of which suggest 
interesting implications for privacy rights in future homes beyond the Earth’s atmosphere.  
But what about subsurface resources? They are truly ‘found’ resources and critically 
different in kind from all other types of resources including human labor, talents, crops, 
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developed or undeveloped surface lands, and the like. These resources include water, minerals 
(salt, of course, or the calcite used in antacids), graphite, rocks and gravel, as well as ores 
containing metals including gold, silver, and iron, clay, various gases and geothermal heat, and of 
course, petroleum. In this section, I will suggest that subsurface property resources can be 
jurisprudentially redescribed in order to become res nullius, or unowned things. Because current 
owners lack a privacy interest in this kind of property, it cannot be said that expropriation of these 
things constitutes a violation of their private property rights. The depths of a property right would 
therefore correspond directly to the depth of the privacy interest. How far might this interest 
extend? 
John Sprankling shows that a surface owner’s title does not extend as deep as the 
Western common law tradition has suggested. According to Sprankling, the legal maxim Cuius 
est solum, eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos, or, simply, the ad coelum principle, meaning 
'whoever owns [the] soil, [it] is theirs all the way [up] to Heaven and [down] to Hell,’ is dead. If 
rights extended to the center of the earth, each landowner in the United States also owns a 
“slender column of rock, soil, and other matter stretching downward over 3900 miles from the 
surface to a theoretical point in the middle of the earth.”199  This property forms the ad inferos 
part of the ad coelum doctrine. Beginning in the 1930s, U.S. Supreme Court rulings began 
dismantling the heaven-oriented part of the ad coelum doctrine. In those rulings, rights in airspace 
that are delineated by the boundaries of one’s land disintegrated with the introduction of 
technological inventions such as airplanes and radio waves, which meant that owners could not 
assert property rights that would prevent other persons from entering the column of air that 
extends upwards from a person’s land. So if ad coelum is dead, why isn’t ad inferos?  
According to Sprankling, ad inferos is an unfounded poetic hyperbole, invented by 
English jurist William Blackstone in the 18th century,200 and it is dead because it has never been 
binding law in the United States in the first place.201 No appellate court opinion has ever 
considered whether an owner has rights down to the earth’s core.202 Real law—the case law that 
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formed the English and then American common law—uniformly supports a property owner’s 
rights down to approximately 100 feet from the surface, but beyond this point there is wide 
inconsistency.  “Broadly speaking, the deeper the disputed region, the less likely courts are to rely 
on the center of the earth theory.”203  So, assuming that surface owners have legally or morally 
powerful claims to own subsurface resources as they would to ownership of surface resources 
such as trees or agriculture, what should (quite literally) be the depth of their claims?  
Using what is known about the make up of the earth’s crust, Sprankling shows that the 
interior of the earth is, like a liquid, constantly moving––which suggests that beyond the crust 
there is no identifiable res, or thing, to own. Furthermore, subsurface property rights have been 
defined to protect owners from invasions to portions of land that they actually use, and few 
landowners, even if they are miners or other types of exploiters, dwell beyond 1000 feet or so. 
Sprankling preliminarily concludes that a new model of subsurface ownership should consider the 
boundary to end at 1,000 feet, with an exception for mineral rights,204 based on the claim that 
property owners would find this reasonably within their expected property rights, and because, 
like air rights, the property that lies ad inferos is in the actual possession of no one.205 Therefore, 
private property simply does not extend very far into the earth, and public ownership is therefore 
appropriate.206 The types of economically productive resources that exist within and beyond this 
thousand feet boundary of private ownership include groundwater, oil and gas reserves, hard rock 
minerals (including gold and silver), objects and properties embedded in the soil (including 
potentials for heat mining), and opportunities, such as carbon sequestration, for waste disposal.207  
Due to the nature of the earth’s landmass, this analysis shows that many subsurface 
properties cannot possibly stand in any privacy relationship to its putative owner. Unlike the 
relationship between a farmer and their land, which can indeed nurture a privacy relationship, a 
miner or mine owner does not ‘farm’ or nurture their property. The farmer returns to the land 
each year to coax out a crop, while the miner visits a productive vein of ore just once or at least 
until the resource is permanently depleted. It is difficult to see how an owner of any surface 
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property can generate privacy interests in unknown or found objects deep below that property, 
and to the extent that a privacy interest cannot be asserted over a piece of property, that property 
cannot be said to be ‘private.’ Property rights would, however, extend as far down as a person 
could maintain they have a privacy interest. If there is no privacy interest, then there is no private 
property. Considered in this way, the left libertarians might gain support for their attempts to 
show that natural resources (at least those located deep within the earth) are incapable of being 
privately owned.   
Consider the difference between a well that draws water for domestic use, and an oil 
well. Both draw resources from the ground, and ownership rights over the water and the oil are 
determined by ownership rights on the surface. However, the property owner’s privacy interest in 
the well water is significantly different than the oil owner’s interest. The water well owner would 
enjoy, under my theory, strong property rights in this resource due to its connection to privacy—it 
nurtures the home, it is necessary for a variety of human capabilities, and so forth—but the oil 
well owner would not enjoy such strong rights, particularly in proportion to the depth of the well. 
In fact, the water well owner’s rights would also diminish in proportion to the depth of the well, 
giving others—neighbors, perhaps—the right to use water found at deeper depths.  
Therefore, many of the same objectives of left-libertarian property theory in the direction 
of non-private ownership of natural resources may already be present in American property 
jurisprudence. I am not claiming that the state or community thereby gains property rights in 
those interests. I am claiming, however, that the privacy argument fails—surface owners have no 
privacy claims to this kind of property—and that incursions or interferences with this kind of 
property are not prima facie unjust or violations of the right to exclude or the duty not to 
interfere. In other words, there is no right to exclude in terms of property a mile (or wherever the 
point may lie) below the surface of private property, and neither the self-ownership justification 
nor the privacy justification will prevent incursions. However, there may be other private and 
communal claims to subsurface property, and those claims are explored in chapter 5.  
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Section 4. The Right Libertarians  
In this final section, I show how the right-libertarian approach to property rights provides 
one of the best protection of private property rights by proposing a takings jurisprudence that 
attempts to restructure takings law by broadening the definition of what constitutes a taking based 
upon a reappraisal of the state’s duty to provide just compensation. This approach is framed by 
Richard Epstein and David Schmidtz. 
Richard Epstein is considered one the most influential right-libertarian property theorists. 
Epstein is primarily concerned with forced property exchanges between individual owners and 
the state. Unlike Nozick, who would presumably oppose all takings because the structures 
necessary for the minimal state are financed only by taxation,208 and because takings (at least in 
the United States) are not typically intended to rectify past injustices,209 Epstein argues that 
“[w]ithout forced exchanges, social order cannot be achieved, given the holdout and free rider 
problem.”210  
Because, Epstein writes, there is no real consent among citizens in modern states, then 
payment for forced exchanges attempts to account for both the monopoly of violence and the 
preservation of liberty and property; the bulwark, or protection of property against the state, is 
located in the form of compensation for forced exchanges. So, although Locke says there must be 
‘consent’ to take property, he does not really mean it; for Epstein, the ‘consent’ requirement is 
rewritten to provide that property may be taken upon provision of just compensation.211 Locke’s 
move from the state of nature to civil society now incorporates two elements of the eminent 
domain equation: 
1. individuals give up the right to use force in civil society, but their property is protected; 
and  
2. because there is no consent, there is no social contract as such, but forced exchanges are 
permitted which leave everyone better off.  
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So, according to Epstein, although Locke does not formally analyze the concept, the public use 
language of the takings clause is consistent with Locke’s general conception of the rights of the 
state over property because the power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public good 
or use. Epstein, therefore, supports the use of eminent domain for the public good, but, as we 
shall see, his conception of what constitutes the exercise of compensable takings is incredibly 
broad. This conception is an attempt to curb the use of eminent domain, which produces a 
powerful disincentive for states to take property. The result, for Epstein, is a property right in, 
presumably, all kind of ownable things including natural resources, that is strengthened by the 
takings clause against the very use of power it purports to authorize.  
For Epstein, the eminent domain clause is a specific protection for individuals against the 
state.212 It builds upon the right of self-ownership in order to claim property rights against the 
state as a bulwark. The eminent domain clause in particular commands courts to strike down 
legislation where property is taken but just compensation is not paid.213 However, these kinds of 
forced exchanges under the Fifth Amendment are characterized by three potential sources of 
conflict and abuse. The first involves state coercion, the second requires the payment of 
compensation, and the third examines the situation where the takings power “removes the 
property owner from the community altogether.”214  
 In terms of coercion, takings cases typically first involve the state as a market participant. 
If the state needs land, it offers to buy it. Epstein notes that a voluntary exchange is usually 
preferable to coercion, but frequently this approach fails. For example, many takings cases 
involve multiple landowners, any one of which could stand her ground as a ‘holdout’ and stop a 
major redevelopment project by demanding an exorbitant price for her property. Epstein claims 
that a takings regime has as its “raison d’être the elimination of the holdout position.”215 
Reluctant property owners are then forced to “take a price that is greater than he would have 
gotten through condemnation (net of expenses) but lower than he would have taken in voluntary 
exchange.”216  
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 Epstein’s solution to the problem of takings is simple: any and all zonings and regulations 
are compensable takings,217 including the types of ‘partial takings’ which merely restrict a 
property owner’s right to exploit the full economic value of their property.  The removal of any 
stick in the bundle constitutes a compensable taking.218  For Epstein, “any state mandated 
alteration of contractual rights,” such as debt relief legislation, “constitutes a partial takings of 
private property.”219 “All regulations, taxes and modifications of liability are takings of private 
property prima facie compensable by the state,”220 and taxation is prima facie a takings.221 For 
Epstein, the question is not ‘what remains’—which is the question many judges ask in takings 
contests—but ‘what was taken’?222  
Because the state must compensate for these actions, it would quickly bankrupt itself—
but only if it insists on continuing its regulatory policies. Obviously, compensation would come 
from taxes, and as a result all of these partial takings cases take government money and give it to 
private owners.223 A powerful property right, for Epstein, therefore serves as a warning to the 
government to restrict its ambitions in terms of legislation, zoning, and regulation, the result 
being a nearly absolute property right due to the demand for compensation by the state for its 
violation.  For Epstein and the libertarians who support this line of reasoning, the gamble is that 
the state actually throws down the gauntlet and begins wholesale expropriations for the public 
good with compensation.224 In such a case, Epstein would have little to complain about.  
The final conflict outlined by Epstein is the forced removal of the property owner from 
the community. At the most extreme end of takings litigation, persons refusing to leave their 
property are forcibly removed after the state has successfully condemned it.  This is, as a final 
step in the eminent domain process, the most flagrant violation of one’s privacy, and the most 
extreme example and outcome of how eminent domain violates privacy.225  
 Property rights libertarians and other conservatives tend to support the kind of formalist 
approach advocated by Epstein. They are particularly fond of court rulings which establish ‘per 
se’ guidelines in terms of takings. For example, when states permanently intrude on property and 
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completely negate the right to exclude, the courts do not engage in any balancing or public use 
discussion because permanent intrusion is a per se taking.226 As stated by the court in Loretto 
“there is no greater assault on private property rights than permanent physical invasion by 
government.”227 Libertarians would also support the type of “unconstitutional conditions” created 
by the requirement of exactions (the conditioning of a building permit upon dedications of private 
land to the public) which raise judicial oversight to a heightened level of scrutiny. These per se 
conditions constitute Epstein’s “second best assault on the modern regulatory state,”228 the first 
being the framing of all regulations as takings.  
David Schmidtz, another right libertarian, interprets the Lockean proviso in order to 
justify first-acquisition rights over unowned property and natural resources in terms of the 
removal of resources from the “common stock.” 229  Locke writes “[l]abour being the 
unquestionable Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right to what is once joyned 
to, at least where there is enough, and as good, left in common for others.” For Schmidtz, no 
single act of initial appropriation can satisfy the proviso: whenever any item is taken out of the 
common stock, there is an automatic violation of the proviso because there is necessarily not 
enough nor as good left for others.230  The proviso renders defective all individual and group 
acquisitions by its very terms.231 But, instead of conceding to the left-libertarians that the proviso 
entails continued communal ownership and ignoring it, Schmidtz adopts Nozick’s suggestion that 
at least some kind of proviso is necessary, and this modified proviso requires potential 
acquisitioners to take into consideration what their appropriation does to others.232  
 This calls back into play Locke’s stipulations about usefulness and preservation. Contrary 
to the idea that every acquisition worsens everyone else, Schmidtz argues that a proviso-ish rule 
might require taking goods from commons in order to prevent the tragedy of spoliation or 
destruction. One of the lessons of the tragedy of the commons is that goods left in the commons 
will be destroyed, so we are obligated to remove them and protect them (or, perhaps, privatize or 
restrict through the use of a public agency) and staking a claim is the only way to satisfy the 
	  	   279 
proviso and not starve. 233 Therefore, removing resources from the commons protects it for future 
generations,234 and original appropriation is teleologically justified as a solution to the public 
goods problem of avoiding the tragedy of the commons.235 
More important is Locke’s recognition that by appropriating, owners will labor in order 
to improve value through additive or generative labor. 236  As Richard Boyd writes, “this 
assumption about the generative power of human labor does an enormous amount of justificatory 
work in Locke’s subsequent defense of private property, allowing him to skirt many of the thorny 
distributional problems of inequality and scarcity.” As a result, the purported possessive 
individualism of Lockean property theory assumes a kindler, gentler repose, and the right-
libertarian reliance on Locke—and subsequent justification for a moral and arguably 
communitarian initial acquisition—provides a powerful response to left-libertarian critiques of 
both initial acquisition and subsequent world-ownership. This response, however, does not locate 
in Locke’s property theory the kind of robust individual rights that are conventionally attributed 
to it.  
Conclusion  
What then is the value of distinguishing between property and privacy conceptions of the 
body in terms of its integrity and autonomy? Alan Hyde observes that “perhaps the only 
difference between the property and privacy formulations is that property inscribes the body into 
normal economic life and thus represents…what Foucault calls ‘disciplinary power,’ while 
privacy inscribes the body into juridical personhood as a site or bearer of abstract political rights,” 
or sovereignty.237  The core violations of bodily autonomy and integrity are physical violence and 
rape, slavery, compelled pregnancy, invasive searches, compulsive heterosexuality, conscription 
or forced military service, compulsory inoculation or vaccination, and forced medication,238 all of 
which appear to interfere with self-ownership and persistently invoke the language of property. 
As Anne Philips writes, “[b]odies alert us to reciprocity and what we have in common; property 
alerts us to inequality and what keeps us apart.”239 So, to preserve bodily autonomy and integrity, 
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perhaps we require a body-as-property discourse that allows us to say “this is mine, and you are 
wrong to interfere with, control, and discipline my possessions, including—my body.” 240  
The potential for bodies and selves to be property—as a metaphysical matter—was 
discussed in chapter 1, where I concluded that bodies and selves are probably not properly 
conceived as properties, and that self-ownership is, at best, a metaphor for other considerations 
and at worst, a falsehood. However, there may be great pragmatic or rhetorical value in the belief 
that we own our bodies, that the right of ownership is constitutive of our personhood, and that all 
persons, by virtue of their membership in the human race, similarly own their bodies. I assume 
that most persons understand the ideas behind the most general principles of ownership: that it is 
just for people to own (some) things and it is unjust to deprive them of those things. 
Consequently, I can imagine that this approach to rights in general can have a galvanizing effect 
on persons whose rights are either in jeopardy or emerging from a period of rights-denial or 
rights-neglect.  
Perhaps we secretly know that persons do not own themselves or their bodies. Bodies just 
are things that are unownable. You can own your toothbrush and your clothes, but you cannot 
own your body. However, the very idea of self-ownership is very powerful and can inspire and 
justify all kinds of action by promoting autonomy, self-reliance, and independence.  Buddhists 
have a term for this kind of gentle rhetoric: upaya, meaning “skillful means.” Upaya refers to the 
practice of lying for another’s good. Plato called this the ‘noble lie.’ In the Buddhist tradition, the 
use of skillful means to tell a noble lie originates from the parable of the Burning House in the 
Lotus Sutra. In the parable, children are playing in a burning house. The father yells at them to 
leave but, unaware of the danger, they refuse and continue to play. After all, they are children. 
The father decides to lie. He promises them toys, so they leave in pursuit of the promised toys just 
before the house in engulfed in flames. The Buddha reasons that the father did not engage in a 
sinful falsehood because the children were, in the end, saved. So, Buddhists justify a certain level 
of permissible ‘skillful means’ that prioritize enlightenment over ‘truth.’ This might be the case 
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with self-ownership: it is just a metaphor, and we know it, but it is the best one we have for 
convincing people that no one else owns them. Otsuka, for example, writes: “I concede that talk 
of property in persons might strike some modern ears as an artificial and unwarranted extension 
of the concept of property. But nothing will be lost if those who resist such talk simply mentally 
delete the words ‘property’ or ‘ownership’ throughout this book and replace them with an 
assertion of the relevant rights.”241  
Nevertheless, privacy concerns help us find new ways of imagining the body and 
whatever rights might inhere in it. Here are a few suggestions for new paradigms. We don’t just 
‘have’ bodies: we are bodies.242 Parts of that body can change (kidney, liver, blood, corneas, 
limbs) and we remain the same person. If we perceive the body solely as something we have and 
use as property rather than something we are, then it is relegated to something we must 
command, a thing that often fails in its performance of its assigned tasks, a thing that distracts, 
disturbs or makes us suffer. This approach—being bodies instead of having bodies—avoids the 
denigrating objectification of the body as a mere instrument that belongs to a self rather than 
something that constitutes an essential expression of selfhood. So, our bodies belong to us but we 
do not claim ownership over them, in the same way that we can belong to a club without seeing 
ourselves as either owning or being owned by it.243 But we still have privacy interests, and, as 
Jürgen Habermas writes, “a well protected private autonomy helps secure the generation of public 
autonomy just as much as, conversely, the appropriate exercise of public autonomy helps secure 
the genesis of private autonomy.”244 In other words, if we are seeking autonomous, free acting 
communities, they need to be populated by autonomous, free acting persons, and the privacy 
contained in private property is necessary for their development. 
I conclude that robust libertarian property rights have no true ancestor in classical 
property theory, and that self-ownership fails as a foundation for world ownership: like personal 
and private behavior, property has always been an object of detailed surveillance by law and 
authority. But the past is no argument about the future, and recent changes in Western social and 
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political theory and practice have brought gay marriage, civil rights, as well as property rights to 
the forefront. Libertarian property rights, including the self-ownership right (per Otsuka’s 
suggestion) as merely metaphorical for other rights, are similar to modern civil rights: we can find 
suggestions and hints in the theories of the past, but full blooded civil rights—as well as property 
rights—are still on the horizon.   
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Chapter 5 
 
The Economic Theories of Property Rights, Law, and Takings 
“[F]or what is land but the profits thereof?” – Sir Edward Coke, 16281 
This chapter concerns the justifications for using efficiency considerations in making 
determinations about property rights and covers eminent domain proceedings at one extreme, 
regulations such as zoning in the middle, and libertarian solutions at the other extreme. Like the 
preceding chapters, the general focus is on the impact of normative theory (here, utilitarianism) 
upon contemporary legal theory (here, the economic theory of law) as it relates to private 
property rights. In many ways, the economic theory of property law can be broadly construed as 
both an assumption about, and an extended proof of, Coke’s dictum.   
According to Milton Friedman, “[t]he basic problem of social organization is how to co-
ordinate the economic activities of large numbers of people.”2 Although economic theory is 
typically referred to monolithically as the economic theory, the economic theory of property and 
property rights has produced two very broad solutions to the coordination problem described by 
Friedman.  These solutions are provided in the theory of the firm (argued by libertarians) and the 
theory of the state (argued by the social-relations theorists, represented primarily by Joseph 
Singer).3  For libertarians, efficiency is a product of extensive private property rights. An 
unregulated market is required to facilitate voluntary exchanges, and such exchanges lead to 
overall efficiency. In this theory, market failures are frequently caused by regulation. For social 
relations theorists, efficiency is produced through the regulation of private property rights, and 
market failure is frequently caused by the failure to regulate private property rights. Whatever the 
approach, market success or failure is a key component in all economic theory. 
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In section 1, the utilitarian normative foundations of economic theory are introduced, 
along with the establishment of the conflict between welfare economics and wealth maximization 
as the primary vehicles for the realization of efficiency. In section 2, I outline how the economic 
theory of law relates to property, property law, and property rights.  This section is primarily 
aimed at Coase’s rejection of Pigouvian welfare economics and the move towards market 
solutions to the problems of market failure, externalities, nuisance, and other property ‘tragedies.’ 
Although the economic theory of law broadly supports free markets, it is typically committed to 
the requirement that property rights be evaluated in terms of efficiency, and efficiency will 
frequently demand non-market solutions. This commitment is rejected by the libertarian 
economists in section 3, who reject Coase’s economic theory, regulation, and takings tout court. 
Section 4 examines how economic theory has approached eminent domain, and explores Joseph 
Singer’s reliance theory of property in considerable depth. Singer’s theory attempts to justify a 
broad takings power for private individuals over corporate means of production on efficiency 
grounds; this approach to takings (and the property law that shapes takings) has the potential to 
encourage outcomes that are undoubtedly not within Singer’s purview.  
In the final section, the backlash against markets and market theory is reprised from 
Chapter 3 in more detail, and particularly in light of the economic theories discussed here.  Jason 
Brennan and Peter Jaworski’s recent work on the semiotics of markets is introduced, the anti-
commodificationist argument is re-examined, and a specific kind of property—cultural 
property—is tested against the semiotic objection.   
I conclude that if considerations of efficiency decide who owns what—through either a 
market (voluntary transfers) or through forced or legal transfers by a judge or the state—then 
private property interests are important only to the extent they promote efficiency. This disregards 
the property’s potential to have privacy components, which are typically not determined through 
market transfers. The theory of private property I have advocated for in this work does not 
allocate property based on considerations of efficiency, but it does require strong protection 
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against both public and private takings based on the moral duty of noninterference that 
nonowners are obligated to observe.   To paraphrase Rawls, economic theory does not appear to 
take the distinctions between people’s property seriously, primary because private property has, 
for most iterations of the theory, only instrumental value. Economic theory, in general, does not 
provide a moral justification for the kind of privacy and economic rights argued for in this work.  
Because of this, economic theory only protects private property better than the preceding theories 
to the extent it can withstand claims to regulate or expropriate it, and economic theory is less 
likely to convince a court that privacy-compromising property regulations (primarily takings) are 
unconstitutional. As a result, there is no reason to prefer a legal system that uses economic theory 
to settle property contests if, as I argue here, the primary moral justification for private property is 
itself the protection of privacy. 
Section 1. The Utilitarian/Consequentialist Foundation of Economic Property Theory  
The economics of law is primarily concerned with efficiency, and has attempted to 
distinguish efficiency from utility. According to A. Mitchell Polinsky, efficiency is “the 
relationship between the aggregate benefits of a situation and the aggregate costs of the 
situation.”4 Although economists have, on occasion, derided the idea that utility is measurable5 or 
even real,6 the efficiency considerations of the economic approach to property rights are broadly 
utilitarian in their conception of the role of property rights as being instrumental toward welfare. 
While welfare is somewhat underdetermined by considerations of utility, and there is room for 
substantial disagreement about the ability of utility to produce welfare (and the ability of welfare 
to produce utility, for that matter) there is broad agreement (among economists) that property 
rights, like any other right or legal entitlement, are desirable just insofar as and to the extent that 
they are efficient. To this end, the economic theory of public policy—the laws and structures 
which guide the workings of the state—is, according to Frank Hahn,  “relentlessly utilitarian” 
because “policy theories are ranked by their utility consequences.”7 Takings, in particular, reflect 
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a strong utilitarian conception of property,8 and economic utilitarianism, it will be argued, offers 
the most comprehensive justification of the takings doctrine.   
Although John Rawls’ theory of justice is committed to providing an alternative to 
utilitarian theory, Rawls also provides a clear definition of it: utilitarianism, for Rawls, is the 
“idea that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so 
as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to 
it.”9 However, the distribution of satisfaction, in terms of all goods including rights and wealth, 
over the relevant persons is irrelevant.10  Because this results in the conflation of “all persons into 
one” for purposes of establishing the good, Rawls famously concludes that “[u]tilitarianism does 
not take seriously the distinction between persons.”11  
Utilitarianism is a version of consequentialism. According to Bernard Williams, 
consequentialism “is the doctrine that the moral value of any action always lies in its 
consequences and that it is by reference to their consequences that actions, and indeed such things 
as institutions, laws, and practices, are to be justified if they can be justified at all.”12 The 
consequences aimed for by utilitarianism include “people’s desires or preferences and their 
getting what they want or prefer.”13 John Harsanyi defends this kind of utilitarianism—preference 
utilitarianism—whereby social utilities are defined in terms of individual utilities, and each 
person’s utility function in defined in term of personal preference.14 According to Harsanyi, “a 
morally right act is one that conforms to the correct moral rule applicable to this sort of situation, 
whereas a correct moral rule is that particular behavioural rule that would maximize social utility 
if it were followed by everybody in all social situations of this particular type.”15 The general 
rules governing these acts also form the basis for the institutions that shape and enforce the rules, 
which consist mostly of the laws by which the institutions are operated. A property law, for 
example, that implements utilitarian morality would therefore aim towards the maximization of 
social utility, or, as Harsanyi formulates it, “the social welfare function.”16  
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A standard objection to classical utilitarianism argues that the maximization of social 
utility leaves no time or ability for self-directed actions such as leisure or entertainment, unless, 
of course, such actions lead to greater utility.  In response, Harsanyi writes “[a]ny reasonable 
utilitarian theory must recognize that people assign a non-negligible positive utility to free 
personal choice, (and) to freedom from unduly burdensome moral standards trying to regulate 
even the smallest details of their behaviour.”17 Harsanyi also notes that some behaviors, primarily 
those that are solely self-regarding or intrapersonal, are not capable of being analyzed by the 
utilitarian calculus: his example is that of intellectual honesty, or “admitting the truth to oneself,” 
which has important moral consequences for the individual “regardless of any possible positive or 
negative social utility this truth may have.”18 Utilitarianism—at least the kind defended by 
Harsanyi—is therefore capable of recognizing the uniqueness of persons as well as the value and 
utility of self-directed action by leaving alone a sphere of moral life that is not constantly 
surveilled by the demands of social welfare.  
According to Partha Dasgupta, if utilitarianism were to form the basis for a political 
theory, it would requires “a central authority whose activities far exceed the…minimal state.” 
This authority, in order to implement the goals of distributive justice, would need to be engaged 
“with the task of redistributing purchasing power among individuals via taxes and subsidies.”19  
This raises again the common objection that utilitarianism cannot tolerate rights, and because it 
cannot tolerate rights it has no place in a liberal political order. However, for Dasgupta, the kind 
of rights that operate as constraints upon the pursuit of social welfare—property rights, for 
example—do not prevent a central authority from otherwise pursuing social welfare in the form 
of distributive justice: the exercise of such rights and their consequences, which “considerations 
of distributive justice…or efficiency, must not override,” 20  are simply excluded from the 
calculations of general utility. In other words, a political and economic program that seeks to 
maximize distributive justice is not necessarily one that fails to constrain itself from violating 
individual rights. Rather, according to Dasgupta, “the maximum social welfare that can be 
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achieved in the presence of these constraints is less than the level which could have been 
achieved had these constraints not been imposed.”21  
By emphasizing how virtue precedes the ability to promote welfare, Philippa Foot denies 
that there are “better or worse states of affairs in the sense that consequentialism requires” 
because the pursuit of best outcomes in terms of maximizing welfare does not stand “outside” of 
moral evaluation. 22 The pursuit takes place “inside” morality because it is dependent upon virtue. 
For Foot, there are persons who act with benevolence, which intends to produce welfare in others, 
but it makes no sense to claim that their actions are motivated by a desire to perpetuate a better 
and more benevolent state of affairs without the motivating presence of this virtue.23 Benevolent 
persons promote good states of affairs by way of acting upon their good virtue, and only virtuous 
persons are capable of determining what are good or bad or better or worse states of affairs.  
Consequentialism is therefore correct to emphasize good ends and the maximization of welfare, 
but only good people, who are in possession of the requisite virtues, are able to bring these 
consequences about.  
Utilitarianism is translated into the language of economics most perspicaciously as 
welfarist consequentialism, which is the result of “simply adding up individual welfares or 
utilities” and assessing the consequences.24 As a moral theory, the goodness of states of affairs in 
terms of welfarist consequentialism, are, according to Amartya Sen, “judged entirely by the 
personal utility features of the respective states.”25 The maximal sum of individual utilities then 
provides the basis for “choosing economic policies to be applied to the real world.”26 
There are many objections to the use of utility, efficiency and wealth by economic 
theorists as objective standards for moral theory and practical action. In terms of general welfare 
and utilitarian theory overall, Robert Nozick critically writes that redistribution (taking from Peter 
to give to Paul) simply takes from Peter, but Paul (as society) is not anything that experiences 
pleasure or pain or has a well-being that can be “maximized.”27 Alan Carter writes that the pursuit 
of efficiency is not a fundamental moral obligation,28 and Ronald Dworkin argues that wealth 
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itself is not a “component of social value.”29 Many of these critics write in response to legal 
theorist and economist Richard Posner, who is himself a critic of utilitarianism but a defender of 
wealth maximization as the goal of economic theory.  
According to Posner, the most severe critics of the economic approach to law are “those 
who attack it as a version of utilitarianism.” Posner has attempted to mollify critics by replacing 
utility with wealth maximization. He argues that economics and utilitarianism are distinguishable, 
and that “’wealth maximization’ provides a firmer basis for ethical theory than utilitarianism 
does.”30 Economics is not, writes Posner, simply applied utilitarianism.  Rather, economic 
efficiency “is an ethical as well as scientific concept.”31  According to Posner, utilitarianism 
“holds that the moral worth of an action, practice, institution, or law is to judged by its effect in 
promoting happiness […] aggregated across all of the inhabitants…of ‘society,’ which might be a 
single nation or the whole world.” Normative economics, on the other hand, judges these same 
behaviors on their ability to promote the social welfare.32 “The ethics of wealth maximization,” 
writes Posner, “can be viewed as a blend of” utilitarianism and Kantian ethics, where “[w]ealth is 
positively correlated, although imperfectly so, with utility, but the pursuit of wealth, based as it is 
on the model of voluntary market transaction, involves greater respect for individual choice than 
in classical utilitarianism.”33 For Posner, “Kantian” refers to a “family of related ethical theories 
that subordinate social welfare to notions of human autonomy and self respect as criteria of 
ethical conduct.”34 “Wealth maximization,” Posner concludes, “as an ethical norm gives weight 
both to utility, though less heavily than utilitarianism does, and to consent, though perhaps less 
heavily than Kant himself would have done.”35 More so than utilitarianism, wealth maximization 
is also the foundation of the kind of economic liberty that is enjoyed in free markets.36  Free 
markets, in turn, function well when participants possess Kantian “conventional pieties” such as 
promise-keeping and truth-telling, which themselves maximize wealth by reducing the costs of 
policing the market.37   
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In contemporary American property jurisprudence, takings and regulation are subject to 
the lowest level of constitutional protection, so that any rational basis can justify the taking or 
regulation as a legitimate use of the state’s police power irrespective of any actual welfare 
promotion. However, general welfare is surely the intention of legislative measures that take for 
either purely public use (such as roads or schools) or the public good in terms of economic 
development. In other words, the jurisprudence does not prescribe for welfare considerations, but 
they presumptively motivate all takings. However, as Frank Michelman notes, it would be 
‘strange’ for courts to find that a taking is invalid because it fails to de facto maximize welfare.38 
A legislative or judicial requirement that regulations or takings promote welfare would change 
property law dramatically by adopting a ‘rights-neutral’ approach, where considerations of liberty 
or personhood are sacrificed to utility, but where social obligation might turn out to be the most 
efficient way to allocate and distribute the things and resources that are the object of property 
rights. These topics are discussed in more detail in section 4.   
Section 2. The Economics of Law and Right  
According to economist Thomas Miceli, “property rights represent those things that one is 
entitled to do with one’s property [,] whereas property law represents the legal rules that enforce 
those rights or entitlements.”39 This section examines, in part 1, how economic theory has shaped 
property law, and, in part 2, how it has shaped property rights.  
Part 1. The economic theory of law  
The economic theory of law is primary concerned with efficiency, and one of the foundations of 
the theory holds that efficiency is the result of voluntary use and exchange. However, if a use or 
exchange is inefficient, then government can initiate regulation or coerced exchanges to promote 
efficiency.40 According to Polinsky, efficiency is “the relationship between the aggregate benefits 
of a situation and the aggregate costs of the situation.” This is a simplified variation of Pareto 
efficiency or optimality, which holds that a situation is efficient or optimal “if there is no change 
from that situation that can make someone better off without making someone worse off.”41 With 
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certain exceptions, the law and economics analysis of the efficiency of a law is based on this 
criterion. For Polinsky, efficiency is contrasted with equity, which refers to the “distribution of 
income among individuals.” Economists analyze how aggregate benefits can be maximized, 
while philosophers, lawyers and legislators focus on the acquisition and distribution of the 
aggregation within the framework of rights, justice, or other moral considerations.42  
As a moral concept, voluntariness is an important element of economic theory. According 
to James Buchanan, the results of voluntary exchanges are efficient, and exchanges are 
efficiency-increasing “[w]hen one person is seen to transfer goods voluntarily to another while 
the second person is seen to reciprocate with a return transfer;” this is true for exchanges from the 
“simplest to the most complex institutional structures.”43 Exchanges are not efficient or not 
efficiency-increasing when there are “nonvoluntary changes in personal endowments of goods 
and services.”44 Inefficiency arises from externalities, or when potential buyers and sellers are 
prevented from exchanges due to a variety of social factors.   
For Buchanan, economics, as the “science of markets or of exchange institutions, 
commences with a well-defined structure or set of individuals rights and offers explanatory, 
predictive propositions concerning the characteristics of outcomes along with conditional 
predictions about the effects of imposed structural changes on such outcomes.”45 Buchanan notes 
that his definition of economics is “at variance with those who define economics in terms of the 
central maximizing principle.”46 Economic efficiency is therefore not the only type of efficiency. 
According to Buchanan and Roger Congleton, “[a] legal structure that embodies equal treatment 
is more efficient than one that introduces inequality.”47 In fact, they note, generality or equality 
before the law might reduce economic efficiency while also facilitating the “operation and 
administration of law itself.”48  
According to Richard Posner, economics is not primarily about money: rather, it is about 
resource use, and “money [is] merely a claim on resources.”49 Posner: “when resources are being 
used where their value is greatest, we may say that they are being employed efficiently.” 
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Efficiency means “exploiting economic resources in such a way that human satisfaction as 
measured by aggregate consumer willingness to pay for goods and services is maximized.”50  
Within the economic theory property law, legal rules are, according to Miceli, “designed 
to maximize the value of property.” These rules pertain to the use, exclusion, and transfer of 
property. Externalities impose unintended costs or benefits on others. Property law deals with 
incompatible uses (such as nuisances) by limiting an owner’s rights “so as to eliminate or 
minimalize the resulting external cost.”51 Property and land use law, and the rights that both shape 
and result from property law, are, for a variety of reasons, an ideal environment within which 
considerations of efficiency can be evaluated. In fact, it was nuisance law (a subset of property 
law) that instigated the earliest discussions about the role of economics in law in Ronald Coase’s 
seminal works on property rights. The economic theory of law is profoundly shaped and guided 
by his work, which has been encapsulated into a theorem. According to The Coase Theorem, as 
long as property rights are well defined, it does not matter who has them if transaction costs are 
low enough so that market participants can compete against each other. For Miceli, this means 
that “[w]hen bargaining is possible, the efficient outcome can always be achieved in an 
externality setting by a voluntary transaction, even if the literal source or cause of the harm…is 
not held legally responsible for it.” The Coase Theorem “is a fundamental element of the 
economic approach to property law, and indeed, of the economic approach to law in general.”52   
Economics is, according to Coase, “the science of human choice.”53 It is based on the 
assumptions that “consumers maximize utility” and that “producers have as their aim to 
maximize profit or net outcome.” Markets, the institutions that “exist to facilitate exchange” and 
which “exist in order to reduce the cost of carrying out exchange transactions,” hold these 
apparently disparate goals together.54 For Coase, commodity exchanges and stock markets are 
“highly regulated,” but not necessarily by government: these markets (as well as historical 
markets or fairs) are regulated by the participants themselves, although “an intricate system of 
rules and regulations would normally be needed”55 in order to facilitate competition, fairness, and 
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security. These rules, according to Coase, “exist in order to reduce transactions costs and 
therefore to increase the volume of trade.”56  
According to Coase, there is no difference between “rights such as those used to 
determine how a piece of land should be used and those, for example, which enable someone in a 
given location to emit smoke.”57 Both are property rights that “will be acquired, subdivided, and 
combined, so as to allow those actions to be carried out which bring about that outcome which 
has the greatest value on the market. Exercise of the rights acquired by one person inevitably 
denies opportunities for production or enjoyment by others, for whom the price of acquiring the 
rights would be too high.”58 Coase: “If rights to perform certain actions can be bought and sold, 
they will tend to be acquired by those for whom they are most valuable either for production or 
enjoyment.”59 
In the absence of transaction costs, the law (and the property rights created by it) is 
irrelevant: the institutions serve no purpose and private property rights play no role.60 However, 
Coase’s point is that in the real world, transaction costs (including the social costs mentioned in 
the title of Coase’s famous article) are never absent, and therefore law and rights play a 
substantial role in formulating the institutions that together make up the economic system.61 The 
imaginary world of zero transaction costs is the world of modern economics (termed “blackboard 
economics”62 by Coase), which Coase recommends discarding in favor of an analysis that takes 
into consideration the “real world of positive transaction costs.” 63  Blackboard economics 
calculates prices, taxes, and subsidies according to the economist’s provision of these factors, 
who then acts as an idealized state or government agency that is tasked with the creation and 
implementation of public policy. But, Coase argues, there is no single government agency 
responsible for creating or regulating economic activity (including taxes and subsidies); rather, 
the government chooses among the “social institutions which perform the functions of the 
economic system” by establishing new agencies, abolishing old ones, implementing new laws, 
delegating new authority, and nationalizing/denationalizing one industry or another,64 all with an 
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eye ostensibly towards the maximizing of wealth through the minimization of ‘defects’ in the 
economic system through state action. This understanding of the role of the state is, Coase argues, 
the product of the “welfare economics” established by Arthur Pigou.65  
 According to Pigou, economics—and, by implication, property rights—must be subjected 
to “public intervention” when “there is reason to believe that the free play of self-interest” 
detracts from “the amount [of resources] that is required in the best interest of the national 
dividend,”66 or market failure. Public intervention (typically in the form of taxes, but also 
including regulations and the use of eminent domain) is particularly justified when externalities, 
or the “effect of one person’s decision on someone who is not a party to that decision,”67 are 
present. The classic examples of externalities are nuisances such as smoke or pollution, and the 
classic Pigouvian response to the presence of externalities is state regulation or taxation of 
property. Pigou says that many factors prevent efficiency, so government ought to step in to 
“control the play of economic forces in such wise as to promote the economic welfare, and 
through that, the total welfare, of their citizens as a whole.”68 
Arguing against Pigou’s interventionalist response to market failure, Coase’s point is that 
externalities are best minimized through strong and manifest property rights, and that the mere 
presence of externalities does not provide an immediate justification for government regulation.  
After all, Coase argues, the economic system is nothing more than “the effect of individuals’ or 
organizations’ actions on others operating within the system,”69 and “if there were no such effects 
there would be no economic system to study.”70 This, indeed, has been the legacy of the Coase 
Theorem, and establishes the connection between strong private property rights and minimum 
regulation. It rejects the Pigouvian reliance on regulation because it leads to “results which are 
not necessarily, or even usually, desirable,”71 meaning that such actions do not produce efficient 
results.  
Coase, and the economic theory he developed, attempts to force economic actors to deal 
with one another using voluntary/market solutions, and not to turn to the state to pursue forced or 
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legal exchanges whenever externalities or potential market failures arise. Although judges, who 
are responsible for implementing legal or forced exchanges, believe they affect “the working of 
the economic system (…) in a desirable direction,”72 Coase and many other economists argue that 
judges and other political actors are either incapable of making efficiency-promoting decisions or 
unwilling to make the effort to produce such decisions. According to economist Thomas Miceli, 
this is because a court’s assignment of responsibility for an external harm “involves a value 
judgment regarding who is more deserving of legal protection.” As a result, the legal rule for 
assigning liability “will affect the distribution of wealth…because it determines who possesses 
the (valuable) underlying property right.”73 So, writes Miceli, “the assignment of property rights 
will therefore always have distributional implications.”74  
Property rights have transaction costs, and costs are impediments to bargaining. If parties 
to an externality cannot bargain (e.g., there are too many people or their rights are unsure), the 
legal rule established by judges determines the rights, and judges ought to chose the rule with 
efficiency in mind.75 However, this is rarely the case. Because property rights are politically 
determined, Gary Libecap argues, politicians and judges serve as ‘brokers’ in responding to 
demands of competing interest groups.76 As a result, interest groups with greater size, wealth, and 
homogeneity will have more resources to influence politicians, resulting in political pressures for 
more favorable definitions of property rights.77   If one group creates pressure for more property 
redistribution, there is a correspondingly greater demand for protection of rights against 
redistribution.78 According to Libecap, private claimants form lobbying groups and negotiate with 
bureaucrats who claim “decision making authority and rents from asset ownership and use.” This 
includes incumbent owners who are “seeking the police power of state to enforce their ownership 
claims,” new claimants who seek a redistribution of property rights and wealth, and third parties 
such as banks and financial institutions who have a stake in the assignment and security of 
property rights.79  
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According to Coase, when economists are annoyed by a variety of things caused by public 
license (such as planes, trains, sewage), they tend to “declaim about the disadvantages of private 
enterprise and the need for governmental regulation.”80 However, Coase continues, behavior that 
economists “are prone to consider as requiring corrective action,” is, in fact, “often the result of 
governmental action.”81 Zoning and other property use restrictions can be very costly and 
inefficient because it is “subject to political pressures and operat(es) without any competitive 
check.”82 For Coase, the solution to the problem of efficiency is not simply using property rights 
in order to, for example, restrain those who cause inefficiencies such as nuisances through the use 
of legal techniques such as lawsuits or injunctions.  Rather, the issue of property rights is 
subordinated to the issue of “whether the gain from preventing the harm is greater than the loss 
which would be suffered elsewhere as a result of stopping the action which produced the harm.”83 
The transaction cost of rearranging rights is high, and judges in nuisance cases not only rearrange 
rights but also determine how resources are employed. Unrestricted use can impose costs in non-
economic terms as well, particularly when unrestricted use violates the rights of others or harms 
them. Certain uses, such as those producing smoke, noise, or pollution, may harm nearby 
residents or environment. These are externalities, or cost spillovers, and create inefficient uses of 
land and therefore may justify governmental limitation on property use/rights on economic 
grounds. This may reduce value, but the goal is to increase overall efficiency.84 
In terms of private property rights, inefficiencies arise when private land becomes more 
valuable for public use. As economies develop, public lands such as highways, railroads, and 
airports, which are freely available to all, can become even more efficient. This is also true for 
lands dedicated to recreation and lands set aside for preservation. Unrestricted private ownership 
may hinder the creation of these public goods, so the state can justifiably step in to ensure these 
good are provided in the ‘efficient quantity.’85  
For Miceli, the Invisible Hand Theorem, which is purported to guide welfare economics, 
stipulates that “in a competitive market setting, voluntary (or market) exchange will result in an 
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efficient allocation of resources” because in perfect conditions of competition, “property rights 
will end up in the hands of those parties who value them the most, or in those uses where they are 
most valuable, without the need for state intervention.”86 So, self-interested private property 
ownership promotes optimal social conditions. In these perfect conditions, there is no need for 
governmental invention in order to improve efficiency, though “there may be a need or desire for 
it to intervene to achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth.”87 According to Miceli, “the law 
acts as substitute for the market” when the market fails to facilitate efficient allocation of 
resources.88 
The framework for determining the proper relationships between markets and law has 
been characterized as a blend of Coasean economics with the ideas suggested in Guido Calabresi 
and Douglas Melamed’s classic paper on assigning liability for external costs.89 According to 
Calabresi and Melamed, the sticks in the bundle of property rights should be allocated to the 
agent who values them most highly. These rights lie on the boundary between (forced) eminent 
domain and voluntary exchange, which is marked by a choice between liability rules and property 
rules and ‘policed’ by the public use requirement. Voluntary exchanges between agents deal with 
property rules, while forced exchanges with compensation deals with liability rules. Voluntary 
exchanges guarantee full compensation but may not maximize efficiency. Forced or legal 
exchanges can ignore many costs, and introduces a degree of unfairness and inefficiency.90 In any 
event, rights to the different sticks may shift from one agent to the other based on the different 
applicability of property and liability rules, resulting in the type of diminution of the right to 
exclude that the exclusionary theorists claim as the core property right.91 This shifting can be 
achieved through the takings and regulatory processes, and the conception of property as a 
severable bundle certainly facilitates these processes. 
So property rules, as consensual transfers, form the basis for market exchanges, while 
liability rules, because they allow for non-market or coerced transfers, form the basis of legal 
exchanges.92 As long as the court sets the rights-holder’s true valuation of the right, the forced 
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transaction is said to be efficient. If the court fails, then the result is not efficient.93 If transactions 
costs are low, property rules are efficient, but if they are high and courts are reasonably good at 
setting damages, then liability rules promote efficient exchanges that probably would not have 
occurred due to high costs of bargaining. In conjunction with the Coase Theorem, this 
understanding of efficiency constitutes the bedrock of the economic approach to property law.94 
As a result of this understanding, property, framed in terms of eminent domain, is not protected 
by property rules. As Leanne Fennell observes, if an owner has a right to refuse a sale on any 
grounds, then they have a property right governed by market considerations. If they have been 
made ‘an offer they can’t refuse’ (as in a takings situation) then their property is (un)protected by 
a liability rule and governed by legal or non-market rules including forced transfers.95 
Part 2. The Economics of Property Rights 
“In the world of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role.”  
– Political economist Harold Demsetz96  
 
         “Political economists are fond of Robinson Crusoe stories.” 
– Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I 
 
For Harold Demsetz, “[p]roperty rights define and protect those things that people can 
and cannot do with the assets under their control, including but not limited to land.”97 According 
to economist Yoram Barzel, this definition needs some unpacking. For Barzel, economic property 
rights are constituted by “the ability to enjoy” or consume a good or asset directly or indirectly 
through exchange. These rights are distinguished from legal property rights, which are those 
assigned by the state to a person.98  This definition of the property right places it between two 
points: legal rights, at the one end, are distinguished from natural or economic rights at the other.  
There is a wide lacuna between these conceptions. However, according to Barzel, the distinction 
made between “property rights and human rights is spurious.” The economic property right, for 
Barzel, is the basis for human rights, and “human rights are simply part of a person’s property 
rights.”99   
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For Barzel, legal rights that are enforced by government “enhance economic rights, but 
the former are neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of the latter.”100 For Barzel, 
possession of property gives the possessor economic rights, but  ownership provides even more 
economic rights. These rights exist both within and without legal institutions.  The economic right 
exists in state of nature-type situations, as well as in legal systems that contain property rights. In 
legal systems that might not feature legal property rights, the economic right would still exist.101 
James Buchanan agrees that “there is really no categorical distinction to be made between that set 
of rights normally referred to as ‘human’ and those referred to as ‘property.’”102  
Other economists attempt to draw out how this characterization of property rights 
determines efficient uses of property. According to Harold Demsetz, one of the main functions of 
property rights is that of “guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of 
externalities.”103 He restates this famous dictum slightly: “property rights develop to internalize 
externalities when the gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internalization.”104  
Externalities consist of the imposition of costs or effects on third parties; polluting smoke from a 
factory is the classic example of an externality. Internalization maintains these costs between the 
contracting parties.105  Property rights, therefore, encourage the contracting parties to ensure that 
the effects of their contract—usually bad effects, such as pollution, but Demsetz also includes 
beneficial effects such as property improvements—do not harm or benefit others by creating 
liability sanctions that promote the absorption of these externalities.   
Demsetz sees property rights in terms of their association with their effects, and new 
rights emerge—and old rights are restricted—when new techniques are developed that produce 
new or unexpected externalities. His classic example is the development of private property rights 
over territories used for hunting by the Native persons of the Labrador Peninsula in the 17th 
century. Prior to contact with Europeans, Native persons hunted for food and fur with no impact, 
or externalization, on the supply of animals or the rights of all to hunt and trap. After contact with 
Europeans and the establishment of the fur trade, animals were in increasingly short supply due to 
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increased trade. Native persons responded by creating private property territories on behalf of 
individual families in order to hunt more efficiently. Demsetz’s point here—and very similar 
points are made by Ellickson,106 Coase,107 and Acheson108—is that private property rights emerge 
in response to the associated emergence of both harmful and beneficial effects, and that such 
rights permit the efficient use of scarce resources without intending to produce, for example, 
social welfare, equality in distribution, or fairness. By implication, Demsetz’s anthropological 
narrative intends to show that considerations of efficiency (illustrated here by the ‘rational’ 
creation of private property rights that encourage the “husbandry of fur-bearing animals”109) 
emerge spontaneously and without central planning even in historical settings that had not 
previously known (or had any use for) such rights.  For the Labradoreans, private hunting and 
trapping territories internalized the externalities created by increasing scarcity (i.e., the depletion 
or extinction of the animals), and the lack of such rights in the prior system of common property 
hunting grounds, which failed to internalize the effects of hunting, were inefficient.  Therefore, 
for Demsetz and many other economists, considerations of efficiency not only justify private 
property rights, but create them as well. For Buchanan, “economic exchange among persons is 
facilitated by mutual agreement on defined rights.” Once rights are defined and settled, 
“economic interchange becomes almost the archetype of ordered anarchy,”110 a situation where 
the role—if any—of the state is that of protecting these rights against aggression, theft, or fraud 
by ‘legalizing’ them through the creation of property institutions.  
Posner agrees that the legal protection of property rights creates “incentives to use 
resources efficiently.”111  These incentives are created by the “parceling out among the member 
of society of mutually exclusive rights to the use of particular resources.”112 Posner: “If every 
piece of land is owned by someone, in the sense that there is always an individual who can 
exclude all others from access to any given area, then individuals will endeavor by cultivation or 
other improvements to maximize the value of land.”113 
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Posner suggests three criteria for an efficient system of property rights. “The first is 
universality. Ideally, all resources should be owned or ownable by someone, except resources so 
plentiful that everybody can consume as much of them as he wants without reducing consumption 
by everyone else.” The second criterion is exclusivity, or the right to exclude.114  The third 
criterion is transferability: “[i]f a property right cannot be transferred, there is no way of shifting a 
resource from a less productive to a more productive use through voluntary exchange.”115 An 
efficient system of property rights is therefore able to minimize the externality problems that exist 
whenever persons “engage in activities which affect the welfare of other members of the 
community at large,”116 and most—perhaps all—productive human activity affects the welfare of 
others.  
According to Buchanan and Congleton, “nearly all of the productive effects of property 
rights systems can be analyzed as solutions to various externalities and commons problems.”117 
Externalities occur because the current system of rights, sanctions, and regulations “fail to 
provide incentives that allow Pareto-efficient outcomes to emerge.”118   As a result, many 
externalities are political creations and not the result of market failure. Efficiency requires the 
regulation of externalities, and property rights are efficient to the extent that they contribute to the 
regulation of externalities. However, permanent assignment of property rights may, due to a 
variety of factors (including technology and climate change) become inefficient. So “most 
polities have procedures for amending property law through time as circumstances change” via 
politics, but this is more efficiently done through voluntary “Coase-like” exchanges.119 
An illustration of this kind of exchange is Posner’s railroad and garage example:  
although a property owner has a qualified right to repel trespassing sparks from a passing railway, 
and although it is probably more efficient to compensate the owner than make the railroad install 
a spark arrester, one cannot park their car in a neighbor’s garage without their consent despite 
high charges at the local garage, parking tickets, and fear of theft. This is true even if the use of 
the garage is more valuable to the car owner than the garage owner. Why depart from economic 
	  	   313 
theory in these examples, which, by forcing one owner to accept compensation in the railroad 
case, also seems to require the ‘efficient’ transfer of the garage to the car owner?120  
According to Posner, because “the market is a more efficient method of determining the 
optimal use of land than legal proceedings,”121 the car owner ought to be able to persuade the 
garage owner to rent the garage to them. How should a court determine a legal claim to a right to 
use the garage against the owner’s wishes? It cannot make that determination because the 
transaction costs are low and therefore the property right is strong. Accordingly, the economist 
only advocates for the creation of ‘absolute’ property rights in “ideas, land, or labor” (here, the 
garage) when the “costs of voluntary transactions are low.”122 However—and this is a key point 
for discussions about the efficiency of eminent domain—when “transaction costs are prohibitive, 
the recognition of absolute rights is inefficient.”123 In such cases, “transaction costs preclude the 
use of voluntary transactions to thus move resources, and alternative allocative mechanisms to 
property rights must be found—such as liability rules, eminent domain, and zoning.”124  
A policy of wealth maximization, therefore, subordinates rights, and property rights in 
particular, when voluntary transactions fail to deliver objects of value (i.e. property) to the 
persons (including artificial persons, such as the state) who value them the most due to high 
transactions costs. Rights are only absolute (‘true’ property rights as opposed to ‘mere’ liability 
rights) “in setting of low transaction costs,” such as the garage example.125  Rights are protected, 
inversely, to rising costs.  
Section 3. Libertarian Objections 
As Barzel notes, economists studying property rights “tend to be strong advocates of unregulated 
markets.”126 Accordingly, there is considerable resistance to the use of efficiency in law or moral 
analysis, particularly in regards to property regulation and the use of eminent domain. Because of 
the kind of pragmatic or contingent approach to rights by theorists such as Posner, libertarians 
consider the law and economics theorists to be unprincipled, utilitarian, and willing to 
compromise absolute property rights in favor of group or communal rights.   
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Hans Hoppe is a libertarian economist—a soi disant ‘private property anarchist’127—who 
argues “the right to private property is an indisputably valid, absolute principle of ethics and the 
basis for continuous ‘optimal’ economic progress.”128 For Hoppe, economic theorists suffer from 
a kind of amoral inconsistency. For example, public goods theorists, such as Buchanan in 
particular, argue that goods such as security are best provided by the state despite the existence of 
a free market for other goods (e.g., toothbrushes).129  Hoppe argues that there is no principled way 
to make a determination between a public good and a private one, and that economists have no 
method for determining whether public goods (i.e., property rights in things controlled by state 
because the state is ‘efficiently’ the best agent to provide them) have positive and not negative 
consequences due to the absence of a competitive market for those goods.130  
According to Hoppe, the public goods literature, and the economic theory that informs it, 
lacks a ‘true’ theory of ethics or rightful ownership due to the fact that efficiency is not the basis 
for a theory of morality or private property rights.131 Hoppe: “all efficiency arguments are 
irrelevant because there simply exists no arbitrary way of measuring, weighing, and aggregating 
individual utilities or disutilities that result from some given allocation of property rights. Hence 
any attempt to recommend some particular system of assigning property rights in terms of its 
alleged maximization of ‘social welfare’ is pseudo-scientific humbug.”132  
 Hoppe’s understanding of economic property rights is similar to the distinction made by 
Barzel: economic rights, such as those stemming from possession, use, or enjoyment, emerge 
spontaneously or ‘naturally’ from language and common rules of conduct and they are either 
protected by or infringed upon by legal rules. These common rules, and not states or their laws, 
create market behavior.133 Recognizing that the redistributive/utilitarian/welfarist state requires “a 
central authority whose activities far exceed the…minimal state,”134 Hoppe concludes that such a 
state is immorally “aggressive” because it is “exempt from the capitalist rules of property 
acquisitions.” 135  These rules legitimize property acquisitions when they are voluntary and 
uncoerced market exchanges. Because the state that engages in efficiency-oriented economic 
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policies is exempt from these requirements, the state and the economists who provide 
justifications for coercive state action are jointly responsible for immorally aggressing against 
property rights.  If, however, property rights are nothing more than the legal rights determined by 
the state (i.e., there are no economic rights that exist independently of legal rules) then the state is 
free to adjust those rights and rules in order to further the state’s objectives without any infringing 
upon anyone’s rights.  Because property rights exist independently of the state, Hoppe concludes, 
states routinely violate those rights through the regulation and redistribution of property and 
wealth.  
 Like Hoppe, economist Robert Sugden locates the genesis of the property right in   
“principles of justice” which “gradually evolv[e] out of the interactions of individuals pursuing 
conflicting interests.”136 Sugden’s property rights are based on game theory, or the idea that self-
interest, operating within rules, produces the best outcomes. His objective “is to show that if 
individuals pursue their own interests in a state of anarchy, order—in the form of conventions of 
behavior that it is in each individual’s interest to follow—can arise spontaneously.”  The various 
games are the conventions, and in each game each ‘player’ is expected to maximize their self 
interest usually by cooperating with 1) the rules, or conventions, and 2) with their ‘opponents,’ 
who are, in the non-game theoretic world, fellow citizens, tribespersons, and nonowners.137 
Like Hoppe, Sugden is also opposed to the market interventions recommended by 
economists. According to Sugden, there can be “few real world markets in which economists 
have not diagnosed some kind of market failure and prescribed some kind of market 
intervention.”138  Most modern economic theory, Sugden writes: 
describes a world presided over by a government (not, significantly, by governments), 
and sees this world through the government’s eyes. The government is supposed to have 
the responsibility, the will and the power to restructure society in whatever way 
maximizes social welfare; like the US cavalry in a good Western, the government stands 
ready to rush to the rescue whenever the market “fails,” and the economist’s job is to 
advise it on when and how to do so. Private individuals, on the other hand, are credited 
with little or no ability to solve collective problems among themselves. This makes for a 
distorted view of some important economic and political issues.139  
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According to Sugden, “economics underestimates the ability of individuals to coordinate their 
behaviour to solve common problems: it is unduly pessimistic about the possibility of 
spontaneous order.”140 For Sugden, the idea that law is a creation of government that is imposed 
on citizens is the “characteristically utilitarian view” that “economists usually take.” For most 
economists, the law “is a ‘policy instrument’ to be controlled by a benevolent social-welfare 
maximizing government.”141  But for Sugden, law simply codifies behavior that arose out of 
anarchy or spontaneous order. Economists are expected to make ‘policy conclusions’ or 
recommendations to the government about what it ‘ought to do.’ They rarely, Sugden notes, do 
the opposite: observe government and then advise individuals.142  
Sugden shares with Ellickson the effort to show that rights (including property rights) do 
not evolve through calculation or moral theories, but through spontaneous evolution that leads to 
conventions.  Property rights are not ‘derived’ from other moral techniques but rather have 
evolved based on individual self-interest. Agreements, or “deals, treaties or contracts, feature in 
just about every aspect of social life.”143 “The utility of an outcome to an individual,” Sugden 
writes, “is a measure of how much it is wanted by that individual.”144  It need not be equated with 
self-interest, and “unselfish aims may come into conflict just as much as their selfish ones.”145   
For Sugden, property rights, as well as conventions such as promises and mutual aid or 
cooperation, arise spontaneously in discrete cultures that otherwise have substantially different 
social and material histories. So, his conception attempts to be universal: these conventions are 
ones that “most human beings act on, and have acted on, in almost all places and times.”146  
In terms of his fear of providing a simplistic conservative rationalization of unjust 
property relationships, where property rights are simply an “ex post rationalization of the law of 
property as it exists in liberal democracies,”147 Sugden suggests that when there is a problem 
about distribution, there is a “natural prominence to solutions that base the assignment on some 
pre-existing relation between persons and objects.” His example is a coordination game similar to 
those discussed by Thomas Schelling. In one such game, a single black dot is surrounded by 
	  	   317 
white dots. One white dot is clearly closer than the others. Players are separately told to draw a 
line joining the black dot to one of the white ones, and they win a prize if they both choose the 
same dot. Sugden thinks that the players will both win because they will both choose the same 
white dot: the white dot that is closest to the black dot. Therefore, for game theorists, the 
relationship of closeness is important for the game and is also important for ownership, and 
charges of conservatism are unfounded.148 So, conventions (“choose dot that is closest” and 
“respect existing rights”) might be potentially arbitrary from a moral standpoint, but, Sugden 
notes, they  ‘work’ because they resolve disputes, provide security, and encourage confidence.149 
For example, in terms of the property convention of initial acquisition, the idea is that people do 
something to unowned property and then have superior claims to it. These and other property 
conventions, Sugden writes, do not arise from ‘reason alone.’150 For Sugden (and for Hume, who 
provides much inspiration for Sugden’s property theory151) these conventions have a “natural 
prominence” both in games of property and property law itself.152  Moreover, many animals have 
a sense of possession and territory, and “it would be surprising if it were not true for our species.”  
“We may be born with some innate capacity,” Sugden writes, to think in terms of individual 
ownership, that possession sets the stage for ownership, and that “ownership ought to be 
defended.”153 Along these lines,  
Sugden asks us to suppose that 
there is an established convention that each person retains possession of those things he 
has possessed in the past. The corresponding norm against over-aggression is the Old 
Testament one: ‘Thou shalt not steal.’ Clearly, this convention favors some people much 
more than others. Those who start out in life possessing relatively little would much 
prefer many other conventions—for example, a convention of equal division—to the one 
that has become established. Nevertheless, it is in each individual’s interest to follow the 
established convention, given that almost everyone else does….Provided I own 
something, thieves are a threat to me. So even if the conventions of property tend to favor 
others relative to me, I am not inclined to applaud theft.154  
 
Interestingly, Sugden writes, “a convention can acquire moral force without contributing 
to social welfare in any way.”155  This is true for a property rule such as possession is grounds for 
ownership, and it is also true for conventions such as “finders keepers” and the morality of 
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queues, which are moral rules that do not cause any increase in social welfare. So a convention 
might acquire moral force for everyone, including those whose welfare might increase without 
it.156 Sugden: “For a welfarist, rights and obligations can be justified only as means for achieving 
the end of maximum social welfare.” 157 However, “[m]ost of us believe that we each have rights 
that cannot be legitimately overridden merely to increase the overall welfare of society.”158 
Sugden concludes that the classic utilitarian position, which requires maximizing the sum of 
happiness, is therefore insupportable.  
Section 4. The Economic Theory of Takings 
Part 1. Takings and Efficiency 
Assuming that the utilitarian theory of property asserts that “property institutions should 
be shaped so as to maximize net utility,”159 the question arises whether eminent domain is the 
appropriate means for maximization. If eminent domain proceedings were governed by economic 
theory (i.e., they were purported to increase welfare), the kinds of libertarian property rights 
discussed in the preceding section have little chance of surviving. Ideally, eminent domain should 
maximize some public purpose or advantage,160 and occasionally governments may in fact 
accurately determine that private land may be more valuable were it providing a public good, and 
a forced sale may be necessary to provide those goods. However, this is not a constitutionally 
permitted use of the takings clause.161 The question arises: does the economic theory of efficiency 
create constitutionally permitted uses of eminent domain?  
Thomas Miceli argues that it does. According to Miceli, takings ought to promote 
efficiency, and, if they are efficient, then economic theory requires that no compensation is due.  
Conversely, compensation would be required as a kind of punishment for inefficient takings. This 
gives courts a substantial role in determining efficiency. James Buchanan takes the opposite tack: 
he wants to leave the courts out of the efficiency game and relegates them only to the 
determination of constitutionality. Joseph Singer wants a radical restructuring of eminent domain, 
one where private persons can make a case for public use as much as the state. Singer argues that 
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a kind of payoff occurs when private property rights in factories, for example, are compromised 
in order to ease the social burden of providing for the costs of displaced workers. Each of these 
approaches revolves around the axis of economics yet they derive from vastly different 
understandings of the role and goal of the law in determining takings contests.  
According to Miceli, “the economic approach to takings focuses on whether or under 
what conditions a forced transfer (for that is what eminent domain allows) is preferred to 
voluntary (or market) exchange as a means of achieving the maximum value of the property in 
question.”162 By providing both a positive (descriptive) and normative (prescriptive) approach to 
eminent domain, Miceli writes, economic theory can clarify the legal and political debate over the 
practice.163  For Miceli, in democratic systems, the power of the state emerges from the citizens 
themselves. So, he asks, why should a group of citizens, acting in concert as the state, have a 
“power that none of them individually has—namely, to force another citizen or group of citizens 
to surrender or limit the use of their property.”164 
Miceli says that in framing the question this way we are forced to examine the underlying 
economic rationale for eminent domain, which is “based on the goal of achieving an efficient 
allocation of land.”165 Eminent domain is “a form of a liability rule in the sense that it entitles 
landowners to seek just compensation (damages) for their land but does not allow them to refuse 
the transaction.”166  Despite this, forced exchanges sit well “within the larger context of an 
efficient legal and economic environment for exchange.”167 
According to Buchanan, the results of voluntary exchanges are efficient, and the process 
increases efficiency “[w]hen one person is seen to transfer goods voluntarily to another while the 
second person is seen to reciprocate with a return transfer.”  This is true for exchanges from the 
“simplest to the most complex institutional structures.”168 Markets fail, and exchanges are not 
efficient or not efficiency-increasing when there are “nonvoluntary changes in personal 
endowments of goods and services.”169 Nonvoluntary exchanges would include takings and other 
legal transfers.   
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There are at least two approaches to the court’s role in making efficiency determinations. 
In his analysis of Miller v. Schoene,170 Buchanan makes the argument that courts should not 
engage in economic or efficiency analysis when they decide takings cases. In Miller, the Supreme 
Court upheld a state statute that authorized the destruction of cedar trees because they were 
capable of carrying cedar rust, a disease that attacks nearby apple trees. Because the statute 
promoted public welfare and provided a public good, the state was authorized to employ its police 
power171 and was not required to compensate the cedar tree owners. The court engaged in an early 
version of efficiency analysis, and determined that the apple trees were more valuable, in the 
aggregate, than the cedar trees.  
According to Buchanan, “there is no role for the judiciary in the decision relating to the 
supply and financing of a public good”172 because there is no way to guarantee that the state had 
reached an efficient decision when it prioritized the rights of apple tree owners over those of 
cedar tree owners.173 The court, in essence, determined that the legislature had made the “right” 
decision in terms of efficiency. For Buchanan, the only role for the court is the determination of 
constitutionality,174 and it should not evaluate the economic efficiency or inefficiency of the 
legislature’s decision.175 The court’s sole role, then, should have been to determine whether the 
destruction of the cedar trees was an exercise of the police power or a compensable takings.  
Miceli sees the role of the court quite differently. In order to bring regulation under 
control and incentivize owners, Miceli proposes the “efficient threshold rule.” According to the 
rule, “full compensation should be paid if the government acts inefficiently (overregulates), but 
no compensation is due if it acts efficiently.”176 This rule penalizes overzealous governments for 
excessive regulation, and induces landowners to be more efficient than governments because 
efficient government regulations will result in zero compensation.177 Although the rule requires 
the court to engage in complex computations in terms of efficiency, the rule can be implemented 
in much the same way that Judge Learned Hand’s formula for negligence was implemented in 
	  	   321 
torts cases. In these situations, the court locates and imposes a rule which, for a variety of 
reasons, ‘sticks’ and becomes a legal test.178 
Posner’s approach is similar to Miceli’s. According to Posner, eminent domain operates 
pursuant to very different principles that other kinds of property transfers. Owners might value 
property higher than the market, and “[t]he extra value I place on the property has the same status 
in economic value as any other value.”179 In those cases, the use of eminent domain frustrates 
efficiency. In other situations, eminent domain is necessary to prevent monopoly—a legitimate 
economic reason to legally force property transfers—“although one applicable primarily to its use 
by railroads and other right-of-way companies rather than government.”180 By ‘monopoly’, 
Posner is referring to the holdout problem and its (purported) effect upon prices: holdouts who, 
e.g., own in the path of a future railway line, will demand high prices, which will be reflected in 
the future costs of the railway’s services. Also, without eminent domain, low-valued land will 
stay in the hands of owners and not be transferred to the railway, who values it higher. The result 
is inefficiency, and eminent domain purports to overcome it through the use of compensation. 
According to Posner, “[t]he requirement of compensation operates to limit takings to 
circumstances where the value of land to the condemnor is in fact greater than the value to its 
present owner; to require the government merely to prove to a court’s satisfaction that the land 
was more valuable to it than to the condemnee would be a less efficient alternative.”181 This 
analysis is a “straightforward economic justification of the compensation requirement.” 182 
Compensation “increas(es) the security of the owner’s property rights and hence the incentive to 
improve land.”183  
Under current nonefficient takings rules, the condemnor is not required to show a more 
valuable use, but is only required to compensate. This is inefficient “if the required compensation 
is not equal to the opportunity costs of the land seized.” Posner: “The disregard of nonmarket 
values…creates a systematic downward bias in the prices paid in eminent domain 
proceedings.”184 So owners might have a higher value than the fair market value, and a forced 
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transfer at this lower rate is inefficient. The fair market value of a property ought to reflect “an 
estimate of the value of the price that the owner would have accepted for the property in a 
hypothetical market transaction.”185  However, it fails to compensate for the subjective ‘premium’ 
that owners might attached to their property, and this is likely to be higher than market value in 
the case of homes.186 Just compensation is therefore inefficient to the extent that it fails to give 
sellers the opportunity to name their price, and the fair market value as the determinant of just 
compensation “almost certainly undercompensates owners compared to what they would have 
demanded in a consensual sale.”187  
In addition to determining fair market value, takings problems have two other (typically 
competing) goals: the provision of public goods, which states are obligated to provide due to the 
clause’s public use requirement (here, “’public use’ equals ‘public good’”) on the one hand, and 
the solution to the holdout problem on the other, which is one of the goals of economic theory.188 
According to Miceli, the holdout problem is encountered when a land assembler (public or 
private) seeks to connect together contiguous small land parcels into a single large parcel suitable 
for projects such as highways and large real estate developments. Once “the process of assembly 
begins, individual sellers realize that they can impose substantial costs on the buyer by refusing to 
sell.” These sellers can then command higher-than-market values by holding out for prices that do 
not reflect the owners’ true valuations.189  
 In terms of private development, the holdout problem is most apparent when a developer 
buys the first of several contiguous properties at market price. Subsequent owners learn of the 
project and the sales price and demand increasingly higher (nonmarket) prices. Because sellers 
can command prices higher than their true valuation, and because buyers must pay these prices in 
order to assemble the required land, holdouts create positive externalities for sellers, negative 
externalities for buyers, and inefficiency overall.  
 One solution to the problem is forced sales. This could be achieved by the government’s 
use of eminent domain, or by simply changing the seller’s property right to one governed by a 
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liability rule, which would permit the buyer to ‘take’ the property subject to the payment of 
compensation with the assistance of the court.190 This is essentially what was done in Spurs v Del 
Webb191 but under different circumstances. The property in Spurs was a single tract of land, and 
the court’s ruling sought to remedy a market failure (nuisance) by essentially forcing the sale of 
the nuisance-creator’s property to what was presumed to be the person who valued the land more 
highly or efficiently.  Similarly, a forced private sale of contiguous properties (for Miceli, a 
“private taking”192) in order to overcome the holdout problem would be efficient (and therefore 
desirable) under economic theory because both buyers and sellers would be trading (albeit 
involuntarily on the part of sellers) at their true valuations. However, as Miceli observes, most 
public takings cases do justify forced sales on these purely economic grounds, but on the grounds 
that the forced sale will benefit the public. Because a public purpose or benefit might be found in 
any kind of development—indeed, one of the primary justifications for increased and unregulated 
development is the expected increase in public goods—the public use requirement loses its ability 
to provide any restriction upon the use of eminent domain. Furthermore, the costs of determining 
the efficiency of this benefit are high or impossible to obtain, which suggests that takings based 
on public use are also inefficient. Therefore, Miceli concludes, public and private takings are 
better justified by framing the issue not in terms of public use or benefit, but in terms of 
overcoming the inefficiencies associated with the market failures that result from holdout 
problems.193 
 One of the most interesting examples of overcoming the holdout problem in land 
assembly, where prices are potentially nonmarket and inefficient because they are not the value at 
which owners would otherwise price their property, is the development of Disney World in 
Florida. The developer, Disney, created a series of ‘front’ buyers in order to purchase large 
contiguous parcels of ‘worthless’ swampland without alerting sellers of the magnitude of the 
project or the intentions of the buyer. By using the “law of undisclosed agency,”194 stealth and 
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deception therefore allowed Disney to buy at market prices, sellers voluntarily sold at their true 
valuation, and the result was an efficient transfer of property rights. 195 
In terms of homes, the taking of homes by eminent domain is usually justified by the 
public benefits associated with a very different use of land: urban renewal. According to Miceli, 
“[t]he economics of urban renewal is based on the role of the government in correcting a market 
failure arising from so-called neighborhood externalities,” which arise from the fact that property 
values are determined not only by the owner’s efforts to increase their property’s value, but by 
the value or disvalue of the neighboring properties.196 If an owner increases the value of their 
home through investment, they cannot capture the increased value that inures to their neighbor’s 
homes. Therefore, there is a disincentive to increase the value of their property, caused in part by 
each owner’s disincentive acting as a negative externality upon one another. As a result, all 
property values suffer, and neighborhoods become ‘blighted.’ The use of eminent domain in these 
situations is, according to Miceli, justified in order to overcome the inevitable holdout problems 
that will arise, but not because of any resulting increase in welfare, livability in the neighborhood, 
or concerns for social justice. In other words, efficiency only demands the elimination of holdouts 
through forced sales, and not the elimination of the conditions that led to the rise of blighted 
neighborhoods. 
 Miceli’s economic analysis of the holdout problem and its relationship to eminent raise a 
series of questions about the political justifications for taking private property.  ‘Political 
justifications’ for taking private property (whether the taker is public or private) include the 
justifications relied upon by political authorities when they seek to take property as well as by 
courts when they rule on contested takings.  They include, in addition to public use and the 
holdout problem, a variety of concerns about sovereignty, police power, and distributive justice.  
The U.S. Steel case is an example of an attempted private takings and addresses many of these 
concerns. This case, and Joseph Singer’s analysis of it, is worth a closer look.  
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Part 2. Singer’s Reliance Right of Nonowners 
In “The Reliance Interest in Property”197 and related work, Joseph Singer argues that a 
specific community—workers—have property rights in the property upon which they labor, a 
right that trumps the employer’s property rights should they (the employers) decide to cease 
production. The reliance interest is said to arise in situations similar to the one presented in Local 
1330, United Steel Workers v. U.S. Steel Corp. (hereinafter, US Steel), where union workers sued 
to compel their employers, US Steel, to sell to them the steel plant that its owners were closing 
because of financial unproductivity.198 
Although Singer makes broad arguments regarding the social justice angle of the union’s 
demands, and suggests that the union should have been able to rely upon promises purported to 
have been made to them by their employer (hence, the reliance interest), Singer is in fact making 
an economic argument for the transfer of the property. For example, he uses the language and 
analysis of the economic theory of property when he writes, “[w]e are obligated to recognize that 
the definition of property rights does not merely involve promoting the autonomy of the owner; 
the allocation and exercise of property rights imposes externalities on others and on social life in 
general.”199 He also argues that the use of private eminent domain in the case would have 
resulted in the most efficient use of the factory.   
Singer’s approach challenges what he calls the ownership model of property, where the 
rights of ownership are taken to be the essence of property. These rights are then normatively 
privileged at the expense of all the other social interests, relationships, and obligations that are 
associated with property. Singer’s alternative to the ownership model is the entitlement model, 
which “seeks to account for the social and contextual aspects of property that are left out of the 
ownership model.”200 According to Erik Olson, these include the kinds of obligations that modern 
corporations owe communities, which include the following: the duty to support the health, 
safety, and interests of workers; the duty to engage in fair competition; the duty to provide 
consumer protection and safety; and the duty to practice environmental stewardship.201  
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For Singer, employees have property rights not only in their job security but also in the 
physical plant itself, which includes the actual property where they work and the machines and 
tools they work with. For Singer, the question “who owns the mill” is a hard one: “I also mean to 
call attention to the fact that even if it is ‘their mill,’ they do not necessarily have the legal power 
to use it in a way that destroys a community.”202 
The facts of the case are straightforward. In 1980, US Steel, the owners of the steel mill 
in Youngstown, Ohio, informed their employees that they were closing the plant. Through their 
union, the workers sued to prevent the closure on the grounds of detrimental reliance, and 
requested injunctive and declaratory relief that would force the sale of the plant to them. 
Detrimental reliance is a common law cause of action that is used to force a party to perform 
under a promise based upon the other party’s reasonable reliance upon that promise. It is used to 
provide contract-type compensation where a legal contract does not exist.  According to Singer, 
“[t]he initial theory of the lawsuit was that the local managers had explicitly promised the 
workers that the plants would not be closed as long as they were profitable and that the workers 
had relied on those promises to their detriment by agreeing to changed work practices to increase 
the plants' profitability and by foregoing opportunities elsewhere.”203 The union lost at the district 
court and in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeal. Two years later, US Steel destroyed the plants.204 
The property rights claimed by the union in US Steel included the right of the union to 
buy the plant in opposition to the company’s right to destroy it without consideration of the 
impact on the workers or the community, which largely depended on the continued operation of 
the plant.205  Specifically, the union asked that the steel company be ordered to “[a]ssist in the 
preservation of the institution of steel in that community; [f]igure into its cost of withdrawing and 
closing the Ohio and McDonald Works the cost of rehabilitating the community and the workers; 
and [b]e restrained from leaving the Mahoning Valley in a state of waste and from abandoning its 
obligation to that community.”206 Both the trial court and the court of appeals concluded that no 
such property right existed, and that the court did not have the authority to create one.  
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According to Singer, this case was wrongly decided, and the court should have found a 
property right arising from the workers’ interest and relationship to the company.207 Such a new 
legally protected interest would, Singer writes, “place obligations on the company toward the 
workers and the community to alleviate the social costs of its decision to close the plant.”208 The 
court could have, among many other suggestions from Singer, effected a legal transfer as a kind 
of private takings for fair market value.209 
Although Singer finds this ‘reliance interest in property’ in a variety of rules,210 nestled 
within his argument is an explicit economic justification offered in support of the proposed 
transfer:   
In a conflict between the workers' personal reliance interest in property and the 
company's fungible investment interest in controlling or destroying the plant, the workers' 
interest should prevail. This choice holds so long as it is sensible from an economic 
standpoint to encourage continued use of the plant and the range of legal alternatives 
open to the workers is not sufficient to protect their reliance interests.211  
 
Singer concludes by arguing that plant closings of this type are inefficient because they create 
substantial negative externalities which produce more social costs than benefits.212 These include 
worker displacement, which “represents a loss of efficiency if the social cost of retraining 
workers for new jobs is less than the social benefit of this training,”213 as well as unemployment 
payments by the state, where “the company externalizes the costs of providing for workers by 
displacing this cost onto the public sector and onto the community directly.”214  According to 
Singer, “[t]hese externalities are unlikely to be absorbed by the marketplace. Transaction costs 
are likely to be substantial when thousands of people are affected by the decision to close the 
plant. The costs include the well-known costs of bargaining, of getting together lots of people, 
and of strategic moves (holdout and freeloader problems).”215 Regulation of plant closings “will 
correct the failure of the market to take account of the externalities of plant closings. Such 
regulation is therefore likely to increase the general welfare as measured by the standard of 
economic efficiency.”216 
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 Is Singer correct? Does economic theory provide both theoretical and practical 
justifications for the kind of judgment sought by the union in this case? There are a variety of 
reasons, not all of which are justified by considerations of efficiency, why Singer’s reliance 
interest is not a desirable amendment to property law. The most striking suggestion by Singer is 
that relationships between employers and employers (at least the kind suggested here, which are 
not obviously property relationships) are property relationships that ought to be the subject of an 
action to quiet title. An action to quiet title is a legal procedure to determine the ownership or title 
of a property when it its owner or its description is unknown or unclear.  It would be used when, 
for example, adjacent property owners are in dispute over their mutual property boundaries 
because one of more of their titles are unclear or missing. Singer’s reliance interest invites a 
massive demand upon courts because the interest would mean that ownership is presumed unclear 
and requires a declaratory judgment from the court, and it further provides that nonowners with 
some interest in the property should be awarded some ownership based on a variety of factors—
none of which include ownership itself.  For Singer, ownership is irrelevant, and searching for 
“the owner” in property contests “is fundamentally wrong. It is simply not the right question. To 
assume that we can know who property owners are, and to assume that once we have identified 
them their rights follow as a matter of course, is to assume what needs to be decided.”217 Rather, 
the court in US Steel (and, I presume on Singer’s behalf, in all property contests) should “decide 
who wins the dispute on grounds of policy and morality, and then . . . call that person the 
owner.”218 From an economical perspective, this places huge transaction costs upon ownership 
and transfer because property rights would be largely undefined and constantly reassigned. 
Furthermore, if workers were to have otherwise unstated property interests in their 
physical plant that is based on their reliance upon their continued employment, then the factory 
also has a similar unstated reliance property interest in the worker. All of Singer’s arguments in 
support of the reliance interest would, mutatis mutandis, apply in the other direction: factory 
owners would presumably be able to prevent workers from quitting, and workers (in their new 
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capacity as owners) would also be able to make similar demands on other workers.  Under current 
law, the factory has only a contractual interest in the worker’s labor and a property interest in the 
things it already owns prior to the adding of value by the worker. The holistic approach advocated 
by Singer admits no boundary for determining whether property interests exist in other things and 
even other people.  
If workers were to gain property rights in their factory through a newly implemented 
Singerian reliance interest, an endless re-assessment process would begin.  First, it would need to 
be determined who else has a property right in the worker’s property right. We can assume that 
each worker-cum-owner spends their money in the community (at the dentist, the grocer, the auto 
repair shop), all of whom can make similar demands on the worker as the Singerian workers 
made on the factory: every person—or, perhaps, corporation—who engages in market exchanges 
for things or labor becomes not a potential but an actual owner. If a group of workers were to 
pack up and leave for better jobs or climate, then Singer would give to the factory a property right 
in their labor as well as to every member of the ‘community’ that depended upon (or had a 
reliance interest in) the support of those workers. This is a remarkable conclusion, but one that 
seems to follow from the proposed terms of the reliance interest in property. It also appears 
obviously wrong, morally and economically. Singer is undoubtedly correct about the large social 
and economic impact of plant closings, but incorrect that economic theory—at least the type 
discussed in this chapter—would demand the kind of resolution he seeks for the workers in this 
and similar cases.  
Finally, a transfer of ownership to workers (however achieved: as a voluntary/market or 
forced/legal transfer) is a transfer from one private owner to another, and the plant remains a 
private property subject to the same claims upon its ownership as those made by the workers. 
Were workers to assume private ownership of the steel plant, it is not difficult to see how other 
interested groups (the local municipality, for example) might be morally entitled to run or own 
the plant based on similar reliance-type claims.  
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Although the union also failed to convince the local municipality to use traditional public 
eminent domain to force the sale of the property to the government, who then could have 
transferred it to the union and its members, Singer advocates for extensive use of takings (real or 
threatened219) to transfer ownership from one private party to another. “Communities faced with 
major plant closings,” Singer writes,  
need not wait for legislation, or even changes in common law, to protect themselves. 
Cities and public authorities should consider using their eminent domain powers to take 
plants that can be operated profitably and transfer them either to the workers themselves 
or to third parties who will keep them open. Such a taking would satisfy the public use 
requirement under the takings clause as long as the government body making the eminent 
domain decision determined that the taking was reasonably related to achieving the 
public purpose of correcting a market failure or otherwise promoting economic 
development or alleviating economic distress.220 
 
Singer’s blithe resort to eminent domain to remedy ‘market failure’ whenever a private employer 
decides to close a business is balanced by his caveat that such use of the takings power ought to 
be ‘efficient.’ Of course, had the status quo been efficient, it is unlikely that the company would 
close shop, and highly unlikely that transfer of ownership would eo ipso result in an ‘efficient’ 
takings. In any event, he raises an interesting point: the kind of public takings he proposes is 
undoubtedly permissible under the current property jurisprudence, so why doesn’t it occur more 
often? There is no legal barrier should ‘The People’ decide to use takings—efficient or 
otherwise—for broadly redistributive purposes.221  This question is taken up more fully in chapter 
6.  
Section 5. Market Backlash and the Semiotics of the Market 
This final section examines how nonowners might have property rights in cultural 
property or ‘heritage,’ and whether such property lies beyond the reach of economic theory and 
analysis and therefore the market. In chapter 2, I explored Alexander’s claims that buildings such 
as Grand Central Station deserved protection against its owner’s desire to modify the building 
because of its value as a cultural property.  Although not explored in detail by Alexander, the 
claim that private property rights ought to be restricted in property that is simultaneously cultural 
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property is a powerful one: if correct, it would provide a strong moral foundation for nonowner 
property rights and justify a wide range of restriction, control, and transfer of a variety of private 
property holdings. In terms of economic theory, the designation of property as cultural property 
has the potential to stymie efforts to promote efficiency because of substantial transaction costs, 
and suggests that a market in cultural property is undesirable. To that extent, Brennan and 
Jaworski’s otherwise keen analysis of the shortcomings of the anti-commodificationist’s semiotic 
objection to markets, first discussed in chapter 3 and reinvestigated here, is subject to at least one 
counterexample in the form of cultural property.   
Part 1. Markets, Semiotics and Shakespeare 
In Markets Without Limits, 222  Jason Brennan and Peter Jaworski offer a moral 
justification of markets but from a different angle than economic theorists (and libertarians) and 
in explicit opposition to the arguments of the anti-commodification theorists.  For Brennan and 
Jaworksi, a market in any commodity is morally desirable, and not merely acceptable, if gifting it 
is morally acceptable as well.  This argument is not a standard libertarian one because the authors 
are not grounding their argument on property rights: they are not making an argument that the 
right to own means right to sell.223 To the contrary, they argue that “if you can give something to 
someone, then you can normally sell it to that person.”224 Markets, they argue, do not create 
improper opportunities to trade things for money if there was nothing improper about giving 
those things away in the first place. If it is improper or immoral to possess or give something 
away, then it is a fortiori improper or immoral to sell it.  The most effective example is child 
pornography, which is neither appropriate to own, give away or to sell on the market.  Kidneys, 
however, are appropriately possessed and may appropriately be given away or donated such that 
they may also be appropriately sold at least under some conditions. Because they might be sold 
under some conditions, Brennan and Jaworski argue, there is nothing essential about their 
noncommodification.  The conditions, which Brennan and Jaworski believe the anti-
commodificationists would accept, involve regulating the kidney market so that, for example, 
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only the wealthy may sell and only the poor may buy. This kind of market regulation would 
eliminate so called ‘dire’ sales, and prove that a blanket prohibition of kidney sales, as well as a 
semiotic objection against such sales, is not justified. It would also save lives by making more 
kidneys available to those who need them.  
Economists, as we have observed, deal in markets: the places where property, goods, and 
services are traded. Anti-commodificationists argue that certain thing, such as properties, 
abilities, and body parts, should not traded for money within a market. Margaret Radin’s 
argument, like those of similarly situated anti-commodification theorists Elizabeth Anderson, 
Michael Sandel, Benjamin Barber, and Michael Walzer, is that these kinds of markets—again, the 
primary loci of the economist—are immoral. Not only are some markets immoral, they argue, but 
persons who engage in the markets are immoral as well or least risk becoming corrupted by the 
immorality of the market or its effects. Markets in some things are, for these theorists, symbolic 
of a culture’s disregard or disrespect for the things, derisively termed ‘commodities,’ that are 
traded at the market. For Brennan and Jaworski, this constitutes the semiotic objection to markets, 
which entails the idea that “[p]articipation in markets can express or communicate certain 
negative attitudes, or is incompatible with holding certain positive attitudes.”225 For Brennan and 
Jaworksi, the semiotic objection to markets fails for a variety of compelling reasons. Anti-
commodificationists, it appears, ‘worry’ that markets do or will disvalue that which is valuable. 
Examples are markets in ‘premium’ medical care such as concierge medical services, markets in 
queues of all kinds, and markets in sex, babies, and surrogacy. For example, Michael Sandel 
argues that selling something that is meant to be free produces inequality, as is the case when ‘the 
wealthy’ pay someone to stand in line for tickets to the otherwise ‘free’ Shakespeare in the Park 
summer event in New York City.  The wealthy already have enough, Sandel argues, and obtain 
further advantages by buying what should be free.226  If the semiotic objection is correct, 
permitting a market for the queue at this kind of event means that someone—American culture in 
general, or perhaps only New York City residents—disrespects what ought to be free: something 
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is lost, Sandel writes, “when free public theater is turned into a market commodity.”227 Queues, 
for Sandel, are equalizers: it is somehow ‘egalitarian’ to wait in line.228 Brennan and Jaworski 
cleverly reply that, in fact, queuing is not egalitarian because it rewards the idle and punishes the 
busy, and that the people who are punished by the current queuing requirements for seeing 
Shakespeare in the Park are the busy, working poor, who do not get a ticket to Shakespeare in the 
Park, “regardless of whether we forbid line-standing services or not.”229  
In a market economy, write Brennan and Jaworski, “the systematic effect of private 
citizens’ pursuit of private ends is to create background conditions of wealth, opportunity, and 
cultural progress,” where welfare is maximized because of the “positive externalities created by 
an extended system of social cooperation” based upon private property exchanges.230 Persons 
contribute to the common good and act as virtuous citizens when they engage in market activities, 
and market activities are productive towards welfare only when they are predominantly free.  
According to Brennan and Jaworski, the commodification debate is supposed to 
determine “what sorts of things should be and should not be for sale;”231 however, the “main 
philosophical debate about markets is whether markets introduce wrongness where there wasn’t 
any to begin with.”232 A market in cultural heritage may introduce wrongness when cultural 
heritage, normally given away ‘for free,’ is based on symbolic or semiotic considerations. This 
example discloses at least one counterexample to Brennan and Jaworski’s argument, one which 
shows that not all semiotic objections are driven by unsupportable assumptions about the 
deleterious effect of markets upon attitudes towards the things traded there.   
Part 2. A Market in Cultural Heritage?  
In Penn Central, the Supreme Court found that the police power justified the designation 
of Grand Central Station as a landmark and thereby prevented its modification and improvement. 
As a result, any diminution of its owners’ rights was not a compensable regulatory takings.  This 
is the standard protocol for denying a regulatory taking by state-run landmark or heritage 
agencies. Under current law, an assertion that property is of ‘cultural significance’ satisfies the 
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public use requirement for takings; it would also satisfy the minimum standard of rationality for 
exercise of the police power short of an actual taking. Although the Court did not find that Grand 
Central Station was cultural or heritage property (it simply deferred to the Landmarks 
Preservation Commission’s designation), it is Alexander’s claim that it is or should be considered 
as such that is important here. For Alexander, this factor justifies the infringement of private 
property rights in this and, potentially, a great many number of otherwise private properties.  
Alexander, however, declines to argue that the right to regulate cultural property is a category of 
common property rights held by the affected community. Rather, it is the right to flourish that 
justifies the exercise of the police power: because there is a right to flourish, and because 
maintaining cultural heritage causes flourishing, and because destroying cultural heritage in 
buildings such as Grand Central Station diminishes human flourishing, states are therefore 
permitted to regulate in order to prevent that diminution. At this point there is a cognizable 
economic-like argument that rights should be transferred in order to promote efficiency at 
minimum and flourishing at maximum.  
Claiming a right to flourish, particularly one that is fulfilled by the holding in Penn 
Central, is difficult, but perhaps a right to a cultural heritage, protected by the transfer of 
ownership rights from private owners to the state or community, better serves the kinds of goals 
that flourishing aims for. This involves turning private property into either state property or 
common property. As discussed in chapter 2, the Supreme Court has routinely permitted a variety 
of zoning and regulatory measures, as well as outright takings, that are meant to preserve 
landmarks, historical and archaeological sites. Regulations of this kind are implemented pursuant 
to the police power.233 
According to Louise Grove and Susie Thomas,  “[a] wide range of things and concepts 
may be construed as heritage, whether a physical monument, cultural or natural landscape, object, 
language, or even a way of life.” The destruction of heritage objects, for example, “causes harm 
beyond the immediate physical loss, due to the meanings and values which may be attached to it 
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and the access to collective memory and commemoration that may be lost alongside it.”234 
Buildings, and presumably the ground they are built upon, can be heritage objects which, 
“because of their architecture, their homogeneity or their place in the landscape, are of 
outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art, or science.”235 However,  
[h]eritage only becomes ‘heritage’ when it becomes recognizable within a particular set 
of cultural or social values, which are themselves intangible. Any item or place of 
tangible heritage can only be recognized and understood as heritage through the values 
people and organizations like UNESCO give it—it possesses no inherent value that 
‘makes’ it heritage.236   
 
Intangible cultural heritage includes rituals, family organization, agricultural practices, religious 
and spiritual beliefs, symbolism, literary histories, performing arts, and festivals based on 
calendar or games237 as well as traditional intellectual property rights of folklore and the artists 
who make it.238  All claims over tangible cultural property are based on the intangible values of 
that culture. It is one thing to claim that the people have a right to culture, and quite another thing 
to claim that they—or the State that is purported to act on their behalf—have property rights in 
the material objects that semiotically represent their culture. These types of claims can be very 
specific and parochial or incredibly broad, where all citizens of a state are ‘owners’ of its cultural 
heritage and the properties (public or private) in which it inheres. 
According to Joe Watkins, heritage is a “resource in need of protecting, preserving, or 
managing. It can have multiple levels of value to multiple groups, and its management may be 
undertaken by individuals, by groups large and small, and by various branches of local, state, or 
national government.” Citing Peter Larkham, Watkins writes that the value of heritage takes into 
consideration preservation, or the unchanged form of “site or objects of major cultural 
significance”; conservation, or the restoration of old buildings so that modern use may be made 
of them; and exploitation, which allows for the use of heritage sites for recreation and tourism.239 
While these designations primary apply to archaeology, historical buildings that are 
currently in use can also be included as archaeological sites. Such buildings may be places with 
historical significance that are subject to effort to preserve them in some historical and non-
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improved state. According to the Antiquities Act of 1906, “archaeological resources are public 
resources and their uses should be regulated publicly for a public benefit rather than for private 
commercial or personal gain.” The act established the policy that “archaeological remains and 
manifestations of archaeological culture ‘belong’ to the American taxpayer.” 240  For these 
reasons, Grand Central Station may be a very recent archaeological ‘discovery,’ albeit one with a 
shorter life than, for example, Mt. Vernon or the Jamestown Settlement.  
These types of items and properties are then drafted into service as part of a people’s 
patrimony and meant to be handed down from generation to generation. They need protection on 
the grounds that their loss or destruction “amounts to loss and impoverishment of the common 
cultural heritage of humanity.”241 The goal of protection, which can assume many forms, from the 
use of eminent domain to criminal sanctions, “is to conserve human creations that may disappear; 
give world recognition; strengthen identity; enable social cooperation within and between groups; 
provide historical continuity; enhance creative diversity of humanity; (and) foster enjoyment.”242 
In order to make the cultural property argument work for a case like Penn Central, 
Alexander needs to show how Grand Central Station is a work of cultural art, and that permitting 
its modification—must less its destruction—amounts to the destruction of a cultural property.  By 
permitting the market (via private ownership) to determine the fate of a work of cultural art, 
which “belongs” to the people of New York (or whomever), we are engaging in the semiotics of a 
market which ‘represents’ our beliefs about art: it has been commodified, meaning that the 
market controls its owners’ decisions about its fate, and commodification ‘means,’ according to 
the semiotic objection, that we disvalue it. By denying its commodification and rendering it 
incompletely commodified, the community can still assert a right in the property as a cultural 
heritage and, at the same time, not have to use public funds to maintain it—which it would if the 
city was found to have engaged in a regulatory takings, or if it condemned the building outright. 
The police power is then drafted into service as a very different beast, one that manifests not 
merely a concern for health or safety, but a concern for the objection of certain government 
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officials—and, undoubtedly, a large sector of the public—to a ‘market’ in cultural property.  Had 
the market operated without regulation pursuant to voluntary exchanges within the meaning of 
economic theory, Grand Central Station would have lost at least part of it façade, and would have 
gained a skyscraper above it.  The resulting building would have (again, according to the 
objection) semiotically revealed a culture that does not value great art or architecture because it 
permits a market that deals in this kind of transaction.  
The issue here is whether a cultural property would have been lost to commodification, 
and whether Brennan and Jaworski are correct that the anti-commodificationist argument against 
a market in this kind of cultural property is unconvincing.  The question turns, I believe, on what 
kinds of intangible cultural properties (i.e., properties that do not have monetary value but have 
other kinds of value) inhere—or do not inhere—within the walls and Beaux-Arts façade of the 
Station.  
In ‘The Authentic Illusion: Humanity’s intangible cultural heritage, the Moroccan 
Experience,’ Ahmed Skounti offers the example of the Place Jemaâ el Fna in Marrakesh, 
Morocco.   The Place Jemaâ el Fna is a tangible, physical space that cultural advocates want to 
preserve in order to maintain the intangible cultural events that take place there in the form of 
human activity: fortune tellers, herbalists, henna tattoo artists, traditional medicine, musicians, 
preachers, story tellers, acrobats, animal tamer, and the like.243 Advocates sought to protect the 
physical space against modernization by the city so that the intangible events can flourish. As 
Skounti writes, community members complained about the changes to “their square,” which is 
“the square that they had got to know in the first decades of their life” and who regret the changes 
and “disappearance” of their square.244  A chaotic public square, owned by the city as public 
property, is transformed into a ‘masterpiece’ that begs for preservation.  
What is interesting about Grand Central Station, as well as the Place Jemaâ el Fna, is that 
as cultural properties, the actual physical spaces themselves are not important. It is the attitudes 
towards the spaces, and the intangible human events that populate them, that create the value in 
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the otherwise (culturally) valueless thing. So, arguing for the preservation of Grand Central 
Station as a cultural property is not arguing for the preservation of the tangible building, but for 
the preservation of the intangible cultural events, and the people who create them, that the 
building is purported to represent. However, unlike the intangible cultural symbolism of, for 
example, the Statue of Liberty, Grand Central Station’s intangible cultural symbolism is unclear. 
Aside from the millions of commuters who move rapidly through it every day without much 
thought about its cultural value, the more stable elements in the building are chain restaurants and 
shops, national and local banks, and tour guide offices.245 Based on this observation, the most 
likely intangible cultural heritage symbolized by Grand Central Station is free market capitalism. 
What is also interesting about these kinds of claims is the argument against the 
characterization of cultural heritage as a kind of ‘property’ in the first place. According to this 
objection, if cultural heritage is viewed as property, then it is a commodity and the familiar 
objections from the anti-commodificationists resurface. Even if it is collective or state property, it 
is still property. Many working in this field “try to resist the tendency of heritage discourse to 
reduce culture to things, (and) we try to counter its privileging of physical fabric over social 
life.”246 On the one hand, in a private property regime, it might be assumed that the most secure 
way to prevent a property from being altered or destroyed is to grant someone, such as a private 
owner, or some thing (such as the State) powerful private property-like rights over the thing. But 
it must be the right owner, one who values the property in a particular condition and protects it 
against the world. On the other hand, ownership of the thing tends to collapse into ownership of 
the heritage itself, and this is the key factor in denying property rights in cultural objects to both 
private owners and the state. In other words, marking out cultural property as a non-commodity 
that is incapable of being owned  (by either state or private owners) may be the best method for 
its preservation.  
John Carman is highly critical of the tendency to characterize cultural objects as ownable 
property.  Using language very similar to Radin’s, Carman argues that cultural objects must not 
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be understood as property, which is what both private owners and the State are committed to 
doing in order to promote their respective interests. Cultural property can possess not simply 
financial value, but can also possess “the store of symbolic and cultural value the object 
represents.”247  Heritage “as a collective store of cultural value is not intended for private 
ownership; the latter represents the appropriation of a sense of community for the enhancement of 
an individual’s own status, which in turn denies the very purpose of promotion of objects to 
‘heritage’ status.”248 This does not imply that the State ought to own heritage: although it is 
assumed that States own their heritage and their heritage objects, Carman objects to State 
ownership because “what passes to the State is almost invariably either full ownership or the 
power to exercise ownership-style rights over the object.”249 Although private ownership results 
in a “loss of heritage object’s purpose,  
we should not suppose that State ownership does anything different. It is much more 
likely that State ownership diverts heritage value away from the collectivity of members 
of the community claiming affinity with the heritage object…and towards the State as an 
institution. The result here is that the institution of the State—only one of a number of 
ways in which any society may organize itself—accrues to itself the sense of community 
carried by the heritage, and thereby affirms its own authority as if it is the natural and 
only legitimate carrier of a sense of community.250  
 
In this way, cultural heritage becomes national heritage or patrimony through the possession of 
cultural property.  Carman’s point is that preservation does not require that rights of ownership be 
granted to either private parties, the state, or even groups of archaeologists acting at ‘stewards’ of 
the sites. For Carman, when States own property, they assume the same exclusive right of access 
and use as a private owner, even when the ownership is vested in institutions such as museums or 
heritage preservation agencies.251  
Recall, again, Grand Central Station. By restricting the right to alter or destroy a building 
such as Grand Central Station, the State, in the form of the Landmark Commission, has taken 
ownership of several sticks in Penn Central’s ownership bundle through its police power. 
Assuming that the people, through the Landmark Commission, now own several sticks in the 
bundle, the people or their representatives now have certain property rights in Grand Central 
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Station.  These property rights are based upon the idea that at least part of the Station—the 
“cultural part”—is ownable in the first place.  By ‘protecting’ privately owned property through 
legislation the State comes to have owner-like discretion over one of more of the sticks in the 
ownership bundle, and it is the State’s owner-like control over these sticks that permits or denies 
certain uses, modifications, or commercial prospects of the relevant property. States are obviously 
owners when they use eminent domain to take title to property, but it is less obvious that they are 
owners when they regulate in this manner. In other words, if the State owns cultural property by 
title or through regulation, then the property is owned in the same sense that it might be privately 
owned, and the State therefore participates in the commodification of the property and in the 
potential for disrespect that may result from commodification.  
Again, Brennan and Jaworski reappear: a market in tangible cultural objects, according to 
the semiotic objection, signifies disrespect for intangible cultural heritage. However, if the 
property may be possessed and given away, then property can be sold and the objection can be 
overcome. Cultural heritage is typically given away, or transmitted, in a variety of ways: it is the 
method through which cultures pass on traditions, customs, art, and histories. Unless these are 
expressly ‘bad’ or immoral traditions or customs, then there is nothing immoral about possessing 
heritage or passing it on.  However, the objection is not overcome if a market in cultural heritage, 
where cultural property is traded as a commodity, does in fact reveal a disrespect for the 
possession or transmission of the heritage as a non-market gift. This is primarily because tangible 
cultural property itself symbolically or semiotically represents the intangible properties of the 
culture: rituals, methods of family organization, agricultural practices, religious and spiritual 
beliefs, and so forth. Brennan and Jaworski’s analysis, I think, is not suited to deal with items that 
themselves have powerful symbolic or semiotic value, in which a market in the tangible goods 
entails a market in the intangible ones. In such a case, a market in the signified tradition, ritual, or 
custom would disrespect those traditions, rituals, or customs.  A market in cultural property 
would reflect attitudes towards tradition as a ‘commodity,’ and a market in tradition would 
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disrespect the practitioners of that intangible cultural property. For example, a folk tale might be a 
cultural property that is normally given away or ‘handed down’ by parents to children as a 
bedtime story. A market where parents charged their children for the tale would disvalue the 
cultural property, and indicate that the parents who chose to charge for the transmission of the 
tale were engaging in an immoral market transaction. Therefore, a cultural intangible such as 
tradition would be appropriate to possess and give away but not to sell on the market, and 
Brennan and Jaworksi are therefore unable to overcome at least one legitimate semiotic objection.  
Conclusion  
On one level, takings are all about costs, and asks when the costs of public regulation 
ought to be left with a property owner and when it should be more broadly distributed and shared 
by the public.252 In many cases, the regulated owner benefits from a reciprocity of advantage, 
where they actually profit over time from the state’s assumption of their costs.253  When the state 
seeks to assume the costs, it can take on what had previously been the responsibility of private 
parties, including impact studies, cost expenditures for experts, surveyors, attorneys, the provision 
of paid governmental positions, and inspections. Certainly litigation, as an example of a 
transaction cost, is expensive if it becomes part of the process.254   
 One of the most economically unsavory aspects of takings is the practice of rent seeking, 
where private parties attempt to secure benefits of eminent domain through lobbying, influence, 
or appeals to the public.255 Although it is generally considered that a taking must yield some 
public benefit or advantage, its use to subsidize non-market driven development can allows for 
eminent domain to produce too many of any given item, e.g., shopping centers, at least some of 
which would not otherwise be built except for the state’s interference in the market. 256  
Oftentimes, “the primary beneficiaries of private takings tend to be real-estate developers, casino 
consortia, and large national or multi-national corporations,” while  “the primary victims of these 
takings tend to be the economically disadvantaged, the elderly, and racial and ethnic 
minorities.”257 While these results may not produce just outcomes for the victims, the efficiency 
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theorist can justify their implementation if net utility is the goal of eminent domain. Moreover, a 
recent study found virtually no evidence of a positive relationship between eminent domain 
activity and the level of state and local tax revenue.258 In terms of political inclinations which 
prioritize welfare, it is a mistake to believe that eminent domain results in a more just distribution 
of property, or that property is flowing top-down from wealthy to poor or even to the public: the 
property of the wealthy is rarely the target of economic development takings.259  
If considerations of efficiency decide who owns what, through either a market (voluntary 
transfers) or through forced or legal transfers by a judge or the state, then private property 
interests are important only to the extent they promote efficiency. Paraphrasing Rawls, economic 
theory does not appear to take seriously the distinctions between people’s property, primary 
because private property has only instrumental value for the theory. Economic theory, in general, 
does not provide a moral justification for the kind of privacy and economic rights argued for in 
this work.  Because of this, economic theory does not protect private property better than the 
preceding theories, and it is less likely to convince a court that privacy-compromising property 
regulations (primarily, takings) are unconstitutional. As a result, because private property has 
more than mere instrumental value, there is no reason to prefer a legal system that uses economic 
theory to settle property contests.  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
 
What’s Wrong with Eminent Domain: the Case for a Constitutional Property Right 
 
“Our Constitution places the ownership of private property at the very heart of our system of 
liberty.” Barack Obama1 
 
As Frank Michelman observes,  “there is a puzzle about how to understand the idea of 
constitutionally guaranteed property rights within a regime of popular democracy.”2 The puzzle, 
he continues,  
is just that it is both an implicit premise of the constitutional system that individual 
holdings are always subject to the risk of occasional redistributions of values through the 
popularly ordained operations of government, both active and regulatory, and an explicit 
premise of the system that people can have property, be owners, not only as among 
themselves but also vis-a-vis the people as a whole organized as the State. And therein 
surely seems to lie a contradiction.3  
 
This final chapter attempts to solve the puzzle by resolving the contradiction between property 
and popular sovereignty in the form of regulations including, primarily, eminent domain. Prior 
chapters have attempted to determine what are the best arguments for the moral property right. 
This chapter is about how the moral right becomes a political or legal right. Here, I make the case 
for the establishment of privacy and property rights as constitutionally protected fundamental 
rights. The discussion turns on the distinction between a right and a fundamental right. There are 
many rights, but the classification of a right as fundamental grants it special moral and legal 
protections, and different classifications require the state to meet different burdens and standards 
of review when its laws impact or infringe upon those rights. The United States Supreme Court 
for example, recognizes the civil rights of speech, religion, and reproductive freedom, as 
fundamental rights. The establishment of property as a fundamental right, on a par with these 
civil rights, seeks to establish what James Riker calls the commensurability between property and 
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other civil rights, and it is privacy that provides the connection between property and civil rights 
and thereby establishes their importance for the promotion of personhood and liberty. This 
jurisprudence permits the state, based on the rational basis standard of review, to take private 
property through eminent domain actions which, I believe, constitute the apex of privacy and 
property rights infringements. Other rights, such as speech and reproductive rights, enjoy 
protection by the much higher standard of strict scrutiny. The point is to provide similar 
constitutional protection for property as currently exists (and should exist) for privacy. This 
formulation of the property rights gives courts and legislators a method for evaluating property 
claims that is not only more perspicacious than present formulations, but also respects rights and 
protects interests.   
Although I will take a variety of approaches to constitutional interpretation, I do not use, 
and nor do I need, any particular version of constitutional interpretation to make this argument. 
Nor do I take any normative position about which version is the correct one. That being said, it is 
beyond any serious doubt that 1) the Constitution protects privacy, property, and private property 
to some extent; 2) the Takings Clause permits some coercive or forcible takings; and 3) a change 
in the private property right can be affected by judicial review. Using these baseline assumptions, 
I will argue in this chapter for a constitutionally protected private property right that is protected 
by the strict scrutiny standard of review, which requires the state to justify incursions into 
property in the same way that the state must justify incursions into other fundamental rights.  
As a personal or individual right, the property right is an exercise of economic liberty. 
Randy Barnett defines economic liberty as “the right to acquire, use, and possess private property 
and the right to enter into private contracts of one’s choosing. If the Constitution protects these 
rights, then the Constitution does protect economic liberty.” For Barnett, the evidence for 
Constitutional protection of private property and contract rights is “overwhelming.”4 Barnett 
locates this evidence in the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses, and the “original meaning of the Ninth Amendment.” Because the Supreme 
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Court has eliminated or ignored these, it has “deprived Americans of these express protections of 
all their natural rights, including their rights ‘to make and enforce contracts’ and ‘to inherit, 
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.’”5 
 I am not going to rehash Barnett’s claims for locating a fundamental property right in 
those clauses, but I am no less sanguine about finding a fundamental right to private property 
elsewhere in the Constitution and its related jurisprudence. In section 1, I make the case for a 
private property right protected by the strict scrutiny standard of review. In that section, I discuss 
the background of how the standard of review is framed by the idea of fundamental rights, the 
kinds of scrutiny used by the courts, and how the courts have bifurcated property from other 
rights. I also show how the property right is intertwined with the privacy right, and how the 
privacy interest in homes plays a key role in justifying the property interest in them as well. In 
section 2, a series of objections to the right—from Thomas Christiano, Frank Michelman, Jed 
Rubenfeld, and Itai Sened—are squared with the arguments in favor of the right. In section 3, 
“The Politics of Takings,” I explore the use of eminent domain to advance redistributive and 
egalitarian goals, and then offer a number of explanations why communities are not more prone 
to use their right of democratic governance to pursue those goals. Section 4 challenges those 
explanations, and examines how one national community, South Africa, has used constitutional 
property and eminent domain to rectify past and present injustices in both ownership and 
distribution, with the understanding that the idea of a constitutional right to property is capable of 
responding to specific cultural situations in order to satisfy the demands of justice.  
Section 1. Making the Case for Strict Scrutiny 
In terms of judicial review, eminent domain and property regulations in general are 
subject to the rational basis standard, whereby legislation is constitutionally permissible if it is 
rationally related to a legitimate government objective.6  Although there have been indications by 
the Supreme Court that the use of eminent domain may command a higher level of review, courts 
have not applied it. The courts had previously applied a much closer standard when scrutinizing 
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economic regulation, and their abandonment of close scrutiny of economic regulation meant 
‘hands off’ of almost all legislative regulation of property rights. The more demanding standard, 
known as strict scrutiny, is applied when legislation infringes fundamental rights or implicates a 
suspect classification such as race. If legislation implicates fundamental rights such as speech, 
religion, or procreation, the legislation will be struck down unless it is ‘necessary to achieve a 
compelling governmental objective.’7  Although some privacy claims enjoy strong protection by 
the Court, property claims are much less likely to be protected because the property right has not 
been held to be a fundamental right. Were the right to private property a fundamental one, then 
laws and regulations that affect the right would be subject to this much higher standard of review, 
and, I believe, many of the traditional uses of eminent domain—particularly those which permit 
its use for the taking of private homes for economic development—would be unlikely to 
withstand judicial review. 
 Procedurally, the private property right is created, so to speak, by the same jurisprudential 
procedure as, for example, the fundamental right of reproductive freedom: a high court—here, the 
United States Supreme Court—analyzes the applicable rules to determine whether a particular 
rights claim can be supported by the jurisprudence which has defined and refined the claim 
through legislation, history, and the common law of the jurisdiction. In the case of reproductive 
freedom, the Supreme Court found a right to privacy in both the Constitution and the social facts 
of marital and reproductive life that resulted in their determination that reproductive rights were 
fundamental, which rendered unconstitutional most of criminal sanctions which sought to bar the 
exercise of the right.8  A Constitutional right to privacy protects the reproductive right by 
nullifying the state’s ability to violate the enjoyment of the right through sanctions, but the right 
can be limited if legislation is able to satisfy strict scrutiny.9 Fundamental rights that are protected 
by strict scrutiny require that any law that has a substantial impact on the right must be narrowly 
tailored to advance a compelling state interest, and the law must be necessary to advance that 
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interest. The First Amendment speech right is similarly protected, and also requires the state to 
satisfy strict scrutiny is order to infringe it. 
Part 1 discusses the kinds of scrutiny the Court has used to review property legislation 
and looks at the major cases. Part 2 shows what is wrong with the process of bifurcation—the 
partitioning of rights between economic and noneconomic—that the court has followed. Part 3 
makes the case for the constitutional right, and part 4 discusses the role of judicial review in 
making that case. 
Part 1. The Road to Kelo: Scrutiny from Footnote four to Midkiff to Nollan  
According to Stephen Macedo, it is generally agreed that the Court’s inclusion of economic and 
property rights with other civil rights during the so-called Lochner era ended when the Court 
decided to give its imprimatur to New Deal legislation primarily in terms of an expanded 
commerce clause. For Macedo, the resulting “virtual non-review of cases involving economic 
liberty is an unconstitutional standard”10 which I shall call bifurcation.  Due to the bifurcation or 
division of rights by the Supreme Court in the famous footnote 4 of Carolene Products,11 federal 
courts have held that legislatures may regulate economic rights using the police power or through 
eminent domain pursuant to the rational basis test, but are only permitted to regulate other 
noneconomic rights such as reproductive freedom or freedom of religion at the higher, or strict 
scrutiny, level of review. Because the Constitution does not provide for bifurcation, the Court 
should recognize economic and property rights by granting them a higher level of review.  
There is “universal” agreement that the Supreme Court created a division between rights 
in footnote 4 of Carolene Products.12 In essence, footnote 4 established different levels of review 
for what the Court determined to be different categories of rights. At issue in the case was the 
constitutional validity of the Filled Milk Act, through which Congress criminalized the interstate 
commercial trade of products which contained both milk and nonmilk fats. Pursuant to the act, 
the producer of ‘Milnut,’ a product which added coconut oil to condensed skimmed milk, was 
criminally charged with producing an “adulterated article of food, injurious to the public 
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health.”13  The Court held that the act did not deprive the owner of his property without due 
process of law, and therefore the act did not transcend Congress’s power to regulate interstate 
commerce.  
 The court approved of Congress’s determination that Milnut and similar products are, in 
effect, nuisances, and that possession or production of them can subject violators to criminal 
prosecution. When Congress or other legislatures create statutes, Justice Stone writes, “the 
existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed,  
for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be 
pronounced unconstitutional unless, in the light of the facts made known or generally 
assumed, it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some 
rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators.14  
 
After establishing the rational basis standard for this kind of legislation, which permits the 
Congress to criminalize the manufacture or sale of a commercial product by regulating an 
economic right, the famous footnote 4 follows, which establishes a higher level of scrutiny for 
other noneconomic rights. 
 Although the note itself is somewhat obscure, there is little disagreement over its impact 
nor over its establishment of a bifurcated set of rights.  According to Justice Stone, economic or 
property rights deserve less protection through the rational basis standard of review, which 
presumes the constitutionality of legislative enactments, while rights expressly protected in the 
Bill of Rights, or the rights of “discrete or insular minorities,” deserve “more searching judicial 
inquiry.”15  These provisions are typically reserved for First Amendment type rights, privacy 
rights, or for the protection of unpopular political views.  The outcome, according to 
constitutional property scholar James W. Ely, Jr., is a “judicially created dichotomy between 
property rights and personal liberties” and therefore a “sharply limited concept of property 
rights.”16  
Bifurcation, and the use of the rational basis standard for property rights, guided the 
courts until Nollan v California Coastal Commission,17 a regulatory takings case. The Nollans 
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owned a beachfront bungalow property that was situated between two public beach properties. 
When they applied for a permit to demolish the bungalow, the California Coastal Commission 
conditioned the permit upon the Nollan’s provision of an easement consisting of a lateral access 
path across their rear (beach facing) property, so that the public could easily traverse from one 
public area to the other. The Nollans sued on the grounds that the condition constituted a 
violation of the takings clause. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the state could not 
condition the issuance of the permit upon the Nollan’s granting of a permanent public easement. 
The state could either pay for the easement without taking title to the property as a regulatory 
taking, or use eminent domain to take title to the strip of land. Either way, “it must pay for it.”18  
In terms of the appropriate standard of review, Justice Scalia writes “[o]ur cases have not 
elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a ‘legitimate state interest’ or what 
type of connection between the regulation and the state interest satisfies the requirement that the 
former ‘substantially advance’ the latter.”19 As Jerold S. Kayden writes, the Court came close to 
applying strict scrutiny in footnote 3 of the case.20 In that footnote, Justice Scalia writes  
[o]ur opinions do not establish that these standards are the same as those applied to due 
process or equal protection claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the takings 
field have generally been quite different. We have required that the regulation 
"substantially advance" the "legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved, Agins v. 
Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255, 447 U. S. 260 (1980), not that "the State could rationally have 
decided' that the measure adopted might achieve the State's objective.  
 
 Justice Scalia seems incorrect here. In Midkiff, a case decided after Agins but before 
Nollan, the court found that in takings cases, the scope of public use is “coterminous with the 
scope of a sovereign’s police power,” and the standard for the public use clause requires that “the 
exercise of eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose.”21 
Midkiff, of course, held that the use of eminent domain was rationally related to the state’s interest 
in regulating and preventing oligopoly on the grounds that “regulating oligopoly and the evils 
associated with it is a classic exercise of a State’s police powers.”22  
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 The most recent statement of the standard of review is found in Kelo v. City of London.23  
The Kelo case involved the use of eminent domain against residents of Fort Trumbull, a large, 
non-blighted neighborhood in New London, Connecticut. The city set out to purchase ninety 
acres of property in Fort Trumbull in order turn the property over to the Pfizer pharmaceutical 
company, who intended to build facilities for the corporation that would include hotels, retail 
space, a corporate center, and other amenities. The city would own the property, and Pfizer would 
be the tenant. Although many residents accepted compensation and moved out after the plan was 
announced, Susette Kelo and six other owners did not. After losing at both the trial court and the 
Connecticut Supreme Court, Kelo and the others found themselves before the United States 
Supreme Court. As Ilya Somin notes, the NAACP, the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference, the AARP, and the Hispanic Alliance of Atlantic County filed amicus curiae briefs 
in support of the plaintiffs. Amicus for the city were filed by development planners as well as 
state and local governments, groups which, Somin writes, “had an obvious and understandable 
interest in minimizing judicial scrutiny of the exercise of their eminent domain authority.”24 In a 
5-4 decision, the Court, per Justice Stevens, upheld the condemnation as a legitimate use of the 
takings clause, and found that the public benefit generated by the proposed use of the property 
constituted the ‘public use’ required by the clause.  
According to Somin, Kelo is first time the court permitted a nonblighted transfer for 
economic development.25 In terms of the kind of scrutiny applied in the case, Somin writes that 
Kelo represents a limited withdrawal from the “ultradeferential approach adopted in Berman and 
Midkiff” by giving courts more power to scrutinize takings.26 To that extent, Kelo is slightly more 
protective than rational basis.27 
In his concurrence with Justice Stevens’ majority opinion upholding the use of eminent 
domain, Justice Kennedy concurred that the rational basis test does not constitute “complete 
deference” to the legislature. In doing so, “he left open the possibility that some takings,” such as 
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private takings that show a favoritism to private parties, should be presumed invalid.28  In those 
cases, “a more stringent standard of review than that announced in Berman and Midkiff might be 
appropriate” if takees can show a presumption of “impermissible favoritism.”29 But Kennedy 
does not elaborate, and it remains to be seen how or when this standard of review is to be 
implemented.   The dissents concluded that private-to-private economic takings are 
unconstitutional. Otherwise, there is no meaningful limit on scope of condemnation.30 As Justice 
O’Connor writes: “The specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing is to prevent 
the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any 
farm with a factory.”31 The slight adjustment of the rational basis standard suggested in Kelo has 
not had any significant impact upon the continued use of bifurcation by the courts in terms of 
economic and noneconomic rights.  
Part 2. What’s Wrong with Bifurcation  
Indirectly referencing bifurcation, Gerald Gaus asks: “All liberals agree that at the core of 
their theory are persons with rights to bodily integrity, freedom of association, and freedom of 
conscience and speech…At what point does the person include her property?”32 It is possible to 
interpret the Constitution as providing for the right based upon an interpretation of the due 
process and takings clauses that finds private property to be a fundamental right because of its 
inextricable relationship to personhood, liberty, and privacy.  Because of this relationship, the 
Court should find that property and economic rights deserve the same strict standard of review 
currently applied to laws and regulations that impact other fundamental rights. This is facilitated, 
initially, by showing what’s wrong with birfurcation, and then refusing to make the kind of 
distinction between rights initiated by the Court in footnote 4 of Carolene Products. According to 
Jonathan R. Macey, this distinction between rights is untenable because of the “lack of a well-
articulated basis upon which a distinction between economic rights and other human rights can be 
made.”33 Like Macey, I show that “constitutional law should accord property rights the same 
dignity accorded other sorts of rights.”34 Specifically, private property should be accorded the 
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same protection as other privacy rights because private property, just like private thoughts, 
conscience, or reproductive decisions, are all derivations of the general, fundamental right to 
privacy.  In order to justify bifurcation— “the false distinction of preferred rights”35—the Court 
needs to show why “property and economic rights are less important to ordered liberty than other 
fundamental rights;” however, as Keynes writes, “there is no constitutional basis for 
distinguishing among property, economic, or other personal liberties.”36  The court has, in fact, 
recognized this lack of distinction. In Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., Justice Stewart writes  
the dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Property does 
not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without unlawful 
deprivation, no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is, in truth, a "personal" 
right, whether the "property" in question is a welfare check, a home, or a savings account. 
In fact, a fundamental interdependence exists between the personal right to liberty and the 
personal right in property. Neither could have meaning without the other. That rights in 
property are basic civil rights has long been recognized.37 
 
However, despite this strong support against bifurcation, the Court has not yet found 
property to be a fundamental right. Speech, religion, procreative, and marital rights are clearly 
protective of the private nature of one’s conscience, belief system, and intimacy, and these 
attributes of personhood are private because of the limited nature of the public’s right to interfere 
with them.  These attributes of personhood are also implicated when a person establishes private 
interests in external zones such as the home; in fact, the exercise of privacy is impossible without 
correspondingly private zones in the form of property, land, or residences. As classical scholar 
Fred D. Miller writes, “private property necessarily has a central place in any account of the 
private sphere, since it defines the location and means of private activities.”38 The private 
property right provides security so that private actions can take place. Because these rights are no 
less fundamental than speech, religion, travel, and marriage rights, they should enjoy the same 
level of constitutional protection particularly when the property right is viewed as an extension of 
the core privacy right.   
This understanding of privacy refuses to prioritize civil rights over property rights 
through the choice of different levels of judicial review.  The fundamental liberty to speak or 
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worship should not be valued higher than the interest in reproductive freedom, and speech rights 
should not be preferred over the right to keep one’s property against the use of eminent domain. 
Therefore, the interest in not being forcibly evicted from one’s home by the state is no less 
fundamental that the interest in not being punished for the exercise of speech or reproductive 
rights.  By distinguishing between the preferred freedoms of speech, liberty, and privacy and 
property rights, the Court has engaged in what Macedo calls an indefensible “double standard"39 
that ignores both the similar origins of these rights as well as their common foundation in the 
right to exclude and the duty not to interfere. The double standard means that the court applies 
strict scrutiny for laws that interfere with “preferred freedoms” such as speech, religion, and 
privacy or suspect classes/discrete and insular minorities, but rational basis for economic liberties 
and property rights.40  
According to Macedo, “[p]roperty rights, the freedom to engage in a particular 
occupation, and other economic rights converge with personal values such as the security of the 
home, the survival of valued communities and associations, and the pursuit of happiness in a 
freely chosen way of life.”41  Therefore, “[p]ersonal security and privacy are…clearly linked with 
property ownership.”42 Because of the importance of these values, Macedo and I agree that the 
Court should apply a “heightened level of scrutiny to cases where individual economic liberty is 
at stake.”43 
William Riker makes a series of comparisons and analogies between the civil right of free 
speech and the right to private property. He locates the origin of these rights in the English 
common law beginning with the Magna Carta, where they are “conceptually intertwined and 
treated identically.”44 He argues that the civil rights and the property right protected similar 
interests against both other citizens and the King. To that extent, Riker writes, “[c]ivil and 
property rights look very much alike.”45 Riker’s point is that civil rights are necessary for political 
participation, economic rights are necessary for economic participation, and that political and 
economic participation are intertwined.  
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Macey makes the claim for the fundamental right to property based on the implications of 
a bifurcated rights system for democratic politics. He argues that a bifurcated system permits 
political authorities to obtain, through regulation, private goods that are then redistributed or 
‘brokered’ as public goods based upon the amount of influence from interest groups supporting 
one distribution over another.46 In order to prevent any one group from having too much 
influence, these “interest group wealth transfers” ought to be costly, meaning that there ought to 
be a system of Constitutional separation of powers which regulates whether and how much 
political influence will result in judicially-sanctioned legislation.  Under such a system, each 
branch of the government has “the authority to curb the activities of the others.”47 
According to Macey, the separation of powers doctrine has failed because the judiciary 
has failed to stop Congress’s “propensity to transfer wealth from the politically disorganized to 
the politically powerful.”48 The politically disorganized group that supplies the transfers and are 
subject to regulation are “the public,” who are not represented in the interest group bargaining 
process.49 When the public is taxed through economic regulation, their wealth is brokered by 
political authorities who are committed to spending that wealth on funding legislation which 
benefits the authorities themselves and the interest groups that successfully lobbied for the 
legislation. Because the judiciary has abdicated their ‘check’ of this kind of political activity by 
bifurcating rights into legislatable, or economic, and nonlegislatable, or fundamental, rights, 
public goods are produced through the economic theory of regulation, or public choice theory.50 
Under this theory, “statutes are treated as commodities that are purchased by individual interest 
groups or coalitions of interests groups that outbid and outmaneuver other interest groups in the 
political process.”51  
According to this theory, economic rights are bifurcated from other rights in order to 
facilitate wealth redistribution by politicians. Redistribution finances the state and provides, 
through legislation, a variety of public goods. Were economic rights not bifurcated from other 
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rights, and were they subject to the same level of constitutional review as other rights, politicians 
would not be able to fund the state, and nor would they be unable to create public goods from 
private goods. Bifurcation is therefore a political decision made by political authorities in order to 
further statist objectives. According to Macey, bifurcation is possible due to “the decline of strict 
judicial scrutiny of legislative interference with economic rights,” which makes it easier for 
interest groups to influence Congress’s power to instigate wealth transfers.52  One of the ways to 
achieve this is to give “special interest legislation a public interest façade.”53  This is most clearly 
visible in the justification of regulation and takings (through public use or police power) 
predicated on the promotion of public welfare.  
            Macey suggests that legislators ‘permit’ noneconomic rights because, at least in terms of 
the speech and assembly rights, they allow special interests groups to form and then seek the 
implementation of their interests through legislation sponsored by elected officials. Legislators 
gain from nonregulation of noneconomic rights, and benefit from regulation of economic rights. 
Noneconomic rights and freedoms, which provide “protection against government interference”54 
in many areas, benefit their holders by  promoting freedom and generating social welfare, and 
they also have low costs or externalities.   
According to Macey, “the activities that take place within the private sector are, by 
definition, voluntary. By contrast, those activities that take place within the public sector under 
the authority of the state are, by definition, coercive; they would not exist without the 
nonvoluntary funding of those who are taxed to support them. Protecting economic liberties is, 
therefore, instrumental to protecting noneconomic liberties.”55  There ought to be a strong, 
cognizable connection between coercive legislation and its intended benefit or purpose. 
According to Macey, the rational basis standard reduces litigation opportunities for the public and 
‘exposure’ of the legislation by the judiciary. “From a public choice perspective, this judicial 
deference to Congress has deprived the public of an important source of information about the 
activities of Congress.”56 Therefore, a stricter standard of review over property and economic 
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legislation would better protect both economic and noneconomic rights, and courts are obligated 
to establish this level of review in order to properly re-situate economic among noneconomic 
rights.  
In regards to this issue, Edward Keynes asks when is property a “constitutionally 
protected private realm that is beyond consideration of public welfare?”57 One way to repair the 
fissure of bifurcation is by showing that economic and property rights, as substantive rights, 
deserve substantive due process protection. A substantive due process right to property would 
provide such a place. In a line of majority and dissenting opinions by Justice Hugo Black, Black 
opined that there no substantive due process protections for economic rights,58 but also that there 
are no similar protections for personal rights such the use of contraceptives.59 As Keynes 
observes, the Griswold and Casey cases invoke due process in order to produce substantive 
privacy rights, but the Court otherwise repudiates “substantive due process as a protection of 
economic and property rights.”60 This requires the Court to make a distinction, resulting in 
bifurcation, between categories of rights. For Keynes, courts should not make this distinction 
because the Constitution does not make it either.  
As Randy Barnett has forcefully argued, footnote 4 has not been strictly observed, and 
that is a good thing for both privacy and property advocates. According to Barnett, Justice 
Douglas’ opinion in Griswold challenged footnote four by providing heightened scrutiny to 
privacy, a nonenumerated right. Douglas “distanced himself from Lochner” and its reliance upon 
the idea of substantive due process, yet still found a substantive right to privacy.61  As a result, 
Barnett writes, “the right of privacy…violated the post-New Deal jurisprudence of Footnote 
Four.”62 This would also be true of the Court’s opinion in Casey, which found that “[i]t is a 
promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may 
not enter. We have vindicated this principle before.”63 
Barnett calls this kind of judicial decision-making “footnote 4 plus,” in which the Court 
takes footnote 4 and adds privacy and perhaps other rights, but still allows the court to pick and 
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choose which rights receive rational basis or strict scrutiny due to their status as fundamental or 
nonfundamental rights. Barnett argues that the bifurcation of rights in footnote 4 “runs afoul of 
the text of the Constitution” and footnote 4 plus does the same by letting judges “pick those 
unenumerated liberties they deem fundamental from those they dismiss as mere liberty 
interests.”64  
According to Barnett, the “pure” footnote four approach would deny strict scrutiny not 
only to property rights, but also to many of the other rights intrinsically bound to the implied yet 
substantive privacy right.65 Both privacy and property rights deserve equal protection, and 
therefore the court’s reliance upon bifurcation pursuant to the footnote should be discontinued. As 
a result, according to Barnett’s analysis, “virtually all current possessory crimes, such as laws that 
make illegal the possession by competent adults of ordinary firearms, intoxicating or therapeutic 
drugs, or pornographic images, are improper and unconstitutional.”66 Discontinuance would also, 
I maintain, protect against other incursions into property through eminent domain or other types 
of property regulation.  
 A final note in light of Barnett’s libertarian objection to footnote 4. As Riker observes, 
the Carolene Products case itself is an example how bifurcation has operated to not only violate 
property rights, but also to inhibit what Macey calls “exposure” of improper influence on the 
legislative process. According to Riker, The Filled Milk Act was special interest, or protectionist, 
legislation designed to favor condensed milk processors, in that “the purported public-interest 
justification was a transparent masquerade for legislation that protected one segment of the dairy 
industry against another. The statute expropriated the property of one lawful business to the 
benefit of another and deprived the public of an inexpensive, healthy alternative to condensed 
milk products.”67 Ely concurs that the case arose out of the “dairy industry’s long standing 
campaign against filled milk, a type of evaporated skimmed milk.”68 Congress passed this special 
interest and anti-competitive legislation by making the determination that filled milk was 
injurious to health, and the Court simply accepted that determination as an exercise of the 
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government’s police power. Supporters of the prohibition of, for example, marijuana, would find 
much of interest in this kind of judicial deference. Opponents, including those of us who believe 
that use of marijuana is protected by a variety of substantive privacy, property, and private 
property rights (including a right against punishment), would encourage a much higher level of 
review because of prohibition’s impact on those fundamental rights. 69   Clearly, political 
opposition to items such as firearms would also benefit from strong or statist rules about property 
regulation, including the facilitation of increased police powers and an increased use of eminent 
domain, which, according to Robin Paul Malloy, “embodies a strongly emerging trend toward 
statist ideology.”70 
Part 3. Locating the Right: The Case for Constitutional Property 
In order to overcome bifurcation and determine that economic or property rights are 
constitutionally protected fundamental rights, courts must be able to ‘find’ the private property 
right within the constitutional jurisprudence. This right to property is already, so to speak, there. 
For example, the right to privacy was found through a lengthy discursive process that includes 
cultural evidence, statutory findings, the impact of criminal prosecution, first amendment rights, 
reference to other rights, and other considerations.71 This right was found to be a fundamental 
right, despite the oft-repeated claim that the word privacy is not found ‘anywhere’ in the 
constitution. This claim is often made in order to deny that the constitution protects abortion or 
other privacy-related rights. But the claim that the word “privacy” is not in the Constitution is 
only half true.  
“Privacy” is the noun form of the word “private,” which is an adjective. For every 
instantiation of the noun “privacy,” (e.g., when a person wants some privacy in order to ruminate 
over an important decision, in which case privacy is a noun or a thing, or, in this case, a place), 
there is a corresponding instantiation of the adjectival “private” (e.g., if that person finds some 
privacy for their deliberations, the place they have found, such as a room or perhaps simply their 
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own thoughts, is private). If a place is private is means that privacy is found there. Therefore, the 
use of the noun “private” always entails the adjectival or descriptive word “privacy.”72  
The word “private” appears exactly once in the Constitution: in the takings clause. It is 
not used in conjunction with the word “right,” but, of course, that word also does not appear in 
conjunction with religion, speech or press—although it is used the final phrases of the First 
Amendment (“or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government 
for a redress of grievances.”). It is also not used in the Third Amendment’s “right” against the 
quartering of soldiers, and nor is it used in the Fifth Amendment’s detailed protection of due 
process “rights.” Interestingly, the Fourteenth Amendment, which is universally understood to 
provide extensive equal protection rights, only explicitly mentions the “right to vote.” There is no 
real controversy over whether these provisions provide fundamental, constitutionally protected 
rights to equal protection, to the free exercise of religion, to speech despite the absence of the 
word “right.” Why should there be controversy over the right to private property? Or, more 
pointedly, to the existence of a right to privacy as an enumerated right—as the only enumerated 
privacy right—in things such as the Fourth Amendment’s ‘persons, houses, places, and effects’? 
The “enumerated right,” a phrase that only appears in the Ninth Amendment, found in the Fourth 
Amendment includes “the right of the people to be secure” in those places, and this right has been 
determined to be a penumbral source of the right to privacy when jurisprudes have sought to 
locate such a right.73 But the privacy right has always existed in the phrase “private property” 
despite the “second class” treatment of the right by various jurisprudential camps since, primarily, 
the rise of New Deal economic legislation in the 1930s. The kind of private property right 
referred to in the takings clause is precisely the kind of private property right advocated for here.  
This is not a purely ‘textualist’ or literalist argument. Other historical factors, including 
the fact that the protections of the takings clause were the very first rights incorporated by the 
Fourteenth Amendment and applied to the states74 also suggest the existence of a fundamental 
property right. Nor is the property right being cherry-picked from the rest of the Constitution, 
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which is replete with detailed references to property-like rights as well as the more established 
privacy rights. These references suggest that certain types of property are specifically protected.  
It is clear that arms have a special type of protection,75 as do ‘persons, houses, papers, and 
effects.’76 The First Amendment would suggests that books and things related to the press are 
specifically protected, and the same amendment suggests that places of worship, and the items 
used there (candles, votives, religious texts) also have some special protection. And, as stated 
above, the Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of soldiers in homes, and this clearly means 
private homes.   
 In Article 1, section 8, clause 8, the Constitution protects the property of “author and 
inventors,” such as books, creative works, and intellectual property, by granting them “the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Clause 1 of that section also 
empowers Congress “To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises” which “shall be 
uniform throughout the United States.” However, according to Section 9, clause 5, Congress 
lacks the power to tax or duty “Articles exported from any State,” (i.e. things or property). Clause 
6 of the same section provides that “No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of 
Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, 
or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.” States may not “make any 
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts” (Section 10, clause 1), and nor 
shall they, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any “Imposts or Duties on Imports or 
Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws.” (Section 
10, clause 2). Article VI, section 1, ensures that prior debts incurred “before the Adoption of this 
Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the 
Confederation,” and Amendment 18, repealed by the 21st, prohibited “the manufacture, sale, or 
transportation of intoxicating liquors.” These examples show that the Constitution clearly 
considers the role of property in its purview of the rights of citizens, states, and the Federal 
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government. This right is most clearly found in the right to private property expressed by the 
takings clause.  
I argued in chapter 3 that homes deserve heightened constitutional protection. Although 
the Court has provided powerful protections for noneconomic rights and other private activities 
that take place inside homes, why has it not protected homes themselves?  As Barros argues, 
homes should be protected by a higher level of scrutiny “to better ensure that homes taken by use 
of eminent domain are in fact required for public use,”77 and to ensure that a higher-than market 
value compensation is provided to owners for the personal interest in the home.78 As Barros 
observes, the Kelo majority “did not even discuss the possibility that homes could be treated 
differently than other types of property in the eminent domain context.” When taking into 
consideration the fact that homes enjoy strong protection in Fourth Amendment situations, “the 
Court's failure to address the unique nature of the home is striking.”79  
For Barros, the private and personal interest in the home should lead legislatures to 
“restrict the scope of public use by prohibiting the taking of homes for purposes of economic 
development,” but also for “non-controversial uses such as roads and schools.” Heightened 
scrutiny would “permit municipalities to take a home only after making a finding that the 
property could not be purchased voluntarily and that there was no reasonable alternative course of 
action that would achieve the same public goal. Legislatures could take other steps to encourage 
municipalities to seize homes only as a last resort, such as requiring the payment of a premium 
above fair market value as compensation for taking a home.”80 
Ilya Somin provides a cautious warning about this kind of approach. Although 
“condemnation of homes often inflicts great suffering,” the same can be said for “houses of 
worship and various other nonprofit institutions” as well as small businesses.81 Also, Somin notes 
that the purpose of the kind of heightened scrutiny Barros recommends is to ensure that the public 
receives clear and significant benefits from the taking. “Unfortunately,” Somin writes,  “the test 
creates a perverse incentive to increase the amount of property condemned than reduce it.”82 As a 
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result, the bigger the development, the easier is becomes to claim it is ‘reasonably necessary’ to 
ensure completion and that “noncoercive alternatives will not suffice.”83 Instead, Somin wants a 
categorical ban on economic development and blight condemnations, and this is best achieved by 
the recognition of a fundamental right to private property. Such a right would probably prohibit 
most uses of eminent domain over private residences. This would eliminate programs of 
economic development that transfer private property to other private owners. It would also 
provide similar protections to many kinds of commercial property as long as claims can be 
sustained that the property expresses the privacy interests of the owner(s).  
According to Somin, stronger judicial enforcement also protects the discrete and insular 
minorities mentioned in footnote 4, whose properties are typically the target of eminent domain.84 
Somin: “Local governments are unlikely to target the property of the wealthy and influential for 
these kinds of takings, because they wish to avoid a difficult political struggle. But they rightly 
believe they can more easily overcome the resistance of the poor or politically weak.”85 
Constitutional scholar Ahkil Reed Amar also views the takings clause as a “prohibition” that 
“seems primarily designed to protect individuals and minority groups.”86 
The dissenters in Kelo also used a fundamental rights approach that is shaped by footnote 
4’s directive that courts should use strict scrutiny in order to protect ‘discrete and insular 
minorities.’ Justices O’Connor and Thomas claimed that eminent domain legislation works 
against the property interests of the poor and minorities.87 This claim is supported by the research 
undertaken by Carpenter and Ross, whose study used census data and a sample of redevelopment 
project areas to verify the Justices’ claims.88 “Compared with those in surrounding communities, 
significantly more residents in areas targeted by eminent domain are ethnic or racial minorities, 
have completed significantly less education and live on significantly less income.”89 Apart from 
losing their homes, Justice Thomas, using language very similar to Michelman’s, infra, noted that 
“no compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to the individuals displaced 
and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes.”90 Still worse, he continues,  
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It is backwards to adopt a searching standard of constitutional review for nontraditional 
property interests, such as welfare benefits, see, e.g., Goldberg, supra, while deferring to 
the legislature’s determination as to what constitutes a public use when it exercises the 
power of eminent domain, and thereby invades individuals’ traditional rights in real 
property. The Court has elsewhere recognized “the overriding respect for the sanctity of 
the home that has been embedded in our traditions since the origins of the 
Republic,” Payton, supra, at 601, when the issue is only whether the government may 
search a home. Yet today the Court tells us that we are not to “second-guess the City’s 
considered judgments,” ante, at 18, when the issue is, instead, whether the government 
may take the infinitely more intrusive step of tearing down petitioners’ homes. 
Something has gone seriously awry with this Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. 
Though citizens are safe from the government in their homes, the homes themselves are 
not. Once one accepts, as the Court at least nominally does, ante, at 6, that the Public Use 
Clause is a limit on the eminent domain power of the Federal Government and the States, 
there is no justification for the almost complete deference it grants to legislatures as to 
what satisfies it.91 
Justice Thomas makes an important point here in terms of the relationship between privacy and 
property. He asks why the court should defer to legislatures when they take homes pursuant to 
eminent domain, and then provide strict constitutional (i.e. nondeferential) standards for the 
issuance of a search warrant based on privacy concerns.  As a result, a person’s interest in their 
home is better protected against searches than takings. Here, Thomas makes the connection 
between Fourth Amendment privacy in the security of the home and Fifth Amendment privacy in 
the ownership and possession of it. This connection is meant to show that eminent domain 
undermines not only property but also privacy interests in the home, and, because it mandates the 
removal of persons and their personal property from their home for use by the state, it constitutes 
the apex of privacy and property rights infringements. Protections against eminent domain protect 
privacy in the ordinary sense that it is protected by the Fourth Amendment, and, by the same 
token, the use of eminent domain violates privacy as well as property interests.  
The United States Supreme made the connection between property and privacy rights in 
Soldal v. Cook County Illinois et al.92 In Soldal, the owner of a trailer home was illegally evicted 
from a mobile home park when the owners of the park towed the mobile home to another 
location. The local sheriff colluded with the owners of the park in the illegal eviction. “As a result 
of the state action in this case,” writes Justice White on behalf of a unanimous court, “the Soldals’ 
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domicile was not only seized, it literally was carried away, giving new meaning to the term 
‘mobile home.’”93 The Seventh Circuit, who were overruled by the Soldal holding, held that no 
Constitutional violation occurred because there was no search of the home in the traditional 
sense: it was never entered, and nor were items seized. This was an error, writes White, because 
the entire house was seized, and a seizure occurs where “there is some meaningful interference 
with an individual’s possessory interest in that property.”94 Such seizures of property are “subject 
to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even though no search within the meaning of the Amendment has 
taken place.”95 
Therefore, the movement of property, particularly in the form of a trailer home, can 
constitute a constitutional violation of the right to security in ‘person, houses, places, and effect’ 
even when state officials do not enter or search the property or otherwise engage in conventional 
Fourth Amendment-type actions. In the context of eminent domain, Soldal stands for the 
proposition that other provisions of the constitution, including the provision for security of houses 
in the Fourth Amendment, are relevant to determinations about the role that privacy ought to play 
in takings litigation. Future litigants in Kelo or Poletown-type situations would be wise to rely 
upon Soldal’s dicta and holding in the search for finding new ways to frame the argument against 
the taking of homes and other properties through eminent domain. 
Part 4. Judicial Review and Rights Foundationalism 
Having shown that the right is locatable in the constitutional jurisprudence, the only way 
to get to the right is probably through the use of judicial review, which would require the courts 
to revisit its property jurisprudence and find the fundamental right. Why would courts do this?  
The due process and takings clauses, among many others, not only recognize and grant 
rights, but they also restrict the state’s ability to limit certain kinds of behaviors. As Barnett 
observes, this reflects the dichotomy of constitutional rights, which reflects the fact that there are 
at least two ways to view such rights. On the one hand, restrictions on liberties are presumed 
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constitutional until judges are convinced that the liberty interest at play is fundamental—this is 
the rational basis standard, and here the burden is on the rightsholder. On the other hand, 
restrictions are presumed unconstitutional unless judges are convinced by state that restrictions 
are necessary, proper, or compelling—which is the strict scrutiny standard, and there the burden 
is upon the state.96 Another option would be a general policy against judicial review altogether. 
Alexander, for example, would like to see a restriction on judicial review of purportedly 
‘legitimate’ land use decisions by agencies and law-making bodies and a wider range of 
opportunities for democratic or popular voices in property law. This is because, for Alexander, 
judicial review is a nondemocratic procedure that ‘interrupts’ ‘the people’s right’ to make 
property determinations.97 
Because the states and their legislatures have not recognized the property right as 
fundamental, Ellen Frankel Paul writes that “[t]he most likely candidate for a countervailing 
internal force for the protection of property rights is the courts.”98 Through judicial review, the 
courts should abandon bifurcation. Paul: “Just as it is now the rule in cases challenging laws on 
‘equal protection,’ or ‘due process grounds,’ when states trench upon ‘fundamental rights,’ states 
should have to demonstrate that a compelling state interest overrides individuals’ economic 
interests.”99 
Jurists who are also rights foundationalists are undoubtedly more prone to find this kind 
of right, and rights foundationalism reflects rights entrenchment.  According to James Fleming, a 
right is entrenched if it “cannot constitutionally be revised, regardless of the extent to which a 
majority” of the citizenry support revision. According to Bruce Ackerman, rights foundationalists 
hold that “the Constitution is first concerned with protecting rights; only then does it authorize the 
People to work their will on other matters.” 100  The foundational rights protected by the 
Constitution are the kind of fundamental rights listed in the document in regards to speech, 
religion, and assembly, for example. When legislation threatens these rights, the classical 
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conception of judicial review considers courts to be “obligated to interpret the higher law of the 
Constitution and to preserve it against encroachments by the ordinary law of legislation.”101  
 It is this conception of judicial review that Richard Epstein, for example, believes is 
necessary to protect private property rights, and his position that uncompensated economic 
regulations are actually compensable takings would mean a huge increase in judicial power and 
intervention.102 Epstein intends to show that judicial review will lead to less takings, but it could 
just as well lead to more police power due to judicial reviews that find against property rights. In 
fact, according to the data, the odds are stacked against property in the courts because the 
overwhelming majority of judicially reviewed cases uphold the taking. As political theorist 
Walter F. Murphy writes, in the U.S. as well as several other nations, “judicial review much more 
often than not sustains the validity of challenged policies.”103 Why then would Epstein want more 
review if the deck seems stacked?  
One of the factors that undoubtedly influences the court’s assignment of protection to 
property rights is its broad or narrow interpretation of the public use clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, and again, this reflects the jurists’ penchant for, or lack thereof, rights 
foundationalism. For Paul, the question of public use should be a judicial question, “but with no 
deference to legislative judgments and no presumption in favor of the constitutionality of a 
challenged takings.”104 As Paul observes, this is the current practice in the constitutions of 
Arizona, Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri, and Washington.105 As James Ely notes, “among all the 
guarantees of the Bill of Rights, only the public use limitation is singled out for heavy [judicial] 
deference.”106  Somin notes that overruling Kelo would, by using the narrow approach to public 
use, deny that economic development (private to private) qualifies as public use.107 The narrow 
view only permits transfers of private property to government or private entities that have a legal 
obligation to allow the general public to utilize the property. For example, the use of eminent 
domain to provide a utility service, which might be public (meaning it is owned by state) or 
private (owned and operated pursuant to a state license), would be a narrow public use. A broad 
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use, on the other hand, allows for eminent domain to be “used for virtually any project that might 
create some sort of benefit to the public”108 The Kelo decision permits the broad interpretation, 
but a strict or heightened scrutiny would, mostly likely, reject it.  
Section 2. Objections to Fundamental Rights Analysis  
There are a variety of reasons for opposing property as a fundamental, constitutionally protected 
right. Certainly, moral opposition to private property in general would deny property the status of 
a fundamental right. According to Merrill and Smith, this ‘property antipathy’ is found in 
“Proudhon's slogan that ‘property is theft,’ and build(s) through Marx and Engels with their call 
for the abolition of private property.” This tradition, they write, “has put property on the 
defensive in the minds of those drawn to thinking of public policy in moral terms.”109 Property 
antipathy is also related to the desire for redistribution either through taxes or in kind 
distributions, or to the desire to provide the kind of autonomy Waldron has argued for on behalf 
of the homeless.110 The biggest fear, I think, is the return to Lochner era substantive due process 
property rights, which, as Thomas Christiano argues below, may result the elimination of 
minimum wage or environmental protection regulations.  
The following objections to the establishment of property as a fundamental right take a 
variety of tactical approaches to the issue. Part 1 examines objections that claim that private 
property is harmful.  Christiano argues that it is harmful because it can be used to override the 
aims of democracy, and the aims of the democratic assembly in particular. In response, the use of 
the police power, which regulates harmful uses of property when it is a nuisance, is proffered as a 
political method for reigning in the property right. In Part 2, I discuss Frank Michelman’s defense 
of bifurcation on the grounds that there is no fundamental right against “asset depletion.” Part 3 
explains Jed Rubenfeld’s pure textualist argument against fundamental rights overall, and, in Part 
4, Itai Sened describes a starkly positivist account of property rights that dispenses with 
moralized concepts like ‘fundamental,’ yet still provides for significant property rights 
protections.  
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Part 1. Christiano, Capitalism, and the Police Power  
As Olsen writes, both Locke and Marx want to prevent private property and wealth from 
being “illegitimately converted into political authority;”111 to that extent, political authority 
cannot be the direct and immediate entailment of wealth and property.112 If economic rights are 
protected as much as noneconomic rights, meaning that both were considered fundamental and 
protected by the same level of strict constitutional scrutiny, what kind of effect does this have in 
either direction? Do economic rights swamp noneconomic rights? There is nothing immediately 
obvious in terms of conceptual compatibility. Part of the argument for noneconomic rights and 
against economic rights is that they are not compatible, or that one is more important or 
fundamental than the other. I think this is a mistake. The biggest fear is that the economic rights 
of one group—owners—will trump the noneconomic rights of nonowners. The primary reason to 
redistribute or deny at some arbitrary point is not that there is a moral degradation, but that wealth 
or property has harmed others: that possession of some item of property entails harm to at least 
one other person or their interests. 
As Gaus writes, there is fear that “if the state does not act through coercive laws, there 
will be great private coercion”113 through the use of property or wealth. Thomas Christiano 
believes that by exercising a ‘disproportionate influence over the political societies in which they 
operate,”114 capitalists harm both the democratic process and other persons through a form of 
private coercion. By exercising what Christiano calls “fairly garden variety property rights,” 
capitalists could defeat democratic control over “the great majority of regulation and taxation by 
the government in pursuit of economic, environment, worker-safety, welfare, and redistributive 
policies.”115 
Democracy, for Christiano, is defined as political equality, where citizens have an equal 
say in the organization of society because they have equal votes, where there is “equality in the 
process of deliberation,” and where there is “equality in the resources that go into making 
coalitions and bargaining over political aims and policies.”116 Political equality is achieved 
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through a democratic division of labor: citizens choose aims or ends of society, and a subset of 
citizens, including politicians, interests groups, and experts,  determine the means through the 
political process of drafting and implementing policies and legislation.117 Capitalists, however, do 
not participate in the establishment of aims or goals, but they make it more or less difficult for 
government officials to make the goals feasible. Feasibility is not achieved through the 
democratic process, but capitalists can influence whether the implementation of the aims are 
feasible by, for example, threatening to fire workers to oppose democratic minimum wage laws, 
or moving factories abroad in order to oppose emission control laws. In fact, Christiano argues, 
the very ability to move to emissions-friendly countries reduces the likelihood that government 
officials will implement the will of the people (their aims) because enforcement will not be 
feasible.118 Firms, therefore, have non-democratic effects on policy choices even when they have 
no influence upon the democratic process, and they still frustrate the aims of democratic interests 
“simply in virtue of being able to exercise their ordinary liberal property rights.”119  
So, Christiano concludes, private property stymies democracy, and actions of capitalists 
act as ‘constraints’ on the government.120 For example, assume that a law is proposed that 
requires capitalists to contribute 1% of all profits over $1B to a fund to save manatees. The 
capitalists announce that they will draw back operations in order to ensure that profits do not 
exceed $1B in order to avoid the tax—perhaps they do not like manatees. Christiano would argue 
that this constitutes political power that defeats democratically chosen aims—for Christiano, it 
“heads off democratic legislation”—and government officials are subjected to that power because 
they may choose to not implement the law despite the aims of the democratic majority. But the 
capitalists have not disobeyed anyone or influenced the formation of democratic aims.121 
However, they have stymied the realization of them. 
Christiano believes there is a moral duty for all citizens, including capitalists, to “go 
along” with the decisions of the democratic assembly. So capitalist private property is limited by 
the “requirement to cooperate with the democratic assembly, just as officials have duties to 
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cooperate in the pursuit of the aims chosen by the democratic assembly.”122 Capitalists have same 
duties as public officials, who have the same duties as everyone else, to cooperate with 
majoritarian aims.  
However, Christiano recognizes that democratic assemblies may not abridge 
“fundamental rights of life, association, or privacy.” Certain aspects of a “right to private property 
are similarly fundamental”123 to the extent that “abridgements of basic rights of personal private 
property are beyond” the basic limits of democratic assemblies.124 This ‘fundamental’ property 
right does not include the right to own capital. Like Rawls, Christiano provides for the purely 
“personal” property right, which I call “toothbrush rights.” These rights protect a fundamental 
right to own, for example, a toothbrush, which is a right on par with freedom of expression or 
association. States that take toothbrushes for public use, or ban them altogether, step over limit. 
However, there is no such right to buy or sell or loan or make toothbrushes—this, of course, 
would be the capitalist right—and states might take over production and distribution with no 
effect on toothbrush rights. The right, then, is only over use: how one brushes, when one brushes, 
or if one brushes at all. There is probably no right to pick color or bristle softness—again, those 
seem to depend upon capitalist rights—and probably no right to own more than one.  
  As Christiano might argue, the best way to facilitate public oversight of private property 
is not through eminent domain, but through the police power: it is low cost, it preserves property 
tax income from owners, it superficially satisfies property rightists (because it does take property 
outright), and it gives the public a stick or two of interest in all regulated property.  According to 
Justice Brennan, regulations promulgated under the state’s police power must be substantially 
related to the promotion of the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the public, and such 
regulations must benefit the public as well.125 This establishes a very low bar for the exercise of 
the power.  
Constitutional rights do not license wrongful harm, and preventing or rectifying unjust 
harm is a basic provision of the state.126 While these provisions are typically served by the 
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criminal law by way of enforcement and punishment, the state’s obligation for serving them in 
the realm of property law constitutes a legitimate exercise of state power. Consequently, the state 
should take and/or regulate property when it is used to wrongfully harm others. The harm must be 
unjust, because there are plenty of examples where we might harm others but the harm is not 
unjust and therefore not actionable.127 Wrongful harm that results from the exercise of property 
rights is best exemplified by the concept of nuisance, but unjust harm can also result from the 
unjust acquisition or transfer of property rights. Nozick’s theory of rectification attempts to right 
these wrongs. The idea is that property rights should be adjusted by the state itself or private 
parties acting within the institutions of justice when the right or possession is the result of 
injustice (as in theft), or when property is used to commit unjust acts. For Nozick, rectification is 
required when there is some stain on the chain of title which shows that an unjust acquisition or 
transfer took place at t1 (some point in the past), resulting in an unjust and reparable property right 
at t2 (i.e. the present day).128   An unjust acquisition or transfer at t1 necessarily includes 
acquisitions or transfers that violate preexisting rights.   
 Therefore, just as the engagement in a harmful nuisance justifies the forced transfer or 
regulation of property rights from a culpable owner to another, justice in rectification authorizes 
the forced transfer of property rights from an innocent owner to a person harmed by the exercise 
of a property right.129 Other examples of harm (culpable or otherwise) would include the use of 
property to cause the exploitation, dehumanization, or degradation of others. However, the mere 
fact of property ownership in some thing, or the accumulation of some arbitrary amount of 
wealth, cannot be said to harm anyone absent some showing that the property is or might be used 
to cause or permit unjust harm. Again, many types of harms are not unjust, so the burden would 
lie with the state (this is always the case when fundamental rights are subject to legislation and 
judicial review) to show the existence of the requisite causal or permissive nexus between the 
exercise of the incidents of ownership (the right to use, collect rents, modify, destroy, and so 
forth) and the unjust harm. This is a variation of the necessity requirement. Rights, particularly 
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property rights, should be infringed or outright denied when such infringement or denial is 
necessary to prevent or rectify some greater harm, or, as Nozick puts it, “moral catastrophe.” No 
property right is more important than rights against exploitation, dehumanization, or degradation 
or the perpetuation of moral catastrophe. Similarly, rights against these injustices are not property 
rights: exploitation and dehumanization are not condemnable as violations of one’s property, but 
one’s autonomy, dignity, and personhood, all of which are protected by the right of privacy, i.e., 
the right to exclude and the duty of non-interference.  
The question persists how the nexus, claimed by Christiano, between property (as capital, 
ownership, or advantage) and harm is a causal one, and this seems to require, in the majority of 
cases, an ad hoc approach to particularized allegations of harm instead of a categorical one. Until 
a particular use of property is alleged to cause the harms at issue here, the owner’s right to control 
and exclude, as external manifestations of their privacy rights, should remain free of state 
interference or the kinds of democratic control suggested by Christiano.   
Part 2. Michelman, Bifurcation, and Property Rights 
In this part, I will explain Frank Michelman’s objection to a constitutional property right, explain 
why we agree on at least one aspect of that objection, and then show why his account does not 
compel the rejection of a constitutionally-guaranteed property right. More importantly, I will 
show that Michelman’s account fails to protect many important rights because it requires 
justifications for rights claims in the form of a burden of proof standard that is incommensurate 
with a liberal-democratic understanding of fundamental rights.  
Over the course of several articles, Michelman lodges what I consider to be the most 
powerful criticism of the type of constitutional property rights I advance here: that property rights 
on their own, considered in isolation from other rights and virtues such as liberty or dignity or 
privacy, do not demand either respect from nonowners or, in the case of the government, 
protection against regulation or takings simply in virtue of ownership. Michelman argues that 
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property rights are the product of other, more important, rights. A formal, constitutional property 
right, such as the right contained in the takings clause, does not protect or advance those rights. It 
merely enforces a rule that says, in effect, “some government action impaired some asset’s value, 
and compensation is due.” Such a rule has nothing to do with any other rules or values or injuries. 
For Michelman, the property right should be protected only if it advances other interests of the 
owner—primarily, political rights against oppression130 but also intangible rights to community 
and security—and only if it does not impair similar interests of nonowners. Property rights have 
little normative force without reference to a broad catalogue of other rights, and a simple rule or 
formula that protects a basic property right, such as that contained in the takings clause, 
improperly privileges that basic right above other rights. For Michelman, the fear that a property 
clause will privilege property claims over others is a reason to bifurcate property from other 
rights, and, as a result of bifurcation, a reason to treat the property right as less deserving of 
protection that other rights.   
As Michelman observes, the view that the right to property is a “basic human right” is, 
“to put it mildly, controversial within the broad stream of recent liberal political philosophy.”131 
For Michelman, any rights claim, including speech or religion or privacy claims, must be justified 
in terms of other rights or interests, and those claims are also subject to analysis in terms of harm 
or benefit to others. For example, a claim of freedom of speech would need to be situated into a 
larger right, such as freedom of expression, and that interest itself would be weighed against a 
variety of claims from others that might justify a restriction of that right.  
In order to show why property is not a basic human right, Michelman asks us to imagine 
that a country’s constitution contains no property clause, and that a Lawgiver is contemplating 
adding a property clause to existing bill-of-rights type guarantees. Those guarantees comprise “an 
otherwise liberally full and adequate scheme of individual constitutional rights”132 and include 
rights to “liberty, to dignity, to free self-expression and self-development, to personal security and 
privacy, to treatment as an equal, to legality and due process.”133  Based this foundation, 
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Michelman asks how should our constitutional Lawgiver “think about the question of a property 
clause?”134  
In order to answer this question, Michelman’s first move is to substitute the term 
“property right” with an “individual asset-holder’s claim to constitutional-level protection against 
state action.”135 Michelman argues that a property clause, as a distinct right in addition to those 
already protected, would only add “a special entitlement to a rule-formalist style of adjudication, 
when what is up for decision is a claim to constitutional-level protection against governmental 
disturbances of existing positions of asset-holding.”136 This term, “asset infringing state activity,” 
is, in Michelman’s usage, another term for the state’s police power or for popular sovereignty 
rights over property. According to Michelman, this entitlement is not necessary because other 
entitlements ought to protect whatever legitimate interests might inhere in one’s property. For 
example, Michelman asks us to imagine a “landowner demanding full exchange-value 
compensation for currently idle land expropriated by the state for redistribution to the landless. 
The landowner’s lawyer would certainly invoke bill-of-rights guarantees respecting liberty, 
equality, dignity, privacy, and legality in support of this demand.”137  Without a takings-style 
property clause, “the landowner would have to run his claim through notions of dignity, liberty, 
privacy, equality, legality, and so on.” Without a clause, Michelman argues that the owner’s 
successful claim for the full fair market value of their property in compensation for the taking 
would depend “on the court’s judgment about whether, in the given context, the state’s moral 
purposes are sufficient in weight and urgency to warrant any resulting (they might sometimes be 
quite marginal) infringements on the political-moral values spoken for by those other clauses.”138 
A clause would simply, or formally, grant compensation, even if the owner cannot show that any 
other rights are violated by the state’s action.  
For Michelman, the Lawgiver should not create a constitutional property right, but should 
make property protection a directive through other means. “In other words, the constitution’s 
directive to courts and policymakers should not be to act on the (false) premise that every state 
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action redistributing asset values is liberally objectionable just as such, but rather to bear in mind 
that such actions can sometimes infringe on individual liberty or dignity in deeply objectionable 
and unjustifiable ways.”139 Michelman clarifies that he is not arguing inclusion of a property 
clause; rather, he doubts “that the reason for any such inclusion should be to give recognition or 
protection to a supposed liberal basic right of the individual against asset-infringing state activity, 
for the simple reason that—as I believe—there is and can be no such liberally basic individual 
right.”140 So, the Lawgiver might include a clause, but it would not protect a fundamental right to 
property, and nor would it stand apart from, or above, other fundamental rights.  
In other words, in the absence of a property clause, justice might demand that the owner 
not be compensated in some cases. Without a clause, there exists no bright or “rule-formulaic” 
determination about either compensation or the priority of certain statuses, such as ownership, 
over other statuses, such as holding political rights. Michelman appears to argue that assets 
should be protected if they promote other liberal rights, so properties that are the object of state or 
community takings decisions should be subjected to litigation to see whether political rights are 
being upheld or violated if compensation were to be paid. A rule-formulaic account of property 
right is both undesirable and unnecessary because it would ignore a wide variety of other rights or 
interests that may be impaired when property claims are upheld.  
Michelman is worried that if a state already guarantees a “full and adequate scheme” of 
rights, a constitutional property right gives formal recognition to a non-fundamental right and 
ignores “any further or other injury to liberty, dignity, equality, or legality.”141 If a state violates a 
right to equality, there is no formal rule or simple fact that rightsholders can prove in order to 
seek rectification; however, a constitutional property right would permit an asset holder to 
formally show some degree of asset impairment and obtain relief against state action on that 
ground only, “never mind how slight may be the insults to anyone’s liberty, dignity, privacy, or 
equality, either in absolute terms or by comparison with impairments that otherwise will accrue to 
other people’s liberty, dignity, privacy, or equality.”142  
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In other words, for Michelman, a taking of private property for public use should not 
trigger a compensation obligation on the part of the state: rather, the state should compensate only 
when its actions insult liberty, dignity, privacy, or equality—all of which are fundamental rights. 
Actions against property should not enjoy a special or facilitated pleading requirement. Owners 
would need to “show some real, substantial, and disproportionate infringement of liberty, dignity, 
privacy, or whatever” due to government action.143 Property rights, Michelman concludes, need 
to be bifurcated from other rights, and treated differently as well else they swamp those other 
rights.  
Perhaps the only reason to grant a constitutional property right is because the Lawgiver 
“thinks that strict security against state- engineered impairments of assets lawfully obtained—just 
as such, and without any further regard to infringements on liberty or dignity or so on—is in and 
of itself a basic human right.”144 If property were a basic right, then, in order to show a rights 
violation, claimants would not be required to show other violations such as impairments of 
dignity or respect.  
Michelman suggest a Property Plus evaluation: if the property claim is coupled with other 
another right that should be protected as well, then property claims against expropriation might 
become fundamental.  Michelman is committed to a high burden of proof that lies with the 
claimant, whose burden under Michelman’s scheme requires them to show a property 
infringement plus an infringement of a non-property right in order to deserve compensation.  And 
here is where we agree: in order for a property claim to be constitutionally protected, it should 
also have a privacy claim, and that claim is already written into the takings clause. Where we 
disagree is on the burden of proof. Michelman places the burden on the claimant to show why the 
state ought not take, and this is true of the rational basis standard in general. Were private 
property treated like other fundamental rights, the burden would shift to the state to justify its 
taking, or “asset impairment,” according to the strict scrutiny standard: the state would need to 
show that its actions are the least restrictive means for achieving a compelling state interest, and 
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claimants are not required to show that any further rights are being violated. Michelman’s 
standard would facilitate takings or impairments; my standard would make them more difficult.  
Without a property clause, a rightsholder has to make the Procrustean argument that the 
state’s action affects their dignity, or that their liberty was restricted. As a practical matter, this 
makes the job of the finder of fact (usually a judge or jury, or what I suspect many theorists 
would like to see: a Rawlsian department or bureau of redistribution who decides these types of 
cases) rather difficult. That being said, I agree with Michelman in spirit: property that is owned 
with no concomitant value has less protection against the community than property plus some 
other value. I believe that value is privacy, and that the constitutional property right that protects 
private property is capable of protecting many of the rights and interests that privacy also 
protects.   
Part 3. Rubenfeld, Textualist Usings, and the Failure of Compensation 
Like Michelman, legal scholar Jed Rubenfeld views the right protected by the takings 
clause as a political right; to that extent, it protects property against usings by the state but not 
mere takings.145 This is a novel interpretation of the clause. If property is used by the state, the 
political right against usings is violated only if the state does not provide compensation. 
Compensation is a political and not a property right, and it protects owners from being treated as 
mere means to the state’s ends. If state action, in the form of property regulations or 
expropriations, does not impact liberty or otherwise exploit the state’s power over its citizens, 
then the state action is not compensable.   
 Like Sened, Rubenfeld is primarily opposed to the idea that persons have fundamental 
rights or liberties, because such rights have “no place in constitutional interpretation.”146 In 
fundamental rights analysis, the court determines that some interest (such as personhood or 
autonomy) is too important “to be a legitimate object of state regulation.”147 Unlike privacy, 
personhood is not a right, and therefore cannot be the foundation for either a property right or a 
political right. Persons do, however, have a political right against having their bodies or their 
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property used by the state without compensation. In Rubenfeld’s analysis, the only appropriate 
constitutional issue is whether the state has forcibly transformed something (say, a person’s 
property or their body) into the property of the state through the state’s use of the thing. In terms 
of takings, then, “[t]he dispositive question in compensation doctrine should never have been, 
‘Has the state taken something from an individual that qualifies as a fundamental deprivation?’ It 
should have been, ‘Has the state taken something for public use?’”148 If the state simply regulates 
the thing, or, to use Michelman’s terminology, “infringes the asset-holder’s claim,” then it has no 
obligation to pay.149  
Rubenfeld’s analysis focuses on the political meaning of a literal or textualist reading of 
the takings clause, which prohibits the taking of property for public use without just 
compensation. Whereas personhood and fundamental rights-type claims are vague, the takings 
clause provides a real, tangible political right against the state. If persons are subject to having 
their property taken and used by the government, this is a clear violation of a political liberty not 
to have one’s property taken, and there is, according to Rubenfeld, no need to engage in talk 
about personality or ‘fundamental deprivations.’ The only issue is whether state action impacts 
the right of political liberty by taking and using private property.  
States impact political liberty when they turn private property into state property by using 
it. So, a state might mandate how property is used by its owner, but that does not constitute a use 
by the state: by regulating, the state is not using the property at all.150  Although the due process 
clause provides protection for property deprivations or takings in the form of regulations, the 
compensation clause makes “special provision for a specific class of deprivations: cases in which 
private property is not merely taken, but taken for public use.”151 The clause does not recognize 
property ownership as a fundamental right (again, for Rubenfeld, there are none); rather, it 
protects “against a fundamental political danger. Just as the right of privacy protects individuals 
from the conscription of their persons or futures, the right of compensation guards them against 
state instrumentalization in the form of a conscription of their property.”152  
	  	   391 
For Rubenfeld, the use of eminent domain is politically objectionable because “a 
servitude is forced upon (the owner, who is) made in a small or large way an instrumentality of 
the state,” and because “we are not ordinarily obliged to see our persons, our lives, or our things 
taken over, occupied, conscripted into affirmative state service.”153 Uncompensated takings are 
wrong to the “degree to which a citizen's things are made into the organs or instrumentalities of 
the state. Along with all the other functions that private property may serve, it stands as the 
material stratum in which independent citizens exercise their will.”154 The political right of just 
compensation operates as a shield against this kind of injustice, and persons who are justly 
compensated when the state uses their property suffer no injustice.   
Property is important because it “stands as the repository, the emerging reflection, of 
what ought to be [the owner’s] politically independent will. When, therefore, the state takes a 
thing marked off as belonging to a private person and puts it to use, the state goes beyond mere 
deprivation. It compromises the independence of his will; it impresses this embodiment of his 
independent subjectivity into state service, and to that degree the owner is instrumentalized as 
well.”155   
Rubenfeld correctly notes the parallels between takings law and privacy law.156 “[T]he 
right of privacy, understood as an anti-totalitarian right,” writes Rubenfeld,  has nothing to do 
with the psychology or personhood of its bearer. Rather, we should be concerned with whether a 
law “affirmatively takes over and occupies individuals' lives.”157 If it does, it does not matter that 
it violates a right, much less a fundamental one. For Rubenfeld, “it is not the freedom taken away 
by anti-abortion laws that makes them unconstitutional;  
it is rather the degree to which, through them, the state has effectively taken over a 
woman's life. Roe protects against a specifically political danger: the danger of 
totalitarian state intervention into our lives. No single prohibition in our entire legal 
system has consequences that so thoroughly take over, physically occupy, and put to use 
an individual's entire existence as do those of a law prohibiting abortion.158 
 
 By discarding talk of fundamental rights, Rubenfeld’s analysis provides a robust yet 
deflationary justification for strong political rights that protect private property and privacy. From 
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my perspective, he fails to engage in the kind of language that is capable of serving those rights 
well within a system of jurisprudence that engages in rights talk, and, because he sees 
compensation as a political remedy that “cures” the “instrumentalization” of persons and their 
property, he is unable to take a stand against compensated takings that are capable of violating 
other political rights.  
 In terms of language, Rubenfeld rejects the way the Supreme Court has attempted to 
participate in the discussions about the justification for rights.  Many of those justifications 
express a concern for the role internal or subjective factors play in the experience of the 
rightsholder, as well as in the duties of others—including the state. Rubenfeld is dismissive that a 
concept like personhood can support privacy or property rights against exploitation by the state, 
so he locates support for these rights in a political stance against totalitarianism. He is primarily 
concerned, I think, with the absence of enumerated rights such as privacy and property in the 
Constitution, and fears that the legal justification for these rights in the jurisprudence is shaky and 
prone to disappear should less-principled jurisprudes revisit a case like Casey. Casey developed 
and modified the right to abortion by using the language of “personhood,” “identity,” and 
“fundamental,”159 but it also upheld the right using the same language. Rubenfeld’s argument for 
the abortion right, on the other hand, is that totalitarianism ensues without it. He may be correct, 
but that does not mean that the jurisprudence of fundamental rights, predicated on extra-legal 
ideas such as privacy and personhood, is any less capable of protecting the political rights that are 
founded upon those ideas. Positivists like Rubenfeld (and Sened, infra) are dismissive of 
fundamental rights because the search for them takes the law outside of its ‘four squares’ in order 
to find foundational principles in either morals or nature. Unless rights are manifest in the state’s 
rules, such as those rights enumerated in the Constitution, legal positivists like Rubenfeld are 
forced to locate them elsewhere; in, for example, a political life that is free from totalitarianism. 
Roe, therefore, does not grant freedom or protect privacy, but it guards against  “a specifically 
political danger: the danger of totalitarian state intervention into our lives.”160  By the same token, 
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the takings clause does not protect privacy; rather, it is a positive, statutory, and political right 
against depradations by the state.  
 In terms of the clause, Rubenfeld’s characterization of it as an example of ‘political will’ 
embodied in property as a bulwark against the state is a remarkably thin one: despite the talk 
about instrumentalization of persons and their things by the state, Rubenfeld somewhat 
remarkably aligns with an unlikely ally, Richard Epstein, by taking the position that takings law 
prevents totalitarianism by mandating for, and providing, compensation. For Rubenfeld, courts 
should not take any factors into consideration other than compensation, such as personhood, or 
community, or the status of property as a home, when states use private property. If compensation 
is paid for usings, injustice cannot be the result and it cannot be claimed that states act beyond 
their limits. On the one hand, this simply appears to be a mistake about the jurisprudence of 
takings. On the other hand, it justifies a mechanistic application of the takings clause that fails to 
address the substantial evidence that takings law has led to clear injustices.   
Michelman provides a compelling argument against the idea that compensation fully 
compensates, particularly in cases like Poletown, where community was also ‘taken’ through 
eminent domain. The right to community is a property-like right and the standing law of just 
compensation cannot include loss of community as a compensable property right. For the 
Poletown residents (and, by implication, the Fort Trumbull neighborhood at issue in Kelo), “an 
eminent domain taking of their homes and neighborhood, to be accompanied by compensation 
payments, is exactly what they are resisting. In these circumstances, we can easily see that 
property may represent more than money because it may represent things that money itself can't 
buy- place, position, relationship, roots, community, solidarity, status- yes, and security too.”161 
Supporters of “pure” property rights decry only the loss of ownership in Poletown, while 
Michelman decries loss of political community. Michelman is correct that social factors make the 
property right more valuable, and that property’s fair market value, paid out as part of the 
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requirements of the current takings jurisprudence, cannot compensate for the loss due to the non-
fungibility of the right to community.   
 Michelman sees the same of kind of injustice occurring when tenants are evicted from 
their homes, either due to eviction, the termination of a lease, or the taking of their landlord’s 
property. The property and community rights of tenants in at least some of these cases are 
protected by tenants’ rights laws, wherein the government in turn acts on the tenant’s behalf but 
also, it appears, violates the owner’s own constitutional property rights.  In Michelman’s view, 
“the tenants in these cases also have interests at stake of the sort that the constitutional property 
clauses are meant to serve. They, after all, are the ones who stand to be uprooted and displaced 
from their homes and neighborhoods unless the law intervenes on their behalf.”162 Michelman 
argues that there is no difference between cases where the state uses eminent domain to uproot 
both owner and tenant, and cases where the owner evicts tenants. In those cases, a tenant “with an 
expired lease might have constitutionally cognizable property interests at stake to be legislatively 
counterposed against those of the building owners.”163 Michelman distinguishes the right of 
ownership from the right of property, and claims that property rights advocates are really arguing 
for ownership rights and not property rights.164 Tenants have a right against having their property 
‘taken’ by landlords at the end of an expired lease, but this right extends beyond the property 
itself: it would also include a right to community. So, when a court finds that, for example, rent 
control laws are constitutional, Michelman sees a constitutional property right arising in not only 
the tangible property that is the subject of the lease, but the intangible property-like rights that 
grow up around the real property, including community, stability, security, and, of course, liberty.  
This, according to Michelman, is how property rights under-protect the interests that are at stake 
when persons reside in property that they do not own that are located in communities where they 
have property-like interests.  
For Michelman, persons have more than property rights invested in their property: they 
have property as well as other rights, and those other rights, such as liberty, are more important. 
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After all, compensation is meant to compensate for the loss of liberty to use or sell one’s 
property. Therefore, a property clause would have to compensate for more than fair market value 
and would have to place a value upon intangible assets including the value of lost community, 
security, and liberty. 165  Also, compensation, set at fair market value, cannot take into 
consideration the real costs of eminent domain decisions that result in the massive relocation and 
demolition of neighborhoods. Among those costs are “the demoralization cost, or sense of 
injustice, remaining after the court has exerted its inadequate, even if maximum, effort to secure 
the payment of ‘just compensation.’”166  Like Peñalver, Michelman argues that it is the “duty of 
public officials to take such costs into account” when they make decisions pursuant to their 
eminent domain power.167  
 “Demoralization costs” add to the disutility created by takings. They accrue due to 
owners’ frustrated expectations and insecurity regarding their plans to remain in their homes even 
if they are not takees. Michelman develops this idea from the property theories developed by 
Hume and Bentham. For Bentham, property is the “collection of rules which are presently 
accepted for governing the exploitation and enjoyment of resources.168 Similarly, for Hume, 
property is a “conventionally recognized stability of possession,” which evolved out of “selfish 
perceptions of the advantage of association,” which is impossible without rules to govern the right 
to control and enjoy things.169 Property rights give owners and nonowners a basis of expectation 
about the future: they provide an institutionally established understanding that rules about persons 
and their resources will continue.170 This expectation of security through property law ensures 
productivity. Since we are accustomed to private possession, threats in the form of expropriations 
would cause unease and this demands rectification.171 So, “as long as individual possession 
continues to be the norm, there is serious disvalue in the spectacle of any encroachment on 
possession by public authority which is suggestive of arbitrary exploitation of a few at the hands 
of the many,”172 or redistribution.  
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Because takings are unpredictable and capricious, the possibility that an owner’s property 
will be taken demoralizes owners. These costs are, in the present regime that requires that takers 
are only liable for the fair market cost of the property, uncompensable.173 Like Peñalver’s account 
of the obligation of political authorities to exercise a more comprehensive use of compensation, 
Michelman argues that it is the “duty of public officials to take such costs into account” when 
they make decisions pursuant to their eminent domain power.174 Like Peñalver, Michelman also 
fails to provide a framework for the implementation of this duty. The duty to provide real 
compensation for takings falls on the takers, and neither Michelman nor Peñalver suggest how or 
why political authorities would be motivated to initiate and conform to this change in takings law. 
They agree that takings law is morally deficient because of its failure to truly compensate the 
dispossessed, but they approve of a process that still gives great deference to political authorities.  
Both Peñalver and Michelman agree that in many cases the use of eminent domain is unjust, and 
this is true primarily in cases where homes and neighborhoods are destroyed for either private use 
as well as more traditional public uses such as highways. However, they deny that a more robust 
property right is the best way for preventing these injustices, or the fear that a more robust right 
would lend itself to abuse by interests that do not deserve such a strong right. They default to the 
position that injustices can be cured by a more morally aware political authority.  
The better approach, in my opinion, understands that full compensation is probably 
impossible, and that compensation of any kind cannot itself justify the use  of eminent domain. 
Short of that, property rights as well as the other rights embodied by property are best protected 
by the recognition that the property right is, in fact, a basic and fundamental right. Like other 
fundamental rights, the claim that property is private property has “considerable normative force 
and puts a brake on expressions of public will that involve the disposition of private holdings.”175 
Like the other fundamental rights, particularly those involving bodily integrity, private property 
permits us to create what Paul Fairfield calls moral spaces, which are “demarcations in the social 
sphere”  and “less metaphorical than many other rights.” Spatiality, writes Fairfield, “makes 
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possible or constitutes the ground on which individuals stand in their particularity” and permits 
persons to exercise the voluntary actions that “conditions of moral agency.”176 Although all rights 
create a sphere or domain of noninterference, what is remarkable about the combined privacy and 
the property right is the fact that it does so “in a more direct and literal way, establishing 
relatively unambiguous territorial distinctions between physical, intellectual, or personal domains 
and the realm of public affairs. Both rights,” continues Fairfield, “are fundamental to the free 
negotiation of interpersonal proximity which is an elementary and pervasive feature of ethical 
relations.”177 In other words, because private property rights are grounded in spaces, they are 
more directly observable and therefore more capable of expressing the moral agency of both the 
owner, who makes choices about their acquisition, use, and alienation of their property, as well as 
the agency of others, who also exercise and exhibit moral agency in terms of this readily-
available or ‘at hand’ moral space in the way they treat the property of others. Framed this way, 
the private property right can be inserted into the discourse about rights that includes rights, such 
as speech and religion, which are already considered fundamental.  It is unlikely that takers or 
legislators—the public officials who initiate takings—will make this kind of determination, so it 
is best achieved by a judicially-determined higher standard of constitutional review due to the fact 
that courts have been more willing to locate and guarantee fundamental rights than the other 
branches of government.178   
 That being said, Rubenfeld’s property theory—positivist or otherwise—offers a 
surprising justification for the constitutional protection of all private property rights against 
takings, including commercial or fungible property. Rubenfeld argues that “the link between 
private property—especially commercial property—and an individual's political independence 
has shown itself too many times throughout history to be ignored.” The property interests at stake 
“apply equally to the Fourth Amendment's search-and-seizure rights.  
These rights similarly rest (at least in part) on the sense of personal investment that 
individuals in our legal system often (perhaps characteristically) attach to things they 
consider theirs. Yet the fact that a piece of property is purely commercial—say, a 
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warehouse—has never been held to nullify the operation of the constitutional guarantee. 
To make sense of such rights (under both the Fourth Amendment and the Compensation 
Clause), it is not necessary that the requisite relation between owner and property obtain 
in every case. It is sufficient, rather, if we acknowledge that this relation is possible and if 
we deem it worthy of protection against state abuse.179 
 
Here, Rubenfeld is arguing that all property—both commercial and personal—is protected against 
uncompensated expropriation, and that there is no constitutional distinction between protecting 
one type of private property over the other. Both kinds of property are compensable if they are 
taken for public use. For Rubenfeld, there is no need to make determinations about the subjective 
intentions of the property holder: there are no differences between homes or other kinds of 
properties. To that extent, “[t]he Compensation Clause protects liberty and property; like the 
Third and Fourth Amendments, the Fifth Amendment protects liberty by protecting property. And 
there are good reasons why compensation is an appropriate remedy for a using, even though 
economic injury is not the gravamen of the constitutional harm.”180  
Rubenfeld’s novel approach therefore supports portions of the private property theory I 
am advocating for here, but it suffers from a stingy account of the role of rights in liberal 
democracies. For Rubenfeld, rights lack moral or normative foundations and are solely the 
product of political struggles: they are only important in terms of their ability to pose a bulwark 
against totalitarianism, yet, in terms of the property right, their violation is easily repaired by the 
tendering of compensation. Rubenfeld is therefore forced to concede that massive rights 
infringements which use eminent domain to displace large communities and homes are politically 
oppressive, yet cured by compensation. As Michelman argued, this understanding of 
compensation cannot be correct, and as a result Rubenfeld’s novel research in the direction 
against fundamental rights is unsuccessful. 
Part 4. Sened, Public Choice, and Nonmoral Rights  
 “The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if 
you do not keep it—and nothing more.” – Oliver Wendell Holmes181 
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According Itai Sened,182 property rights and institutions are purely positive: they are non-
moral and non-normative. Governments are “rational entrepreneurs who produce law and order in 
return for political and economic benefits,”183 and who also use their monopoly on force to 
protect property as well as other individual rights. These rights emerge because they “serve 
tangible interests of particular individuals…(as well as) the interests of central authorities that pay 
a remarkable cost to protect and enforce them.”184 Like the position of the economists in chapter 
5, Sened concludes that there is simply no need for the idea of fundamental moral or human 
rights, nor their justification, because a fundamental right of speech is justified solely on the 
grounds that it “makes governments and individual agents—i.e., every agent in society—better 
off.”185 
Like Holmes’ motto, Sened argues that political institutions that protect property rights 
are not trying to “satisfy some abstract normative requirements.”186 The state does not protect 
property because it aims at developing personhood or privacy: it acts in order to satisfy state 
interests. For Sened, a private property system exists because politicians, and the governments 
they manage, depend upon political support as well as tax revenues to fund their operations.187  
Governments grant property rights in order to improve productivity, which in turn, Sened argues, 
raises the tax revenues necessary for operating the government.188 A private property system, in 
this derivation, has no moral basis, and politicians have “no ‘deep moral’ intention” when they set 
up “the institutional design of the new governments in a way that would be attractive for future 
investors.”189 
In other words, if the government did not ‘gain’ from granting property rights, it would 
not do so. Agents who desire property rights can petition the government for property rights, and 
it is costly to petition the government. If the government grants the right, the property right in 
general becomes a public good to be enjoyed by everyone “regardless of whether they paid the 
cost of petitioning for these rights.”190  
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Securing a property right therefore involves a collective action problem: why would 
anyone engage in costly efforts to gain the property right when free riders end up with the very 
same rights? The implication is that persons will not expend the costs to earn the right without 
compensation, which consists of exclusive rights over particular property that are on par with 
everyone’s exclusive rights over their property. The second implication is that if political 
authorities do not believe that it is in their best interests—“best interests” in this case includes the 
raising of taxes through political means to ensure the operation of the government—to grant 
property rights, then property rights either will not be granted, or granted with varying degrees of 
regulation that always reflect the interests of politicians in their operation of the government. If 
rights do not advance those interests, politicians are not motivated to grant them and as a 
consequence will not grant them.  
In Sened’s model, rights are not granted for moral reasons, primarily because there are no 
moral reasons for granting rights: rather, they are granted when enough people petition the 
government for the right, and politicians then engage in ‘payoff’ calculations when they 
determine whether to grant it.191 If more people petition for the right, then there is a higher 
probability that the government will grant it.  Otherwise, politicians have no motivation for 
granting rights.192 Political agents are motivated to use private property to promote a more 
affluent society not because such rights are moral or natural, but because a more affluent society 
increases tax revenue and support from constituents.193 
By removing all things normative from the discussion of property rights, Sened—and the 
economists before him, including Buchanan—errs on the side of the kind of property rights I 
endorse here. Despite its amoral positivist and realist conception of rights, Sened concludes that 
individual property rights ought to trump a variety of collectivist or statist approaches to property 
ownership. Now, Sened argues that such rights are coercive (and justifiably so, because they 
promote efficiency) and tend to support the coercive structure of the state, but his conclusions are 
not statist: they arrive at the same or similar property rights as those supported by my approach, 
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and we would agree that moralized opposition to property rights should not be formalized in the 
property law. Finally, despite his denial of the moral basis of many rights, Sened agrees that all 
rights, economic and noneconomic, occupy the same position qua rights, and to that extent, he 
denies that they ought to be bifurcated.  
Section 3. The Politics of Takings   
According to Gary Minda, takings cases “fail to decide anything: knowing that regulation 
is not a taking if it advances the public interest or avoids a noxious use fails to tell us anything 
about regulation prohibiting developers to filling wetlands for commercial use.” Taking law 
requires judges to “look beyond the legal concepts of takings law in order to determine the 
boundaries between property and community.” This requires “pragmatic ethical answers” about 
which properties—specific ones, such as Kelo’s house, or general ones, such as those constituting 
cultural property that achieves some further purpose—remain private and which are legislated 
into the public domain.  As a result, takings cases are “inextricably bound up with moral, 
philosophical, and political debates that have remained persistently immune to scholarly and 
judicial ‘solutions.’”194 Courts can rectify this by entrenching the private property right against 
the state’s right to use eminent domain, thereby making it more difficult for states to use eminent 
domain for traditional public uses as well as the more recent public benefit-type transfers to other 
private owners.  
However, the property right is not entrenched. As a result, writes Michelman, we are, 
“dealing with ‘two conflicting American ideals,’ both reflected in the Constitution: ‘the 
protection of popular government on the one hand’ and the protection of property rights on the 
other.”195 This section explores this conflict on a more political level than previous sections. 
Using the work of Leslie Bender, Louis Putterman, James Buchanan, and Gerald Gaus, it 
examines several ways that popular government can be utilized—or not—in order to promote 
more democratic control over property. The section concludes, however, that democratic 
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majorities have good reasons to choose not to regulate or take property, both in non-ideal 
situations and when they act as Rawlsian deliberators in ideal situations.  
As Radin notes, “[c]onstitutional protection of property against takings…is 
countermajoritarian,”196 and it appears that Madison was speaking directly to this subject when he 
writes:  
Wherever the real power in a government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our 
Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of 
private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the 
sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of 
the major number of the Constituents.197 
 
In terms of the power of popular government, Richard Posner writes that “a group of poor people 
may have much greater financial resources in the aggregate than one wealthy person or a small 
group of wealthy people.”198 Even were they to lack financial power, Louis Putterman asks “why 
the overwhelming majority of citizens” in industrial democracies, “who collectively possess a 
very modest share of” their nation’s wealth and property, “do not use the political power 
conferred on them by democratic institutions to distribute more property to themselves.”199 As I 
have shown, this kind of redistribution is permissible according to current interpretations of the 
takings clause, the taxing power, and other provisions. So, why don’t “they,” the democratic 
majorities, do it?  
Part 1. Midkiff, Oligopoly, and Popular Sovereignty  
As I have shown, the property jurisprudence of the United States provides that a very low 
threshold be met in order to take property for public use. According to legal theorist Leslie 
Bender, the takings clause should be interpreted to only permit transfers for use by the public, and 
“the public,” in her interpretation, is constituted by the poor or propertyless. Like Michelman, 
Bender is interested in the loss of community that occurs in cases like Poletown, where persons 
were deprived of both community and home.200 For Bender, community is not a property but a 
“higher” type of interest.201 Eminent domain, Bender argues, ought only to be used to “benefit 
community and environment interests” and this can be done by making fungible or 
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developmental interests “yield” to community interests. There is no price on community, so no 
compensation can be “just”; as a result, for Bender, the ‘property’ that makes up a community 
“simply cannot be taken.”202 The Midkiff case is the primary example of the ‘proper’ use of 
eminent domain.  
As noted previously, Midkiff provides constitutional protection for the use of eminent 
domain in order to prevent oligopoly by permitting the state to force the transfer of ownership of 
a rented home from landlord to tenant. This situation is unique in the takings jurisprudence 
because the tenant was not displaced and because of the expressed nature of the legislation. 
Although the case “did not specifically proclaim that redistribution from the wealthy to the poor 
is a ‘public use/ purpose,’ it theoretically supported a legislative program designed to achieve that 
end.” Bender approves of this kind of use of eminent domain because it establishes a precedent 
for further uses of it to achieve the general goals of social justice: Bender “would like to think 
that our Constitution has room for this type of legislatively-sanctioned social and economic 
reorganization.”203 But, as Bender recognizes, because the same judicial attitude of unquestioning 
deference permits desired rich to poor transfers as well as undesired poor to rich transfers, some 
method ought to be able to prevent the former while permitting the latter.204  
Interestingly, Bender supports a version of heightened scrutiny in order to pursue this 
interpretation of the clause, but one that operates in the service of rich to poor transfers as a 
matter of public use, and not as a promotion of private property rights in general. Because it is a 
“special, constitutionally expressed limitation on the eminent domain power,” public use “should 
not be relegated to the same standard of review as the due process clause.”205 So, Bender argues, 
heightened review should pertain to public use, and public use means something special here. It 
means taking from the rich to give to poor. Community cannot be taken for public use, but 
investment or fungible property can and ought to be taken. In this sense, heightened review 
means examining whether the public really benefits, and, if property can benefit the public, then 
that property ought to be governed by only due process protections.  
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What Bender wants protected, as a fundamental right, is community, “so that any 
government action that discriminated against or harmed a community would have to be carefully 
scrutinized. 
 Any time a taking detrimentally affects other public or social rights, such as health, 
safety or preservation of the environment, courts should also scrutinize it more closely. 
Takings of investment property, since it is fungible and monetarily compensable, might 
only be entitled to rationality review. In such cases, great deference to the legislature 
might be appropriate. A final approach would be to use different standards of review for 
takings where the government is the transferee from those where there is a private 
transfer to private parties, (which) should require a stricter standard of review, that is, 
more intense judicial evaluation.206 
 
For Bender, a “literal reading of the takings clause” in regards to ‘public use’ would bar all 
private-to-private transfers.207  To that extent, “[p]ublic use must mean public access and control. 
It necessarily involves transfers from the few to the many; from the wealthy to the less wealthy or 
poor or needy. It cannot mean the reverse. This redefinition of public use would still permit the 
Hawaii Housing Authority redistribution, but would prevent another Poletown from 
happening.”208 
Bender concludes that takings should be restricted to “a small variety of cases in which 
the government acquires real property ownership, possession or full control (restrictions on use 
would never be takings) for government projects that service the public. In only those cases is the 
government constitutionally permitted to acquire property, and thereby required to provide just 
compensation.”209 
 Primarily because Midkiff is still good law, Bender’s analysis is within the scope of 
contemporary takings jurisprudence, and thousands of properties are taken each year by eminent 
domain. Given that communities have the power to redistribute, why haven’t more of them taken 
advantage of the opportunity?  
Putterman offers three answers: first, inequalities are understood to be morally justified 
by luck or desert; second, redistribution might be inimical to voters’ interests; and third, wealthy 
people disproportionately influence political outcomes.210 In terms of luck or desert, one reason 
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not to tax too highly or implement redistribution or leveling is the lottery factor, where “non-
wealthy voters might prefer to leave open the possibility that they or their heirs could be wealthy 
in the future.” Voters weigh their risk of being insured against extreme poverty (via redistribution 
of high gain wealth) or possibly finding themselves or their heirs occupying the upper echelons of 
income that are used to guarantee insurance against poverty. By choosing not to redistribute, they 
choose to be either winners or losers in the lottery. The lottery factor indicates a “high, including 
unrealistic, subjective probabilities of wealth.”211 Putterman: “So long as a large proportion of 
those with little wealth feel that they would be entitled to keep any fortune they might themselves 
come into, the ideological legitimacy of wealth must constitute a powerful barrier against 
proposals for redistribution.”212 So, not only are owners entitled to what they earn, but also to 
what they are chosen to receive: fortunate ones are entitled to the property that lands on their 
doorstep.213  
Putterman suggests that the masses also engage in “forbearance in redistribution” because 
of their fear that the kinds of policies required to substantially “level wealth would have negative 
long term consequences for the expected income levels of the average citizen.” This is a “fear of 
the unknown, material consequences of leveling”214 where “less wealthy citizens may benefit or 
be hurt by leveling.”215 Because the outcome is unknown, citizens with the power to act choose 
not to. Because redistribution might be inimical to their interests, voters are reluctant to act 
against the “moral legitimacy of wealth…obtained through various non-criminal routes.”216  
Putterman suggests that the best explanation for the lack of redistribution, despite the 
clear right to do so, is that the wealthy prevent it.  The wealthy probably cannot literally buy the 
votes of individuals, but representatives of the wealthy, such as politicians, are liable to bribes or 
influence.217 Or, “[w]ealthier voters may participate more in the political process because they 
have more to lose.”218 The wealthy may also influence belief and value formulation apart from 
voting and lobbying.219 If this theory is true, Putterman suggests, the wealthy must lay out 
considerable cost and effort to retain their wealth by convincing the masses that inequality is in 
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their best interest. For this explanation to work, it must pay off through low levels of taxation, 
weak or ineffective property regulation, and fewer takings, and these effects must be the result of 
improper influence and not other factors (such as those influenced by desert or luck).  The fact 
that inequality persists does not necessary mean the wealthy have hijacked both the political 
process and the political will of an otherwise powerful democratic assembly. And, of course, 
many wealthy people do not participate in these activities, and for good reason: according to 
Mancur Olson’s research on collective action, wealthy persons as individuals, like the members 
of all large groups, are better off not contributing to their mutual best interest because the costs of 
participating, and the problem of free riders, are large. So, Putterman concludes, the wealthy 
influence the political system, but the extent of their influence and their actual influence against 
movements to redistribute their wealth is exaggerated.220 Other factors, including the choice not 
to redistribute by the very people who stand to benefit from redistribution, are also relevant.  
Part 2. Pace Rawls: Constitutional Property in the Original Position 
 James Buchanan and Gerald Gaus both argue that Rawlsian deliberators, but not Rawls 
himself, would arrive at political positions that constitutionally align basic civil rights with 
property and exchange-type rights. Like the persons in Putterman’s examples, Rawlsian 
deliberators also fail to exercise their right to extensive redistribution. 
 According to Buchanan, the exercise of many activities associated with noneconomic 
rights have minimal externalities other than invoking “mildly-felt meddlesome negative 
preferences,” but their exercise can subject their practitioners to criminal sanctions and 
punishment “through the operation of ordinary politics.”221  To that extent, Buchanan suggests 
that “rational choice…would dictate skepticism with regard to the working of politicized 
majoritarian intervention with voluntary exchange.”222 Using examples of smoking, alcohol, sex, 
and “contracts for perpetual servitude,” Buchanan uses the language of public choice to defend 
constitutional, and not ad hoc legislative, treatment of these kinds of behaviors. Any prohibition 
of voluntary exchanges for specific items would need to be constitutional and not ‘merely’ 
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legislative.223 In this sense, Buchanan argues that the “constitutional stage chooser” in a Rawls-
like original position would not legislate on issues like smoking or commercial sex or the 
voluntary exchange thereof, and that the constitutional rules that emerge from behind the 
constitutional veil of ignorance would, if truly impartial, not regulate “voluntary exchanges in 
such goods and services”224 either. By implication, they would also not regulate a wide variety of 
other kinds of voluntary exchanges. The result is a constitutional right (or prohibition, as the case 
may be) to voluntary exchanges that is immune from the legislative process, which for Buchanan 
constitutes the “overt politicization of restraint on the exchange process.”  
Such exchange is so important that restraints, if any, ought to be constitutionally 
imposed, developed under a veil of ignorance, and immune from local or legislative override. 
Because such restraint is unlikely to be imposed behind the veil, a “constitutional protection of 
voluntary exchanges between persons or organizations of persons”225 results in a constitutional 
right to property, which protects the items that make exchanges possible.   
Gerald Gaus also argues that Rawlsian deliberators, who, after justifying basic civil 
rights, would select private ownership and economic freedom—and not Rawls’s socialist scheme 
which, like other bifurcated regimes, strongly delineates between civil and property rights—when 
they select political programs designed to promote civil rights.226  Persons in the original position 
would not, like Rawls, reject ‘capitalism’ and “they would conclusively reject all forms of 
socialism, including market socialism.”227 This is because the deliberators would be aware of 
empirical studies that link civil liberties with extensive private ownership, including “private 
ownership of capital goods and financial instruments and institutions.” These studies show that 
extensive private ownership, which does not merely cover the kinds of property that Rawls would 
protect (such as toothbrushes or clothing), is a “requirement for a functioning and free social 
order that protects civil liberties.228  
According to Gaus, studies show that “private-property based regimes that protect 
property rights and overall economic freedom are the best protectors of civil liberties and, indeed, 
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of political rights.”229 Rawls’ liberalism, on the other hand, calls for a redistributive branch of 
government that adjusts property rights “to prevent concentrations of power detrimental to the 
fair value of political liberty and fair equality of opportunity.”230 Rawls also rejects ‘welfare state 
capitalism’ because it ‘permits very large inequalities in the ownership of real property 
(productive assets and natural resources) so that the controls of the economy and much of the 
political life rests in a few hands.” Finally, Rawl’s property owning democracy allows private 
property but only so that it operates by dispersing “the ownership of wealth and capital, and thus 
to prevent a small part of society from controlling the economy and, indirectly, political life as 
well.”231 Contra Rawls, who believes that effective markets can be separated from “private 
ownership in the means of production,”232 Gaus writes “[t]here has never been a political order 
characterized by deep respect for personal freedom that was not based on a market order with 
widespread private ownership in the means of production.”233 As Gaus writes, “the basic liberties 
of the person and civil rights themselves ground a social and economic order based on extensive 
rights of ownership.” To that extent, “political orders based on the protection of property rights 
and economic freedom provide the only known basis of a regime that effectively protects the 
basic rights of persons. This is a great political value, and all reasonable members of the public 
must acknowledge it.”234 Gaus’ claims are borne out, for example, in the market economies that 
grew out of the Eastern European former socialist bloc.  
As Duncan Kennedy has shown in his article on Hungary’s efforts to reprivatize socially 
owned housing after the fall of state socialism, reprivatization is desirable not only because it 
promotes Kennedy’s goals of solidarity and participation, but because it respects the property 
rights of the current occupants of public housing, it is voluntary, it respects freedom of contract 
and private property rights, it maximizes profit, and the state’s participation would be minimal.235   
Because the Rawlsian deliberators would be aware of this data, they would embrace a 
constitutional property right and reject Rawls’ own assessment of the role of the state in both 
restricting and redistributing private property.  In other words, in addition to the non-ideal 
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operators in Putterman’s examples, even hypothetical Rawlsian deliberators avoid large-scale 
democratic redistributions, despite having such power available to them through legal and 
democratic means.  
Part 4. Comparative Constitutional Property 
That being said, Buchanan and Gaus would recognize that Rawlsian deliberators and 
constitution-makers will be aware of fact that the constitutional treatment of property will vary 
among different historical patterns and cultural factors, and it would be remiss not to recognize 
that in some cases constitutional property provisions may need to be drafted in order to rectify 
prior and current injustices. For example, South Africa’s constitution attempts to redress racial 
discrimination in property ownership, limit compensation based on the state’s role as a past 
subsidizer of a property’s value when it is taken, and require courts to consider the use, history, 
and acquisition of property in question. The South African constitution, which was intended to 
squarely confront the gross and extensive housing shortages that resulted from apartheid,236 
expressly attempts to reject a racist and authoritative past which imposed a near-total legal barrier 
to blacks owning land before and during apartheid. Within a framework of social transformation 
and social justice, Section 25 of the constitution attempts to redress racial discrimination in 
property ownership, limit compensation based on the state’s role as a past subsidizer of a 
property’s value when it is taken, and requires courts to consider the use, history, and acquisition 
of the property in question. Section 25 “leaves no doubt that private property rights are subject to 
social needs for land redistribution, tenure reform, and restitution of land rights.”237 It seeks to 
repatriate properties that were unjustly taken during the apartheid regime by inquiring into the 
justice of the present owner’s title, and directs courts to examine not only whether the regime’s 
racist policies played a role in the acquisition, but also whether the regime’s infrastructure 
provided subsidies that resulted in “beneficial capital improvement of the property.”238  
In 1991, when apartheid ended and the debates over constitutional property began, whites 
constituted 14 percent of the population and owned 87 percent of land. 239 This disparity was the 
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result of the Land Acts of 1913 and 1936, which formed the basis of land allocation between 
black and white South Africans. The Acts provided “the basis on which blacks could be excluded 
not only from access to land, but also from its control.” When the Acts were eliminated and new 
policies were implemented, many white property owners were fearful that the value of their 
properties would be negatively impacted.240 Faced with the problem of both protecting and 
redistributing property, the government anticipated claims by dispossessed people who were now 
occupying land they previously lived on, and by other landless people “moving onto any land 
where they could make a home on which they could farm or where they could live within easy 
access to their work.”241 The country was also experiencing an extensive housing shortage.242 
The debate over inclusion of a constitutionalized property right was therefore a 
contentious one among the constitution-builders. Opponents of the right feared that it would 
freeze the unjust maldistribution of resources or frustrate land reform,243 and that “market and 
economic forces rather than…apartheid legislation and traditional forms of repression” would 
continue to oppress by ensuring racial imbalances in land ownership.244 Proponents of property 
owners feared redistribution without compensation.  It was finally agreed between the parties that 
“no positive right to property would be constitutionalized. Parties concurred that the inclusion of 
provisions in the Constitution prohibiting the arbitrary deprivation of property and providing for 
the expropriation of property in certain circumstances and subject to compensation, were perhaps 
more important safeguards and as such were adequate.”245  
Although property rights are not ‘constitutionalized’ in South Africa, the new constitution 
contained a detailed formula for compensation determinations, which is radically different than in 
the United States. Compensation in South Africa recognizes that property holders who benefitted 
from unjust state policies should not receive full fair market compensation for their properties in 
the event of expropriation. According to Matthew Chaskalson, the ‘just and equitable’ 
compensation contemplated by Section 25(c) of the new constitution 
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would accommodate the payment of less than market value in appropriate circumstances. 
In particular, the reference to the history of acquisition of land was designed to free a 
future government from having to pay full market value compensation to the 
beneficiaries of forced removals who had originally obtained their land at sub market 
prices or with the assistance of soft government loans.246 
  
This seeks to reduce the amount of compensation (to zero, perhaps) paid to expropriated 
landowners.  
In contrast to the property norms of the United States, which tend towards the moral 
prohibition against theft coupled with exclusion rights, Africans have a social norm that did not 
regard “wealth or property in the ordinary sense, and therefore did not form part of a person’s 
estate...land is not property, it is something you use for a time and then abandon.” “African land,” 
writes Caiger, “therefore traditionally formed part of the social obligations within the community 
and could not be transferred through succession,” although rights of access to land could be 
inherited depending on “population density, land shortages, and soil impoverishment.”247 White 
South Africans, on the other hand, saw land in much the same way as other European-based legal 
cultures, where land is “something owned, a right which can be asserted against the world at large 
and used at the exclusion of others.”248  
Constitutions can impact property in other ways. For example, the Zimbabwean 
constitution, which originally tried to protect white farmers with a property clause, was amended 
in 1990 to remove its property clause, leading to easier access of the state to land acquisition.249 
Specifically, the amendments removed the right to ‘prompt payment’ for expropriated lands, and 
now permit the National Assembly to determine the principles of assessment and compensation 
for land which cannot be challenged in a court of law through the use of judicial review.250  
One of the major differences between the United States and South African documents 
and the deeply political situations in which they were created involves the fact that the South 
African property reforms are primary intended to remedy two significant injustices that were 
present at the time of drafting: first, the repatriation of dispossessed black citizens with tribal, 
communal, and individual properties that were taken (or, more accurately, stolen) from them 
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under the jurisdiction of the Land Acts and subsequent apartheid regimes, and, second, the dire 
housing shortage. Repatriation and rectification for past injustices are not topics that are 
contemplated in American property law. However, there is nothing in the history of constitutional 
property in the United States to prevent the state from seeking to implement policies that achieve 
the same purposes as the South African constitution in terms of housing justice.   
The sole case that appears to address and authorize housing justice in the United States is 
Midkiff. Like all other takings cases, Midkiff required the payment of just compensation, and it is 
here that the constitutional regimes of the two countries diverge: South Africa’s property regime 
is structured to deny payments to undeserving owners, while the United States property trajectory 
is beholden to payments to the ‘oligopolists’ who are ‘made whole’ by the just compensation 
clause. The Midkiff court recognized the injustice of the property distribution, and agreed that the 
state was furthering a public use of the property by allowing tenants to force transfers of their 
apartments.  Had the state attempted to exercise its police power by forcing uncompensated 
transfers, there is little doubt that the transfer scheme would have been found unconstitutional, 
and the state would have had to either pay compensation or be enjoined from enforcing the 
statute.  However, with compensation, there is nothing in the jurisprudence that would prevent the 
Court from permitting legislation that uses eminent domain to provide housing to the homeless or 
to repatriate dispossessed communities. No specific constitutional property provisions are 
required to effectuate this kind of transfer. As Bender has shown, this is the only legitimate use of 
eminent domain based upon interpretation of the public use clause.  
With the understanding of the social and legislative history of the South African property 
statute in hand, what can property jurisprudes in the United States and other countries stand to 
learn from South Africa’s example and experience?  As Alexander makes clear, background legal 
institutions and culture play a central role in the ‘normative pull’ of constitutional property,251 and 
the background of racial injustice and apartheid certainly shaped the South African conception of 
property rights. This recognizes that background institutions and cultures of different countries 
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reflect different property law regimes as well as different social obligation norms, and it is 
unlikely that the causes and contingencies that give rise to one nation’s constitutional property 
law are ever fully replicated in another nation’s experiences and constitution-making.    
As leading South African property commentator Matthew Chaskalson observes, the 
South African and United States constitutions have very different points of origin, and they seek 
to accomplish different goals. Due to the effects of apartheid and the stated constitutional attempt 
to remedy them, South Africa recognizes the unjust provenance of many property claims and 
therefore does not purport to protect the title of existing owners; unlike the United States 
constitution, which historically and presently protects existing title, the South African constitution 
“drives a legislative programme of land restoration and rural restructuring.”252 Many of the same 
problems of racism and original appropriation exist in the U.S. land regime, particularly in 
regards to lands traditionally linked to Native American tribes. Indigenous people and their lands 
would benefit from stronger constitutional property rights, but a thorough discussion of the 
necessity of a South African-style constitution in these cases, and its specific attempt to rectify 
past injustice, must wait for a later time.   
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Conclusion 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau famously locates the root of all evil not in money, but in the private 
property invented by the first owner and acquiesced to by the first ‘simple’ nonowners:  
The first person who, having enclosed a plot of land, took it into his head to say this is 
mine and found people simple enough to believe him was the true founder of civil 
society. What crimes, wars, murders, what miseries and horrors would the human race 
have been spared, had some one pulled up the stakes or filled in the ditch and cried out to 
his fellow men: "Do not listen to this imposter. You are lost if you forget that the fruits of 
the earth belong to all and the earth to no one!”1 
 
As I hope to have shown, both the owners and the neighbors-to-be in Rousseau’s parable have 
very good reasons for establishing this institution and rejecting the stake-puller’s admonitions. 
However, the connection drawn by the stake-puller between private property and the evils of civil 
society—to which I will add inequality and oppression—may not be only hortatory, in which case 
the institution of private property ought to be held to answer for its role in perpetuating inequality 
and oppression.   
 The issue here is whether property regulations, including takings and the exercise of the 
police power, can rectify these problems—many of which are caused by factors other than this 
particular institution—whether they cause them. I have already shown that the use of eminent 
domain disproportionally impacts minorities. Other state action is also suspect. For example, 
redlining is the joint effort between private property owners and political authorities to deny 
African-Americans the opportunity to rent or purchase properties in designated areas. The kind of 
strong private property rights argued for in this work might appear to perpetuate this kind of 
discrimination. In fact, the opposite is true. For example, Ta-Nehisi Coates makes the argument 
for the payment of reparations to victims of state-sponsored redlining who were denied the equal 
protection of the law when they applied for Federally subsidized mortgage insurance through the 
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Federal Housing Administration.2   The FHA designated white neighborhoods as eligible for 
insured mortgages, and black neighborhoods, outlined in red on the maps used by loan officers, as 
ineligible. As a result, potential African American homeowners were denied the opportunity to 
own property. This was not, however, the sole province of the private interests of racist real estate 
agents. Rather, Coates writes, “the federal government concurred.” In fact, “[i]t was the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation, not a private trade association, that pioneered the practice of 
redlining, selectively granting loans and insisting that any property it insured be covered by a 
restrictive covenant—a clause in the deed forbidding the sale of the property to anyone other than 
whites.”3 
 The provision of reparations is a hotly contested topic, in part because the amount of 
reparations is difficult to determine and different persons have different claims based on 
individual experiences. But Coates shows that reparations in these specific cases are particularly 
just because the persons who were denied the equal right to own private property are readily 
identifiable through the documentary evidence: the loan applications, records of interviews, and 
the government’s own redlining maps.4 For Coates, reparations in housing due to redlining are 
meant to compensate not for general damages to all African Americans, but for “specific damage 
to black people because they were black” when they attempted to buy property.  In the case of 
redlining,  
we have the maps. We know exactly where the communities are that were damaged. We 
have census report. We know who lived there. In cases of, for instance, the GI Bill 
or FHA loans that black people were not allowed to give, we have folks who could go 
before a claims office and say, ‘I tried to do this. This was denied to me.’ So we don’t 
have a problem of knowing where folks live. We don’t have a problem knowing what 
communities were affected. I would target those communities for investment and target 
those specific people, you know, given that they could prove what happened to them, for 
investment. That’s a very specific—that’s a limited case of reparations, but it’s what I 
focused on in terms of housing.5  
 
Coates recognizes the value of private property, and describes how the state played a key role in 
preventing African Americans from taking part in the institution. Justice requires the rectification 
of this wrongful denial of the opportunity to own private property, and the kind of strong property 
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right I advocate for here includes a strong right against the state when it actively participates in 
preventing persons from owning private property, as it did in the situations Coates describes.   
The constitutional right to private property I am proposing protects property that is 
capable of containing private interests, and to the extent that property is incapable of containing 
those interests, it cannot enjoy constitutional protection.  This, again, protects one type of 
property (such as the protection of the home against eminent domain) but may also protect a wide 
variety of other properties that are not commonly associated with privacy. In addition to 
protecting homes, a private property right that is protected by the strict scrutiny standard of 
review would probably prohibit the criminalization of drugs, permit all Lyft, Uber, or individual 
vehicle-for-hire services by denying state-granted livery (or taxi) monopolies, forbid the 
prohibition of short term leases such as those used by AirBnB proprietors and customers, prohibit 
the regulation of most kinds of personal weapons including guns, outlaw most takings, and, very 
importantly, prevent civil forfeiture of property.  
If there is a fundamental right to property that is predicated on privacy concerns, the 
exercise of eminent domain as well as the provision of criminal punishment for possession of 
protected property violates the right. If the property is a body, home, or personal property—sites 
which are primarily private and important for the development of personhood, autonomy, and 
freedom—then eminent domain is unjustified and should be constitutionally prohibited in these 
cases unless the state’s expropriative measure can pass strict scrutiny. Because the privacy 
interest diminishes from here, there are fewer opportunities for the development of personhood 
and autonomy, and less restrictions on the freedom-granting aspects of ownership the further one 
moves away from the home and body. The extreme end of the spectrum would disclaim both 
privacy and property claims in natural resources, and the use of eminent domain to divest private 
owners would not be presumptively unjust because of the unlikelihood that private ownership of 
these materials implicates privacy concerns or facilitates the development of personhood or the 
maximization of freedom. The middle ground between homes and natural resources would 
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encompass various levels of entrepreneurship, business investment properties, closely-held 
corporations, and other concerns which reflect the private intentions and plans of their proprietors 
and demand extensive property rights protections on those bases.  
However, because many of these endeavors necessarily involve commercial transactions 
with the public, their protection is less than that enjoyed by the privacies inherent in the home or 
body. The extent to which owners do not or cannot make privacy claims about their property is 
the extent that constitutional private property claims cannot be made about that property. In other 
words, if there is nothing private about an owner’s property, then there is no reason to respect 
their privacy rights in the property, and other interests (those of the community or nonowners) 
can make claims about the use of the property without violating the owner’s rights. If property is 
not private, then its owner’s right to exclude (and the duty of nonowners’ not to interfere) are 
reduced in favor of eminent domain type proceedings or regulations that recognize this reduced 
right to exclude. This reduced ability to claim privacy protections is mostly due to the actions of 
owners themselves, who reduce their privacy or personhood interests in places and things in order 
to benefit or profit from using them in commerce, which results in the kind of quasi public 
property owned by providers of common carriers. If owners choose to use private property as 
quasi-public property, which is presumptively open to all, then they have consented to regulation 
by withdrawing their privacy interest in their property.  
Too much privacy disregards public life, 6  while openness, or a lack of privacy, 
encourages solidarity.  But privacy is not apolitical or detrimental to the political, and privacy 
claims, in fact, also help structure social and political life. A concern for privacy should therefore 
entail a concern for the private aspects of private property which, I have argued, promote the 
development of personhood through the enjoyment and exercise of liberty against the “adverse 
forces” mentioned by Bachelard in the introduction.  
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1 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, Part Two. 
 
2 Ta-Nehisi Coates, “The Case for Reparations,” The Atlantic (June, 2014) 
(http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631; accessed January 
16, 2017).  
 
3 Ibid. 
 
4 Ta-Nehisi Coates “Interview: Ta-Nehisi Coates Is Voting for Bernie Sanders Despite the Senator's 
Opposition to Reparations,” Democracy Now 
(https://www.democracynow.org/2016/2/10/ta_nehisi_coates_is_voting_for; accessed January 16, 2017).  
 
5 Ibid. 
 
6 Anita Allen, Why Privacy Isn’t Everything (Lanham: Rowan and Littlefield, 2003), 6. 
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